Greece and Crete 1941 (The Second World War, 1939-1945. A Popular Military History)

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{ IBRARY
UNIV:RSITY OF
CALIFORNIA
SANTA CRUZ

GREECE
AND CRETE
1941

This volume has been written at the request of
H.M. Government as one of a series designed to
furnish the general reader with a short military
history of the Second World War 1939-45, pen-
ding the publication of the Official Histories. The
author has been given access to official documents
and sources of information: for the presentation
of material, for the statements made, and for
the opinions expressed, he alone is responsible.

Other Volumes in this Series:
ARMS AND THE MEN
THE CAMPAIGN IN ITALY
NORWAY—THE COMMANDOS—DIEPPE

in preparation or projected:
THE CAMPAIGNS IN AFRICA

IRAQ—SYRIA—PERSIA—MADAGASCAR—
THE DODECANESE

N.W. EUROPE, 1944-45
THE FAR EAST, 1941-45

THE SECOND WORLD WAR, 1939-1945

A POPULAR MILITARY HISTORY BY VARIOUS AUTHORS
IN EIGHT VOLUMES

GREECE
AND CRETE
1941

BY
CHRISTOPHER BUCKLEY

LONDON
HER MAJESTY’S STATIONERY OFFICE
1952

First published 1952

Crown Copyright Reserved
LONDON : PUBLISHED BY HER MAJESTY’S STATIONERY OFFICE
To be purchased directly from H.M. Stationery Office at the following addresses:
423 Oxford Street, London, W.1; York House, Kingsway, London, W.C.2;-
P.O. Box 569 London, S.E.1; 13a Castle Street, Edinburgh, 2 ; 39 King Street,

Manchester, 2; 2 Edinund Street, Birmingham, 3; 1 St. Andrew’s Crescent,
Cardiff ; Tower Lane, Bristol, 1; 80 Chichester Street, Belfast ;

or through any bookseller.
Price 12s. 6d. 1952 8.0. Code No. 63-111-1-3*

Printed in Great Britain under the authority of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office
at The Curwen Press Ltd., London, E.13

Foreword

THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE and the Battle for Crete, 1941, form
a further contribution to this series by the late Christopher Buckley.
The author and the publisher are very greatly indebted to the official
historians of Australia and New Zealand who devoted much time
and trouble to a critical reading of the narrative and supplying
additional information ; also to Lord Freyberg for his valuable notes
and suggestions.

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Contents

THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

Chapter I. The War Spreads Eastward . . : : _

II. Swastika over the Balkans. , : : 11

III. British Troopsin Greece. ; : . 29

IV. Germany Strikes . : ‘ : : ‘ 37

V. The Western Flank . ; : : : 49

VI. The Olympus Position. . . . . 65

VII. Retreat to Thermopylae ‘ : : d 79

VIII. Evacuation . : ; . , : . 104

Epilogue : . es . . : : . 138
THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

Chapter I. ThelIsland . : : , ‘ : . 145

II. The First Day. . : ‘ ; . 173

III. Royal Escape : : ‘ : : . ii

IV. The Days of Decision . : : : . 217

V. Evacuation . ; E : . ; . 261

VI. Conclusions . ‘ ; : : . . 291

General Index. ; i : F , F . 305

Index to Formations and Units : ; : 2 . 309

vii

bi a a a da

MAPS

All heights shown are in metres

Greece: The Lower Aliakmon and the Vardar Plain
Greece: The Western Flank

Greece: The Olympus Position .

Greece: Tempe-Elasson

Greece: Thermopylae-Brallos

Greece: The Road to the Beaches

Greece: The Beaches in the Peloponnesus_ .
: General Map.

: Maleme :

: The ‘Prison Valley’ .

: Canea-Suda .

: Retimo .

: Heraklion

: The Road to Sphakia

: Balkans—Mediterranean, North

: Balkans—Mediterranean, South.

ILLUSTRATIONS

Between pages British Troops Arriving at Piraeus

72-3

Greek Welcome
A British Gun Passing Through Lamia
New Zealand in Greece

PAGE
42
48
68
88

110
118
130
148
180
190
196
200
204
266
front
back

Transport Old and New on a Greek Mountain Road

Mount Olympus
The Pass at Thermopylae

On the Way to the Beaches: Australian Interlude

Between pages Suda Bay under Attack

232-3

Cretan Countryside

The King of the Hellenes and 2nd-Lieut. Ryan
A German Troop-Carrier

General Freyberg

Parachutes at Heraklion

Cretan Air-Raid Refuge near the Beach
Trophies from Crete

vill

THE CAMPAIGN
IN GREECE

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CHAPTER I

The War Spreads Eastward

m1 le
Aims of the Axis Powers

THE fall of France and the declaration of war by Italy in June 1940
marked the beginning of a new phase of the struggle. With the British
armies seriously weakened by the loss of the campaign in North-
West Europe, the British Commonwealth and Empire faced the might
of Germany and Italy, and continued to do so for a whole year, alone
without ally.

There were, at first, two major theatres of operations. One was the
sky over south-eastern England where the Battle of Britain was fought
and won during the late summer and autumn; the other was the
eastern Mediterranean and the Balkan peninsula. Throughout
the autumn and winter Germany was in the process of conquering the
Balkans by infiltration. German troops passed through Hungary.
They took over control in Rumania in October, having previously
retroceded half the province of Transylvania to Hungary. And during
the winter signs were not wanting that they were preparing to descend
upon Bulgaria and that Bulgaria was not in the least likely to offer
them any opposition.

That had been the direction of the German land drive after the
fall of France; and to many observers—the present writer included—
it seemed that Hitler was about to pursue the traditional Drang nach
Osten, that drive to the East which seemed to offer such rich prizes—
the control of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles; Mosul and the
Persian oil-fields ; the Suez Canal; ultimately perhaps even India.

Italian participation in the war seemed to point the way towards
this strategy still more strongly. If Germany were to drive through
Turkey to the Persian Gulf or the Suez Canal or both, the natural
corollary was for Italy to thrust from Libya, the whole forming one

3

4 - THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

gigantic pincer movement to eliminate the British forces in the
Middle East, which, failing a direct attack upon the British Isles or
their reduction by slow strangulation, furnished the best chances of
dealing an early decisive blow against the one Power still in the field
against them.

This was logical enough; and we know now that Germany’s
venture through the Balkans to the eastern Mediterranean caused the
postponement of the invasion of Russia for a full four weeks. The
decision was taken by the Fiihrer at a conference held in Berlin on
March 27th, 1941, when it was announced that Yugoslavia must be
liquidated. The attack on Greece was to be carried out simultaneously.
Later, the objective of these operations was described as ‘that of
driving the British from the Balkans and laying the foundation for
_ German air operations in the eastern part of the Mediterranean’.

Nevertheless, the moves into the Balkans, which were initiated by
Germany in the autumn, winter and spring of 1940-1 may be re-
garded as a buttressing of her southern flank for the forthcoming
campaign into Russia as well as preliminary operations against our
forces in the Middle East. Germany needed Rumania as a base and
jumping-off ground for the attack upon Russia in the following year,
and she needed control of Rumanian oil. It was realized that Bulgaria
and Yugoslavia must be absorbed into the German system. Thus the
swoop of the German forces upon ill-equipped, unready Yugoslavia ;
the relentless drive down through the Greek passes; the bold and
hazardous airborne invasion of Crete—these might be viewed as part
of a strategically defensive operation to neutralize Turkey, and to
prevent the possibility of a British diversion northwards from bases
in Greece, whence British bombers might operate against the oil wells
of Ploésti in Rumania.

Probably Hitler, and a fortiori the General Staff, who had still less
liking for divergent operations, hoped that such action would involve
the minimum dispersal of force and would take the minimum time to
accomplish. When Mussolini’s ineptitude did involve a considerable
German commitment both against Greece and Yugoslavia, Hitler
and the General Staff were certainly anxious to finish as soon as
possible the spring campaign in south-eastern Europe prior to the
great offensive against Russia. Moreover, a swift and easy success in
the Balkan countries would hasten the day for the opening of the
aforesaid German air operations in the eastern Mediterranean.

Actually, as will be seen later, the course of events was to lead to
German intervention in Africa.

But in any study of the Balkan campaign of 1941, and especially
of the motives that conditioned the despatch of a British force to

THE WAR SPREADS EASTWARD 5

Greece, it is as well to see it as it must have appeared to us at the
time. Though evidence was building up through the months to suggest
the German intention of attacking Russia, it was not sufficiently sure-
founded to act as a basis for British strategy. The direction of the
forthcoming Axis advance was assumed to be towards the south-east,
with Hitler and Mussolini pursuing a closely co-ordinated plan for
the dismemberment of the British Empire and the destruction of
Britain.

Under these circumstances, and following the decision to abandon
the proposed ‘Operation Sea Lion’ (the code name for the invasion
of Britain) which seems to have been taken as early as September
19th,! the centre of gravity of the war began to shift eastward from
the English Channel to the vast area between the Danube and the
Nile.

Germany enjoyed the prestige of continuous victory, the advantage
of very much shorter lines of communication and the possibility of
deploying her numerous magnificently equipped and battle-trained
divisions against us; Italy was in a position to strike directly across
the desert into Egypt or, from her advanced base in Albania, into
Greece or Yugoslavia. Between them the two Powers appeared to
have all the cards in their hands. The tide of the Axis advance across
the Balkan peninsula was sweeping on, by means of conquest
(Albania), military infiltration and disintegration (Rumania) and
economic penetration and encirclement (Hungary and—as it seemed
—Yugoslavia).

For months Britain could not hope to do more than play a waiting
game, holding off the converging attack upon Suez—if it should
come—until such time as sufficient reinforcements of men and
material should have arrived in the Middle East to enable her first to
safeguard the immediate Canal zone and then to take the offensive.
Therefore the best that could be hoped for fully twelve months would
be a series of ‘delaying actions’ on our part. Wherever there seemed
some chance of temporarily staying the onset, the meagre British
resources must be disposed—to parry here, to snatch advantage from
an unguarded move there, to retard, even though it could not prevent,
a débdcle elsewhere. That was the strategy planned by the Chiefs of
Staff and executed by Wavell during those twelve months when we
stood alone in face of the Axis Powers.

1 See Peter de Mendelssohn, The Nuremberg Documents, p. 217.

6 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE
om [2 ]«

Italy Attacks

For Mussolini the Greek campaign represented aggression along
the line of least resistance. By declaring war in June like one who
buys on a rising market, he had hoped to secure easy profit, despite
the fact that Italy was actually unready for war. Intervention in Spain
had been a costly and exhausting undertaking. The armed services
needed re-equipment with modern material, yet she could not hope
to do this from her own resources. Her vulnerable position in the
Mediterranean, so long as the British fleet remained in being in that
sea, predisposed her to neutrality. But the opportunity seemed too
good to miss. France was beaten to her knees, and good Fascists
could not forget that it was only a matter of months since they had
been clamouring for Tunis, Corsica, Savoy, Nice and Jibuti. Now it
seemed that they might be secured with little effort. Most of Europe
at that date would have endorsed Weygand’s view that within three
weeks England would have her neck wrung like a chicken. And when
the three weeks came to an end and England still stood erect, most of
Europe still thought that there might be peace by September; so
Mussolini was able to reflect that there might be time after all for a
victory campaign.

On the Alpine frontier the Italians had contributed little to the
defeat of France. Malta, which many had believed would rapidly
become untenable for the British, had been repeatedly raided from
the air—at great cost to the attackers and very little to the defence.
The Italian forces had hitherto had all the worst of the skirmishing
on the frontier between Libya and Egypt. Their navy shunned a trial
of strength in the eastern Mediterranean. Small penetrations across
the Kenya and Sudan borders and the occupation of a number of
frontier posts were a poor gesture on the part of the East African
army which could at any one of these points have commanded a ten-
fold or twentyfold superiority in manpower. Mussolini might speak
in florid terms at the opening of August of the forthcoming develop-
ment of an all-out offensive against the British Empire in Africa to
synchronize with the German air attack upon England, but the
labour of the Fascist mountain produced only the ridiculus mus of
the over-running of British Somaliland.

It is not surprising that in seeking easy triumphs and bloodless
victories Mussolini’s eye should have turned upon Greece. Of all the
neighbours to whom he had issued his guarantee in June, Greece
appeared the weakest, seemed to present the easiest prey. Fascismo

THE WAR SPREADS EASTWARD 7

had long conducted a vendetta against its small neighbour on the
further side of the Ionian Sea, and after Albania was annexed in the
spring of 1939, Italian forces could be launched in a direct invasion
of Greek territory.

On August 4th, General Metaxas, the Greek Dictator, had cele-
brated the fourth anniversary of his assumption of power—and the
occasion had been signalized by congratulatory messages from
the German and Italian Governments, but not, be it observed, from the
British or American. The régime in Greece was dictatorial. It had
copied many of the characteristics of the Fascist and Nazi models. It
commanded some respect but no affection from the nation. Not only
was it unpopular with the Venizelist (Liberal and Anglophile) party,
but also with the Royalists. For these reasons Mussolini, with a mis-
judgment of the Greek character and Greek patriotism that was to
prove disastrous to Italian arms, probably assumed that there would
be little support for the régime in the event of an Italian attack.

On August 15th the Greek light cruiser Helle was sunk by torpedo
at her anchorage off the island of Tenos. When fragments of the
torpedo were recovered they were found to be of Italian origin. The
Greek Government studiously refrained from publishing the facts,
the torpedo being described as coming from a submarine of ‘ unknown
origin’, though the truth was well known throughout the country.
The attack upon the Helle had been made by Italy to test Greek
reactions, and quite the wrong deduction was drawn from the official
silence. It was assumed that the Greek Government was silent through
fear and therefore was unlikely to offer more than token resistance in
the face of invasion. Actually the outrage provided the occasion for
a closing of the ranks within the country.

The torpedoing of the Helle was not the only, nor indeed the first
provocation which Greece had to endure from Italy during the period
August-October 1940. Frontier ‘incidents’, so familiar a cause or
result of friction between Balkan states, grew in number; the Albanian
Press, inspired and encouraged by Italy, voiced many a grievance
against the Greek Government and people.

Metaxas stood his ground against Italian provocation. He notified
the Italian Ambassador that force would be met with force in the
event of any military action being taken against Greece. The bold-
ness of this decision, made in the very nadir of the fortunes of anti-
Axis resistance, should never be forgotten. Greece at that moment
was quite unready to face attack. Her armed forces were unmobilized,
inadequate and hopelessly under-equipped even by Italian standards.
France had collapsed. Russia was still in close alliance with Germany.
Britain was fighting for sheer existence against the great air attacks

8 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

which were to have been the preliminary to invasion, and it appeared
unlikely that she could provide even token support to implement her
guarantee of help against aggression given in April 1939.

Hitler gave no encouragement to his junior partner; which may
explain why Mussolini held his hand for a time, continuing to rein-
force his garrisons in Albania and trusting to a war of nerves to do
nine-tenths of his work for him.

With October tension grew greater in Greece. Early in the month
an Italian aircraft flying over Greek territory dropped three bombs
between Thebes and Levadia, but the incident was hushed-up by the
Greek censorship, as the Government was, very sensibly, striving to
avoid any action that might be interpreted as ‘provocation’ of the
Fascist Power. The Greeks, however, who had been quite unprepared
in August, were now disposing their scanty resources to the best of
their ability. The army, partially mobilized, was awaiting attack on
the Albanian frontier. Metaxas told his Cabinet that the troops would
be kept under arms until the threat to Greek independence was
definitely past, though the cost of this continued state of semi-
mobilization was appalling, and he could not begin to consider how
it was to be met.

With winter approaching, the prospects of immediate aggression
seemed to decline. Italy, indeed, might have been well advised to have
delayed her offensive until the spring of 1941; but Mussolini does not
seem to have regarded the Greek campaign asa serious military under-
taking. If he envisaged a triumphant military parade of probably not
more than a week’s duration, it was immaterial to him at what time
of year it might start. Italian forces had occupied British Somaliland ;
they had penetrated into Kenya and the Sudan; Graziani had gone
forward nearly a hundred miles into Egypt; nowhere had the Italian
troops as yet withdrawn. And so it was unthinkable that Greece
should provide any serious opposition.

On Monday, October 29th at 3 a.m., General Metaxas was handed
an ultimatum by Count Grazzi, Italian Minister in Athens. This
ultimatum accused the Greek Government of having weighted its
neutrality heavily in favour of England, of having allowed the British
fleet to make use of its territorial waters, of having facilitated the re-
fuelling of British aircraft and of having allowed a British Intelligence
Service to establish itself in the Greek islands: the Greek Govern-
ment was further accused of allowing Greek territory to be
‘transformed into a base for warlike operations against Italy’, Italy
therefore demanded the right of immediate occupation of certain un-
specified strategic points in Greece for the duration of the war against
England. It asserted that this was a measure of purely defensive

THE WAR SPREADS EASTWARD 9

character and that it would not be in any way prejudicial to Greek
sovereignty over these territories. Greek troops were required not to
impede the movements of the Italian forces.

General Metaxas promptly refused these demands. War was in-
evitable. With speed and unanimity the Greek nation responded to
the mobilization summons.

It seems fairly clear that the Italian ultimatum was not meant to
be accepted. Even before the close of the brief period allowed for
acceptance or rejection Italian troops were moving forward in the
frontier districts. Documents later discovered showed that every
detail of the attack had been prepared. If the ultimatum had been
accepted Italian troops would, of course, have moved forward to
assume occupation of the unspecified districts of Greece in the
interests of Italian security; but one can be safe in supposing that
Mussolini preferred that the Greeks should put up at least some
show of resistance. His prestige needed some indisputable victories to
balance the sweep of Napoleonic triumphs of Nazi Germany.

The world was prepared to see Greece fall an easy victim of aggres-
sion. How could the courage and resolution of the Greek dictator and
the spirit of the Greek people prevail over the Italian preponderance
of force? Despite her commitments in Africa, Italy had massed upon
the Albanian frontier troops which outnumbered the Greek defenders
by nearly four to one. Possessing no tanks themselves and very few
aircraft, the Greeks were ill-equipped to resist Italian armour or
Italian attacks from the air. And yet the unexpected happened.
Heroic Greek endeavour brought a triumph of Greek arms.

The principal Italian thrust was delivered in the Pindus towards
Yanina and made some progress at first ; but the Greeks proved them-
selves superior in the tactics of mountain warfare so that the invaders
were soon driven back and pursued beyond the frontier. Further
north the Greeks checked Italian attempts to advance, and then
passed to the offensive, crossing the Albanian frontier on October
31st. Soon they were threatening Koritsa. In Epirus, where the open
ground favoured the employment of mechanized forces, the Italians
reached and crossed the river Kalamas, but the failures further north
had their repercussions and a general retreat set in. By November
25th Greek soil was clear of the invader and a Greek counter-offensive
was in progress.

This effort was crowned with remarkable success, a change of
Italian commanders and the arrival of considerable Italian reinforce-
ments having little effect. After the capture of Koritsa, the largest
town in Albania, Pogradec on Lake Ohridsko fell to the Greeks, and
only the onset of winter stayed further advance in the mountains.

10 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

Near the coast Argyrokastron was captured on December 8th, Himare
on the 24th, and Kelcyre on January 10th, 1941; but the port of
Valona remained in Italian hands.

After weeks of inconclusive winter warfare the Italians, under
another new commander, struck again with considerable forces. This
offensive was pressed with something like desperation but only re-
sulted in heavy losses: the Greek defensive victory near Tepelene in
March 1941 meant that Italy’s last attempt to prevail by force of arms
had collapsed. For she did not try again.

Yet, although the prowess of the Greek Army was fitly rewarded
by success, the efforts of the troops had left them overstrained and
their numbers sadly thinned as a result of the hardships of the winter
campaign. Re-equipment was a vital need, for all resources, military
and civilian, had been used without stint to repel the invader. The
whole Greek people sorely needed a period of recuperation, instead
of which they were soon to be subjected to a much greater ordeal
which ended in disaster.

It is now time to turn to the diplomatic developments of the winter
of 1940-1, months which saw the small beginnings of Britain’s
assistance to her Greek ally and brought Germany to the point when
she would intervene.

CHAPTER II

Swastika over the Balkans

om 1. Jee

British Aid to Greece?

THE Italian attack on Greece called for the British assistance against
aggression guaranteed in April 1939; but the occasion was hardly
propitious. Britain’s exiguous land and air forces were urgently
required for defence of the mother country against the most formid-
able threat of invasion that we had ever known. What could be
spared for service elsewhere was required with scarcely less urgency
for the defence of our position in the Middle East, based on-the Nile
and the Suez Canal and now much weakened by the defection of
France, whose co-operation had of course been assumed at the time
that the guarantee was given. The Middle East was regarded as the
lynch-pin of the whole Empire; if that went, the war could be lost
almost as surely as if Britain herself were to be invaded.

With France out of the war it became quite clear that, in view of
our vital defence commitments elsewhere and our extremely limited
resources, there could be no question of taking the initiative in ex-
tending our protection to Greece, though the guarantee remained
valid and Greece, unlike Rumania, took no steps to repudiate it or to
seek protection elsewhere. It was to be hoped—and it was little more
than a pious hope—that with increasing strength we should be able
progressively to extend our help to Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia,
all of whom were still nominally linked together by the Balkan
Entente and by a common interest in opposing the further expansion
of the Axis Empires.

The first definite plan for coming to the help of Greece in case of
need appears to date from May 1940, before Italy came into the War
and before France was defeated. The Middle East Command had then
been ordered to prepare an expedition which, with the consent of the

11

12 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

Greek Government already secured, would occupy the islands of
Crete and Milos, in the event of Italy attacking Greek territory.
Originally this was intended to be a Franco-British expedition, but
the orders were confirmed in June, the Royal Navy being of opinion
that Suda Bay, on the north coast of Crete, would form a valuable
re-fuelling base for light craft. For the time being, however, it was
our policy to keep out of Crete rather than provide Italy with an
excuse for aggressive action. And when, early in August, the first
clear signs of Mussolini’s hostile intentions towards Greece became
apparent General Wavell, then in London, reported to a meeting of
the Chiefs of Staff that there was not so much as a single brigade
available for the garrisoning of Crete in the event of an Italian attack
on the mainland of Greece. Nor did it seem possible at that stage that
we could provide even the most modest air assistance or anti-aircraft
defence for the island.

By October, things were a little better. Graziani had stopped short
at Sidi Barrani in his advance towards the Delta, and the Duke of
Aosta was still trifling on the frontiers of Kenya and the Sudan. It
was decided that it would now be possible to contemplate the occupa-
tion of Crete in the event of Italian aggression. With the consent of
the Greek Government, at the end of the month a small British force
was landed in Crete and became responsible for the defence of the
island. Even so, we were still incapable of any considerable contribu-
tion to the Greek resistance, although Mr. Churchill’s speech in the
House of Commons, announced that General Metaxas had requested
from Sir Michael Palairet, British Minister in Athens, such aid as we
could give in accordance with our guarantee. It must be remembered
that what resources were available in the relative proximity of Egypt
were being carefully husbanded for a counterstroke against Graziani
with the object of driving the Italian force from Egypt before it could
resume its advance from Sidi Barrani.

Fortunately the requests of General Metaxas were not excessive.
He was a realist, and he was perfectly well aware how little we our-
selves possessed. Moreover, he knew that the appearance of any
significant British force in Greece might be the signal for Germany to
come to the assistance of her Fascist partner.

Accordingly, Metaxas limited his requirements to an appeal for
the naval protection of Corfu, air protection for Athens and general
assistance in terms of finance and supply. The British fleet was
already, to all intents and purposes, in control of the eastern Mediter-
ranean ; it was therefore improbable that any immediate danger was
to be feared from the Italians at sea. The most urgent need was, con-
sequently, for air support on the most immediate and the fullest scale

SWASTIKA OVER THE BALKANS 13

possible. The Italians were in a position to employ over five hundred
operational bombers and fighters; the Greeks had available a first-
line strength of some 26 bombers and 28 fighters, and perhaps half
as much again in terms of obsolete aircraft of quite negligible value
under modern conditions.

. Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore, A.O.C.-in-C. Middle
East, here acted on his own responsibility. To provide Greece with
air assistance he disregarded our commitments in the Western Desert
and ordered squadrons from Africa to Greece, relying upon rein-
forcements from the United Kingdom to fill their places. This course
gained the entire approval of the Prime Minister who cabled ‘You
have taken a very bold and wise decision’ and promised reinforce-
ment as soon as possible.

Accordingly, No. 30 Squadron of Blenheims began to arrive as
early as November 3rd, six days after the beginning of the Italian
campaign. It was followed by No. 211 Squadron of Blenheims, No. 84
Squadron of Blenheims, No. 80 Squadron of Gladiators and No. 70
Squadron of Wellingtons; and on November 6th Air-Commodore
J. H. D’Albiac arrived in Athens to assume command.

Two points of major importance arose in the first conference
which D’Albiac held that same evening with the Greek Prime
Minister and Greek Commander-in-Chief. The first referred to the
general air strategy to be employed by the British forces; the second
related to the selection of airfields from which they were to operate,
and the preparation of new ones. On the first issue the British com-
mander had his way; on the second the Greeks were able to impose
their views—with far-reaching consequences to the development of
the campaign.

Briefly, D’Albiac found the utmost pressure brought to bear upon
him to employ his air force in direct and close support of the land
forces. The Greek air force, which was under the control of the
General Staff, was employed in this manner; the German air force,
which had achieved such striking victories in Poland, Norway and
the Low Countries had operated with great success during those
campaigns in the closest co-ordination with the army. Such methods
appeared to provide the pattern for air victory, and, which was a
matter of importance to the Greek leaders, they would be of very
great value in maintaining the morale of the Greek troops, since
soldiers are always heartened by the spectacle of friendly aircraft
immediately overhead.

D’Albiac pointed out that his small force of bombers could be best
employed in striking at the enemy’s disembarkation ports in Albania
and at certain important centres of communication, and that the

14 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

Italian advance could be more easily retarded by these means than
by head-on attacks under unfavourable conditions upon advancing
troops. In the end he was successful in carrying his point, and during
the weeks that followed the maximum air effort was employed against
the ports of Valona and Durazzo by which reinforcements and
supplies were fed into Albania. Nevertheless, the British policy of
long-term strategic bombing, still far from the peak of its efficiency,
was not one that commended itself to the Greek military mind.

On the matter of airfields D’Albiac was less successful, for the
question involved issues of diplomacy right outside the range of air
strategy. Apart from the two at Elevsis and Tatoi (Menidi), both in
the Athens area, the best airfields lie in the Macedonian plain around
Salonika ; and though much of the ground is liable to be water-logged in
winter, the Larissa region would naturally be convenient for the
concentration of our bombers engaged in operations over the
Albanian and Italian ports.

But at this point the shadow of Germany—as yet a cloud no larger ~
than a diplomat’s hand—looms over the scene. Hitherto Germany
has acted with the utmost correctness towards Greece. The Italian
attack had been undertaken on Mussolini’s own initiative. Hitler was
definitely opposed to such action in October 1940; eventually he
would incorporate Greece in the ‘New Order’, but the time was not
yet. The German Government pointedly refrained from withdrawing
its Minister from Athens or counselling German subjects to leave
‘Greece. Everything was done to create the impression that in the
German view the quarrel was one which concerned only Italy and
Greece. General Metaxas had even been told privately by the German
Minister in Athens that Germany would not be disposed to regard
the presence of a small British air increment as a casus belli provided
that it was not permitted the use of airfields in northern Greece. We
may assume that Hitler was genuinely nervous about the possibility
of bombing attacks on the Ploésti oil installations, and perhaps also
of the political repercussions that might result.

Consequently, D’Albiac found himself met with a firm refusal
when he applied for the use of air bases in the neighbourhood of
Salonika. Such a concession would provoke Germany, and to pre-
vent Germany from intervening in the Greek war Metaxas was quite
prepared to ban the Royal Air Force from bases in northern Greece.

It is difficult not to sympathize with the point of view of the Greek
ruler. Greece seemed to have the measure of her Italian adversary,
but a clash with Germany promised almost certain destruction. The
fallacy lay in supposing that Germany could afford to allow her ally
‘to be beaten in the field. She must, inevitably, come to the rescue.

SWASTIKA OVER THE BALKANS 15

General Wavell had drawn attention to this as early as November
16th when commenting upon an appreciation of the situation sub-
mitted by his Deputy Director of Military Intelligence. He wrote:
*I am sure Germany cannot afford to see Italy defeated or even held,
and must intervene.’

In fact, Hitler had just begun to plan for this purpose. Only four
days earlier he had issued an order to the General Staff to prepare
for the invasion of Greek Thrace on the basis of a twelve-divisional
operation. At the same time he was toying with the idea of sending
a mountain division to help Mussolini out of his difficulties in
Albania. Badoglio came up to meet Field-Marshal Keitel at Inns-
bruck a day or two later, and between them the first Biuepant for
German intervention was prepared.

Nevertheless, Hitler saw that no intervention would be practicable
before the spring. His troops had entered Rumania during the month
of October, though not in great strength, and were in no position yet
to move down through the Bulgarian mountains to attack Greece.
Besides, it was necessary to put pressure upon Yugoslavia to ensure
her co-operation, since any advance across Bulgaria to Thrace would
be exposed to a possible hostile reaction from the side of Yugoslavia
which would threaten its communications with the north.

So it came about that our first attempts to bring aid to Greece
were not carried out in the happiest circumstances. D’Albiac had to
be content with the limited accommodation afforded him by the two
airfields in the Athens neighbourhood for his bombers, while his
fighters had to operate from the most primitive stations behind the
front line under conditions of extreme hardship and discomfort. He
was not allowed even to reconnoitre, much less use, airfields in the
Salonika area, and when a British aircraft crashed near the town
members of the R.A.F. were forbidden to visit the spot to salvage
what was left of it.

There remained the plain of Thessaly around Larissa, the only other
area in Greece where the country is sufficiently open to provide a
large number of suitable sites for airfields. But the rains had already
begun, and the one squadron which was stationed here was soon
flooded out. It was clear that the construction of further accommoda-
ton would have to be put in hand speedily. Having reconnoitred all
available sites D’Albiac recommended to the Greek Premier the
immediate construction of all-weather airfields at Agrinion (near the
west coast, north of the Gulf of Corinth) and at Araxos (in the north-
west corner of the Peloponnesus). The advantage of these sites was
that they allowed a considerable margin for Greek withdrawals and
could still be operated even though the whole of northern Greece

16 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

were lost. D’Albiac was given assurances that they would be ready
by the end of January 1941. Unfortunately, through shortage of
labour, material and transport, and, it must be added, through a
failure fully to realize the importance of giving a high priority to the
work, this estimate proved sadly over-optimistic. Neither of these
airfields was ready for use when the British troops evacuated Greece
at the end of April. Araxos was almost immediately put into com-
mission by the Germans after their occupation of the Peloponnesus.
It was a melancholy comment upon the situation. We spent the
winter getting the runways ready for use in the spring. Then, when
the fine weather arrived, the Germans swept in and occupied them,
completed what remained to be done with conscripted local labour
and promptly turned them to their own use.

Meanwhile Major-General M. D. Gambier-Parry' had arrived as
chief military representative of a British Inter-Services Mission to
Greece, specifically charged to avoid giving promises or making com-
mitments. Apart from the air squadrons, the first of which opened
its operations on November 6th with a highly successful bombing
attack upon Valona airfield, British help at the start had been
limited to the despatch of nineteen anti-tank rifles, which had been
flown over from Egypt to Patras and thence up to Yanina. These
anti-tank rifles were hurried straight to the front line in the southern
sector, where they are said to have done good service.

Still more opportune was the attack of the Fleet Air Arm upon
the Italian fleet in harbour. On the moonlit night of November
10th/11th two waves, one of twelve and one of nine Swordfish flown
from the carrier Illustrious, swooped down upon Taranto. Their
brief and brilliant low-level attack with torpedoes sank two battle-
ships, partially sunk a third, and damaged a cruiser and two des-
troyers. The price of their success was two naval aircraft.

On November 16th a British convoy arrived at Piraeus from
Alexandria. It contained the base personnel for a British Expedi-
tionary Force and totalled something over 4,000 men (284 officers
and 3,913 other ranks) divided between R.A.F. and the Army with
a slight preponderance of the former. Though a senior officer was
privately informed that he should select a base which would permit
expansion to accommodate two divisions for ‘possible develop-
ments’, the formal instructions forbade discussing with the Greeks
an increase which must raise hopes which could not be realized. The
force, apart from the crews of the operational aircraft, was mostly
non-combatant, being composed of signals, supply and intelligence
units, bomb disposal detachments and oil sabotage specialists

1 He was succeeded later in November by Major-General T. G. G. Heywood.

SWASTIKA OVER THE BALKANS 17

together with a certain number of officers with specialized know-
ledge of modern weapons and mountain warfare. It could scarcely
be regarded by the Germans as providing a casus belli and beyond
noting its presence they paid it little attention.

Now began an elaborate diplomatic game in the Balkan peninsula,
a game which extended throughout the winter months until with the

-coming of spring weather German armies were in position to
attack.

German threats and blandishments were directed towards the three
Balkan States, Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey, but especially towards
Greece. Bulgaria, true as ever to her tradition of siding with the bully,
needed no persuasion. Germany knew that Greek resistance must be
crushed, and if the Italians could not achieve this it remained for
German arms to do so. Assured of the peaceful co-operation of
Bulgaria, Germany wanted that of Yugoslavia ; for the present she was
content that Turkey should remain outside the conflict, though there
was some justification for the current British assumption that the subse-
quent line of German expansion would be in the direction of Asia
Minor and the Middle East.

For Britain, with her slowly expanding and still very meagre re-
sources, the chief object was to avoid enticing Germany further into
the Balkans and to be in a position to offer some sort of obstacle to
her penetration to the eastern Mediterranean. The amount of aid
that could be afforded to Greece required to be very carefully judged.
The Greeks wanted enough to enable them to overcome the Italians
but not enough to provoke Germany to intervene. As we have seen
these two aims were incompatible; but the Greek Government
affected not to recognize this.

At the beginning of December 1940 Mr. Churchill was already of
the opinion that British intervention on an increased scale would
probably become necessary against Italy and possibly against
Germany with the coming of spring, and the Chiefs of Staff were
requested to prepare plans on this assumption. By the end of the
year, however, nothing had been done to increase the operational
capacity of the existing airfields and no significant progress had been
made with the new ones at Araxos and Agrinion despite promises to
the contrary.

Since the commitment estimated at this stage amounted to no
more than two divisions (and we should be hard put to it to find even
these) and since the minimum force necessary to defend the Salonika
and Larissa areas was estimated at four divisions, it was decided in
principle that further airfields should be only constructed south of
a line from Mount Olympus to the Gulf of Arta.

18 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

Then on January 8th the Chiefs of Staff came to the conclusion
that no effective resistance could be undertaken if Germany inter-
vened in Greece and that any formations sent by us could do no
more than delay the outcome and would, judged in terms of the
Balkan campaign alone, prove to have been wasted. Nor could our
air strength be increased in the course of the next two months to
more than five bomber and three fighter squadrons. Under the cir-

- cumstances, therefore, there seemed little case for pushing the pro-
ject further unless we wished to invite a second and more disastrous
Dunkirk. Seen as a purely military problem divorced from any
consideration of political expediency, the case against our inter-
vention in Greece with land forces appeared to be complete and
unanswerable.

On the German side Hitler’s personal decision to attack Russia in
1941 had been made in the autumn of 1940. It was determined in
part by the Russian occupation of Bessarabia at the end of June 1940,
in part by the realization that ‘Operation Sea Lion’, the attack upon
Britain, could not be launched under the cover of a beaten Luftwaffe
with any reasonable prospect of success unless the potential threat
from Russia were eliminated. The Russian pact had never been
regarded by Hitler as anything more than an ingenious military expe-
dient to free him from the danger of war upon two fronts, the night-
mare of the General Staff. Ultimately, Soviet Russia was always the
enemy par excellence.

Hence the entry of German troops into Rumania at the beginning
of October 1940, while governed in part by a desire to safeguard the
oil-fields for Germany’s future use, served the further important
purpose of lengthening the base for future operations against Russia.
At the same time Rumania served as a strategic turn-table. Troops
established there could be used for the invasion of southern Russia ;
equally, they could be employed for the subjugation of the rest of the
Balkan peninsula by way of a complaisant, and probably actively
co-operative, Bulgaria.

A secret directive had fixed May 15th, 1941 as the date of the com-
pletion of the German deployment for the Russian campaign. But
Greece remained in arms against the Fascist ally, forming a potential
British bridgehead for operations driving deeper into Europe and
therefore a threat to the southern flank of the grand offensive against
Russia. Accordingly War Directive No. 20 for ‘Operation Marita’
(the move against Greece) was issued on December 13th, 1940. Its
purpose was to ‘foil British attempts to create air bases under the
protection of a Balkan front . . . for this would be dangerous above all
to Italy as well as to the Rumanian oil-fields.’ At the same time the

SWASTIKA OVER THE BALKANS 19

Italian defeats in the Western Desert were opening up the possibility
of the British over-running the whole of Libya and fundamen-
tally altering the Mediterranean balance in their favour. Accordingly,
a further War Directive, issued after the loss of Bardia, on January
11th arranged for the despatch of German forces to Tripolitania (the
beginning of the famous Afrika Korps) and the establishment of a
German air force in Sicily.

Thus, with the beginning of the new year, two German thrusts
were developing southwards to the Mediterranean. One was destined
to operate from Rumania through Bulgaria into Greece and the
Aegean, the other into Africa by Sicily. Both were the subject of
much speculation in the British Press at the time. It seemed reason-
able to suppose that they represented the horns of Germany’s 1941
summer offensive and that they aimed at converging by the conquest
of Turkey and Egypt and driving through to the Persian Gulf. This,
it must be repeated, was not the primary objective. Hitler, having
considered and rejected the possibility of an advance through Spain
to seize Gibraltar, was concentrating upon the campaign against
Russia. The two operations in the south were, therefore, both in the
nature of divergences imposed upon Germany by the weakness of
her Italian ally. Italy had embroiled herself in Albania and got the
worst of it. Therefore, Germany must make herself responsible for
the subjugation of Greece. Italy was on the run in Libya, and if this
débdcle continued, there was a grave danger of an entire transform-
ation of the situation in the Mediterranean. Therefore the Afrika
Korps had to go to Libya and the bombers had to go to Sicily. Both
represented a dissipation of force from the main objective.

So far as this narrative is concerned December 13th is the impor-
tant date, when Hitler issued the directive for operations against
Greece. A month elapsed before any corresponding—defensive—
step was taken from our side. Then in mid-January General Wavell,
at that time engaged in operations for the reduction of Tobruk, was
instructed by the War Cabinet to proceed to Greece and make
an offer to the Greek Government of armoured troops, field
artillery, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns to assist their forces in
the defence of Salonika and Macedonia against possible German
aggression.

With Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore, Wavell journeyed
to Athens, arriving there on January 13th and remaining until
January 17th. During these days conferences were held with General
Metaxas, the Prime Minister, and General Papagos, the Commander-
in-Chief, in which future operations in Greece were discussed.

' De Mendelssohn, The Nuremberg Documents, pp. 257-81.

20 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

Metaxas declared categorically that Greece would resist a German
or combined German and Bulgarian attack with all the means at her
disposal even though there appeared little possibility of either
Yugoslavia or Turkey departing from her attitude of neutrality;
and he called upon General Papagos to state the military needs of
the Greek Government.

Papagos stated that in view of the German concentrations in
Rumania (they had already twelve divisions in the country and were
receiving constant reinforcements) and the preparations developing in
Bulgaria for the passage of German forces, a thrust against Greek
Thrace and eastern Macedonia must be anticipated. In this area
Greece would have only three divisions. Accordingly the Greek
Commander-in-Chief requested, in order to establish a defensive
position in adequate strength along the Greco-Bulgarian frontier, the
despatch of nine British divisions with corresponding air support.
He further advocated a rapid pressing on with the reconditioning of
airfields in Greece, and the building up of magazines for the supply
of the British troops in Greece; also the development of a ‘cover
plan’ to create the impression that these forces were destined for
large-scale operations in Tripolitania. The British divisions could be
shipped to the ports of Salonika, Amphipolis and Kavalla and take
up their positions on the right flank of the Greek forces, thereby
extending the front as far as the Turkish frontier, an operation which
might be expected to produce favourable repercussions in Turkey and
Yugoslavia.

General Wavell may well have felt embarrassed by the scale of this
request. He was obliged to point out that he could offer only two or
three divisions and a relatively small number of aircraft, and that the
troops were not likely to be available, owing to problems of shipping
and reconcentration, for over two months. Thus they could scarcely
begin to arrive before the end of March, whereas there was much
evidence to suggest that a German attack might be expected at any
time after the beginning of March.! The only immediate assistance he
could promise was one artillery regiment and a unit of 60-65
‘armoured cars.

Metaxas naturally replied that such a force would be quite in-
adequate and could only serve the purpose of providing the Germans
with a pretext for launching their attack upon Greece. He therefore
could not accept the British offer, and requested us not to proceed
with the despatch of the first contingent. The conference broke up on

1 When the occasion arose for the despatch of the force Wavell proved a good
deal better than his word. The first flight of British troops landed at Piraeus on
March 7th. By the end of the month over 30,000 had arrived.

SWASTIKA OVER THE BALKANS 21

this note, and the question of military aid for Greece remained in
abeyance for nearly three weeks.?

On January 29th, General Metaxas died after a fortnight’s illness
following a throat operation. In the critical situation in which Greece
found herself, the death of the Dictator robbed the country of the one
man who, whatever may be thought of the nature of his régime,
possessed greater prestige and authority than any other figure in the
country. His successor, Alexander Koryzis, while lacking nothing in
patriotism, was a man of less force of character and less dominating
personality. The new Greek Government approached Great Britain
on February 8th to ask what help could be expected in the case of a
German invasion ; it was requested, however, that no British troops
should move until German forces had crossed the Danube into
Bulgaria, the old fear of precipitating a clash with Germany being
again in evidence.

The War Cabinet now formulated a new policy for the Middle
East. General Wavell received a telegram from the Chiefs of Staff
directing that no operations be undertaken beyond the frontier of
Cyrenaica—Benghazi had fallen on February 7th—where a strict
defensive would be maintained; all troops and aircraft which could
be spared would go to help the Greeks against the expected German
invasion.

om [2]
Defence Problems

THE two Allies, with their slender resources, had now to evolve a
defence scheme with the least possible delay; and, considering their
divergent points of view, it was perhaps inevitable that difficulties and
misunderstandings should arise. To give up large tracts of Greek
territory—including the port of Salonika—or to relinquish the well-
won gains in Albania was likely to affect gravely the morale of the
Greek armies and the Greek people. Thus it was not surprising that
General Papagos favoured the holding of a forward line, the more so
as the Greek divisions lacked modern or suitable transport—there
was a shortage of the pack transport essential on the mountain
routes, and ox-wagons were largely in use for the heavier loads—and
therefore moved so slowly that withdrawal and re-grouping would be
difficult and tedious tasks. But a forward policy involved the active

1 According to Papagos, The German Attack on Greece, this refusal to accept
British assistance was communicated by Metaxas, in confidence, to the Yugoslav
Government who passed it on to the Germans.

22 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

co-operation of Yugoslavia which could not be counted upon, though
the Greeks seem to have hoped for it almost to the last. General
Wavell was more immediately concerned with the military needs of
the situation, and could not count upon the favourable turn of
political events to simplify his problems.

If Yugoslavia did throw in her lot with Greece and Britain it would
be essential to hold Salonika, the only port through which Yugo-
slavia could be supplied with war material. In that case it might be
practicable to hold the so-called ‘Metaxas Line’ which consisted of a
chain of forts from Mount Beles, close to the junction of the Yugoslav,
Greek and Bulgarian frontiers, across the Struma by Fort Rupel to
the Mesta river. The fortifications of the Metaxas Line lacked
depth, and their length—over one hundred miles—was excessive in
relation to the troops available to occupy them, for the garrison had
been depleted in order to reinforce the Albanian front. These con-
siderations apart, it would be absolutely necessary for Yugoslavia
to concentrate sufficient forces in southern Serbia to prevent a turning
movement by the Germans down the Vardar valley or through
Monastir which would take the Metaxas Line in rear.

As there was really no justification for counting upon effective aid
from the Yugoslavs, it is difficult to establish a case for holding the
Metaxas Line, or even for occupying a position from Mount Beles to
Rupel and thence down the Struma to the sea. This line, some
seventy miles in extent, had been held by British forces in the First
World War for two years (1916-18) but had never been subjected to
serious attack; and in 1941 it was as much exposed to a turning
movement as was the Metaxas Line.

If Yugoslavia could be considered as a neutral willing and able to
deny passage to the German and Bulgarian armies a strong position
—and a shorter one, for its length was little more than sixty miles—
might be established from the mouth of the Aliakmon river across to
Verria and Edessa and thence to the Yugoslav frontier at Kaymak-
chalan.1 This line follows the edge of the table-land of western
Macedonia, the mountains rising abruptly, from the flat Vardar
plain. The roads that pierce this mountain line at Verria and Edessa
do so by steep gradients which offer every opportunity to the defence.
Towards the coast the country is flatter, but here, too, the defender
would have the advantage since the steep mountain slopes south of
the Aliakmon give excellent observation over the bare and open
country. It was intended to harry the German advance by the action
of covering detachments in selected forward areas, but this position,
Aliakmon-Verria—Edessa-Kaymakchalan, which became known as

1See Maps 1 and 2.

SWASTIKA OVER THE BALKANS — 23

the ‘Aliakmon Line’ was eventually accepted in principle as the main
line of defence, to be held by British and Greek forces. Even on this
Position special measures would have to be taken to safeguard the
vulnerable left flank. If Yugoslavia should display neither the will nor
the ability to resist a German invasion, enemy forces might reach
Monastir without much trouble or delay, and thence advance south-
ward to Florina and Kozani penetrating to the rear of the Aliakmon
Line.

A defensive position further in rear, sited to join at a point in the
Pindus mountains with the main Greek armies on the Albanian front
would be considerably longer; and it would involve the withdrawal
of the Greek forces from Koritsa and all their conquests at the
northern end of the line in Albania. Whether such a withdrawal
could be carried out in the face of the enemy with the very limited
means of transport which the Greeks possessed and without the
morale of the army going to pieces was extremely doubtful. It was
even doubtful whether some of the local commanders would obey
orders calling upon them to surrender territory to the despised
Italians in accordance with an over-all strategic plan which they
could scarcely be expected to appreciate.

Thus, whatever dispositions they made, the attitude of Yugo-
slavia was of vital importance to the Allies; and time was running
short.

For the purpose of co-ordinating defence measures in the eastern
Mediterranean theatre, which meant gauging the possibility of sup-
port from any Balkan country not yet under the German heel, Mr.
Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary, and General Sir John Dill, Chief
of the Imperial General Staff, left London for Cairo on February 12th.
Unfortunately they were delayed en route by unfavourable fiying
weather and did not reach Cairo until very late on the 19th, ‘five
valuable days being thus lost at a critical time’. The words are General
Wavell’s. Delay was indeed serious, for the German forces in
Rumania were steadily increasing and might be expected to enter a
complaisant Bulgaria at almost any moment. And on February 17th
Turkey had signed a non-aggressive treaty with Bulgaria. As the
Germans were preparing for bridging operations on the Danube and
German troops were awaiting the signal to cross the river, the treaty
could have but one meaning: Turkey would not regard as a casus
belli the entry of German troops into Bulgaria for the purpose of
invading Greece. This triumph of German diplomacy was made
possible by the presence of powerful German forces on the Danube.
Von Papen, German Ambassador at Istanbul, displayed the iron
hand within the velvet glove: Mr. Eden had nothing but the glove.

24 © THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

On February 22nd our Foreign Secretary and the Chief of the
Imperial General Staff, accompanied by General Wavell and Air
Chief Marshal Longmore, journeyed to Athens, and conversations
were held in the greatest secrecy at the Royal Palace at Tatoi. No
word of these conversations leaked out either then or for some time
subsequently. Eden began by stating that there was little probability,
according to his information, that either Yugoslavia or Turkey
would intervene on the Allied side and that therefore defence
measures should be taken with this fact in view.

On behalf of the British Government he offered a force of 100,000
men, 240 field guns, 202 anti-tank guns, 32 medium guns, 192 A.A. guns
and 142 tanks. These figures included all categories of base details
and what Major! De Guingand, ‘who was responsible for preparing
the list, has described as ‘doubtful values’. In any case they con-
siderably exceeded the total that actually arrived, although more
would have been sent had the campaign lasted longer. Asked for a
survey of the military situation General Papagos stated that the
abandonment of eastern Macedonia—that is to say the Metaxas Line
and Salonika—and also of certain forward positions in Albania
would cover a period of twenty days; and at the end of this period
he would be able to dispose thirty-five battalions along the Aliakmon
Line. Before taking the irrevocable step of abandoning so large a
strip of national territory, Papagos urged that the Yugoslav Govern-
ment be informed of the decisions taken and requested to clarify
their attitude.

Quoting the account published by General Papagos, this suggestion
was adopted and ‘it was resolved to send an urgent code message to
the British Minister in Belgrade. According to the reply received, the
order for evacuation and withdrawal would be issued or not, as the
case might be. This was agreed upon by all... .’

This was not the impression left upon the British representatives
when the meeting broke up in the early hours of the morning. Both
Mr. Eden and the two soldiers believed that while a reply from
Belgrade was awaited the three Greek divisions would be on their
way back from eastern Macedonia to take up their positions in the
Aliakmon Line. To them it was obvious that this movement must be
carried out at once or not at all. The lack of unanimity towards the
close of the conference was noted by an eye-witness who described
Papagos as looking ‘none too happy’, whilst, when the party dis-
persed, ‘Eden came in looking buoyant’.”

The British would certainly have cause for satisfaction if they

1 Afterwards Major-General, and Chief of Staff to Field-Marshal Montgomery.
2 De Guingand, Operation Victory, pp. 58-9.

SWASTIKA OVER THE BALKANS 25

thought that all available forces would be concentrated in the Aliak-
mon Line without delay; and General Papagos might well be a prey
to anxiety, if in his view, the fate of eastern Macedonia and Salonika
hung in the balance.

Mr. Eden and General Dill now journeyed to Ankara, but the visit
produced little that could be regarded as encouraging. The Turks did
not deny all intention of entering the War as an ally, but stated that
they were in no condition to do so at this juncture: they certainly
could not declare war upon the Axis powers if Greece should be
invaded.

On returning to Athens, where they arrived on the evening of
Sunday, March 2nd, the British party were greeted with two items of
news, both unwelcome, one expected and one unexpected. The entry
of strong German forces into Bulgaria on the previous day occasioned
no surprise, but it came as a shock to learn that General Papagos had
not begun the withdrawal of his divisions from eastern Macedonia.
Nor had any preparations been undertaken along the Aliakmon
Line.

Papagos pointed out that no reply had been received from Belgrade
regarding the attitude of the Yugoslav Government and that there-
fore he had felt unable to take responsibility for giving the order to
withdraw, and that it was now impossible to do so in view of the
presence of German and Bulgarian troops deployed in strength just
across the frontier: the slow-moving Greek divisions might be
attacked in the process of withdrawal and destroyed in detail. Politi-
cally, too, any hope of Yugoslav co-operation would disappear with
the abandonment of Salonika. He now recommended what was, in
effect, a council of despair: the maintenance of a purely static front
along the Metaxas Line with British divisions coming up to reinforce
piecemeal. Mr. Eden and General Dill found themselves quite unable
to agree to this.

Nothing, therefore, was decided at the meeting on March 2nd, and
the crowds who next day acclaimed the British Foreign Secretary
outside the Grande Bretagne Hotel, Headquarters of the Greek
General Staff, in the brilliant spring sunshine little knew what an
impasse had been reached. General Wavell was summoned from
Cairo and discussions were resumed until they resulted in the follow-
ing signed agreement :

(1) The Greek Army would leave in Macedonia three divisions to
defend the prepared positions in the Mesta—Rupel Line (i.e. the
Metaxas Line).

(2) The Greek Army would concentrate with all speed on the
Aliakmon Line the following forces:

26 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

12th Division from western Thrace, already moving west-
wards by train.

20th Division from Florina.

19th Motorized Division from Larissa.

Seven battalions from western Thrace, provided that the
Turkish Government agreed on the principle of their release
from the neighbourhood of their frontier (where they con-
stituted a potential check against Bulgar aggression), at the
request of the Greek and British Governments.

(3) A separate Greek commander would be appointed forthwith
for these forces.

(4) British forces would be despatched as rapidly as shipping
would permit to Piraeus and Volos.

(5) The British forces would concentrate on the Aliakmon posi-
tion, where it was intended that the Greco-British forces should
give battle.

(6) The command of all forces on the Aliakmon position would be
entrusted to Lieut.-General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, but
under the high command of General Papagos. The date on
which General Wilson assumed his command would be settled
by General Papagos in consultation with him and would de-
pend upon the arrival of General Wilson’s headquarters and
the establishment of his communications.

This decision represented a not very satisfactory attempt to
reconcile the British desire to base the defence of Greece on the
Aliakmon Line and the Greek reluctance to abandon Salonika and a
large portion of national territory so long as there remained any
reasonable prospect that Yugoslavia might adhere to our ranks. But
compromises, though the essence of successful diplomacy, are rarely
justified in the realm of war. On whatever position the Allies decided
to make their stand, it was clear that they would require the con-
centration of all their resources. It is doubtful if any of those who
signed the agreement felt really happy about it. Certainly there were
no illusions on the British side.

General Wilson, who had handed over his command in Cyrenaica
to Lieut.-General P. Neame arrived in Athens on March 4th. At the
urgent request of the Greek Government, fearful as always of doing
anything which might be construed by the Germans as an act of
provocation, the General appeared in plain clothes under the name of
‘Mr. Watt’. His personal staff were likewise incognito, also our
military attaché by whom he was greeted at Tatoi airfield. There is
no reason to suppose that the Germans were deceived; but General
Wilson, who required to make extensive reconnaissances and to

SWASTIKA OVER THE BALKANS 27

supervise the arrival and disposition of his forces, was hampered by
these restrictions for a whole month.

The first flight of our combat troops had left Alexandria and was
due to arrive while the always threatening situation was still obscure.
As ever, in war, time was the important factor. How soon the
Germans would be ready to strike we could not know. Actually, the
deployment of List’s Twelfth Army along the Greco-Bulgarian
frontier was barely completed by March 20th, and on the 24th Army
Headquarters suggested an April date for the attack. Meanwhile the
Germans were putting the squeeze on the Yugoslav Government and
the Italians indulged in their futile and costly offensive in Albania.

Divided counsels were the ruin of Yugoslavia. The Regent, the
Oxford-educated Prince Paul, was emotionally Anglophile, but weak
and easily terrorized; Tsvetkovitch, his Prime Minister, was a
mediocrity; Cincar-Marcovitch, the Foreign Secretary, inclined to-
wards the Axis, and so the Government pulled all ways at once, now
seeming to lean towards the Allies and now towards the Aggressors.
They had no definite policy and were at the mercy of circumstance.
It is true that the Belgrade Government despatched to Athens on
March 8th a Lieut.-Colonel Perescitch, of the Yugoslav General
Staff, under the not inappropriate pseudonym of ‘Mr. Hope’. Mr.
Hope had no power to commit his Government and did not seem to
be aware of any plan for the defence of his country. The sole purpose
of his visit appeared to be to ascertain the extent of British aid in the
event of Yugoslavia joining Greece and Britain and to stress the
importance of Salonika as a means of securing Yugoslav communica-
tions. It was impossible to co-ordinate any defence plan as the result
of this visit.

Throughout March, German diplomatic pressure upon Yugoslavia
was steadily intensified. Hitler spent precious weeks endeavouring to
get a diplomatic agreement signed. Russian influence was effective in
delaying this for some little time, but on March 25th the Prime
Minister and the Foreign Secretary of Yugoslavia signed in Vienna
a pact of adhesion to the Axis.

The signing of this treaty appears to have persuaded the Greeks
that Yugoslavia was lost as an ally : they now asked if General Wilson
could supply transport for the withdrawal of their divisions from the
Metaxas Line. No more, however, was heard of this, for two days
later came fresh and more hopeful news.

The pact did not commit Yugoslavia to intervention on the side of
Germany and Italy, or even to allowing the passage of troops through
their country. But it implied a benevolent neutrality towards Germany
and it allowed ‘sealed trains’ to pass, bringing, in theory, medical

28 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

supplies and stores. Its implications were obvious and they were fully
recognized by the Yugoslav people. On March 27th, less than forty-
eight hours after the signature of the pact, as a result of a widespread
and simultaneous revolution, the Government was overthrown, King
Peter assumed power in place of the Regent Prince Paul, and the new
Government of General Simovitch, was established by coup d’état.

It was an heroic gesture, by which the people redeemed the pusil-
lanimity of their Government, but it came too late to make very much
difference to the pattern of the campaign in the Balkans. And it gave
Hitler the excuse for drastic and immediate action. He was deter-
mined to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. No
diplomatic enquiries would be made nor ultimata presented. And so
he issued his ‘Operation Number 25’ for the immediate destruction
of Yugoslavia. No great redistribution of forces was necessary, and
the campaign was to open concurrently with the attack upon Greece
in the first days of April.

CHAPTER III

British Troops in Greece

WHILE the Germans were coercing Yugoslavia and completing
their concentrations on the Bulgar-Greece frontier, while Mussolini
was making his last effort to do his own work in Albania, troops of
the British Commonwealth were crossing over from Egypt to Greece
and taking up their position on the Aliakmon Line.

Throughout those vital months when the Italian entry into the war
and the defection of France threatened disaster to our whole position
from Gibraltar to the Persian Gulf the defence of the Middle East
had been maintained by a mixture of bluff and daring on the part of
our commanders and troops and almost incredible ineptitude on the
part of the Italians. Increased reinforcements had supplemented the
results of the victories in the Western Desert, but at the beginning
of February 1941 Wavell still disposed of only four divisions and a
Polish brigade in Egypt and the Western Desert; two Australian
divisions in Palestine ; two Indian divisions in Eritrea;.and a South
African division and two native African divisions in East Africa.

Not all these formations can be described as battle-worthy. The
tanks of the 7th Armoured Division, which had carried out the
advance to Benghazi, required a complete overhaul ; the 7th and 9th
Australian Divisions in Palestine were both short of training and
equipment ; the native African divisions were not suitable for opera-
tions in North Africa or Europe. The 2nd Armoured Division was
newly arrived, and the engines and tracks of its two regiments of
cruiser tanks were already giving trouble.

Wavell had to perform some intricate jugglery to produce even
the modest contingent to which we had pledged ourselves for Greece.
The expeditionary force, under Sir Henry Maitland Wilson’s com-
mand, was to consist of the New Zealand Division (Major-General
B. C. Freyberg, V.C.); the 6th Australian Division (Major-General
Sir Iven Mackay) ; and the Ist Armoured Brigade Group (Brigadier
H. V. S. Charrington). The Australians and New Zealanders were

29

30 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

to form the I Australian Corps under Lieut.-General Sir Thomas
Blamey. In General Wavell’s words, ‘the despatch of this force
involved removing from the Middle East practically the whole of
the troops which were fully equipped and fit for operations’.

Subsequently the 7th Australian Division and the Polish Brigade
were to be added as soon as they could be got ready. As it happened,
the German counter-offensive in the Desert, which began on the
31st March and made rapid progress, kept both these formations in
Africa. In any case, considering the rate of the German advance
through Greece, they could not have arrived in time to affect the
situation.

While still posing as a civilian, General Wilson was able to make a
fairly extensive reconnaissance of the Aliakmon Line where his troops
were to take up their positions. Extending from the mouth of the
river to the Kaymakchalan massif on the Yugoslav frontier, its great
advantages lay in the excellent observation over the open Mace-
donian plain and in the restricted lines of approach; yet to hold
it securely would require more troops than were likely to be
available.

There were four possible routes of attack.! The first was directly
down the coast following the line of the Salonika—Athens railway
between Mount Olympus and the sea; the second by the pass that
‘runs on the inland side of Olympus from Katerini to Elasson, a steep
and narrow road, with wooded and precipitous slopes on either side ;
the third by the steep and exceedingly difficult Verria pass; and the
fourth by the somewhat easier Edessa pass to the north. In addition
a successful turning movement was possible by a penetration from
Monastir in southern Yugoslavia through to Florina, and thence by
the road that runs south-east to Kozani and Servia, parallel to and
at an average distance of twenty miles from the Allied position.

A further weakness lay in the indifferent rearward communica-
tions. Piraeus, the port of Athens, was the only major port of supply
available, but communications with the front three hundred miles
to the north depended upon one railway and a road so narrow in
many places that it had to be regarded as a single-line route. There
existed a secondary port at Volos, much nearer the front, but possessed
of quite inadequate means for unloading shipping. It was connected
with the advanced base area at Larissa only by a single-track railway
line and by a road which proved quite impassable for three-ton
lorries. In addition, lateral communications were wholly inadequate,
consisting of minor roads and mountain tracks, the latter at all
times, and the former after rain, being quite impracticable for

1 See Maps 1 and 2.

BRITISH TROOPS IN GREECE 31

wheeled transport. There was the further disadvantage that the
civilian telephone and telegraph could not be regarded as secure!
and the mountainous country interfered greatly with wireless
communication.

The Aliakmon Line had never won general acceptance from our
Ally. General Papagos could not but regret the surrender of so much
national territory without a fight. As we have seen, he would have
liked to have held, in the greatest possible strength, the Metaxas Line
on which so much labour and treasure had been expended: and he
had always felt that a forward policy designed to retain the port of
Salonika was the best, the only, hope of securing the help of
Yugoslavia.

At his request, on March 6th, General Wilson had promised that
when the British armour arrived it should move forward without
delay to manceuvre in front of the Aliakmon Line.

Our own build-up developed well during the early part of March,
and the first and second flights (the Ist Armoured Brigade and the
New Zealand Division) had arrived in Greece on time. Both forma-
tions reached the forward area during the latter part of the month.
In the towns and villages the troops were loudly acclaimed by the
people who threw flowers and brought them gifts of food and wine.
Spring had come to Athens, but travelling northwards the men had
to endure the rigours of winter. The cold was bitter.

The third flight was delayed by exceptionally unfavourable
weather, and the fourth by the naval battle off Cape Matapan. The
Italian Fleet had been urged out by its German Ally, partly in the
hope that it might catch one of the British convoys at sea, partly to
distract the attention of Admiral Cunningham’s Fleet from the con-
voys crossing with German troops to North Africa. Failing com-
pletely in its first objective, it paid the penalty by being brought to
action in the open sea by Cunningham on March 28th.?

The coup d’état of March 27th brought no closer liaison with the
Yugoslavs. News of this development reached our Foreign Secretary
and the Chief of the Imperial Staff after they had started for home and
caused them to return to Athens; but although Sir John Dill flew to
Belgrade on April Ist he could obtain no agreement to a plan of con-
certed action. We did not give up trying. General Wilson—no longer
in civilian guise—and General Papagos met General Yankovitch, the
new Yugoslav Deputy Chief of Staff, at the little frontier station of

1 ‘until the Germans attacked it was possible to telephone from Athens to
Berlin...’ Wilson, Eight Years Overseas. p. 84.

2 The Italians lost three heavy cruisers and two destroyers sunk, and a battleship

and a destroyer seriously damaged. This our Fleet achieved without the loss of or
damage to a single ship.

32 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

Kenali, south of Monastir, two days later.! It then transpired that the
Yugoslavs had made no preparations to meet a German invasion
and had a very exaggerated idea of the strength of the British forces.
Nothing could be decided and so, when the Germans attacked on
April 6th, the Allies were in no respect depending upon Yugoslav
resistance.

It is easy to criticize the new Yugoslav Government which, at the
eleventh hour, found themselves unable to control and direct the
national will to resist German aggression. Yugoslavia was not ready
for such a war and there was no time to prepare for it. The bulk of
her forces were concentrated in the north, for Croatia was ever an
uneasy part of the union, and a re-deployment to safeguard old
Serbia would have been too long and too clumsy a process. It was
useless for the Yugoslav Government to declare Belgrade, Zagreb,
Ljubljana open cities ; useless for it to obtain on April Sth, the very
eve of the invasion, a treaty of friendship and non-aggression with
Soviet Russia. Nothing at this stage could have saved her. The Yugo-
slav campaign was bound to repeat most of the characteristics of the
war in Poland, and no one supposes that a better grouping of the
Polish armies could have altered the issue of that campaign. This
Balkan campaign was a combat between mechanical armies moving
perhaps, at fifteen miles an hour and troops moving in bullock
wagons at no more than three miles an hour. Tanks against ox-carts!
When the equipment and means of battle are so disparate, strategy
scarcely enters into the matter at all.

The British commanders could not but regard the Greek troops
sent to assist in holding the Aliakmon Line as a poor substitute for
the well-trained divisions which they had hoped to welcome from
eastern Macedonia. The Greek 19th (Motorized) Division consisted
of ‘just over 2,000 quite untrained and recently enlisted garage hands’,
with ‘no possible prospect of fighting usefully as a mobile force,
having only a few Bren carriers, motor cycles and small cars’. They
had also a number of captured Italian lorries and some Italian and
Dutch tanks.’ The 12th Division had only six battalions, two machine-
gun companies and three mountain batteries ; the 20th Division could
muster only six battalions, having no artillery. As originally planned
the 19th Division was to occupy the coastal sector with the New
Zealand Division on its left and the 6th Australian Division on the

1 Mr. Eden and General Dill were also present but took no part in the discussion.
Before they left the country they paid informal visits to some of our troops who
had arrived in the Aliakmon region.

2 The armament of the division was given officially as: 24 light tanks; 123 machine
guns; 78 light machine guns; 30 mortars; 22 A/Tk guns; with one field and one
mountain battery.

BRITISH TROOPS IN GREECE 33

left again. The other Greek divisions, 12th and 20th, were allotted to
the defence of the Edessa Pass and to the left flank. Our Ist Armoured
Brigade was to operate in the Axios (Vardar) plain, well forward of
the main position.

On March 20th, it was decided to move out the Greek 19th Divi-
sion into the plain in an anti-parachutist réle, which meant that the
New Zealanders were called upon to extend their right to the coast,
giving them a total frontage of 23,000 yards. Both the divisional com-
mander, General Freyberg, and the corps commander, General
Blamey, recognized that this was an impossible task for one division.
They favoured a modification of the whole line, making Mount
Olympus itself the principal bastion of the defence on the right flank :
the New Zealand Division could defend the Platamon tunnel be-
tween Olympus and the sea, and the line would run from the mountain
westward to the Aliakmon, south-west of Servia, along the river to
Grevena, and in that region join up with the Greeks to present a
co-ordinated defence against attack through the Monastir Gap.
General Wilson recognized the advantages of occupying such a posi-
tion, but knew that it would first be necessary to persuade the Greeks
to pull back from Koritsa. And they were not yet ready to give up any
of the conquered ground in Albania, even if they were capable of a
successful withdrawal.

By April 4th, the day before he openly assumed command of what
was given the name of ‘W Force’, General Wilson felt justified in
reassuring the Greek Commander-in-Chief as to the state of prepara-
tions in the Aliakmon Line; but he was well aware that we could not
compete with the German concentration. The enemy was estimated.
to have from nineteen to twenty-one divisions in Bulgaria, of which
it appeared that not less than eleven were grouped opposite the three
Greek divisions holding the Metaxas fortifications. Six or seven might
be expected to deliver the initial attack upon the Aliakmon Line,
which would be held by two improvised Greek divisions and the
equivalent of less than two British divisions.

On the eve of the German attack our forces in Greece were still
coming into position on the Aliakmon Line. The Ist Armoured
Brigade Group, first to be landed, had been in the forward area since
March 21st and was disposed in several detachments each with a
different task. The 4th Hussars, with a company of the Rangers,’ one
battery of the 2nd Regiment R.H.A. and one battery of the 102nd
Anti-Tank Regiment (Northumberland Hussars), had its headquarters

1 A London Territorial rifle battalion, the 1st Rangers (9th King’s Royal Rifle
Corps) had been converted into a motorized unit in 1940: hence its presence in an
armoured formation.

B*

34 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

at Yannitsa and had pushed well forward into the Vardar plain, its
mission being to cover the carrying out of demolitions and, by every
means in its power, to delay the advance of the enemy towards our
main position. The Rangers, with the other battery of the 102nd
Anti-Tank Regiment were near Skydra, east of the Edessa Pass which
they covered with the support of the second battery of the 2nd R.H.A.
The 155th Light A.A. Battery held a series of positions stretching
across the plain from Edessa. Further west the 64th Medium Regi-
ment R.A., north of Lake Petersko, supported the 20th Greek divi-
sion. Finally the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment was located near
Amyntaion south of the Monastir Gap, and with it was the 27th
New Zealand Machine-Gun Battalion, less two companies. This de-
tachment, soon to be augmented, was under the command of Brigadier
J. E. Lee who had been lent, originally, to General Blamey to com-
mand the corps medium artillery.

The 4th Hussars had 52 light tanks ; the 3rd R. Tank Regiment the
same number of cruisers. The latter, as has been said, were not in
satisfactory condition. When the 2nd Armoured Division arrived in
the Middle East, its commander had drawn attention to the poor
state of the tracks of his cruisers, already nearly worn out, and to the
engines which were in sore need of overhauling. There had been no
opportunity to remedy these faults, so the 1st Armoured Brigade,
supplied by the division for service in Greece, took the field in a
condition which could not be described as battle-worthy. It may also
be remarked that the 2nd R.H.A. and the 102nd Anti-Tank Regiment
consisted of two batteries each, although the third battery of the anti-
tank unit arrived later.

The New Zealand Division which completed its arrival during the
last week of March had just taken over the coastal sector, its 4th
Brigade and 6th Brigade, from right to left occupying the high ground
overlooking the Aliakmon river from the south. Most of the divi-
sional cavalry regiment (armoured cars and Bren carriers) was
stationed in an advanced position on the river bank, with a view to
carrying out a delaying action. The Sth Brigade occupied a reserve
position on the Olympus Pass, twelve miles south-west of Katerini.

Coming by later convoys, the 6th Australian Division was still in
the process of arriving. Its 16th Brigade was actually taking over the
Verria Pass locality from the Greeks, its 19th Brigade was in Greece
and moving up towards the front; and the 17th Brigade was still on
the sea.

The three Greek formations, ill-equipped and weak in numbers,
already mentioned as co-operating in the defence of the Aliakmon
Line had been formed into the ‘Central Macedonian Army’ under

BRITISH TROOPS IN GREECE 35

General Kotulas, with its headquarters at Kozani. The 19th Division
’ was now well forward, echeloned between the Vardar and the Struma,
the 12th Division was being relieved by the Australians at the Verria
Pass, and the 20th was near Edessa with detachments further west
towards the Monastir Gap.

As far as was possible General Wilson was contriving that our
troops should hold the defiles and the Greeks defend the mountain
positions so that each nation should fight on ground best suited to its
own type of training and transport.

The Force was notably weak in anti-aircraft artillery. In addition
to the 155th Light A.A. Battery with the forward troops there were
one heavy battery and one light regiment on the lines of communica-
tion and one heavy and two light batteries for airfield protection
under the R.A.F.

Whatever fortune we might expect in the military operations in
Greece, it was clear that we should be heavily and probably deci-
sively outnumbered in the air. The five squadrons which had been
operating in Greece during the closing weeks of the previous year
had now been increased to eight by the arrival of No. 11 Squadron
(Blenheims) in January, No. 112 Squadron (Gladiators) on February
10th and No. 33 Squadron (Hurricanes) on February 19th. Striking
successes had been achieved in a series of air combats against the
Italians. In one encounter a formation of Hurricanes and Gladiators
destroyed many Italian aircraft—the number was reported as 27
at the time—without loss to themselves. But during March the
demands upon our air strength had expanded considerably. D’Albiac,
as the result of constant pressure by his Greek colleagues, had had to
modify his strategy of concentrating against the Italian supply ports
and lines of communication, being constrained to detach a part of
his force to give immediate air support to the troops in Albania. This
method proved successful from the point of view of maintaining or
raising the morale of the front-line soldiers but the achievements of
the British aircraft proved more spectacular than useful. -

With the forthcoming German attack in view, D’Albiac organized
his scanty resources into two Wings:

A Western Wing (one bomber and one fighter (Gladiator) Squad-
ron) to support the Greeks in Albania.

An Eastern Wing (two bomber squadrons and one (Hurricane)
fighter squadron) to support the Anglo-Greek forces operating
against the Germans. The squadrons of this wing were under the
necessity of occupying improvised landing-grounds on the Larissa
plain which, though now drying, were still soft after the rains of a
delayed spring.

36 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

In the Athens area one bomber and one fighter squadron were
stationed. There was also an army co-operation squadron available,
but since most of its aircraft consisted of obsolete Lysanders (there
was rarely more than one Hurricane available at a time) it was able
to do very little effective work in face of the enemy. Airfield accom-
modation was still limited, but had the German attack been delayed
by even as little as a week we should, in the opinion of D’Albiac,
have enjoyed the benefit of several more satellite landing-grounds,
whereby at least one subsequent holocaust might have been avoided.

Expressed in terms of numbers, the R.A.F. could muster some
eighty serviceable aircraft to do battle with approximately 800
German, supported by 160 Italian aircraft based on Albania and
another 125-150 based in Italy but operating over Albania.

The odds were heavy. They were the odds of Thermopylae, and the
Royal Air Force in Greece could hope for little better than to win for
itself the fame of Leonidas.

CHAPTER IV

Germany Strikes

»([1 ]«

The Fate of Yugoslavia

AT 5.45 on the morning of Sunday, April 6th, the German armies
thrust across the Yugoslav and Greek frontiers, while the German
Ministers in Athens and Belgrade were handing declarations of war
to the Governments of these two small nations which had refused to
be coerced by Germany. In the case of Greece the Germans justified
themselves by claiming that they entered the country merely to drive
out the British troops, whose presence was evidence that Britain was
seeking to build up a front in the Balkans against Germany. This
argument ignored the fact that the British force had only been
despatched after the German troops, which had been massing in
Rumania for months past, had actually crossed the frontier into
Bulgaria and had penetrated to positions overlooking Greek terri-
tory. In the case of Yugoslavia no such excuse was proffered. That
she had repudiated the pact of alliance and/or subjection was regarded
as sufficient proof of her warlike intentions towards Germany.

The Germans had concentrated thirty-two divisions for the Balkan
campaign, of which only twenty-one were actually committed to
action. These were grouped in two Armies, the Second Army of von
Weichs being directed to invade Yugoslavia from the north and
north-west while the Twelfth Army under von List advanced into the
country from the east and also attacked Greece. Von Weichs appears
to have had two panzer, one motorized, one mountain and six
infantry divisions; von List, who had the more important and the
heavier task, was allotted five panzer divisions, two motorized, three
mountain and eight infantry divisions, three independent regiments
and the SS Adolf Hitler Division. Besides these forces, more than
adequate to the task in hand in view of their vastly superior

37

38 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

armament, the Italian Second Army could be relied upon, at least in a
defensive capacity in the Julian Alps, while the presence of the two
Italian Armies in Albania would prevent the Greeks from with-
drawing troops from that front to reinforce central Macedonia.

The story of the campaign in Yugoslavia can be briefly told.
Against overwhelming German mechanized strength and a plan well
devised and executed with the utmost resolution and speed, the
Yugoslavs could set only the unquestioned courage of their troops.
It was the Polish disaster over again, in more difficult but by no
means impassable country. The Yugoslav High Command quickly
lost control of the situation: contact was severed between the
Government and the General Staff on the one hand and the various
army commanders on the other. As a result of the savage bombard-
ment of the capital on the opening day of the war, Belgrade radio
closed down for forty-eight hours. The first official war communiqué,
broadcast by wireless on the morning of Tuesday, April 8th, opened
with the remarkable statement ‘On all fronts the situation is in our
favour’. In fact, the Government, shifting constantly across Serbia
and Bosnia, from Belgrade southward to Uzice, from Uzice westward
to Sarajevo, and thence to the coast, constantly bombed from the
air, can never have had much idea of what was happening in other
parts of the country.

The main German drive came from von List’s Army into southern
Serbia, and it met with instantaneous and spectacular success. It took
the form of a three-pronged drive in great strength upon Nis, Skoplje
and Monastir. At the same time a further detachment attacked the
Strumitsa Pass in the extreme south of Yugoslavia and by a swift
turning movement by way of Doiran advanced into the Vardar Plain
and thence towards Salonika.

Von Stumme, who commanded the advance on Skoplje met with
some tough opposition at the frontier pass but his forward troops
reached Skoplje by 5 p.m. on April 7th, less than thirty-six hours
after the opening of hostilities. In 1915 the Bulgarians had made their
most powerful and their most swiftly successful thrust into Serbia in
exactly the same direction, and Skoplje had been the first town of
importance to fall to them. Now, twenty-five years later, the Germans
had repeated the achievement, the defenders showing themselves
much less prepared to resist.

The southern column of von Stumme’s corps, after an engagement
on the frontier, crossed the Vardar at Veles and reached Prilep on
April 8th. The subsequent operations of this column and also those
of the Strumitsa force belong to the story of the Greek campaign.

Further north von Kleist’s corps did not occupy Nis until the

GERMANY STRIKES 39

morning of April 9th. Then, wheeling north, von Kleist advanced on
Belgrade which he entered, after some fighting, on April 13th. While
he had been hurrying up from the south, however, the German
advance from the north had been equally rapid, and on the evening
prior to von Kleist’s arrival a very small party had reached the
Danube from the opposite direction. The fact that these few men
were able to cross the river and obtain the effective surrender of the
capital shows what a state of demoralization existed, following the
air bombardments and the disappearance of the Central Government.

The hardest fighting, and that in which the Serbs showed to the
best advantage, occurred when the Germans, thrusting north-west
from Skoplje, were held up some days in the Kacanik Pass and lost
a number of tanks. This stand enabled many Yugoslav units to break
contact and disband, thus avoiding capture as prisoners of war. But
apart from the Kacanik action the Germans were at no point
seriously checked. Zagreb, capital of Croatia, was occupied by the
Second Army on April 11th, without having put up any defence, and
on the same day German and Italian troops joined hands on the
Yugoslav-Albanian frontier north of Lake Ohridsko. After a week’s
fighting, organized resistance was practically at an end. Sarajevo, one
of the last of the inland centres to yield, fell to the Germans on
April 15th and Split, on the Adriatic coast, on the same day. The
formal capitulation of the Yugoslav armies took place on April 17th.
As in the Battle of France, the losses of either side in the field were
relatively light. Even the prisoners of war captured by the Germans
were fewer than might have been expected, for many of the Yugoslav
soldiers were able to break away and hide in mountain retreats
whence many reappeared as guerrilla fighters under the command of
General Mihailovitch or Marshal Tito.

oo [2 ]«
Greece Invaded

THE German invasion developed along the whole of the Greco-
Bulgarian frontier. In Thrace, at the eastern extremity the enemy met
with little opposition, for this region lay beyond the protection of the
Metaxas Line and it had never been the intention of the Greek Com-
mand to hold it—unless with the co-operation of Turkey. Attacking
the fortifications, however, the Germans encountered the most deter-
mined and courageous resistance : heavy assaults against the Metaxas
Line were hurled back with the courage of despair. The Greeks had

40 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

been ordered to hold these positions to the last and delay the Germans’
occupation as long as possible. This order was obeyed. The defenders
were attacked by wave after wave of infantry, bombed by Stukas,
shelled without respite by light and heavy artillery. Two forts were
taken on the first day, but only after they had been destroyed by
artillery fire and bombing from the air. Elsewhere the Germans
forced their way into the underground galleries only to be driven out
by counter-attack. In the Struma gorge parachutists to the number of
about 200 were dropped behind the Greek lines: within a few hours
two-thirds of these men were killed and the remainder captured.
Assault teams with flame-throwers, hand-grenades and explosive
charges were engaged and worsted in close-quarters fighting.

The tragedy lay in the fact that the heroic resistance of these Greek
divisions was of little or no avail. While they continued to give of their
best and to hold the enemy at bay other German forces were penetra-
ting the Strumitsa Pass, where Yugoslav opposition was of the
slightest, to reach Lake Doiran and begin an advance down the Vardar
valley with nothing but open country between them and Salonika.
The Metaxas Line was turned. We have seen how in February the
prompt withdrawal from this position had been discussed, and then
rejected by the Greek Command: useless now to stress the fact that
the successful defence of the Metaxas Line depended upon Yugoslav
active co-operation in which the Greeks had never had much cause
to trust.

In the early hours of Monday, April 7th, Piraeus received a terrible
reminder of the realities of war. At 3 a.m. an immense explosion,
followed at intervals of about half an hour by two others, shook every
house in the port. Even seven miles away in Athens doors were blown
in and windows broken. A 12,000 ton ship, s.s. Clan Fraser, heavily
laden with T.N.T., had been blown up by a delayed action bomb. Six
merchant ships, sixty lighters and twenty-five caiques were sunk or
burnt out. The docks office and two quays were wrecked. An ammu-
nition barge and an ammunition train were blown up. The work of
unloading the ammunition ship had apparently been suspended for
the whole of Sunday, which in itself is hard to understand in view of the
declaration of war by Germany early that morning. And the ship was
left in port partly unloaded instead of being moved to an outer
anchorage for the night, a normal precaution to take. We could ill
afford to lose the cargoes, and another unfortunate consequence was
that a Royal Engineer company destined for Amyntaion was kept in
Piraeus to clear the debris while a light A.A. battery which should
have gone to Larissa, was detained for the protection of the port.

Perhaps the moral effect was greater than the material loss. Having

GERMANY STRIKES 41

heard the great explosions and seen the resultant havoc, the popula-
tions of Athens and Piraeus were in no way deceived by the official
communiqué of the Ministry of the Interior which announced that
‘a steamer and some buildings had been damaged’. The incident was,
indeed, nicely calculated to give a foretaste of the thunderbolt quality
of the German offensive which had just been launched in Thrace and
Macedonia. Coupled with the news of the air bombardment of
Belgrade, it convinced many of the inhabitants of the Greek capital
and its port that the hour of destruction of their own cities was at
hand. As a matter of fact, apart from a little machine-gunning of
roads in the outskirts of Athens during the last days of the campaign,
the German raiders confined themselves strictly to military targets
in Greece. Athens remained unbombed, but the port was raided with
considerable thoroughness and efficiency nightafter night, and was very
nearly put out of action, though there was nothing so spectacularly
disastrous as the explosion of the munition ship on that Sunday night.

On April 7th the Germans pushed down through Thrace to the
Aegean Sea, occupying Alexandroupolis and Komotini by the even-
ing. This had been foreseen and caused no particular concern: what
spelled disaster was the German break-through on the other flank of
the Metaxas Line where a German armoured division, followed by a
mountain division, reached the Vardar and swung south to cross the
Greek frontier at Doiran and Gevgeli.

By April 8th the magnitude of the Yugoslav disaster had already
become apparent, and a Greek Government communiqué issued at
noon was not calculated to hearten the people of Athens. It referred
boldly, and somewhat vaguely, to the plight of the heroic defenders
of the Metaxas Line. Further depression was caused in the capital by
the pricking of another bubble. When, during the morning, it was
rumoured that Turkey had declared war on the side of the Allies the
people thronged the streets to salute the event. Turkish flags were
carried alongside the British and the Greek, and there was a pro-
cession to the Turkish Legation, where the Minister very prudently
refused to show himself. Within an hour or two, of course, the cold
truth was known, but the demonstrators were at first reluctant to
believe it. One may well suppose that the rumour was deliberately
inspired by enemy agents. Certainly the ultimate result was to depress
still further the spirits of the Athenians, and from about this time may
be noted the emergence of certain defeatist elements in the capital,
though the population as a whole stood firm as a rock.

German tanks and armoured cars were now racing down the broad
and easy corridor of the Vardar towards Salonika, delayed at first
only by the small Greek ‘motorized’ division with its tragi-comic

THE LOWER ALIAKMON MAP No.l.
AND THE VARDAR PLAIN
20

SCALE

30

GERMANY STRIKES 43

assortment of vehicles. At Axioupolis, where the railway and road
to Salonika cross the Vardar, British troops, on this day April 8th,
made their first contact with the invader. A patrol of the 4th Hussars
encountered some German carrier-borne troops and after an exchange
of fire blew the bridges and withdrew westward. Other forward de-
tachments of the Armoured Brigade did likewise, after carrying out
demolitions on the roads leading towards the British position. In
Salonika there was time to destroy the oil stocks, installations and
stores, the task of a special detachment of Canadian Royal En-
gineers known as the Kent Corps Troops. The vanguard of the
German advance penetrated the outskirts of Salonika that night, and
occupied the city at dawn the following morning, April 9th.

In eastern Macedonia, where several of the forts still resisted, the
evacuation of the rear echelons of the divisions holding the Metaxas
Line had begun from the ports of the Aegean coast.

After the opening of hostilities our main force stood awaiting
attack for four days, an anxious and fretful period with little rest for
either commanders or troops.

On April 6th reports of German progress made it tolerably certain
that some enemy columns were heading for Monastir, while the
thrust down the Vardar seemed bound to develop into an advance
across the plain against the Aliakmon position. Our troops were still
so thin on the ground that a characteristic German punch by the
Twelfth Army would have broken the line anywhere; and the com-
mander of the Australian Corps was in favour of pulling back the
New Zealanders to the line of the passes without delay. General
Wilson, however, considered that time was needed to clear stores
and other impedimenta from the Katerini railhead but authorized a
bigger allocation of labour to the Olympus positions.

The detachments of the Ist Armoured Brigade in the Vardar plain
still expected to advance eastward to fight. At the Verria Pass the
16th Australian Brigade, fresh from the Western Desert, did not
welcome the change of scene and climate. The three battalions were
approaching positions 3,000 feet above sea-level ; they had little pro-
tection from the bitter cold; and nearly all their gear required to be
man-handled, for only a few pack donkeys were procurable and
nothing on wheels could negotiate the steep mountain tracks. The
relief of the Greek 12th Division promised to be a long and arduous
affair. When the other two brigades of the 6th Australian Division
should arrive Wilson intended to concentrate them near Kozani
ready to reinforce either the main front or the Amyntaion position
as the need arose.

44 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

First blood in the air operations went to the British. In a fighter
sweep over the Beles-Rupel area a patrol of twelve Hurricanes met
thirty ME 109’s and shot down five of them without loss to them-
selves. The weather grew worse and after the first day the German
advance was carried out under chilly grey skies and frequently in
thick mist and through pelting storms of rain and sleet ; but, although
our own air reconnaissance and fighter and bomber attacks were
hampered, we certainly gained more than we lost under these
conditions. Once the skies cleared the Luftwaffe, in overwhelm-
ing strength, made short work of the task of establishing total air
supremacy.

Early on the morning of the 8th a British motor patrol pushed
across the Yugoslav frontier to Monastir which it found almost
empty. There were no troops in the vicinity and no arrangements
had been made to carry out systematic demolitions. The local police
chief was in charge of the town and it appeared most unlikely that
any resistance would be offered. The British patrol arranged for the
demolition of the bridge across the Crna some miles to the north on
the Prilep road and then withdrew, bringing back three Yugoslav
tanks and four anti-aircraft guns.

That day a number of officers of the Yugoslav General Staff
arrived over the Greek frontier in Florina. The news of the break-
down in southern Yugoslavia was confirmed. It was learned that
three Yugoslav divisions had capitulated in the south and that the
Germans were likely to be in Monastir by nightfall.

General Wilson came forward in the morning to confer with
Generals Blamey, the corps commander, and Mackay, commanding
the 6th Australian Division which was still arriving. On his way
Wilson met the streams of Greek and Yugoslav refugees, military
and civilians, in flight from the frontier regions. They were mainly
on foot, but also on donkeys, in ox-carts, in antiquated buses and
ramshackle cars, the vehicles covered with a medley of bedding,
furniture and pots and pans lashed to roofs, mudguards and running-
boards. This tragic exodus—one all too common in war—had already
continued for several days and nights; and the Allies had no means
of checking and organizing these pitiful crowds which might yet
contain enemy agents, fifth columnists and other undesirables.

As the result of the conference at which Greek staff officers were
present the decision was taken to withdraw from the Aliakmon Line
to a position defined as Olympus—Servia—mountains west of the
Kozani-Amyntaion valley. This course had the approval of General
Papagos. It was imperative to defend the Monastir Gap with ade-
quate forces, and orders had already been issued for the detachments

GERMANY STRIKES 45

of the 1st Armoured Brigade who were operating in the Vardar plain
and to the northward of lakes Vegorritis and Petersko to fall back
that night to the area Vevi-Kozani. These units were to reinforce the
Amyntaion detachment which on expansion would be commanded
by Major-General Mackay with the incomplete 19th Australian
Brigade added to the force. Of this brigade the 2/4th Battalion was
arriving ; the 2/8th had been directed to the Verria region ; the 2/11th
was still on the sea.

It would be necessary for Mackay to hold on at Vevi, selected as
a suitable position for the defence of the Monastir Gap, for two,
probably three, days, in order to allow time for the withdrawal of
the two Greek divisions, the 12th and the 20th, in the mountains
between Verria and Edessa to the heights between Servia and
Kastoria. So far as could be judged General Papagos was not yet
reconciled to giving up the Albanian fruits of victory; but he was
sending some support to the British left flank where a cavalry divi-
sion and an infantry brigade from Albania were to link up with
Mackay’s command.

General Mackay reached Sotir—headquarters of Brigadier Lee
who commanded the original Amyntaion detachment—shortly before
midnight, April 8th/9th. No troops had yet arrived on the Vevi
position for most of the Ist Armoured Brigade were driving west-
ward by way of Edessa and Verria in fitful moonlight and rain, over
roads greasy with mud and stony tracks running with water, all
routes congested by Greek horsed transport, pack animals, bullock
wagons, marching men and refugees. By dawn of the 9th, however, .
the troops were beginning to take up their positions in the Vevi Pass,
one of the first arrivals being the 64th Medium Regiment R.A. which
had come from the Kelli area.

At Vevi the valley is at its narrowest, and the Monastir-Florina
road follows a winding course through a pass which varies in width
between 100 and 500 yards. The Ist Rangers, now included in Briga-
dier G. A. Vasey’s 19th Australian Brigade in place of its missing
battalion, had two companies at the top of the slope north-east of
Vevi village and one in the foothills north-west of the highway which
it thus bestrode. On the left of the Rangers the 2/4th Australian
Battalion, which lacked one company, was given a four-mile front
along the hills, linking up with Greek infantry on the eastern slopes
of the eminence called Hill 1001. On the other flank the 2/8th Austra-
lian Battalion did not arrive from Verria until the morning of the
10th, officers and men having suffered considerably during the bitter
cold night following the lack of opportunity for sleep while on their
way to the front. The 2/8th linked up with the Rangers; and on the

46 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

right of the Australians a Greek unit, the Dodecanese Regiment,
came into position at the lakes.

The New Zealand machine-gunners were to support the 2/8th and
the Rangers. The 1st Australian Anti-Tank Regiment put guns in
forward positions with good observation of the road. In front of the
Rangers the 2/Ist Australian Field Company completed the laying
of a minefield. Artillery support was supplied by the 2nd R.H.A.,
the 2/3rd Australian Field Regiment and the 64th Medium Regiment.

As a reserve in the region of Perdhika were collected the remainder
of the 1st Armoured Brigade: 4th Hussars, 3rd R. Tank Regiment,
and 102nd Anti-Tank Regiment (Northumberland Hussars).

April 9th was a day of great activity and preparation in the Vevi
position which extended for nearly twelve miles, far too great a fron-
tage for the three infantry battalions to hold, although the support of
three artillery regiments might compensate, in some measure for the
thin line. Lateral communication was difficult to maintain across
the steep hillsides, and the position of the anti-tank guns, sited on the
forward slopes and inadequately camouflaged, gave cause for some
concern. Greek troops and refugees were still passing through our
position, and in Vevi village, just in advance of our line were some
unorganized soldiery among whom the presence of Germans in Greek
uniform was suspected.

Fortunately the German advance was not so swift as had been
anticipated. The hostile columns appeared to have been held up by
the Crna demolition, for they did not enter Monastir until five o’clock
on this afternoon. This extra respite was of great value not only to
Mackay’s force but to the whole of our troops and those of our Greek
ally. The New Zealand Division was pulling back gradually from the
Aliakmon mouth to the Olympus and Servia passes, where the
defensive positions were strengthened. There was general regret
that so much material had been used on the Aliakmon Line, for
wire, sandbags, battle stores of all kinds, were not to be had in
abundance.

Our forces were nowhere strong enough for the defensive tasks to
which they had been committed. On the right the New Zealand
Division holding the Olympus passes, the 16th Australian Brigade
and the Greek 12th Division in the region of Verria, were under
General Blamey; next on the left, the Greek 20th Division which
occupied the wooded heights beyond and whose Dodecanese Regi-
ment linked with Mackay west of the lakes, was the command of the
Greek General Kotulas, superseded on the morning of April 9th by
General Korassos; and Mackay’s force was also directly under
Wilson. Wilson who commanded this Anglo-Greek army had, of

GERMANY STRIKES 47

course, to fight his war under the strategic direction of General
Papagos, Greek Commander-in-Chief, although, if occasion arose,
he could appeal to General Wavell, Commander-in-Chief Middle
East. Advanced G.H.Q. were near Elasson, not far from General
Blamey. Rear G.H.Q. remained in Athens, 200 miles away.

MAP No.2.

-THE WESTERN FLANK
20 30

(sr,
L.Vegorritis
ree G
ndeleimon

n “¢

Perdhika
»)

A rdhassa

CHAPTER V

The Western Flank

»([1 ]«

At the Monastir Gap

Snow fell during the night of April 9th/10th and the bitter cold
persisted. At 6.15 a.m., before daylight came, two armoured car
patrols—one of the 4th Hussars and one of the New Zealand divi-
sional cavalry regiment, each accompanied by a sapper detachment—
drove forward from the Vevi position to reconnoitre. If possible, they
were also to carry out more demolitions. They saw the heads of
German columns about six miles away, and returned after an ex-
change of shots. The stream of refugees was thinning and no more
Greek troops were expected to pass through, so, at 10 a.m., the
Rangers blew up the road in front of the minefield. The Germans
were now advancing steadily, and from noon onward the British and
Australian gunners indulged in long-range shooting at the enemy
vehicles. One of the first rounds fired by the 64th Medium Regiment
put a German tank out of action and further casualties were inflicted
as the hostile infantry and armour sought cover behind the ridge
which runs between Lofoi and Sitaria. This ridge was some three
miles beyond our forward positions.

It was obvious that the German artillery was not yet up, so no
serious attack was to be expected until next day. Soon after four
o’clock in the evening a German aircraft flew low over some of our
batteries.

During the night German patrols crept forward up the slopes held
by the 2/8th Australian Battalion and the Rangers. In the murk it
was hard to distinguish friend from foe and some of the enemy took
the Australians unawares by hailing them in English. Four Austra-
lians and six of the Rangers were captured, but when daylight came
no hostile infantry could be seen.

49

50 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

At 6 a.m. on April 11th the 64th Medium Battery fired on Vevi
village where lights and movement had been reported.

Snow lay heavy on the mountains, but the morning was fine in the
valley ; the bitter cold persisted, and in the afternoon rain and snow
hampered our gunners in their search for targets. A few German tanks
appeared, one, and then another coming to grief at the minefield in
front of the Rangers. Later our artillery shelled the road leading to
Kelli where German infantry were reported to be digging.

The German artillery came into action about noon, but our troops
were more concerned with the mortar and machine-gun fire which
began to open from Vevi village and from behind the Lofoi ridge.
Movement between the forward posts became difficult and the
infantry and the Australian anti-tank gunners began to lose men.
Some of the German machine-gun posts were engaged effectively by
the Rangers’ small-arms fire; but the company on the immediate left
of the Australians withdrew for 400 yards in order to shorten the line
which was woefully thin.

As the light began to fail, about two battalions of German infantry
attacked astride the road but were soon checked by the fire of our
artillery. On the left the enemy was more persistant, his infantry
advance against the 2/4th Australian Battalion making slow but
steady progress despite the accurate shooting of the R.H.A. By
10 p.m. the Germans were digging in on the lower slopes about 300
yards away. At this time German infantry were dribbling forward
between the posts of the 2/8th Australian Battalion and as the result
of several encounters two prisoners were sent back. They proved to
be hardy and well trained young soldiers of the SS Adolf Hitler
Division.

In the early afternoon a report had been received that German
tanks from Kelli were attacking the Greek troops between the
Vegorritis and Petersko lakes where a break-through would carry the
enemy down to Amyntaion and Sotir behind the Vevi position. To
deal with this serious threat, a squadron of the 3rd Royal Tank
Regiment and a troop of the 102nd Anti-Tank Regiment (Nor-
thumberland Hussars) were hurried across from Amyntaion to
Pandeleimon, moving in snow and sleet over eight miles of ploughed
vineyards. It seems that the Germans did not press their advance after
losing one tank, and our troops were not engaged at all; but the
occasion threw into relief the principal weakness of our armoured
force. Six of the cruisers broke their tracks and were permanently out
of action; another broke down through mechanical defects. We were
notably deficient in tank repair facilities and, as a consequence, in
the course of the campaign our armour wasted away.

THE WESTERN FLANK 51

On this day, April 11th, the 6th New Zealand Brigade completed
the withdrawal from the lower Aliakmon in the coastal sector, pass-
ing through the 5th New Zealand Brigade which held the Olympus
Pass, with one battalion detached to cover the Platamon tunnel
corridor where the railway runs between the mountain and the sea.
Meanwhile the 4th New Zealand Brigade consolidated its position
around Servia. A cavalry screen of Bren carriers and armoured cars
was left watching the crossings of the lower Aliakmon to the north.

And meanwhile General Bakopoulos had surrendered on behalf of
his army in eastern Macedonia. Since the fall of Salonika these troops
had been completely cut off from the rest of the Anglo-Greek forces, but
even after their commander had capitulated the men in the frontier forts
and some of the field troops continued to battle on. About 17,000
were made prisoners by the Germans, and some thousands were killed
or wounded ; but it may well be that, as the result of the resistance
maintained by the forts of the Metaxas Line, half the total number of
Greek troops between the Vardar and the Turkish frontier were able
to escape by sea. The three lost divisions contained some of the finest
fighting material in the Greek Army, and it was the more unfortunate
that they had not been used in a sector where their courage and skill
would have been of real profit to the Allies.

With the Germans in Florina General Papagos could not fail to
see the threat to the right flank of his forces in Albania. Early on the
morning of the 11th he made known his proposal to disengage in
northern Albania and said that by so doing he would be able to
provide a whole corps for the protection of the British left flank ; but

‘he asked for an assurance that our armoured brigade would carry
out a diversionary operation towards Florina to cover the Greek
movements. This assurance was given by our Rear Headquarters in
Athens, although ignorant of the situation at the front where the
Ist Armoured Brigade was hardly in a position to carry out any such
task. In any case Wilson had issued his orders at 3.45 a.m., the with-
drawal of the two Greek divisions, 12th and 20th, from their Verria
~Edessa position to start first. Our troops at Vevi were to withdraw
gradually during April 12th: the Rangers would cover the movement
and come away during the night.

General agreement was reached by the British and Greek com-
manders when they met at Pharsala later in the day. Yet General
Wilson was only too well aware of the problems which remained to
be solved. The immediate one was to move back over the same roads
a force consisting partly of mechanized troops with a high proportion
of motor transport and partly of Greek infantry dependent upon

52 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

bullock-wagons and mules. General Karassos had stressed the im-
portance and the fighting quality of the Dodecanese Regiment which
was posted in the area of Lake Petersko, and urged that every effort
should be made to bring it safely back. We were prepared to move
some troops with such transport as could be spared, but it was clear
that the rate of retreat would be very uneven and that the slower-
moving units might not get away at all.

And whatever might befall, Wilson saw his troops committed to
tasks which they had not the numbers to fulfil. Every position they
occupied would be too thinly held, with few or no reserves. There
was no hope of further reinforcements from Egypt. General Wavell
had arrived in Athens in the course of the day and, after conferring
with General Blamey, confirmed his decision that the 7th Australian
Division and the Polish Brigade, previously ear-marked for Greece
should go to the Western Desert. There they were sorely needed, for
the Germans, after retaking El Agheila, Benghazi and Derna, were
already approaching Tobruk and Bardia. Wavell’s decision was un-
avoidable, for the safety of Egypt and the Nile Delta mattered more
than all.

Already there were signs that the next German thrust would
develop at the junction of the British and Greek forces : if the enemy
could reach Kastoria he would be in the rear of the Army of Western
Macedonia, and the capture of Yanina would put him right across the
line of retreat of the Army of Epirus. And that would bring down the
curtain on the epic of the Albanian campaign. Wilson had already
determined that his left flank must provide its own protection: when
Mackay withdrew, the Ist Armoured Brigade would act as flank-
guard, moving via Kozani and the Siatista defile.

The course of events next day, Saturday, April 12th, seems to have
determined the trend of the whole campaign. It would hardly be true
to say that nothing went well, but a part of our own forces suffered
severe loss, and serious doubts arose as to the military capacity of our
Ally. General Wilson was soon led to the conclusion that even the
Olympus Line could only be held as a stage in our general with-
drawal; and the loss of Olympus would involve the abandonment of
the Larissa plain where our forward airfields lay.

Opinions differ as to the degree of disintegration which set in
during the retreat of the Greek 12th and 20th Divisions from the
Verria—Edessa heights to their mountain positions between Servia
and Kastoria. The movement was bound to be a difficult one as its
direction, roughly from east to west, crossed the line of communica-
tion and eventual withdrawal of Mackay Force; but it is seldom safe
to judge foreign troops by our own standards. The Greeks, like the

THE WESTERN FLANK 53

soldiery of many other nationalities, do not move with our formality
and precision. Their withdrawal would, naturally, be carried out in
small groups bearing little semblance of purpose and order even if
they were ready and willing to respond to the next call for action. The
primitive and varied types of transport was bound to slow down the
march, causing traffic blocks and delay. The state of these two
divisions, at least, may not have been so bad as some of our observers
believed. Certain it is that the language difficulty caused misunder-
standings and annoyance, while the Greek staff work proved to be of
indifferent quality. Also it may be significant that Papagos asked us
to assist in the defence of the new positions to which the two Greek
divisions were directed, the Siatista and Klisoura passes.

Here a word must be said for the Greek cavalry division holding
the Pisodherion Pass, west of Florina, where for several days the
Germans had been able to make no headway.

We had promised to do what we could to get the Dodecanese
Regiment out intact, but these troops were fully 50 per cent more
numerous than had been estimated. They were lent thirty 3-ton
lorries which were used mostly for the sick and wounded and they
thinned out steadily during the day from their position on the right of
the 2/8th Australian Battalion.

The withdrawal of the Greek armies in Albania formed the larger
and more important issue, which was as much a psychological as an
administrative one. The Greek commander-in-chief, who, before the
German attack was launched, had been so reluctant to withdraw his
troops from Thrace and eastern Macedonia could hardly bring him-
self to order the abandonment of the gains made with so much glory
and at so much cost in Albania. He knew the limitations of his trans-
port, and he knew also the moral effect of such a withdrawal upon
his troops. This reluctance to abandon the tangible fruits of victory
in the face of the despised and defeated Italians was not limited to the
men in the front line. Several of the divisional commanders were
showing themselves unwilling to withdraw ; the Chief of Staff of the
Army of Epirus had stated with a sublime disregard for strategy that
he would go back no further than the Greek frontier ; and the Bishop
of Yanina, an extremely politically-minded prelate, was exhorting
the troops in the same sense.

Yet withdrawal from Albania there must be, or the western flank
of Mackay Force, and therefore of the entire British force in Greece
would be placed in great jeopardy. Even now when General Papagos
was about to act it might be too late.

54 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE
wr [2 ]«
The Action of Vevi

THE conditions under which fighting proceeded during these days
are described by an Australian correspondent as follows:

Temperature has dropped to ten degrees below freezing point during
this cold snap. . . . Since the Germans began to invade Greece our men
have been fighting in the snow, sleeping huddled together, wrapped in
one or two blankets which they were able to carry. It is perishingly
cold, though some young veterans say that it is no colder than the
night winds of Libya in January and December. The bright side of the
picture is that rain has evidently bogged the Bulgarian aerodromes.
Few German aircraft have been going overhead; on the other hand
an. bombers have been going over in waves throughout the whole

a

Libya was like a billiard table compared with the terrifying ranges
and yawning ravines. The roads which thread the mountains are
narrow and tortuous. ...I set out to visit different sectors of the front
early this morning. The going was fairly slow because of the endless
line of army traffic on the roads—supply wagons, carriers, and guns
moving up between the precipitous walls of the passes. The wind was
cruel. It was blowing off the new snowfields formed on the mountain
tops by the falls of last night. Truck drivers clung to their steering
wheels with numb fingers. Their faces were blue with cold. I saw many
groups of Greek soldiers swinging along on foot with their rifles slung
over their shoulders. I passed a battery of light guns drawn along by
teams of shaggy mountain ponies. .. . I met knots of refugees upon the
road... .I found men of an Australian battalion deep in the mountains.
They were watering their donkeys at a stone trough fed from a spring.

- The country in which these troops are deployed is too craggy and
precipitous for motor transport, and they are hauling up their food,
ammunition and other supplies on the backs of donkeys. Some units
of the Allied troops are living under very trying conditions on the
snowclad ridges. Their only protection against the cold is provided by
shelters which they erect in stony hollows with the aid of ground
sheets. They have not been worried yet by enemy aircraft. The heavy
peak of cloud hanging low over the mountains make bombing

ifficult.

At Vevi, to avoid any repetition of the infiltrations into our line
which had proved so effective on the previous night, the commanding
officer of the 2/8th Australian Battalion had given orders that between
9.30 p.m. and 5 a.m. all troops would remain in their rifle pits and fire
at any movement observed or heard. His message read:

You may be tired. You may be uncomfortable. But you are doing a
job important to the rest of our forces. Therefore you will continue
to do that job unless otherwise ordered.

THE WESTERN FLANK 55

The morning of the 12th dawned with further falls of snow which
had ceased by 8.30 a.m. when German infantry came forward to
deliver another attack upon the Vevi position. The corps commander
had at first favoured a double envelopment, but perhaps doubting
the ability of his troops to carry this out over the difficult country on
either flank he eventually agreed to allow the SS Division a further
chance to force the position by frontal assault. This division was now
supported by the whole of its own artillery and by a battalion of corps
heavy artillery. The balance in fire-power had therefore swung over
to the enemy since the previous day.

General Mackay had given precise orders for our withdrawal. The
Australian battalions on the flanks were to thin out gradually and be
in their trucks ready to depart by 8 p.m., the Rangers, astride the
road through the pass, would act as rearguard and not retire until the
early hours of next morning. The bulk of the Ist Armoured Brigade,
in its capacity as left flank guard to our whole force, was to occupy
two positions by nightfall of the 12th: one through Sotir, facing
north-west, and one further back at Proastion about three miles
south of Ptolemais. -

Supported not only by artillery but by mortar and machine-gun
fire the Germans came on steadily through the Vevi pass, the main
thrust being east of the road and at the junction—weakly held
because we were so few in numbers—between the Rangers and the
2/8th Australians. Our artillery was able to inflict considerable loss
upon the attackers but before 11 a.m. the platoon of the 2/8th on the
extreme left of that battalion was overrun. To the Rangers it seemed
that the Australians had withdrawn, though such was not the case.
They were themselves so hard pressed that by noon they were forced
to give ground and reorganize in the neighbourhood of the railway
station. Casualties were mounting, some groups being cut off and
lost, and it soon appeared to be a question of breaking off the action
without further delay if complete disaster were to be avoided. The
Bren gunners were organized as a rearguard while the remainder of
the Rangers was collected and ferried back in the available transport
to Amyntaion.

The 2/8th Australian Battalion hung on grimly all the afternoon,
being able to bring some enfilade fire to bear upon the German tank
and infantry advance; and one local counter-attack regained some
ground. By 5 p.m., however, the Greeks (Dodecanese Regiment) on
the right of the 2/8th had nearly all gone, touch had long since been
lost with the Rangers on the other flank, and the Australians were in
grave danger of being cut off altogether. They had to get out quickly
as best they could and the only way of retreat was south-eastward

56 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

and then down the road to Sotir. In this direction the survivors made
their escape, most of them too exhausted to carry anything, so equip-
ment and even arms had to be discarded. By 9 a.m. about 200 officers
and men had reached Sotir, a large proportion bearing no weapons of
any kind. During the night they were taken south by lorry to Servia.

On the left flank the 2/4th Australian Battalion was ordered to
withdraw in the middle of the afternoon but, with a shortage of tele-
phone wire and breakages to cable caused by hostile shell-fire, orders
to the companies and platoons were difficult to transmit. When
runners had to carry messages across the snow-covered hillsides one
could not be sure when they would arrive or if they would arrive at
all. Eventually the battalion came back piece-meal in the dark when
the German infantry were almost among them. Small wonder that
most of one of the rifle companies was cut off and captured:
it was a great achievement to bring away what could still be reckoned
a fighting force fit for further action.

Much credit must go to the artillery, the 2nd R.H.A., the 2/3rd
Australian Field Regiment, the 64th Medium Regiment and such
Australian anti-tank guns as had not been overwhelmed in the
German advance. Until darkness fell our gunners maintained an
effective fire, although in some cases no infantry remained in front
of them. The R.H.A. withdrew with the utmost coolness under small-
arms fire at 400 yards range.

One may say that we were hustled out of the Vevi position as soon
as the Germans were able to develop their full strength. But our
troops had done all that was possible, bearing in mind the lack of
numbers which condemned them to hold a far too extended position
with little chance for mutual support, and no reserves. The bitter
weather had probably borne more hardly upon our own men than on
their antagonists. Considerable loss had been inflicted upon the
Germans but only at a cost that we could ill afford, for all three
infantry battalions had suffered severely and had lost arms and
equipment. The Australian field regiment lost two guns which
became hopelessly ditched during the withdrawal and had to be
destroyed; the 64th Medium Regiment lost one gun and a tractor
in the same fashion. The Ist Australian Anti-Tank Regiment lost
16 guns, ten of them when a whole battery was cut off by a premature
road demolition and captured. A troop of the Northumberland
Hussars, with the Greeks, had to abandon three of its anti-tank guns,
also cut off by a demolition, but the gunners brought away the
breech-blocks. In the 3rd R. Tank Regiment one squadron was now
reduced to six cruisers and another to only four, repairs being
impossible owing to the lack of track plates and pins, and engine

THE WESTERN FLANK 57

spare parts. Patrols of the regiment had covered the withdrawal of
some of the infantry to the Sotir position.

Here a certain amount of work had been done on the defences,
Sotir being the responsibility of the Ist Armoured Brigade under
Brigadier Charrington. At Amyntaion a demolition squadron under
the command of Major Peter Fleming, the well-known explorer,
had destroyed 20 locomotives and about 100 railway coaches, which
must otherwise have fallen into German hands. Mackay Force had
ceased to exist as such, its 19th Australian Brigade and other Austra-
lian troops being under orders to rejoin General Blamey’s command
which from this day forth was known as the Anzac Corps, thus
reviving the old memories of a quarter of a century ago.

[3 la
The Actions of Sotir and Proastion

At Sotir Brigadier Charrington had at his disposal the reserve com-
pany of the Rangers and, being so short of infantry, he obtained
permission to retain the two rifle companies which remained of the
2 4th Australian Battalion. His other troops comprised an anti-tank
battery of the Northumberland Hussars, the 3rd Royal Tank Regi-
ment (less one squadron), a platoon of the New Zealand machine-
gunners, and a detachment of the 3rd (Cheshire) Field Squadron
R.E. for demolition and minefield work. The 2nd R.H.A. came in
during the night. Its task was to cover the whole front.

Back at the Proastion position were assembling the remainder of
the Ist Armoured Brigade, the Rangers and New Zealand machine-
gunners from Vevi being expected to arrive during the early hours of
the morning. The 64th Medium Regiment arrived at Perdhika during
the evening of the 12th, and at 7.30 p.m. was sent off to a village south
of Servia to come under the Anzac Corps.

The Germans were not slow in following up our retreat, for some
of their motor-cyclists were seen on the road in front of the Sotir
position before nightfall on April 12th. They advanced to the assault
next morning—Easter Sunday in the Western Calendar—with the
weather turning fine and warm. The British position, which extended
for some five miles along a ridge between Lake Vegorritis and a swamp
south-west of Sotir, was partly protected from tank assault by a
stream running diagonally across the front.

Driving forward in their trucks until they were well within field-
gun range, the hostile infantry alighted near Amyntaion in full view
c

58 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

of our forward troops and came on in short rushes despite the fire of
the R.H.A. and of the Bren guns of the Rangers. They crossed the
stream and tried to close but their threat to the right of the Rangers’
company was warded off by our tanks firing from hull-down posi-
tions; and one squadron came into action on the forward slope,
opening with all its weapons on German infantry and vehicles. This
bold performance appears to have deceived the enemy as to our
intentions. Some German reports describe the British tanks as
moving forward with infantry clinging to them and running beside
them, implying that a counter-attack was delivered; the German
divisional commander is stated to have been consumed with anxiety,
and to have ordered his anti-tank guns forward with the utmost
speed, while the infantry prepared to defend themselves in fox-holes
with hand-grenades and blocks of T.N.T. against an armoured
attack.

Later, the German artillery began to come into action with air
observation, sending over an aircraft which took the opportunity of
opening machine-gun fire on the tanks in their exposed position. By
this time the withdrawal had begun. First to go was the 2/4th
Australian Battalion which travelled in trucks to join its own brigade.
The Rangers followed about 10 a.m., the infantry retirement being
well covered by the R.H.A. who, in their turn, came out of action
while tanks and anti-tank guns maintained their fire. The whole
movement was nicely judged—one battery of the R.H.A. pulled out
just as howitzer shells began to fall about its position—and executed,
but the troubles of the Ist Armoured Brigade were by no means over
for the day. The brigade had received orders to hold off the German
pursuit as long as possible, so that the Greek 12th and 20th Divisions
might have more time to reach their new positions and reorganize.
Most of the Sotir force was sent back to Mavrodendri, six miles
beyond the next rearguard position at Proastion where the three
companies of Rangers had arrived at 6.30 a.m.

At Proastion the road to Kozani passes through a mile-wide gorge
which, while providing a natural defensive position, allowed suffi-
cient room under cover for transport vehicles to be parked well
forward, an obvious advantage when a rearguard action is to be
fought. As at Sotir a stream served the purpose of an anti-tank ditch:
it ran across the front some 300 yards in advance of our forward
posts. The Rangers had two companies astride the road and one in
reserve, with carriers well ahead to watch the line of the stream.

The Germans lost no time in covering the dozen miles from Sotir,
and when they appeared it was seen that tanks and armoured troop
carriers were now leading the way, with engineer detachments at

THE WESTERN FLANK 59

hand. These were not our familiar opponents of the Adolf Hitler
Division, but troops of the 9th Panzer Division which had been
passed through to lend fresh impetus to the advance. German air-
craft were already overhead, for after a week of bad weather the
skies had cleared and the Luftwaffe was quick to take advantage of
favourable conditions to exert its superior strength. Henceforth
enemy air attacks were a real and constant hazard to be undergone
alike by fighting troops and transport, communications, bases and
ports.

A dive-bombing attack on our infantry and battery positions soon
compelled the withdrawal of some of our forward guns to less con-
spicuous positions. The R.H.A., however, scored a hit on the leading
vehicle of a motor column emerging from Ptolemais and the traffic
jam which resulted seemed to hinder the development of the frontal
attack. German tanks and infantry then started an out-flanking
movement on our right where the Rangers were hard pressed but
held on with the support of our tank and anti-tank guns. Next, the
left forward company of the Rangers, under heavy fire from artillery
and mortars, and machine-gunned repeatedly from the air, was
pressed back so that the anti-tank guns of the Northumberland
Hussars were left in action without infantry protection and the New
Zealand machine-gunners seemed liable to be cut off. Yet our
artillery fire held the Germans at bay and continued to do so until
after darkness fell.

Meanwhile a column of enemy tanks and carrier-borne infantry
had taken the Ardhassa track which leads westward, and then made
for the left rear of our position. In the gathering dusk about thirty
light and medium tanks, followed by infantry, approached Mavropiyi,
not much more than a mile from the main road and Ist Armoured
Brigade Headquarters at Komanos. The movement had not gone
undetected: part of the 4th Hussars and a troop of anti-tank guns
had been hurried across from our front positions and were there to
meet them. A spirited combat ensued. The light tank of the 4th
Hussars was no match for the heavier German type, but the troop
of Northumberland Hussars anti-tank guns under Lieutenant A. W.
Trippier was so swiftly and ably handled that the first crisis safely
passed. Driven boldy in to effective range these anti-tank two-
pounders, firing from their portées, took the enemy by surprise.
A number of his tanks were mancuvred into a ravine north-west
of Mavropiyi and six were knocked out. As the fight continued two
more were destroyed.

But the Germans were pressing on towards the main road. There,
a squadron of the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment arrived and came into

60 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

action at 800 yards range, hull-down behind a ridge above brigade
headquarters. The fire of these tanks—there were only four of them—
enabled the Northumberland Hussars to disengage and accounted
for at least two more of the enemy tanks. The men of brigade head-
quarters were in action with rifles and Bren guns and some of the
New Zealand machine-gunners withdrawing from Proastion assisted
to shoot it out in the after-glow of the sunset.

The Germans drew off into the gathering darkness. From their
own reports it seems that almost all their surviving tanks were out
of ammunition and many were down to their last litre of fuel. They
betray a rueful appreciation of the skill and courage of our anti-tank
gunners, and pay the troops who fought at Komanos the compliment
of describing them as a ‘British tank division’.

The firing had hardly died away when the Rangers drove down the
road past Komanos, withdrawing from the Proastion position on
their way to Kozani. Our troops at Proastion sustained by admirable
artillery support, had been able to break contact at their own time ;
and their actual withdrawal, under a smoke-screen laid down by the
guns of the 4th Hussars and 3rd R. Tank Regiment, was carried out
unperceived by the enemy who continued to shell the empty positions
for half an hour or more.

Brigadier Charrington was withdrawing down the main road as
far as Kozani and thence by a secondary road which leads south-
westward to Grevena beyond the upper Aliakmon. From Kozani his
way passed through the position of the Greek 20th Division around
Siatista, but those of our Allies who were encountered seemed bent
only upon retreat. Three of our cruiser tanks halted at Kozani until
the whole column was through the town and, as the march proceeded,
companies of the Rangers were dropped to hold delaying positions
in case the pursuit should be pressed. At Mavrodendri German
motor-cyclists and troop carriers made contact with the Rangers
detachment and then withdrew: it seemed that the lst Armoured
Brigade had hit the enemy so hard that no trouble was to be expected
from him at the moment.

Near the village of Siatista at the Metamorfosis Pass the column
passed through the remaining battery of the 102nd (Northumberland
Hussars) Anti-Tank Regiment which had followed the unit to Greece,
and was in action for the first time. The pass was one of the positions
which the Greek 12th Division was expected to hold, but the Greek
divisional headquarters, established at Siatista, could provide no
Greek infantry to supplement the anti-tank defence. However, two
good machine-gun detachments were sent and, later, a horsed battery
of Greek artillery arrived.

THE WESTERN FLANK 61

The Ist Armoured Brigade, very tired but still in good heart,
reached Grevena in the early hours of April 14th but the brigade was
now a brigade in name only and its chief losses were in armour. The
3rd Royal Tank Regiment, organized as one squadron, had only
13 cruisers left, most of the casualties being from broken tracks and
other defects, not from enemy action. The 4th Hussars was reduced
to 40 tanks fit for service and the Northumberland Hussars had lost
six anti-tanks guns: in the affray near Komanos, however, Lieutenant
Trippier’s troop had lost only one gun, one portée and one truck.
The Ist Rangers could now muster about half its original fighting
strength, and was short of weapons and equipment. The 2nd R.H.A.,
after three days’ fighting, reported two men wounded, an expenditure
of 3,100 rounds of ammunition, and four vehicles and one motor-
cycle abandoned in the retreat. Observers had spoken with admira-
tion of the splendid order in which the regiment came out of action
after the most gruelling time.

It will be remembered that the 64th Medium Regiment R.A. had
been sent to Servia to support the Australian division. Directed to
the Portas Pass, south of Servia, the regiment found nearly all the
available positions occupied by the 7th Medium Regiment, com-
paratively late arrivals in Greece who had only reached the forward
area on April 11th. At first only two troops of the 64th could come
into action, but reconnaissance for other positions began without delay.

As we knew the 4th New Zealand Brigade was established at
Servia and the 19th Australian Brigade, whose two battalions had
lost so heavily at Vevi, was taking up positions opposite Servia on
the western side of the Aliakmon. Since there was no bridge in their
rear to enable them to be supplied and reinforced or, if necessary,
withdrawn, across the river, they began to construct two light
bridges. Servia and the road junction about three miles beyond were
of vital importance, for penetration here would place the enemy in
rear of the whole Olympus position on the main road to the plain of
Thessaly and Larissa. General Blamey therefore strengthened the
defence by bringing across the 26th New Zealand Battalion from the
coastal sector to take up a position on the right of the 19th Australian
Brigade west of the river. Here the New Zealanders were in visual
contact with their own 4th Brigade on the opposite bank.

In the mountains between the 4th New Zealand Brigade above
Servia and the 5th at Olympus was the 16th Australian Brigade which
had arrived from Verria. Its position seemed immune from attack
except by the hardjest of mountaineers but the problem of supply
was a difficult one: no motor transport could be used and only a few
mules and donkeys were to be obtained.

62 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

On the morning of April 13th a German mountain division was
reported to be arriving at Verria, and the enemy’s advance towards
the lower Aliakmon was now developing. The road bridge and the
railway bridge between Guida and the sea had been blown, and the
New Zealand cavalry (armoured cars, carriers and motor-cycles)
watched the crossings. They had the close support of a troop of the
Sth New Zealand Field Regiment. During the afternoon of April 12th
some German motor-cyclists who approached this road bridge were
scattered by the fire of Bren guns ; a column of vehicles further in rear
was engaged by the New Zealand gunners at dusk. Next morning the
enemy came on in some strength. The fire of the New Zealand cavalry
was concentrated upon infantry near the road, and the admirable,
well-controlled shooting of the 25-pounders checked German pro-
gress for a time. The river was 100 yards wide and the infantry found
it difficult to make the passage in rubber boats, but, after becoming
exposed to the fire of tanks and artillery, our thin cavalry screen was
withdrawn early in the afternoon. At night the New Zealanders were
in position behind a tank-ditch ten miles south of the river crossings.

m4 le
Retreat in Albania; Our Need to Withdraw

On April 13th the Greek retreat from Albania had begun in earnest
and Koritsa, the first great prize of the autumn victories, was
evacuated. This movement was carried out without the slightest inter-
ference from the Italians who were actually unaware of the departure
of the Greeks until twenty-four hours later. But, as had been feared,
the beginning of the withdrawal from these gloriously won positions
was fatal to the staying power of the Greek armies. They had shown
that they could resist and overcome an enemy offensive and maintain
with spirit and enterprise an offensive of their own. They could cope
with bitter weather and some of the most uninviting terrain in
Europe. But to retreat from an enemy they had beaten, along a single
road packed with transport vehicles of every kind and swarms of
refugees, constantly dive-bombed and machine-gunned from the air,
and to maintain their cohesion and fighting spirit through it all was
not to be expected.

The breakdown of the armies retreating from Albania undoubtedly
affected the morale of the Central Macedonian Army as the Greek
12th and 20th Divisions were termed. As we know, these divisions
had never been much more than brigades in strength, and had always

THE WESTERN FLANK 63

lacked supporting arms and adequate transport. Their new position
was on the left of the 1st Armoured Brigade, linking up with the
armies now drawing back across the Albanian frontier, but whether
they were capable of holding it was another matter. If the Germans
could thrust down through Kastoria they might outflank the Ist
Armoured Brigade at Grevena, but this danger does not seem to have
been imminent. However, General Wilson believed that the western
portion of the Anglo-Greek front extending from Mount Olympus
to the Albanian frontier was unlikely to hold in face of a serious
attack, even if it were not already on the point of dissolving. He con-
ferred with General Blamey on the evening of the 13th, and then
decided to withdraw to the Thermopylae position, a distance of over
one hundred miles.

Looking south at central Greece from the direction of Macedonia,
all roads appear to converge upon Larissa which stands in the centre
of the plain of Thessaly. If the Germans could once push their
armoured forces—superior both in quantity and quality—through
the crust of mountains into the ‘soft’ country beyond, before General
Wilson’s forces had made good their withdrawal from the Olympus
line, the whole Anglo-Greek army would be in danger of destruction.
The supreme achievement in war, the achievement which makes
Cannae, Tannenberg and Tunis classic masterpieces of battle, is the
defeat and annihilation of the enemy where he stands. On the morn-
ing of April 14th the possibility of such a victory may well have
occurred to the German Command.

Of the roads which lead down from the north to Larissa that from
Kozani crosses the Aliakmon river near Servia and reaches Elasson
by way of the Portas pass. This is the only one which can be dignified
by the name of a modern road. The route from the Aliakmon mouth
and Katerini over the Olympus pass to Elasson is very inferior. And,
east of the mountain, the coastal route which follows the railway and
turns inland through the vale of Tempe tq reach Larissa from the
north-east is no better. Each of these routes passes through, on the
mountain barrier, a natural defensive position against which there
would be difficulty in deploying large numbers, whether of troops or
armoured vehicles. The attacker could count upon no swift
penetration.

But there was the fourth possibility which General Wilson had in
mind. A road reaches Larissa from the west by Trikkala, which is
linked with Kalabaka, on the fringe of the plain; and Kalabaka is
connected by an indifferent but possible road with Grevena, thirty
miles to the north. Von List might well decide upon an advance
through and beyond Grevena where resistance might be expected to

64 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

be of no great strength. Such an advance, although it would set a
considerable administrative problem, possessed further advantages
for the Germans. By coming south down the road from Kastoria to
Grevena their forces would soon be in rear of the Greek front in
Albania. Clearly a concentrated effort west of the Olympus mountain
passes offered the prospect of big results.

CHAPTER VI

The Olympus Position

om [1]

Left Flank Guard

IN the course of the morning of April 14th, columns of enemy
transport were observed moving westward from Amyntaion and
Ptolemais towards Klisoura which was in German hands before noon.
In the better weather R.A.F. Blenheims and Hurricanes were em-
ployed to bomb and machine-gun these columns and certainly helped
to delay their progress. Three Greek battalions were relied upon to
hold Argos, south of Lake Kastoria, which was likely to be the next
German objective. Meanwhile we despatched as many lorries as could
be spared to Yanina to help in the evacuation of the ten Greek divi-
sions still in southern Albania.

The Ist Armoured Brigade harboured at Grevena on the 14th, the
only troops north of the Aliakmon being the battery of Northumber-
land Hussars who held the Metamorfosis Pass with their anti-tank
guns. The battery was attacked in the afternoon, German infantry
advancing with the support of mortar fire, but the Hussars, ably
assisted by the Greek machine-gunners and field battery, held their
own. At nightfall, however, the Germans began to occupy an un-
finished anti-tank ditch near the mouth of the pass. The defenders
then pulled out and retreated to Grevena, the rickety bridge over the
Aliakmon being blown by the 3rd (Cheshire) Field Squadron as soon
as they had crossed.

During the day the Ist Armoured Brigade in the Grevena region
had been heavily attacked from the air. The transport, closely con-
centrated in a gorge a little way to the south, presented, as was said
by one who was present, ‘the best bombing target the Germans can
have enjoyed since France’. Our only defence was provided by the
155th Light A.A. Battery, and it is therefore not surprising that

c® 65

66 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

considerable damage was done by the bombs and machine-guns of
the Luftwaffe.

The 1st Armoured Brigade was not well placed at Grevena to fight
a rearguard action and its powers of resistance were so diminished
that General Wilson was obliged to take further measures to safe-
guard his left flank. Brigadier Charrington received orders to with-
draw to the line of the Venetikos river—a tributary of the Aliakmon
—about five miles further south, the movement to begin at midnight.
The 17th Australian Brigade, which had now arrived in Greece, was
to concentrate in the Kalabaka area in a reserve position. The brigade
was commanded by Brigadier S. G. Savige and consisted of the 2/5th,
2/6th and 2/7th Battalions: to it would be attached a battery of the
64th Medium Regiment R.A., some anti-tank guns, seven cruisers
of the 3rd R. Tank Regiment, and an Australian machine-gun com-
pany. As it happened, transport difficulties had delayed the arrival of
the troops at Larissa. Owing to break-down on the railway from
Athens, neither the 2/6th nor 2/7th Battalions arrived until April 16th,
and by that time they were urgently required elsewhere. So the 2/11th
Battalion from the 19th Australian Brigade was added to make up,
in part, for this deficiency. When Brigadier Savige arrived at Kalabaka
at 11.30 p.m. on April 14th most of ‘Savige Force’, as finally con-
stituted, was present.

» [2 ]«
At the Passes

AT the Servia position the 4th New Zealand Brigade was dug in on
a line from the village of Kastania to Rimnion, part of the front pre-
senting an almost clear view of Servia village, the Aliakmon crossings,
and the road from Kozani along which the German armour must
come. Behind the New Zealanders the road, turning south-east
through the Portas Pass, ran for nearly eight miles between rocky
walls nearly 4,000 feet high.

On the left beyond the Aliakmon the 19th Australian Brigade had
in position the 2/4th and 2/8th Battalions, both very weak in numbers
and the 26th New Zealand Battalion. Its 2/11th Battalion had been
taken for Savige Force. In the mountains to the right of the New
Zealanders was the 16th Australian Brigade.

The Servia area was heavily bombed from the air at intervals during
the 14th, but the damage inflicted was slight. In the morning the
9th Panzer Division entered Kozani and moved south-eastward to-
wards the Aliakmon crossing at Servia. The distance from Kozani to

THE OLYMPUS POSITION 67

the river was little more than ten miles, but the German advance
proved to be unexpectedly slow—a tribute, perhaps, to the effective-
ness of our demolitions. Towards evening the head of the column
approached the river where the bridge had been blown by the New
Zealand engineers, and came to a halt. The hostile artillery had
opened in reply to ours, but the firing died down as darkness fell.

Further to the east the 5th New Zealand Brigade which held the
Olympus passes was also in contact with the enemy. The New
Zealand cavalry regiment, retiring before a force of all arms, came in
during the afternoon, having lost two troopers killed, one motor-
cycle destroyed, and one carrier abandoned through a mechanical
defect. German aircraft had made little attempt to interfere with the
movements of the regiment.

The demolitions at the entrance to the main Olympus pass which
carries the Katerini-Elasson road were blown as soon as the New
Zealand cavalry had passed through. Two hours later, about 5 p.m.,
forward posts of the 22nd New Zealand Battalion saw the head of a
German column which was not fired on and soon disappeared from
view. A number of enemy aircraft flew over to reconnoitre before
darkness fell. Then, about 11 p.m., some motor-cyclists rode boldly up
the road and, when they had almost reached the edge of the demoli-
tions, the New Zealanders opened fire. Next morning five wrecked
motor-cycles were found in front of the position—but no Germans.
The remainder of the night was enlivened by bursts of machine-gun
fire to which the defenders did not reply.

On the seaward side of Mount Olympus runs the road which is
the shortest way to Larissa : the classic avenue of approach for invad-
ing armies. Here the railway passes through the Platamon tunnel.
Demolitions had been prepared in order to wreck both road and rail-
way though it was not to be expected that the enemy would be
checked for long by these measures. Unfortunately the work of
destruction had to be confided to an Army Troops company of New
Zealand sappers which was short of its proper equipment. For mak-
ing an impression in solid rock a pickaxe is a sorry substitute for a
pneumatic drill. Before nightfall the 21st New Zealand Battalion
which was defending the pass reported the advance of some 80 tanks
and 150 other vehicles along the coastal road. Thereupon the demoli-
tions were blown. A series of explosions blew away the face of the
ravine and completely blocked the road, but the attempts upon the
tunnel were not so successful. The first brought down the brick lining
but did little damage to the rock and the second produced better but
not very effective results. Throughout the night the heavy rumble of
battle traffic could be heard in the New Zealand posts, and it seemed

y.
Z
—

THE OLYMPUS POSITION 69

almost certain that with the coming of daylight a heavy attack would
be delivered along the coast.

On the evening of this day General Papagos issued a directive
which defined a new defensive position running from sea to sea:
Mount Olympus passes—Servia—southern bank of the Venetikos
river—Mount Smolikas—Greco-Albanian frontier—sea south of
Santi Quaranta. It is difficult to understand the purpose of the Greek
Commander-in-Chief who at this time was not credited by us with so
optimistic a view of the Allied situation. At British Headquarters
where, so far as was known, Greek resistance south of Kastoria was
crumbling away, there were no illusions regarding the state of the
Greek armies. No one believed that the Allies could stand upon the
line described above. General Wilson, as we know, had already
decided that a retreat to the Thermopylae position was the only
course, and, as a preliminary measure, the Royal Air Force was
instructed to evacuate its airfields around Larissa and to move back
to the southern fringe of the Thessalian plain. It was accepted that
the base at Larissa could not be cleared of heavy stores and equip-
ment, since all available transport would be needed for the movement
of the troops.

It was on this day, too, that the Joint Planning Staff in Cairo began
to prepare a scheme for the evacuation of General Wilson’s force
from Greece, although evacuation had not yet been mentioned to
General Wilson, either by the Greeks or by Middle East Command.

As though it had read the minds of the Allied Commanders the
German propaganda machine seized upon the probability of a
British evacuation, and on April 15th proceeded to capitalize it with
some skill. Following an early morning report on the Swiss radio to
the effect that the evacuation of General Wilson’s force was begin-
ning, Dr. Goebbels’s chorus got to work. The theme was developed
on the lines that the British had, as usual, stirred up a small people
to fight their battles for them ; and now, after sending an insignificant
force to Greece, they were preparing to run away, leaving the Greek
troops to protect them from the righteous wrath of the German
Army. The attitude towards the Greeks was one more of sorrow than
of anger, and it was generally implied that if they saw fit to speed, or
at any rate dissociate themselves from, the parting guest all might yet
be forgiven and forgotten. But for the British retribution would be
swift and sure.

70 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE
»([3 ]«

Attack from the Air

On this day, April 15th, communications from the front began to
fail, and little news was received from the localities where our forces
were in contact with the Germans. Even less was known of the situa-
tion of the Greeks on the western flank. Actually we held our own at
the passes, but the day was an unfortunate one owing to the crippling
losses suffered by the R.A.F.

During the bad weather which had accompanied the first week of
the German offensive R.A.F. aircraft had been repeatedly in action,
on several days having the skies to themselves and flying in weather
in which the Luftwaffe did not attempt to take the air. The first day’s
action, when twelve Hurricanes were reported to have shot down five
ME 109’s out of a flight of twenty without loss to themselves, was
most encouraging, and on the following days our bombers repeatedly
attacked the main line of the German advance, first of all in the
Strumitsa pass and later along the Prilep-Monastir road in southern
Yugoslavia. But the second week opened with clear skies. On Easter
Sunday, April 13th, when the Armoured Brigade fought its tank
action at Proastion, a formation of six Blenheims of No. 211 Squadron,
which had carried out the first raid of the war in the Middle East ten
months earlier, set out with the task of holding up the German
advance by a bombing attack on the road through the. Monastir gap.
None of them returned. As they emerged from dense cloud on the
way to their target a number of ME 109’s attacked them and
destroyed every one. It was a tragic foretaste of what was in store.

The disaster of April 15th was of a different nature. Our advanced
airfields had been distributed over the broad Thessalian plain, now
drying after the winter rains. At dawn the German aircraft swept out
of the northern sky. The observer system which had been arranged
in liaison with the Greeks had now broken down and our aircraft
were caught on the ground. They were insufficiently camouflaged
and too closely concentrated, and the A.A. defence was quite
inadequate.

Every one of the 16 Blenheims at the Niamata satellite airfield was
destroyed on the ground, as were 14 Hurricanes at Larissa aerodrome.
It was a grievous loss. Air Vice-Marshal D’Albiac, who was at
Larissa at the time, promptly ordered all R.A.F. units back to the
airfields in the neighbourhood of Athens—a decision which, in any
case, could not have been postponed more than a few hours in view
of the imminence of the retreat of our ground forces. And, as a

THE OLYMPUS POSITION 71

consequence, it was no longer practicable for the air force to provide
any assistance to the army except some measure of fighter defence
in the back areas. A second unfortunate result of the withdrawal
would be the concentration of our remaining aircraft upon the two
or three airfields available, thereby offering some tempting targets to
the German attackers.

Throughout the day enemy aircraft, freed for the time being from
all fear of interruption by our fighters, continued remorselessly to
bomb Larissa, whence the railway workers fled. The wretched town,
already wrecked by an earthquake in March, was suffering now from
its unfortunate position as a nodal point of numerous roads along
which the British must retreat. The more the Germans could crater
the streets and block them with rubble, the greater would be the
delay that they might expect to impose upon our wheeled traffic and
therefore the brighter their prospect of throwing our forces into a
state of chaos and destroying them before ever they made good their
withdrawal to the Thermopylae position.

On our western flank the Ist Armoured Brigade had left the area
of Grevena at midnight, April 14th/15th, to gain the line of the
Venetikos river. This withdrawal was not molested by the German
ground forces and the distance to be covered did not amount to more
than six or seven miles ; yet it took the column sixteen hours to reach
its new position. The road was appalling. South of Grevena a narrow
gorge could only take one line of traffic, and the whole route was
encumbered by Greek and Yugoslav transport and marching men,
dead horses, broken wagons and debris of all kinds, for the Luftwaffe
had already been busy here, and our own vehicles had suffered
equally with those of our Allies. As day broke and the long column
emerged from the gorge on to high exposed ground the German dive-
bombers came again. Fortunately they were attracted chiefly by the
bridge over the Venetikos and had departed by the time the brigade
made the winding descent to the river and crossed to the southern
bank. Few casualties and little damage had been sustained, though
the sorely over-worked 155th was the only anti-aircraft battery in
action.

The position on the Venetikos was held by the Rangers with two
companies and one in reserve, supported by the New Zealand
machine-gunners, the 2nd R.H.A., and the Northumberland Hussars
with their anti-tank guns. The 4th Hussars, which had been acting
as rearguard, came back through the rain at nightfall to report that
the Germans had not yet approached Grevena.

It was now evident that the Central Macedonian Army was in-
capable of organized resistance and Brigadier Charrington reported

72 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

as much to G.H.Q. But his own brigade was officially described as
having ‘ceased to exist as an aggressive fighting formation’. Cer-
tainly, as an armoured force it could hardly be said to exist, for it was
shedding broken-down tanks with every movement it made. The
attached artillery was in much better case for the 102nd Anti-Tank
Regiment (Northumberland Hussars) had lost only six guns, and the
R.H.A. was said to be ‘as good as ever’.

Savige Force was now moving into position near Kalabaka, and

for the moment, at least, there appeared to be an easement of the
pressure against Wilson’s western flank. As will presently be seen,
the chief danger was to come from the east.
’ In the morning was issued the formal order for withdrawal to the
Thermopylae position which would be conducted by General Blamey,
commanding the Anzac Corps, leaving General Wilson free to confer
upon questions of policy with the Greek Commander-in-Chief and
the Greek Government. The first phase was to begin that same
evening—the evening of April 15th—when the 19th Australian
Brigade and the 6th New Zealand Brigade, the reserve to its own
New Zealand Division, were to move back to covering positions.

This Australian brigade, which comprised only two weak batta-
lions, with the 26th New Zealand Battalion attached, was not in
contact with the Germans during the day although, from its position
on the high ground beyond the Aliakmon on the left of the New
Zealand Division, it had seen some enemy movement. It came back
at night over the improvised bridges which had been constructed in
its rear, but there was no suitable bridge for the passage of the eleven
guns of the Ist Australian Anti-Tank Regiment, which had fought
with the brigade at Vevi. These weapons had to be destroyed on the
spot.

The ultimate destination of the 19th Australian Brigade was
Dhomokos, on the southern edge of the Thessalian plain, where a
strong rearguard was to be assembled under the command of
Brigadier J. E. Lee. This force would include the 2/4th and 2/8th
Battalions (19th Australian Brigade); the newly arrived 2/6th and
2/7th Battalions belonging to Savige’s 17th Australian Brigade; and
the 2/1st Australian Field Regiment which had not yet been in action.
It was April 17th before all these troops arrived.

The New Zealand divisional cavalry was already guarding the
Elasson—Dhiskata road against enemy movement eastward from
Grevena. Enemy aircraft bombed and machine-gunned the area
without much effect. The 6th New Zealand Brigade went back to
the Elasson area to come into position covering the two roads south
of the town,

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THE OLYMPUS POSITION 73
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The Fighting at the Passes

AT the Servia Pass the 4th New Zealand Brigade was engaged with
the 9th Panzer Division whose infantry had crossed the Aliakmon
river during the night, presumably in readily portable assault boats.
Before dawn of the 15th a party of Germans came up the road in loose |
formation after the manner of Greek soldiery for whom they were
at first mistaken. Some got by the New Zealand advanced posts before
the 19th Battalion opened fire and, with the support of its own
mortars and the Australian machine-guns, settled the affair. Repeated
attacks by dive-bombers followed and the German artillery pounded
away, but all with no avail. At noon and again at 5.45 p.m. infantry
assaults were repulsed, some of the enemy choosing to wave white
flags from their positions on the rocky hill-sides rather than to with-
draw under fire. Thus the New Zealanders were able to collect about
two hundred prisoners, some of them wounded, and the,German
total losses were reckoned at four hundred. Two New Zealanders
were killed and six wounded.

As close support for the infantry attacks the German bombers had
failed completely, and the German artillery had made little impres-
sion. On the other hand, the accurate and well-controlled fire of the
New Zealand field guns and British medium batteries had hampered
the enemy’s artillery and prevented the bridging of the Aliakmon.
All that the Germans gained by their efforts on this day was posses-
sion of the village of Servia which, although on our side of the river,
was well outside our defences.

Next on the right, among the mountains between the Servia Pass
and the Olympus Pass, the 16th Australian Brigade was not engaged.
It had orders to move to Zarkhon where it would cover the line of
retreat of the Ist Armoured Brigade and Savige Force which were
expected to move back through Kalabaka and Trikkala as the
withdrawal proceeded.

At the centre, or main, pass of the Olympus mountain, the fighting
started soon after dawn with artillery registration by the New Zealand
gunners and then quick bursts of fire on enemy vehicles and infantry
assembling in front of the 22nd New Zealand Battalion which was
astride the road. German tanks then sought a covered approach to the
position by turning up a track which brought them under the fire of
mortars and machine-guns supporting the 28th (Maori) Battalion
holding the mountain slopes further to the left. Later in the morning
other vehicles were seen to leave the main road and disperse, but no

74 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

serious attack developed against the 5th New Zealand Brigade. The
German guns which opened at about 4.30 p.m. killed two men of the
22nd Battalion but otherwise produced little effect.

At the Platamon tunnel the 21st (Auckland) Battalion was sub-
jected to something of an ordeal, for the Germans had been preparing
throughout the night for an attack on the morning of April 15th. In
the open plain which lay in front of the New Zealand position fresh
_ enemy forces continued to assemble, and our outposts could see the
flash of moving lights (the enemy could afford to ignore the possibili-
ties of air attack) and even in some cases hear the guttural shouting
of orders. The situation of the defenders was by no means satisfac-
tory.Although they had done everything that was possible the tunnel
was not seriously damaged, and the enemy appeared to be mustering
in great strength for the assault against one solitary battalion. How-
ever, the New Zealanders enjoyed the advantage of excellent observa-
tion posts and of ground which would limit the number of armoured
vehicles which could be deployed against them.

Daybreak brought the opening of a German artillery bombard-
ment, to which the New Zealand guns replied. Then tanks and
infantry began to move forward. It was estimated that as many as
150 tanks were seen in the course of the day, but despite this weight
of armour the German attacks met with practically no success. There
is little doubt that on this occasion the enemy was over-encumbered
with armoured fighting vehicles, which could not be deployed on a
broad front ; and, when they were knocked out or broke down, they
hampered the movements and limited the area of manceuvre of the
columns which followed.

So the New Zealanders were able to hold all attacks, with
few casualties to themselves. Only on the left did the Germans
succeed in gaining some ground, infiltrating in small bodies up into
the foothills of Olympus and temporarily occupying a village
which was within our defences. A counter-attack expelled them
before darkness set in, but the night promised to be another anxious
one.

To avert disaster it was essential that our forces should make good
their retreat through Larissa and cross the open plain with as little
delay as possible to Lamia. This was the main route to the Thermo-
pylae position. General Blamey, however, hoped that some of his
forces would be able to by-pass Larissa by making use of two secon-
dary roads, one on the west which led south-eastwards from Trikkala
by Kharditsa to Pharsala ; and one on the eastern flank, by Volos and
then down the coast. Every effort was to be made to keep all routes
clear of Greek troops, since congestion was likely to be bad enough

THE OLYMPUS POSITION 75

in any case; and it was, of course, understood that the Thermopylae
position would be held by our forces alone.

The dispositions for safeguarding the left flank were as complete
as they could be; but the two brigades of the New Zealand Division
holding the Olympus passes would be obliged to accept battle on the
morrow and the day after. Then, on the night of April 17th/18th they
must break contact with the enemy and come away with all speed.
They were expected to retire through Larissa and thence by the road
to Volos and so down the coast, but a reconnaissance by a New
Zealand staff officer subsequently revealed that this road was not
good enough for the ‘shuttle service’ of trucks required to get the
two brigades away. So, plans had to be redrafted hurriedly. There
was nothing for it but that the New Zealanders must be committed
to the main Lamia road, to swell the stream of battle traffic in retreat.
On this afternoon German aircraft carried out a heavy raid on Volos
and did much damage.

On April 16th the only heavy fighting occurred at the Platamon
tunnel where, perhaps, we had over-estimated the strength of our
position and under-estimated the fighting quality of the German
mountain troops. Certainly a single battalion could not be expected
to hold this gap indefinitely, although it was reckoned that no more
troops could be spared for the task..

The left flank of the 21st New Zealand Battalion had been heavily
engaged by a strong German patrol during the night, and shortly
after dawn the enemy attacked in this quarter with a battalion of
infantry supported by mortar and artillery fire. After holding on for
three hours the left company of the New Zealanders was forced to
give ground, which resulted in the withdrawal of the centre and right
companies to a reserve position south of the tunnel. Even so it
became more and more difficult to prevent parts of the thin line from
being over-run or cut off. All movement was harassed by artillery fire
and by the attacks of tanks which were driven boldly up the steep
hillsides. Soon after 10 a.m. Lieut-Colonel N. L. Macky, the batta-
lion commander, signalled to the Corps that his position was un-
tenable, and, in reply, was told to fall back towards the river Pinios,
demolishing the road as he went.

The intention was to occupy for a time a ridge about a mile south
of the tunnel, but the German pressure was too great. While the
carriers kept the enemy infantry at bay with Bren gun fire the retreat
was continued until the battalion was beyond the range of the
German artillery. The four guns of the 27th New Zealand Field
Battery came safely out of action. At length Macky’s command
reached the gorge where the Pinios river emerges from the mountains

76 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

to flow into the sea.! Here a bridge had been destroyed, but a
ferry was in use—a flat-bottomed barge pulled to and fro by hand-
ropes. The banks of the river were between twenty and thirty feet
high, so light vehicles and guns could only be embarked and landed
with great difficulty. The artillery tractors and limbers were driven
over the undecked railway bridge after sleepers had been closely
placed side by side across the rails. When all had crossed, extensive
demolitions were carried out on road and railway. The ferry was
sunk, ‘but not before a large flock of sheep and goats and their two
shepherdesses had been ferried across’.

Despite the enemy’s efforts to smash his way through, the New
Zealanders had got back in comparatively good order from Plata-
mon. Although much equipment had been abandoned the little force
had brought away all its guns and had lost only one officer and
thirty-five men

During the passage of the river, Brigadier C. A. Clowes, command-
ing the Corps artillery, had arrived. He was sent by General Blamey
to see what could be done to protect our coastal flank where a
German penetration would jeopardize the whole plan of withdrawal.
Already reinforcements had been bespoken. They were to come from
the 16th Australian Brigade, which had begun to withdraw from the
mountains between Olympus and Servia, its destination the western
flank. When the leading battalion, the 2/2nd, reached Elasson it was
diverted eastward to the Pinios gorge. Other units were to follow, for,
whatever else happened, the western end of the gorge must be held.

In darkness and drizzling rain the 21st New Zealand Battalion
moved up the gorge which is known as the Vale of Tempe. It is about
five miles in length with steep banks rising on either side, the Pinios
river, deep and flowing swiftly, being about thirty-five yards wide.
Battalion headquarters was established at the village of Tempe. One
company covered the road three miles forward in the gorge.

At the Olympus pass the men in the forward posts of the 22nd New
Zealand Battalion, which was astride the main road, heard Germans
calling out in English during the night. It was thought that by this
means the enemy hoped to draw fire, so no action was taken ; but next
morning came the discovery that the shouts were a ruse to distract
attention from the cutting of wire and the lifting of mines. The 22nd
was attacked soon after dawn, but when our mortars, and the guns
of the 5th New Zealand Field Regiment opened fire the enemy with-
drew. Tanks and other vehicles were then seen to be advancing, the
demonstration—it was hardly more than that—covering the forward
movement of mortars and infantry guns. These weapons, cleverly

1See Map 4.

THE OLYMPUS POSITION 77

sited, soon became troublesome. Their fire appeared to herald the
launching of another infantry attack up the rocky hillsides. Far back
towards Katerini, the road was thickly crowded with battle traffic,
and German tanks turned off right and left wherever the ground
seemed favourable for movement. There were many targets for our
guns on the fronts of the 22nd and of the 28th (Maori) Battalion
which held the left of the brigade position, and about a dozen German
vehicles were hit. Tanks which opened upon one of our infantry posts
at a range of 400 yards were driven back by the fire of our artillery
and mortars.

By eleven o’clock rain shrouded the hillsides and half an hour later
a luminous mist had reduced visibility to 300 yards. This by no means
favoured the defence, for the enemy infantry took advantage of the
obscurity to work their way forward along the whole front. About
3 p.m. the mist lifted for a while on the left, and the Maoris saw
parties of Germans entering the Mavroneri ravine with the intention
of moving along it round the left of the brigade line. Bren gun fire at
1,200 yards produced little effect. On the right the 23rd Battalion lost
a post near a small village, but another thrust was not successful and
cost the Germans twenty killed. On the extreme right in very broken
country they worked round the flank almost unseen; and although
a counter-attack succeeded, the New Zealanders found that their
opponents were not shaken off.

Orders had been received for the brigade to withdraw to the top
of the pass at night, for such a movement, while giving little away to
the Germans, would greatly facilitate the main withdrawal when the
time came. The Maoris began to carry back part of their impedimenta
late in the afternoon. Their left company, in mist and falling rain,
could see little of the scrub-covered hillsides below them, but managed
to check by fire the advance of German mountain troops who had
thrust forward in some strength. Covered by machine-gun and mortar
fire the enemy attacked and overran one section post, but the Maori
counter-attack was successful. Owing to these exchanges the with-
drawal of the battalion, over a difficult route, was somewhat delayed
and a number of men did not get back. The Maoris lost four killed
and eighteen missing on this day but inflicted many casualties on the
Germans.

The other two battalions had less difficulty in breaking contact
except on the extreme right flank where the Germans were so close.
Coming back over the shoulder of Mount Olympus the 23rd had to
climb to 2,000 feet over narrow tracks slippery with mud and slush.
Nine anti-tank 2-pdr. guns had to be tipped over the cliff; also ten
of the battalion carriers and twenty trucks could not be brought

78 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

away. The men of the brigade struggled on for most of the night, only
discarding equipment when they could carry it no longer; but arms
and ammunition were retained and the tracks and roads behind them
were blown in. It had been an anxious day with artillery and tanks
playing a diminishing part as the weather closed down, while the well-
trained German infantry sought to exploit conditions which favoured
an unseen advance. Yet the Sth New Zealand Brigade still held the
pass.

CHAPTER VII

Retreat to Thermopylae

om[ 1 lo
The First Two Days

AT the Servia pass the battalions of the 4th New Zealand Brigade
made some alterations in their dispositions. An artillery duel con-
tinued throughout April 16th across the Aliakmon, but only a single
German patrol made any attempt to approach the New Zealand
posts. Late in the day the battery of the 64th Medium Regiment
pulled out of action : owing to the rain and the mud and the difficult
exits from the gun positions this business occupied nearly eight hours.

In case his New Zealanders in the Olympus positions should be
pressed hard by armoured forces when their retreat began, General
Freyberg gave orders for a covering detachment to occupy a position
at Elevtherokhori where the main road from Olympus meets that
from Servia. At this important junction were assembled in the eve-
ning three platoons of New Zealand carriers, some anti-tank guns and
some machine-guns under the command of Lieut.-Colonel C. S. J.
Duff of the 7th New Zealand Anti-Tank Regiment.

As for the western flank, Brigadier Savige had made his disposi-
tions near Kalabaka where he waited for the Ist Armoured Brigade
to come through. His chief trouble arose from the stream of Greek
soldiery, mostly unarmed and in no sort of order, which filled the
roads and caused a certain amount of disturbance in Kalabaka
where some looting occurred. Yet it is said that these Greeks were, on
the whole, ‘a good humoured lot’.

At daybreak the Ist Armoured Brigade had started off on its march
from the Venetikos to Kalabaka. It proved to be a slow and difficult
journey. The road, optimistically described on the ordnance map as
‘motor, under construction’, proved to be little more than a mud
track winding through mountain country. Under any circumstances

79

80 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

it would have proved almost impassable to a mechanized force; and
the cratering caused by the previous day’s bombing, in addition to
the burned-out wrecks of Greek lorries and our own second-echelon
transport, helped further to slow down progress. From the Venetikos
to Kalabaka is only thirty miles, perhaps a good day’s march for a
fully motorized column. Yet by midnight, after something like
eighteen hours on the road the head of the brigade had only advanced
twelve miles, the rear only five miles. Progress would naturally be
faster once the column got its head out of the mountains on to the
straighter, clearer and better surfaced road across the plain; but the
time lost in the course of the day might prove a serious matter if
the New Zealand defence at the passes were to cave in against over-
whelming attack.

Yet to the men engaged in the retreat it was a blissful day, for it
poured with rain the whole time with very low clouds, which pre-
vented any road ‘straffing’ on the part of the Luftwaffe. The German
aircraft were, in fact, able to get into the air, but had to content them-
selves with bombing known targets such as Larissa.

After his original check at the Olympus passes von List seems to
have decided to exploit the western route to the Thessalian plain by
way of Kalabaka and Trikkala, advancing on the heels of the
Ist Armoured Brigade. But this decision could not at once be put into
effect. The 9th Panzer Division after its losses at Proastion was in no
condition to undertake an energetic pursuit, so the Sth Panzer
Division, which had taken part in the original breakthrough into
Yugoslavia, was moved south to carry out the operation. This im-
posed a delay which destroyed all prospect of cutting off any part of
the British force. It was not until April 15th that the bulk of the
division began to move down the road to the south. Not until
April 16th, when the British were moving towards Kalabaka, did the
Germans reach Grevena more than thirty miles to the north. And
south of Grevena the going appeared so bad, after British demoli-
tions and the bombing of the Luftwaffe had reinforced the work of
nature, that German military engineers were in some doubt as to
whether the passage could be attempted at all.

Enemy accounts take considerable credit for the march that
followed. The road was no doubt in much worse condition than when
our Ist Armoured Brigade passed over it a day or two earlier, and
the German reports described it as the worst that the Sth Panzer
Division had encountered. The engineers managed to throw up
bridges of a sort, and every man who could be spared from the wheel
of a vehicle aided in widening and otherwise improving the surface
of the road. Tanks and tractors were used to pull the lorries over the

RETREAT TO THERMOPYLAE 81

worst spots, and the whole operation was carried out with charac-
teristic German thoroughness and vigour. But it took the German
division three nights and two days to cover something under forty
miles from the Grevena district to Kalabaka. And from the point of
view of its effect upon the campaign the whole effort was a useless
expenditure of energy and ingenuity, for by the time that the head of
the German column emerged on the western fringe of the plain of
Thessaly the British force was well on its way to Thermopylae more
than a hundred miles distant.

Any satisfaction that might have derived from the successful defen-
sive fighting at Olympus and the freedom from interference by the
German air and ground forces of our troops in retreat was more than
counter-balanced by the dismal developments on the Greek front to
the west. The Greeks and the British were now hopelessly split
asunder and retreating along divergent lines. The Army of Central
Macedonia, like the Army of Thrace, had ceased to exist, and all the
Greek divisions north of Grevena had disintegrated and were scatter-
ing through the mountains. There remained only the Army of Epirus
under General Tsolakoglou, and that was in very low water. Its
ammunition was running short. Its commander had little heart left
for the fight. There was only one route of supply for the troops and
that was the road from the south through Yanina; and once the
British withdrawal to Thermopylae was completed that too would
be at the mercy of the Germans. That influential figure in Greck
politics, the Bishop of Yanina, was pressing the Prime Minister to
abandon the hopeless struggle.

On the morning of April 16th General Wilson had met General
Papagos in conference at Lamia. The Greek Commander-in-Chief
had nothing good to report, and at the end of the meeting suggested
that the time had come when, in order to avoid the devastation of the
country, the evacuation of the British Commonwealth forces
from Greece might be considered. Naturally, General Wilson lost no
time in reporting this suggestion to General Wavell in Cairo.

The rain and the mist which had preserved our troops from air
attack during the withdrawal on the previous day again came to our
assistance on the morning of Thursday, April 17th. Later in the day,
however, the skies cleared in some localities, and the Luftwaffe were
again in evidence, though the damage they did was small.

Not since the first clash at Vevi was there so little fighting on our
front, a testimony to the fashion in which our troops had broken
contact with the enemy and delayed his advance. For the retreat was
now in full swing, at the moment not greatly menaced by the German
ground forces except on the eastern flank where it seemed that the

82 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

enemy was about to make his attempt to break out from the Vale of
Tempe and advance in force down the road to Larissa.

The Vale of Tempe, a shady cleft parting the giants Olympus and
Ossa, is the Arcadia of northern Greece. In a land of treeless, sun-
dried hills Tempe is a veritable paradise of abundant foliage and cool
flowing water. It caught the imagination of antiquity and to the
classical Greeks it was the ‘happy valley’ of pastoral tranquillity and
innocence, where the Gods themselves sported carelessly and it was
always the Golden Age.

The description of Pliny, translated into the gracious Elizabethan
language of Philemon Holland, will not easily be matched:

. the most famous river Peneus, which arising near Gomphi,
runneth for five hundred stadia i in a woodie dale between Ossa and
Olympus, and halfe that way is navigable. In this course of his are
the places called Tempe, five miles in length, and almost an acre and a
half [sic] broad, where on both hands the hills arise by a gentle ascent
above the reach of man’s sight. Within-forth glideth Peneus by, in a
fresh green grove, clear as crystal glasse over the gravelly stones;
pleasant to behold for the grasse upon the bankes, and resounding
again with the melodious concert of the birds.

Yet this pastoral scene has often witnessed the tramp of armed
forces, and it was here that the Greeks under Leonidas had planned
to make their first stand against the Persian hordes of Xerxes:
planned but failed to execute, for the position could be turned by
a force coming over the Olympus Pass, where the Germans came and
the New Zealanders stood in 1941.

During the night of the 16th/17th the whole of the 16th Australian
Brigade was moving down from the mountains. The 2/2nd Battalion
arrived at the Vale of Tempe before dawn, but the 2/3rd, which was
following, did not reach the gorge until the afternoon of the 17th.
The 2/1st was too far in rear to be collected in time, although Allen,
the brigade commander who was to command at Tempe, spent half
the night trying to get in touch with it. He did not receive hls orders
until 2 a.m.

The two Australian battalions which did arrive were very tired.
They had had a harassing march before they were picked up by their
. transport, and their route to Tempe was then by way of poor bombed
Larissa where the traffic congestion was considerable and some of
the roads were blocked by the rubble of wrecked buildings: Brigadier
Allen arrived soon after midday by which time defence positions
were already being occupied. Covering the western end of the gorge
the New Zealand companies were on the lower slopes of Mount Ossa,

1 See Map 4.

RETREAT TO THERMOPYLAE 83

east of Tempe. One company was responsible for the road. The
2/2nd Australian Battalion protected the road and railway on the
left flank against attack across the river from Gonnos, the Australian
positions being on the western slopes of Mount Ossa near the village
of Evangeliamos. Later, one company was placed on the high ground
west of the road ; and when the 2/3rd Battalion came up the position
was extended still further to the west, the flank then resting south of
Parapotamos. But most of the 2/3rd was kept in reserve. Seven anti-
tank guns, Australian and New Zealand, and three troops of New
Zealand field artillery were in support of the infantry.

In the afternoon German patrols appeared. Troops and pack
animals were seen on the ridge above Gonnos, and in the evening the
enemy entered the village. That they had done so was verified by an
Australian patrol which crossed the river in a punt after dark: later
there was a brush with some Germans at the river passage.

On the New Zealand front a German tank was seen to come along
the railway in the gorge until stopped by a blocked tunnel. Towards
dusk fire from this tank and from German infantry caused casualties
to an Australian patrol. Poor radio reception, due to the mountainous
country delayed our gunners in engaging targets, but the 26th New
Zealand Battery kept the road and railway demolitions under
harassing fire during the night, and expended a number of rounds on
Gonnos where the enemy was showing lights. The German artillery
was not yet in action.

As the Germans in the Vale of Tempe were in the right rear of the
Sth New Zealand Brigade at the head of the Olympus Pass it was
judged necessary to withdraw this brigade without further delay. The
movement was carried out during the afternoon, the only interference
coming from German mountain troops who pressed the 23rd Batta-
lion rather hard and had to be held at bay by machine-gun fire while
the companies dribbled back. In mist and rain the brigade was con-
veyed in trucks to join the general retreat through Larissa and along
the Lamia road.

At the Servia pass the German artillery continued to bombard the
New Zealand positions, and when the mist lifted aircraft attacked.
But our guns were pulled out during daylight, and at 8 p.m. the
infantry began to withdraw. Before daylight of the 18th the brigade
convoys were well on their road south, a rearguard supplied by the
20th Battalion, with a detachment of New Zealand sappers, being
left to complete the demolitions.

On their way back the 5th and then the 4th New Zealand Brigades
passed through the New Zealand cavalry posted at Elevtherokhori;
but the regiment had left some carriers in the Dhiskata region and

84 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

sent some armoured cars to Allen Force. Duff Force, now no longer
needed, was disbanded, while the 6th New Zealand Brigade, south
of Elasson, made ready its demolitions and prepared to retreat when
orders to do so should be received. This brigade had been joined
during the day by detachments of the Sth New Zealand Field Regi-
ment from the Olympus pass, and of the 7th Medium Regiment from
Servia. The 26th New Zealand Battalion, which had parted company
from the 19th Australian Brigade, came through and spent the night
in rear of the 6th Brigade.

The retreat of the Ist Armoured Brigade had continued. Kalabaka
was reached during the morning, and here some misunderstanding
seems to have arisen. According to the orders of the Anzac Corps
the Ist Armoured Brigade was to cover Savige’s withdrawal, but
Charrington had received orders from G.H.Q. to go into reserve
forthwith at Ata Lanti, 170 miles away, behind the Thermopylae
position. Leaving a small detachment—Rangers and anti-tank guns
—to act as rearguard to Savige Force, the Ist Armoured Brigade
proceeded on its way through Trikkala, where it refuelled, and
towards Larissa. West of Larissa the premature destruction of a
bridge over the Pinios river compelled a detour over a track slippery
with mud ; but despite this delay, and another caused by an air-raid,
the column passed into the main stream of traffic at Larissa about
nightfall. Driving on through the darkness with blazing headlights—
it was our experience that the German dive-bombers never operated
at night—the head of the brigade reached Pharsala by midnight:
Pharsala where Caesar had overthrown Pompey and the forces of
the Roman Senate in one of the greatest battles of antiquity. The 4th
Hussars still had about thirty light tanks left, but the cruisers of the
3rd Royal Tank Regiment had been reduced to four as the result of
more losses through broken tracks.

Savige Force was left nearest to the enemy on the western flank
after the Ist Armoured Brigade had passed through Kalabaka. As
we know, the Germans were still some distance away, and, on receipt
of fresh orders, Brigadier Savige made preparations to withdraw
during the night. It seemed that his chief problem would be a traffic
problem.

As the British and Greek armies continued to withdraw along
diverging routes with an hourly widening gap between them, no
further co-operation was possible between the two Allies. The diffi-
culties of command were manifest. General Wilson was, in theory,
under the orders of the Greek Commander-in-Chief, but he had a
right of appeal to Middle East Command and a certain indefinable
responsibility regarding the use to which he committed the Australian

RETREAT TO THERMOPYLAE 85

and New Zealand troops in his force. It is probable too, that General
Papagos exercised a rather looser control, and hesitated to express
his views with quite the emphasis which he would have used in
addressing a commander of his own nation. Difficult as it is to ensure
the smooth working of such a command when all is going well, the
task is immeasurably more difficult when that command has been
hastily improvised to fight a delaying action against desperate odds
on the territory of one of the participants.

It was on this day that the remnants of the Yugoslav armies
surrendered at Sarajevo, depressing news for British and Greek alike.
But if the Greek morale was beginning to waver, it was not among
the fighting troops nor yet among the common people of city and
countryside that there was any sign of weakening.

The present writer, who passed the whole of this period in Athens
and its neighbourhood, had some opportunity of seeing the subtle
corrosive of defeatism at work. Athens, which remains as dis-
tinguished for the mercurial effervescence of its population now as
in the days of Saint Paul or Pericles, had begun to buzz with rumours
early in the week. The Ministry of Press and Propaganda, while
restraining all Press comment on the military situation, proved
singularly unsuccessful in discouraging the stories that were being
disseminated from day to day to the effect that the German forces
had shattered the Olympus position, that the British were already
making plans for a speedy withdrawal of all their forces, and that
they had requested the Greeks to cover their evacuation with their
army and fleet.

Wednesday, April 16th, and Thursday, April 17th, were among
the worst days in respect of defeatist rumours. It was said that the
British line had been fatally broken on the Olympus front, that the
Australian Division had been cut to pieces and that the Germans
were swarming over the Larissa plain. So far was this from the truth
that at this time no German troops had yet broken through to the
plain, the withdrawal was being conducted in good order and only
one of the three Australian brigades had suffered at all severely.

Athens was badly rattled during these days. One symptom of the
spirit now abroad was the tearing down of anti-German posters. On
the first day of the German attack a number of these had appeared,
the most effective being one which depicted Hitler as a butcher lead-
ing to slaughter a number of fat pigs—Poland, Denmark, Norway,
Holland, Belgium, France, Rumania and Bulgaria, and calling out
for more blood. Between nightfall on April 17th and dawn on
April 18th every one of these had disappeared from walls and

86 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

hoardings. It was never discovered who was responsible for this
significant gesture.

The tension in the capital was much heightened during these last
days by the appearance of slow-marching armed police who patrolled,
in groups of half a dozen as a rule, up and down the Athens streets.
This certainly did nothing to calm the general anxiety. Their somewhat
sinister presence suggested that the Government feared an impending
Germanophile coup d’état. There were actually rumours of some such
stroke on the Thursday and the names of the leading members of the
Government that was to seize power were bandied about.

In truth, there was now an urge, both in the Government and in
the Army Command to prepare for the inevitable, acting without
sanction of King or Premier, the former a loyal friend of Britain, the
latter a sick and disheartened man.

Papademas, Minister of War, was responsible on April 17th for
the issue of an order declaring further resistance impossible and giving
a free hand to the Generals to behave as they saw fit. The same day an
Army Order was published, releasing for a period of two months’
leave all those classes which were just about to be called up for mili-
tary service. This latter order was the first to become known, and
nothing did more to convince the nation that the Government con-
sidered that the game was up. Still more reprehensible was the con-
duct of Oeconomou, Minister of Communications, who took it upon
himself to issue instructions that, to prevent unnecessary loss of life,
the remaining Greek aircraft should be grounded and the petrol
dumps at Tatoi and Elevsis destroyed. The British Military Mission
fortunately received early news of this intention and was quick to
inform the King, who promptly secured the revocation of the order,
and British ground staff at the aerodromes succeeded in preventing
the intended sabotage ; but Oeconomou’s proposal is an indication of
the lengths to which some defeatists were prepared to go in order to -
bring the struggle in Greece to an abrupt end. The surrender of
Bakopoulos in eastern Macedonia at a time when his troops were still
fighting bravely in the frontier forts may be regarded either as prema-
ture, or as displaying a realistic view of the fate of Greece. There
were known to be other commanders who felt that a sufficient gesture
had been made in the face of the overwhelming strength of the
invaders, and that the Army should accept the situation and make
the best terms it could.

RETREAT TO THERMOPYLAE 87
om [2 ]«

The Rearguard Actions: Tempe—Elasson

FRIDAY, April 18th, a fine sparkling spring day, saw another crisis
pass. Our forces, though under constant air attack, were on their way
back across the plain of Thessaly, and were beginning to arrive upon
the Thermopylae position, their hazardous withdrawal through the
bottle-neck of Larissa being made possible by the stout resistance and
self-sacrifice of the rearguards.

At the Vale of Tempe the Australians and New Zealanders com-
prising Allen Force had orders to hold the German armour at the
exits from the gorge until nightfall. The German guns opened as soon
as it was light enough to see, shelling the positions of the 21st New
Zealand Battalion at the end of the defile and on the hillsides to the
east. German mortars opened from the other side of the river and
were engaged by the 26th New Zealand Field Battery.

About 7 a.m. German infantry moved down to the river from
Gonnos, and about a battalion was seen on the tracks leading west
from Gonnos towards the Elasson-Tirnavos road. An enemy
advance near Parapotamos came under our artillery fire but the left
of the 2/2nd Australian Battalion was threatened, and Australian
carriers protecting this flank suffered loss from the German mortars.

Before noon the 21st New Zealand Battalion became heavily
engaged, the enemy clearing away the road block in front of the
forward company. Tanks came through and knocked out an anti-
tank gun ; then supported by infantry they sprayed the forward slopes
of the Ossa massif with their fire. Other anti-tank guns claimed two
or three tanks before they were over-run as the New Zealand infantry
began to lose ground. The battalion began its retirement platoon by
platoon in a direction which was mainly eastward, past the village of
Ambelakia, the movement being covered by the fire of the field guns
which kept the tanks in check for a time. Unfortunately, the New
Zealanders found it impossible to reform or reorganize among the
maze of gullies on the upper slopes of Ossa, and they were now out
of touch with the Australian battalions in the centre and on the left.
Comparatively few had succeeded in joining the Australians.

About 3 p.m. the Germans made a fresh effort, after Allen’s head-
quarters on the railway had been bombed by about thirty-five air-
craft. While tanks advanced down the Larissa road from Tempe,
infantry, covered by machine-gun fire, waded the Pinios and crossed
it on rafts. Australian mortars and Bren guns checked this movement
and killed a fair number of Germans, but the tanks, now followed by

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RETREAT TO THERMOPYLAE 89

infantry, pressed on. Meanwhile the enemy were round the left flank
of the 2/2nd Australian Battalion and digging in south of the village
of Parapotamos. Covered by the fire from a number of carriers, the
left company of the 2/2nd with a company of the 2/3rd in position on
its left rear, were able to get back to the village of Makrikhori whence
a further withdrawal was made in trucks.

These two companies joined brigade headquarters, another com-
pany of the 2/3rd Battalion, some carriers, and some armoured cars
of the New Zealand cavalry, at a defile some six miles S.S.W. of
Tempe where road and railway crossed.

German tanks and infantry were now fanning out in the valley
near Evangeliamos, and the remnants of the 2/2nd Battalion were
forced back into the hills to the east. The carriers and armoured cars
and the New Zealand field guns engaged the enemy armour till night-
fall, covering the withdrawal of the infantry who’were near brigade
headquarters and enabling them to gain their trucks. The German
advance along the road stopped when darkness fell, though hostile
infantry were still in motion in the hills. Away to the east small parties
of New Zealanders and Australians were making painful progress
across the mountain ridges of Ossa towards the bomb-wrecked port
of Volos.

Allen Force—it was only a ‘brigade group’—had done its duty.
The German advance, made by the 2nd Panzer Division and the
6th Mountain Division, from the Vale of Tempe down the road to
Larissa had been held. Now all that remained of Allen Force, in
carriers, trucks and armoured cars, drove back cautiously through
the darkness with no lights showing towards Larissa. Less than three
miles north of the town the leading trucks came under fire from the
railway-crossing : a detachment of German Alpine troops had moved
wide round the western flank of Allen Force during the afternoon and
now blocked the road at this point. It seemed to our men, watching
the tracer bullets and flares, that Larissa must be in enemy hands, so
most of the column turned back. Then in the darkness groups of
vehicles made off eastwards over farm tracks and sodden fields in an
endeavour to reach the port of Volos.

They arrived at Aiya which was found to be a dead end, a mountain-
side village from which only goat-tracks led southwards. Some of the
troops returned in the direction of Larissa, others took to the hills
and made their way as best they could towards the coast. Helped by
Greek peasants and fisher folk, some reached the sea-shore, acquired
caiques and fishing smacks, and, sailing down the coast, rejoined
their units further south. Others crossed into the island of Euboea
and thence back to the mainland. Others, again, after lying hid
D

90 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

for days in the hills eventually arrived in Crete long after the evacua-
tion of Greece had been completed. But Allen Force which had
fought so finely at Tempe against heavy odds of numbers and fire-
power had ceased to exist.

The scene now shifts westward to Elevtherokhori, on the main
road twenty-five miles north of Larissa where the road from Katerini
through the Olympus Pass comes in. This junction was protected by
two squadrons of New Zealand cavalry and two troops of New
Zealand anti-tank guns.

Out in front, coming back from Servia, was Lieut.-Colonel H. K.
Kippenberger and a few Bren carriers of the 20th New Zealand
Battalion. As we have seen, this unit had been acting as rearguard
of the 4th New Zealand Brigade, but Colonel Kippenberger had been
thinning out his force as he retired until only this small detachment
remained with him. As he moved towards Elevtherokhori he stopped
at each road demolition while the charge was blown, so that he could
bring along the sapper parties.

In the early morning the New Zealand cavalry were surprised to
hear sounds of traffic on the road coming down from the Olympus
Pass: it had been thought that our demolitions would have delayed
an enemy advance by this route for some considerable time. Soon
the Elevtherokhori rearguard was engaged with German tanks,
two of which were hit, and motor-cyclists who also suffered loss.
But one of our anti-tank guns became bogged and had to be
abandoned as the rearguard, in the face of superior forces, drew
back south of the road junction behind the bridge which.was now
blown up.

Kippenberger’s party stumbled into this engagement and, being
fired on by tanks at close range, could not get through. Sappers and
infantry took to the hills whence the colonel led out later one small
party on foot. Meanwhile the rearguard took toll of tanks, infantry,
armoured cars and lorries before German mortars, opening at short
range, settled the issue. The rearguard came back through Elasson
which was being bombed from the air and then through Barra-
clough’s 6th New Zealand Brigade in position to the south.

The brigade covered the two roads which led, respectively, south-
east and almost due south from Elasson and united at Tirnavos. On
the former road, which led over the Meneksos Pass, was the 24th
New Zealand Battalion; on the latter, traversing easier country, the
25th Battalion was in position, well supported by the 2/3rd Australian
Field Regiment and a troop of the 64th Medium Regiment, with two
troops of New Zealand field guns further in rear. The 26th Battalion
and a number of New Zealand anti-tank guns were in reserve at

RETREAT TO THERMOPYLAE 91

Dhomenikon, and an additional New Zealand field battery was also
available if needed. We had no tanks. When battle was joined in this
pleasant valley, Australian, New Zealand and British guns opposed
German armour.

At first our shell-fire hit several of the tanks and kept them in
check, while the German counter-battery work was of little avail. So
the enemy attack was delayed until later in the day, although our
medium artillery ran out of ammunition early in the afternoon.
Brigadier Barraclough took the opportunity to thin out his artillery
and infantry, the 26th New Zealand Battalion being taken back in
trucks to Larissa to entrain for the south. Then, just before dusk, the
Germans put down a heavy bombardment under cover of which
they attacked the 24th New Zealand Battalion at the Meneksos Pass.
Here the leading tanks hit land-mines, and the Australian guns
shelled the remainder of the assault column; but as the German
armour pulled back the infantry pressed on over the demolitions
which no vehicle could pass. Yet they failed to close and only delayed
for a little the withdrawal of the battalion when it sought to break off
the action and obey the order to go.

On the other road, where the batteries pulled out troop by troop as
the New Zealand infantry retired, the rear parties held on until
11.30 p.m. and then drove hurriedly away, blowing culverts as they
came, to reach Larissa about 3 a.m. on the morning of April 19th.
From Larissa the 6th New Zealand Brigade—with the exception of
the 26th Battalion which had already departed—was directed towards
Volos with orders to take up a covering position in that vicinity. The
Volos road, after being condemned as unusable, was now considered
fit for traffic, thanks to the exertions of the sappers and to the effect
of the hot April sun.

Savige had begun his retreat from Kalabaka, according to orders
received, during the night of April 17th/18th, protected by a small
rearguard of infantry, tanks, artillery and machine-guns. He was not
worried by the enemy and the last of his vehicles had passed through
Larissa early in the morning. His engineers had blown a large number
of the bridges which carry the road across the streams of the Thessa-
lian plain.

The Ist Armoured Brigade continued on its way to Ata Lanti,
where it would be in reserve behind the Thermopylae position, and
its units began to reach their destination before nightfall. The air
attacks made upon them while passing through Larissa and crossing
the plain had done little damage; but at the northern end of the
Lamia pass Lieut.-Colonel R. L. Syer, commanding the 64th Medium

92 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

Regiment R.A. which was under orders for Molos, received a moons
from a bomb splinter and died a little later.

Puttick’s 4th New Zealand Brigade began to reach its devination:
Molos, by noon. Instead of continuing southwards to Lamia,
Hargest’s 5th Brigade turned east to reach Volos by way of Almiros,
its operation order having, by mistake, substituted Volos for Molos.
In consequence the brigade did not reach its destination before dark.

om [3 ]«
Air Attacks Continue

DurRInG the daylight hours, the column of motor transport which
crowded the road from Larissa to Lamia and beyond underwent a
trying ordeal for, with improved weather conditions, the Luftwaffe
was out in force. Our vehicles could never move faster than the
modest rate of ten to fifteen miles an hour on account of the conges-
tion; and in the absence of any anti-aircraft batteries the German
bombers had it all their own way. They would circle overhead, select
a target, and then dive. Sirens screaming, they swooped down amid
a rattle of ineffectual small-arms fire from the ground. A crash or
thud as bomb after bomb burst about the road was followed by the
roar of the approaching fighters who swept along the column to
machine-gun their all-too-visible targets. Yet the procession crept
on by fits and starts: damaged vehicles were pushed aside, blazing
wrecks avoided, detours made where the road had been destroyed.
Even when no bombs had fallen the surface, broken by the effect of
winter rains followed by the unaccustomed traffic which it had been
called upon to carry, was now turning to mud in this flat and marshy
plain. All day long the Anzac engineers toiled at the tasks of rein-
forcement and repair, using any materials which came to hand.

It was fortunate that no direct hits were made upon any of the
important bridges during the course of this phase of the retreat, but
an ammunition truck was hit quite early in the day just as it was
approaching a little bridge north of Pharsala. The consequent explo-
sion badly damaged the embankment north of the bridge and the
engineers went to work to make a diversion, but the ground was so
soft and yielding, after the recent rain, that the job took four hours
to complete. And during all this time, while the close-packed vehicles
waited, by great good fortune the German bombing was both in-
accurate and unintelligent. The pilots might have concentrated on
hitting the leading vehicles and thereby still further extending the

RETREAT TO THERMOPYLAE 93

road-block and the consequent delay. It would have been worth
much more to the enemy than the aircraft which might have been
lost in the process.

As it happened, the column was able to start again by 1.30 p.m.
and push on towards Thermopylae with only insignificant loss and
damage. Indeed, as the hours passed, it became evident that, in spite
of the nerve-racking noise and the smoke and the fumes, and the
spatter of machine-gun bullets, the German airmen were doing com-
paratively little harm either to troops or vehicles. If among Australians,
New Zealanders and British there was little sign of loss of morale they
owed something to the splendid example set by their divisional com-
manders and other senior officers who were determined to regard
the German air attacks as nothing but a nuisance. Yet British fighters
in the sky would have been a heartening sight. Twice during the day
General Blamey, commanding the Anzac Corps, made urgent
requests for fighter protection, but only two sorties, each of one hour,
for fifteen miles on either side of Lamia was all that could be given
him, for this and the following day.

And now let us spare a thought to Larissa, the ruined unhappy
town through which guns and trucks and fighting vehicles were
passing in long procession throughout the day and night. Confusion
there was bound to be in the debris-strewn streets; but though halts
were frequent and traffic tangles had to be sorted out the flow never
stopped for long. Rumours of many kinds were rife. Some parties
of troops turned aside to seek fresh routes towards the south,
believing that the Germans were in possession of the town. This was
not so: neither was it true, though the story has persisted, that enter-
prising Germans wearing Australian uniforms had slipped into
Larissa and were directing—or rather mis-directing—our columns as
they converged upon the place from the north. Although the ambush
on the Tempe road prevented the remnants of Allen Force from going
through, all other routes remained open, and belated New Zealanders
testify that a British military policeman was seen calmly directing the
traffic at about 4 a.m. on April 19th. It was after that hour that the
bridge over the Pinios was blown, and there is no doubt that our
traffic police, Australian and British, remained in full control until
this demolition was carried out. We know now that, according to
their own reports, the Germans—tanks and infantry from the Tempe
gorge—did not enter Larissa until 7 a.m.

94 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE
m4 ]«

Political Crisis

On this day, April 18th, General Papagos, the Greek Commander-
in-Chief, delivered an exceedingly depressing report on the military
situation to the King and the Cabinet. It is unlikely that this came
as any particular surprise to those who enjoyed any degree of inside
information: despite the guarded nature of the Greek official com-
muniqués it was already becoming clear that the army in Albania had
delayed its withdrawal too long. In fact, von List was already pre-
paring its coup de grace. Just as he had thrust a wedge between Greeks
and Yugoslavs during the first days of the campaign and had then
proceeded to isolate and destroy the latter, so, now that the British
and Greek forces had been widely separated, he could prepare for
the final advance on Yanina and the cutting of the last line of retreat
of the Greek Army.

The Cabinet meeting was followed later in the day by the death of
M. Koryzis, the Greek Premier. Himself wholly loyal to the alliance
but harassed by the defeatists in his own Cabinet, unable to determine
in his own mind whether the moment had come for the evacuation
of the seat of Government to Crete, and appalled by the magnitude
and imminence of the disaster which loomed over his country, he
took his own life.

The King himself now became Premier, and a few days later in a
broadcast to the nation announced his intention of fighting to the
finish. A succession of Vice-Premiers followed one another until, at
the time of the removal of the Government to Crete, the post was
taken over by M. Tsuderos, a moderate Venizelist and a former
Governor of the Bank of Greece; and an admirable ‘compromise’
Minister, with the additional advantage of being himself a Cretan.

By this time the question of the evacuation of our forces from
Greece was due and over-due for settlement. When, in March, the
troops had been packed into warships and despatched with all speed
from Egypt to the port of Piraeus, it had been present in the minds
of many senior naval officers that the need might arise to bring the
soldiers back again. On April 15th Wavell had conferred with
Longmore and Cunningham, his air and naval colleagues, and the
three Commanders-in-Chief had come to the conclusion that pre-
parations for evacuation must be made. Consequently a section of
the Joint Planning Staff under Rear-Admiral H. T. Baillie-Grohman
was sent from Cairo to examine the problem of withdrawal and to
formulate preliminary plans. This party had arrived on April 17th.

RETREAT TO THERMOPYLAE 95

The news from Greece brought Wavell to Athens on April 19th,
and his first act was to discuss evacuation with Wilson. To go or not
to go! Primarily the Commander-in-Chief had to consider his posi-
tion in North Africa in the light of reverses suffered and his present
means of defence. Certainly no more troops would be available for
the Greek adventure. It was true that, so long as we maintained a
footing in Europe we might delay the execution of whatever plans
the enemy had made for a summer campaign. Further reinforcement
of German troops in Libya might be regarded as unlikely while we
remained in Greece.

Again, there could be no question but that yet another evacuation
might gravely affect our prestige and also the morale of our troops.
We might have to leave many behind ; many ships might be lost in the
process of evacuation ; quite certainly there would be a grave loss of
heavy equipment. We were still so overmatched in respect of war
material that a further sacrifice could not be lightly regarded.

But to attempt to hold on—not on the planned line of defence but
upon a new and improvised line—would necessarily involve further
reinforcement. More troops implied more shipping both for main-
taining our force in action and for feeding the civil population, the
latter being now wholly cut off from all European sources of supply.
Since the shattering early raids on Piraeus our only major port was
partially out of commission, and there was scarcely even a secondary
port available since we were now in the process of evacuating Volos.
Above all, we could not maintain ourselves without a great strengthen-
ing of our air forces. In the clear Mediterranean spring weather the
convoys would require adequate air protection to avoid heavy losses
from dive-bombers, and the fighting power of the troops would be
worn down by the Luftwaffe unless we could meet the Germans in
the air. We had not the aircraft to carry out these tasks neither did
we possess the airfields and air bases.

So it seemed that we could not contemplate an indefinite defence
of a bridge-head—it would not be more than that—in Greece
because it would not be possible to supply our forces, seeing that we
had not got the means to maintain the struggle in the air.

It will be remarked that these considerations took no account of
the Greek Army as a fighting force: there was, indeed, no hope that
the Greeks would continue to resist for more than a day or two longer.
As already related, the suggestion that we should leave Greece had
first been expressed by the Greek Commander-in-Chief.

The British commanders were well aware that political purpose
had yet to be reconciled with good military counsel when, on the
same day, they attended a conference called by the King of the

96 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

Hellenes at his palace at Tatoi, outside Athens. Wavell assured King
and Cabinet that our army would fight so long as the Greek Army
continued to resist; yet, if the Greek Government so desired, we
were prepared to go. He pressed for an early decision. Papagos
painted a gloomy picture of the condition of his armies, and feared
that continued resistance might result in the total devastation of his
country. After renewed British assurances that both our ground and
air forces would make every sacrifice to fight on if required to do so,
Greek military opinion expressed itself in favour of British evacuation.
It remained for the British Minister, Sir Michael Palairet, to read a
telegram from our own Prime Minister which clearly stated that we
would only leave Greece with the full agreement of King and
Government. King and Government then gave their unqualified
approval of the evacuation of the British forces.

We were faced with an unwelcome and very difficult task. Baillie-
Grohrhan’s first report was not encouraging, and the Commander-
in-Chief was left with the impression—happily much too pessimistic
a one as events were to prove—that we should be lucky if we em-
barked as many as 30 per cent of the troops. There was little hope of
getting away any of the guns and transport that had been so hardly
spared from Africa. Piraeus, being much damaged already and under
constant air attack, could not be used; and as no other port was
available the embarkation would have to be from open beaches and
on as wide a front as possible. Any troops who found it impossible,
for one reason or another, to reach the embarkation points would be
expected to make for the Peloponnesus, whence they might be
rescued later.

Wavell still hoped that, unless unforeseen events compelled a more
hurried departure, it would be possible to hold on at Thermopylae
for a little time; and every day that our troops maintained their
positions in Greece meant a day gained for organizing the defences
of Crete and Egypt. April 28th was selected as a provisional date for
the embarkation to begin. There would be a new moon on the 26th.

m»[S]l«
At Thermopylae

WHILE General Wilson and Admiral Baillie-Grohman continued at
work on evacuation plans, General Wavell left Athens at night for
Levadia where, at Anzac Corps headquarters he saw General Blamey
on the early morning of April 20th. The Corps commander was not

RETREAT TO THERMOPYLAE 97

unsatisfied at the progress of the retreat. On April 19th the bulk of our
forces had won clear of the plain of Thessaly, and were beginning to
take up their positions on the Thermopylae line. The scenes of the
previous day had been re-enacted, for the Luftwaffe was as active as
ever, bombing roads, railways, and suspected areas of troop con-
centration in rear of Thermopylae. Despite their ordeal by air-attack,
their lack of sleep, and the feeling of frustration which was induced
by their continuous retreat, the morale of the fighting troops was still

Long columns of German troops were reported on the 19th to be
converging upon Larissa from the Olympus Pass and from Servia;
but by nightfall the enemy was still not in contact with Lee Force at
Dhomokos. All stragglers and belated parties of our troops appeared
to have passed through Lee’s position which had been under heavy
but ineffective air attack at times, so Lee was ordered to blow his
demolitions and withdraw. This he did, two New Zealand anti-tank
guns being cut off in the process by a premature explosion. Two
companies of Australian infantry, with detachments of machine-guns
and anti-tank guns, and five cruiser tanks, were left to hold the pass
ten miles south of Dhomokos.

Having fulfilled its purpose the 6th New Zealand Brigade had come
in from the Almiros-Volos area, via Lamia where it half-expected to
clash with the advancing Germans. Before withdrawing the New
Zealanders had gathered in a number of parties who had fought at
Tempe. The Navy had been asked to provide patrols so that others
who might appear on the coast could be brought away by sea.

On April 9th a German force of about a hundred Stukas, with
fighter protection, made a concentrated attack upon our airfields in
the Athens area. All the remaining serviceable British fighters, fifteen
Hurricanes, took off to intercept them. For the last time over Greece
the R.A.F. David was able to challenge the German Goliath. In
terms of heroism in the face of odds, the pilots of those fifteen
fighters deserve to rank with the heroes of the Battle of Britain. They
destroyed twenty-two enemy aircraft, perhaps eight more, but in the
action they lost a third of their number. And that indeed constituted
a Pyrrhic victory.

During April 20th great progress was made in sorting out the troops
and placing them under their proper commands. By the evening the
retreat could be regarded as ended, although there was still much to
do to remedy the confusion which had been caused by the traffic con-
gestion on the roads. Battle casualties, except in the few battalions
which had borne the brunt at Vevi and at Tempe gorge were not
heavy, but several convoys had lost direction during the retreat, and
D*

98 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

many groups of men seeking to make their way back on foot across
the hills had failed to rejoin their units. An official summary of the
situation, dated April 20th, states that ‘a measure of control had been
lost’; but after a short breathing space the combatant units could be
expected to give a good account of themselves whenever the Germans
should again attack. The loss of guns, fighting vehicles, transport,
and other arms and equipment was, however, a serious matter.

The only fighting on this day occurred atthe pass on the Dhomokos-—
Lamia road where Lee’s rearguard under an Australian major was
posted. At 11.0 a.m. German vehicles were seen coming down the
slopes from Dhomokos, but the first clash did not occur until after
two o’clock in the afternoon when some German motor-cyclists rode
into our well-concealed positions and were killed. A little later the
fire of one of our cruisers destroyed a German armoured car, but
under cover of a rainstorm enemy mortars came into action. Their
fire was silenced for a time by the Australian machine-guns ; then at
4.30 p.m. Lee informed the rearguard commander that he could
withdraw when he liked, all Australian and New Zealand convoys
being clear of Lamia. The withdrawal was carried out in some con-
fusion under heavy fire from artillery and mortars, but the anti-tank
guns were got away, two cruiser tanks helping to cover the whole
movement.

Some of the Australian infantry who were cut off made their own
way back to Thermopylae during the night.

Both Force Headquarters at Thebes and Corps headquarters at
Levadia were persistently bombed from the air, and the telephone
system was destroyed. Our shortage of radio equipment was an
additional handicap to commanders and staff officers striving to re-
assemble battalions, batteries and brigades, to guide troops to new
and unfamiliar positions, and to deal with problems of supply.

The name of Thermopylae conjures up visions of a narrow moun-
tain pass held by a tiny band of heroes against a horde of invaders.
Every schoolboy (at any rate every schoolboy of a generation or two
ago) has heard of the dramatic resistance of Leonidas and his three
hundred Spartans—the seven hundred Thespians who also died there
are for some reason nearly always ignored in history and anecdote—
against the tens of thousands of Persians under Xerxes, the prototype
of all Oriental tyrants. It seemed fitting that what might be the final
stand in Europe against the new tyrant of the West should be made at
this historic pass.

But however alluring the prospect of history repeating itself may
have seemed to those enjoying a sense of historical fitness, together
with a comfortable physical remoteness, the value of Thermopylae

RETREAT TO THERMOPYLAE 99

as a defensive position at the present day is considerably decreased
by the fact that the sea has receded in the course of centuries. Instead
of the narrow road only wide enough for a single chariot to pass at a
time, there is now a plain some three miles broad between mountain
face and the water.1 Nor is it the only, or even the best, route by which
an army nowadays can approach Athens from the north. The main
motor road from Larissa and Lamia runs to the south through the
high pass of Brallos and thence by way of Thebes to the Greek capital.
And any German force which might come down on the Gulf of
Corinth from Epirus would have the road through Delphi at its
disposal.

Thermopylae itself, and the marshy ground south of the Sperkhios
river, was to be covered by the New Zealand Division, its 5th Brigade
taking up the whole front from the sea near Molos to the mountain
face. Coastal patrols, to watch for a possible enemy landing from
Euboea, were furnished by the 4th Brigade, a reconnaissance of the
island being carried out and a number of craft on the beaches
destroyed. In reserve was the 6th Brigade which had fought the rear-
guard action at Elasson on April 18th.

On the evening of the 20th a report, which proved to be false, that
German armour was moving south from Lamia caused the demoli-
tion of the bridge which carried the Lamia-Molos road over the
Sperkhios river.

Brallos Pass was the responsibility of the Australians, their 19th
Brigade, which had been with Lee, arriving from Dhomokos to
occupy positions astride the road. On the left the 17th Brigade—
Savige’s battalions being now re-united—was drawn back to cover
the approach along the railway. The 16th Brigade was in divisional
reserve : it only disposed of two battalions, both very weak in numbers
after the action at Tempe, the 2/1st Battalion being now with the 19th
Brigade. This was the first occasion during the campaign when
General Mackay had all three brigades of his division under his own
command.

The ist Armoured Brigade had almost ceased to exist as such.
When the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment eventually collected itself south
of Thermopylae only one of its 52 cruiser tanks was in running order.
Few of the others had been lost in battle; mechanical and steering
troubles and damage to tracks had accounted for most of them. One
is reminded of the solitary elephant that survived Hannibal’s crossing
of the Alps and Apennines. The tanks sent out from England in the
winter of 1940-1 were as unfit to negotiate the Greek countryside as
were Hannibal’s unfortunate quadrupeds to cope with the rigours of

1See Map 5S. s

100 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

an Alpine winter. So the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment was ordered to
the Athens area to give protection against possible parachutist attack.

The light tanks of the 4th Hussars had stood up to the earlier
ordeals better than had the cruiser tanks ; but during the retreat from
Grevena they, too, began to suffer severely from mechanical break-
downs. They were reduced to 30 runners by the time they reached
Pharsala, and 17 more failed at the pass of Lamia. With its remaining
13 tanks the regiment was regrouped around Thebes, available for
reconnaissance purposes or, in an emergency, to counter-attack
against an infantry penetration.

The infantry battalion, the Rangers, had suffered considerable loss
in action and during the long retreat from Vevi, and a great deal of
equipment had been left behind. What remained of the unit was
posted near Force Headquarters at Thebes in an anti-parachutist réle.

The advantages of the Thermopylae position were obvious enough.
As reconnaissance proceeded, however, a number of serious handi-
caps began to be apparent to the harassed commanders of the force
while their men rested, and bathed in the warm sulphur springs at
Thermopylae as the Spartans of Leonidas had bathed twenty-five
centuries ago.

The two weakened divisions were manifestly insufficient to defend
the whole thirty miles of front. For an effective defence it was esti-
mated that a full division would be required at each of the two major
approaches, Thermopylae and Brallos, apart from the forces needed
to cover the hill-tracks which trained mountain troops might well be
able to negotiate.

The right flank in the plain of the Sperkhios could be enfiladed
across the Gulf of Maliaic.

There was the practical certainty that the Germans would rapidly
establish themselves in the island of Euboea which lay parallel to the
Greek coast for many miles to the rear of our position. A proportion
of our force must therefore be permanently employed patrolling the
coast all the way back to Khalkis and beyond ; and at the latter town,
where the strait was little more than fifty yards wide, special precau-
tions must be taken to prevent a crossing. A detachment of the
Rangers was therefore sent to Khalkis.

The plain of Thebes, now our Headquarters area, provided the
enemy with excellent conditions for airborne landings with which we
were singularly ill-equipped to deal. Very few troops could be spared,
and those who were available were rendered almost static by our
losses in tanks and transport during the withdrawal. At best we could
only hope to organize a few platoons of Bren carriers as mobile
detachments in this wide area.

RETREAT TO THERMOPYLAE 101

Troops had yet to be found to defend the road through Delphi by
which an enemy advance from Epirus would turn the whole position.
Such an advance might be expected to follow quickly upon the
collapse of Greek resistance.

[6 )«
Greek Surrender

EveN now the final scene of the tragedy of the Greek Army of Epirus
was being enacted. The word tragedy is not lightly employed in this
connection. Contemplating the sudden and total dissolution of this
brave and long-enduring force, never defeated in six months of con-
stant battle, one experiences a genuine Aristotelian katharsis, an awe-
inspiring sense of the futility of all human effort and all human
courage when pitted against the will of the Gods. That is of the very
essence of the tragedy of classical Greece and of the tragedy of con-
temporary Greece during these April days.

It was on April 19th that von List put into operation the movement
designed to inflict the coup de grdce upon the Greek forces in southern
Albania, the last intact army possessed by our Ally. It was then
slowly falling back in fairly good order towards the Greek frontier,
the Italians still following up with extreme caution and making little
attempt to interfere. But the collapse of the Central Macedonian
Army and the British retreat to Thermopylae had uncovered a route
across the Pindus mountains by which the Germans might take the
Greeks in flank and rear.

Von List wanted to clear the way to Yanina and thence south to the
Gulf of Corinth for subsequent operations, if necessary, in
the Peloponnesus ; and he presumably still doubted the capacity of the
Italian troops to cope with the Greeks unaided. At all events, he
committed the SS Adolf Hitler Division, which had already been
engaged by our forces at Vevi and Sotir, to hasten a consummation
which would otherwise have been brought about by the Luftwaffe, by
the Greek lack of transport, by the Greek roads and—perhaps—by
the Italians.

The task assigned to the SS Adolf Hitler Division on the morning
of Saturday, April 19th, was to push through to Yanina in order to cut
the last supply line of the Greek forces in Albania and precipitate
their capitulation. To reach Yanina the division had to cross the pass
at Metsovo. General Papagos had rushed a force there as fast as
marching men could go, in a last forlorn effort to stave off the

102 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

inevitable. The Greek troops reached Metsovo, but not in time to dig
themselves in before the enemy arrived. The pass could not be held
in the face of a German motorized division and though the Greeks
fought with the utmost courage, the high ridge of the Pindus was
crossed by the enemy who occupied Yanina on the following morning.

How complete had become the lack of contact between the British
Headquarters in Athens and the Greek forces may be shown from the
following anecdote: :

Our General in command of the mission at Athens had decided to
go direct to Yanina to see exactly what the situation was. He had taken
the precaution of having a message sent to the Greek staff there, and
the reply had come in German—‘Hier is das deutsche Heer’—or
bok i that effect. There is nothing like asking the enemy precisely
where he is.*

With von Stumme’s advanced guard in possession of Yanina and
von Boehme’s troops all over the plain of Thessaly the end of this
disastrous week meant the end of Greek resistance. On the following
day, April 21st, General Tsolakoglou, commander of the Greek
Army of Epirus, offered his surrender to the Germans. The General
acted without authorization from his Commander-in-Chief, General
Papagos, but in accordance with the instructions issued by M.
Papademas, Minister of War, three days earlier, giving Generals a
free hand to behave as they saw fit.

Looking at the situation purely from a military point of view it is
difficult to see what purpose could have been served by further resis-
tance. With Yanina taken by the German forces who had come down
on his rear, Tsolakoglou had no hope of getting his army away, even
had he possessed the transport to attempt a quick break-through to
the south. It should be noted that the surrender of Tsolakoglou did
not affect the strategic position of his Ally. General Wilson’s force
was already completely out of contact with all the main Greek
formations when the surrender occurred and had made good its
retreat to the Thermopylae line, so its position was in no way imme-
diately worsened by the surrender in Epirus. Had the British aimed
at fighting a rearguard action all the way down to the southernmost
point of the Peloponnesus irrespective of losses, then the enemy
forces released by Tsolakoglou’s surrender might have been employed
with great effect. But the British decision to evacuate Greece had
already been taken, and the chosen points of embarkation were
comparatively close at hand.

Tsolakoglou had made his original offer of surrender to the Germans
on April 21st, but it was not until 2.45 in the afternoon of the 23rd

1 Casson, Greece Against the Axis, p. 175.

RETREAT TO THERMOPYLAE 103

that the surrender was formally concluded at Salonika. General
Jod1 who, four years later, was to put his signature to a considerably
more momentous document in a school-house at Reims, signed for
the German Army, General Ferraro for the Italian. The original
terms proposed by the Germans had been almost suspiciously
generous. The Greek victory in Albania was recognized ; their armies
were required only to withdraw as far as the Greek frontier in places
where they had not already done so; the Germans were
prepared to undertake to prevent any attempt by the Italians to cross
the frontier ; Greek officers were to be allowed to retain their equip-
ment, while the soldiers, after surrendering their arms, would be free
to return home.

No doubt, the Germans could, had they chose, have exacted much
harsher terms from the unfortunate Tsolakoglou, but there was no
particular need to do so. The agreement to capitulate once being
extracted, the Germans were quick to repudiate it, on the grounds
that the King’s ‘fight to the end’ broadcast made on April 22nd
nullified the terms on which the armistice had been arranged. This
excuse served as well as any other. As finally signed, the capitulation
provided that all Greek equipment should be handed over to the
Germans and all Greek soldiers become prisoners of war, though
the latter condition was never, in fact, brought into force. And the
Italians, of course, were enabled to advance into the country as
conquerors.

CHAPTER VIII

Evacuation

o[1 ]«
Plans and Difficulties

IT is true that there were fewer troops to be withdrawn and that we
still controlled a wide extent of coastline and were not bottled up
around a single port; but the conditions of evacuation from Greece
were, in some respects, more ‘formidable than they had been at
Dunkirk. The distance to be traversed to Egypt (600 miles) and even
to the intermediate stopping point of Crete (160 miles) was very
much greater than the width of the Channel. The Saronic Gulf, which
is the natural route of evacuation from the Athens area, had been
heavily mined by enemy aircraft. The much-bombed port of Piraeus
could only accommodate a limited proportion of its customary
tonnage, owing to the damage done, more particularly in the first
disastrous German raid. The Germans might, at any time, seize the
isthmus of Corinth with paratroops, which would effectively prevent
any evacuation from the ports of the Peloponnesus. R.A.F. fighter
defence was almost non-existent as a result of the repeated low-level
bombing attacks upon our landing-grounds; indeed, within a day
or two it was to be altogether eliminated. And, finally, we could not
on this occasion depend upon a great rally of the little ships. To those
of us who were in Greece at the time it looked an exceedingly bleak
prospect.

Our Command was faced with the unenviable alternatives of an
evacuation by night, which, though ensuring relative safety from air
attack during the actual period of embarkation, meant that most of

1 In the opinion of the present writer the damage done to the port of Piraeus has
been somewhat exaggerated in accounts written from second-hand. Large numbers
a Sree were evacuated from this port on April 18th/19th and also on April

nd/23rd.

104

EVACUATION 105

the voyage to Crete would take place in daylight with enemy dive-
bombers swooping down on our convoys; or a day evacuation, with
all the attendant disadvantages which embarkation under observa-
tion of the enemy would imply. The former was considered to repre-
sent, on the balance, the lesser evil. April 28th had been the original
date provisionally selected for the beginning of the evacuation; after
that a waxing moon would have progressively discounted the advan-
tages of a night embarkation. The news of the Greek surrender in
Epirus, however, determined Wavell to advance the date by four
days. Evacuation would now begin on April 24th/25th and be spread
over that night and the two successive nights. The small beaches on the
eastern coast of Attica, also those around Megara and towards
the isthmus and the port of Navplion in the Peloponnesus would be the
principal points of embarkation. In order to ensure a quick turn round
of the shipping, a good proportion of the troops would be evacuated
in the first instance to Crete for subsequent transference to Egypt.

It seemed that the Germans were aware of our approaching depar-
ture. The Luftwaffe was making determined attacks upon the rail-
ways in our rear areas, leaving most of the tracks and equipment in
a condition beyond our capacity to repair during these last few days.
Perhaps from our point of view, it was not worth while to do so, for
railway staffs had, for the most part, dispersed and what ammunition
was required for the forward dumps could be sent by road at no
greater risk. Coastal shipping suffered in the same fashion as the
railways. The Royal Navy reported twenty-three vessels sunk by air
attack in Greek waters during the 21st and 22nd; and, although some
of these craft were small, the total included a Greek destroyer and
two hospital ships. This could be taken as a hint of what we might
expect when embarkation began.

On April 22nd evacuation orders were issued, and the intention to
depart was made known to the troops. Wounded and convalescents ;
nursing sisters; signals, ordnance workshop and survey personnel :
these would be among the first to go. Rifles, light machine-guns,
anti-tank rifles, gun sights, and such items of signal equipment as
could be man-handled were all to be brought away by the troops
concerned. Motor vehicles were to be destroyed by smashing radia-
tors and batteries and breaking engine casings with sledge-hammers,
and all tools and tyres were to be made unserviceable. Explosions
and fires were to be avoided as far as possible. Horses would be shot,
mules handed over to the Greeks. These instructions make melan-
choly reading; to carry them out was a melancholy task.

The oil stocks in the neighbourhood of Athens were, fortunately,
not large; for the King had requested that they should not be fired

106 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

so’as to cause danger to the civil population, and the Greeks who had
taken charge were opposed to their destruction. Under these circum-
stances it was judged better to leave the oil stores intact.

The King of the Hellenes, with members of his Government and
the British Minister left Greece on April 23rd by Sunderland flying-
boat for Crete and landed at Suda Bay.

The localities selected for embarkation, four in Attica and one in
the Peloponnesus, were all open beaches. The troops would go first
to ‘collection areas’, thence to ‘assembly areas’, and so to the
beaches as their turn came to embark. Owing to the menace from
the air it was important that no time be lost whenever a vessel closed
the coast to take troops aboard: even a concentration of shipping
so far away as Suda Bay—in Crete—was held to be a dangerous risk.
One need not be surprised that General Wilson asked for fighter
protection round the coast.

It had been intended that our embarkation should be covered by
the few Hurricanes that still remained serviceable. This we could not
do. After the destruction of a large number of our Blenheims and
Hurricanes on their landing-grounds in the dawn attack of April 15th,
the remains of the British air force in Greece had been hastily eva-
cuated to the airfields in the neighbourhood of Athens. It had been
the only practicable decision under the circumstances, and in any
case the ground forces were on the very point of themselves with-
drawing across the plain to Thermopylae. There were no satisfactory
landing-grounds immediately behind Thermopylae, though a Greek
Gladiator squadron and a British army co-operation squadron of
Hurricanes were temporarily based upon Amphiklia in the plain of
Boeotia until the Greek unit was caught on the ground and des-
troyed. Thereupon the Hurricanes were hastily withdrawn to Attica.

Air Vice-Marshal D’Albiac draws attention in his despatch to the
dilemma in which he found himself with his scanty number of
aircraft and inadequate airfields.

The constant lack of intermediary aerodromes made it inevitable
that, if our fighters were placed on an aerodrome from which they could
give protection to our troops, they were in imminent danger of destruc-
tion as soon as they were on the ground. If, on the other hand, they
were placed beyond the range of air attack when grounded, they were
unable to protect our troops and the tightly packed columns of M.T.
withdrawing along the roads. The utmost efforts had been made to give
protection to our much harassed ground forces, and pilots went again
and again into the air to work at extreme range and against
immeasurable odds.

With the preparations for evacuation now well advanced, D’Albiac
withdrew his remaining fighters to the tiny airfield at Argos to cover

EVACUATION 107

the embarkation of the troops. It was here that on April 23rd in an
evening attack the Luftwaffe shot up and destroyed on the ground all
our remaining Hurricanes, including a number newly arrived from
Egypt.!

That was the end of any hopes of air protection for the evacua-
tion. Moreover, it became necessary to modify certain of the plans
for embarkation.? It was now decided that we could not afford to
make so much use of the beaches of Attica, which lay dangerously
exposed to air attack, and must place more reliance on the ports of
the Peloponnesus. More use would be made of destroyers in order
to speed up the process of evacuation, and the revised embarkation
programme was now worked out as under:

Rafina Porto Rafti Megara Navplion Tolo Kalamata Yithion

& Plytra
April 5N.Z. Bde. H.Q. Anzac
24th/25th (4,000) : Corps.
Base details
RAF
(5,000)
April 19 Aus. Bde.
25th/26th (4,000)
1 Armoured
Bde. details
(500)
wounded
(1,000)

April 6N.Z. 6N.Z.Bde. 4N.Z. Basedetails Base 16&17 Strag-
26th/27th Bde (3,000) Bde. 3R.T.R. LofC Aus.Bde. glers
(3,000) 1Armoured (4,000) 4 Hussars (2,000) et 000) advised
Bde. (400) (6,000) Base _ to use
details
(4,000)

In addition there were about 2,000 Yugoslav refugees who would
be embarked from the tiny beach of Theodhoroi midway between
Megara and the Corinth isthmus.

The programme was not ideally balanced, for while it allowed for
an embarkation rate of 9,000 on the first and 5,500 on the second
night, an estimated total of over 26,000 would have to be embarked

1 There is a considerable amount of discrepancy between the various figures for
the actual number of aircraft destroyed on this occasion. D’Albiac gives no
numbers. Longmore says 13. Wilson in his report says ‘only about 9’. The heavy
A.A. Battery posted at the isthmus gives the figure of 21. The late Lieut. “Colonel
Stanley Casson, Intelligence Officer at British Headquarters, who drove through
Argos on the following day was told by an anti-aircraft officer there that ‘the
previous dawn [sic] a swarm of German fighters had descended on the airground
and shot up some forty newly-arrived British aircraft’. (Casson, Greece Against
the Axis, p. 182.) That the total, whatever it was, included new Hurricanes from
Egypt seems clear from the evidence of T. H. Wisdom (Wings Over Olympus,
p. 199) who was R.A.F. Press Officer in Greece at the time.

2 See Maps 6 and 7.

>

108 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

on the final night. Nor do the actual figures themselves appear to
have been very accurately estimated, for even after two serious mis-
haps in the latter part of the evacuation we were still able to with-
draw a larger number of troops than had been allowed for in the
programme.

The selection of embarkation beaches showed a desire to achieve
a greater degree of dispersal on either side of the. Isthmus. At the
same time, in view of the probability of a German airborne landing
at the Isthmus itself, it was perhaps unfortunate that arrangements
were not made for a larger proportion of embarkations from ports
and beaches rather more remote from that marked danger spot. It
would have involved longer drives by daylight under the observation
of the Luftwaffe, but in the event the choice of so many beaches in
the neighbourhood of the Isthmus proved a little unfortunate.

»[2]«
The Covering Forces

IT was as well that the German follow-up to Thermopylae was not
so speedy as to threaten any danger of our troops being ‘bounced’
from the position before full arrangements for the evacuation had
been completed. Our force was back behind the Sperkhios and at the
' Brallos Pass by the evening of April 20th, though defensive prepara-
tions had yet to be completed: it was not until the 24th that the
enemy attacked.

Not that the pursuit was sluggish; but the combination of stout
resistance by our rearguards with the natural difficulties of the
country and our effective demolitions made swift movement im-
possible. These conditions must have been foreseen by the Germans
for von List had his transport aircraft in readiness. Just as they had
been used to land troops on the Kozani plateau, so now JU 52’s
carrying both infantry and light field guns began to descend, at first
in the meadow country north of Lamia and then still closer to our
front. Parties of the enemy reached the line of the Sperkhios river on
April 21st, and the repair of the bridges appeared to have been taken
in hand. Enemy aircraft were active in reconnaissance and attacked
our infantry and battery positions. As a precaution, New Zealand
carriers patrolled as far as the river bank at night.

That there was no threat of envelopment from Epirus in the form
of a German advance southward, and then eastward to the Delphi
pass, can be attributed to the fact, unknown to us at the time, that

EVACUATION 109

the SS Adolf Hitler Division did not move from Yanina until April
25th. On the 21st the Delphi pass was still unguarded by us, a state
of affairs which could not be allowed to continue, for once the
Germans were through the defile they would have a clear run through
to Corps or even Force Headquarters.' Scarcely less dangerous to our
prospects of embarkation would be the existence of a roving German
column at large in the Peloponnesus. Somehow, therefore, troops
had to be found to cover the open flank, extending our defensive
positions so that we held some sort of a front from sea to sea: from
the Maliaic Gulf beyond Thermopylae to the Gulf of Corinth in the
neighbourhood of Delphi.

Accordingly, on April 22nd, the 19th Battalion was withdrawn
from the 4th New Zealand Brigade on the coast of the Maliaic Gulf
and sent to the Delphi pass under Corps command. Then, on the
following day, the 2/Sth Battalion from the 17th Australian Brigade,
holding the left sector of the Brallos position, was added to the
Delphi detachment together with a machine-gun company and a
troop of field guns. Some Greek troops and anti-tank guns were
pushed forward to Navpaktos to deepen the defence, and at both
places demolitions were set in hand. Major Fleming’s unit, which had
already distinguished itself at Amyntaion and subsequently during
the retreat, arrived at Navpaktos on the morning of April 23rd and
the same evening, after it was estimated that all that was left of the
Greek forces from Agrinion and the west had passed through our
lines, blew the road at a point about eleven miles east of Navpaktos.
Twenty or thirty yards of road were carried away by the explosion,
and the damage done was such that, at a conservative estimate, it
would take forty-eight hours to repair. Further back, at Delphi, the
New Zealanders were engaged in rolling down rocks to block the
gorge, thereby repeating the classical legend ; for the tale goes that at
the time of the Persian invasion the Delphic Oracle had been saved
from violation through the action of the god Apollo who dispersed
the advanced parties of barbarians by hurling down rocks upon them
in protection of his sanctuary.

Precautions had also to be taken against a German advance into
the Peloponnesus after crossing the Gulf of Corinth at its narrow
entry near Navpaktos. A Greek infantry battalion which was avail-
able was despatched to Patras, while the 4th Hussars, whom we left
on the look-out for parachutists around Force Headquarters, were
sent, with their remaining twelve tanks, organized into four squad-
rons of three each, with ‘rifle troops’ added, to patrol the road along
the southern shore of the Gulf from Patras to Corinth. At the Isthmus

‘See Map 6.

sO11VU8 —
3VIAdOWYSHL

“S°ON dVW

EVACUATION 111

was gathered a troop of heavy A.A. guns and the headquarters
squadron of the Hussars, forming the embryo of Isthmus Force
which was to protect that vital point against airborne attack. Finally,
the 3rd R. Tank Regiment was set to work upon road blocks and
local defence in the Athens area.

It was the best that could be done. All units were weak in numbers
and short of arms and of every sort of equipment; and their only
protection against attack from the air would be an inadequate
number of anti-aircraft guns.

And still the German attack hung fire, while our preparations to
embark were pushed forward and the defenders of the Thermopylae
position were thinned out. On April 22nd the 6th New Zealand
Brigade took over the whole divisional front, while the Sth Brigade,
having spent the day unostentatiously destroying such of its equip-
ment as could not be taken away, moved back towards the beaches
after dark. The withdrawal of the Sth Brigade meant loss of contact
with the Australians at the Brallos Pass, but the mountainous
country which intervened was practically impassable.

Brigadier Barraclough, commanding the 6th New Zealand Brigade,
placed the 24th Battalion on the right, facing north-west from the
sea-coast to a point on the main road opposite the northward turn
of the stream beyond the marshes. The 25th Battalion continued this
line westward in the foothills well south of the road, the left flank
resting about a mile and a half short of Thermopylae village and
twice that distance from the Alamanas bridge where the main road
crosses the river. The 26th Battalion was kept in reserve.

Once across the Sperkhios river the German armour would be
able to move freely on a broad front over the drying marshes, so our
artillery dispositions were planned to repel a southward attack, with
many of the batteries well forward, and some 25-pdrs. in an anti-tank
réle. Two troops of the Sth New Zealand Field Regiment and the
Tth New Zealand Anti-Tank Regiment were actually emplaced
beyond the most advanced infantry posts and protected by special
patrols at night. Indeed the infantry were so thin on the ground that
the defence mainly depended upon the artillery which consisted of
one medium regiment (the 64th Medium Regiment R.A.), four field
regiments (three New Zealand and one R.H.A.), two anti-tank regi-
ments (one New Zealand and our Northumberland Hussars), and the
155th Light A.A. Battery R.A.

Further to the left at the Brallos Pass the thinning-out process had
left Brigadier Vasey of the 19th Australian Brigade with the 2/1st,
2/4th and 2/11th Battalions, all weak in numbers, two companies
of the 2/8th, and the 2/2nd Field Regiment. Detachments were

112 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

maintained at the crest of the pass well forward of the Brallos position.
The Australian gunners had some difficulty in finding battery posi-
tions which gave crest clearance ; but two guns which came into action
on a mountain ledge with good observation over the plain, did
considerable execution before being shelled to destruction in their
precarious position.

To the men waiting in the Pass of Leonidas for the assault to open,
these days preceding the German attack may well have been among
the most trying in the campaign. The suspense was bound to be
rendered more uncomfortable by the depressing foreknowledge of the
overwhelming advantage in striking power which the enemy pos-
sessed both on the ground and in the air. From their eyries among the
mountains the Anzacs could observe the rhythm of enemy prepara-
tions developing often in full view. They watched the German
artillerymen digging their gun pits in the plain, and at night they
could see the undimmed lights of the German transport proceeding
serenely along the roads as the enemy infantry dispositions were
taken'up just out of range of our guns. The hot sunshine was drying
the earth. Every day, enemy aircraft could be seen touching their
wheels down to test the surface of the landing grounds. The Germans
were ‘winding up their tail’ by means of their transport planes, which
were being used to bring troops and supplies forward to the area of
deployment for battle. Though to the anxious watchers at Thermo-
pylae they may have appeared to show no signs of particular hurry
it is most unlikely that the German war-machine was wasting any
time.

Bombardment and counter-bombardment continued all through
the 22nd and 23rd, the Germans shelling our positions as a pre-
liminary to launching their assault, the Australians and New
Zealanders firing with the determination to expend as much ammuni-
tion as possible upon their targets before the order came to go.

German air co-operation continued to be close and effective.
‘Spotter’ planes were constantly overhead, locating our gun sites or
signalling back the fall of the German shells, while dive-bombers
made sporadic attacks upon our positions, difficult though it was for
them to secure direct hits in this mountainous country. Perhaps the
Germans were using the dive-bombers more for the moral effect ; for
the dive-bomber was something of a spell-binder. It was not a
strikingly accurate means of attack, but it could be an exceedingly
alarming one to any but well-trained and experienced troops.

In the course of Wednesday the 23rd, German landings were
reported on Euboea, but these proved to be only on a very modest
scale. It was judged prudent, however, to withdraw the company of

EVACUATION 113

the Rangers which had been posted on the Euboea side at Khalkis
and to blow up the bridge across the narrow strait. Khalkis had been
heavily bombed by the Germans for some days for it appears that the
enemy, quite wrongly, regarded the town as playing an important
part in our evacuation plans. These certainly did not involve any
embarkation at Khalkis.

During the night the 4th New Zealand Brigade with the 2/3rd
Australian Field Regiment, the 106th Light A.A. Battery, an
Australian anti-tank battery, and some machine-gunners and
sappers, occupied a covering position at Kriekouki on the Thebes
road.

m[3]«
The Action of Thermopylae

At dawn of the 24th on the New Zealand front our patrols dis-
covered that the enemy was repairing the bridges over the Sperkhios
river. The artillery duel continued with great intensity throughout
the morning, and German dive-bombers repeatedly attacked our
battery positions, albeit with little success. The enemy did not
attempt to come to grips until the early afternoon.

Then, about 2 p.m., tanks were observed moving forward over the
marshy ground in front of the 25th Battalion. Two tanks were
knocked out by the fire of our field guns, and then the main attack
developed down the main road from dead ground near the Thermo-
pylae cliff face, well beyond the left flank of the 6th New Zealand
Brigade. A group of cyclists and motor-cyclists came on at a fast
pace, followed by a number of tanks, while infantry took to the hills
in an endeavour, which promised to be only too successful, to
envelop the flank of the 25th Battalion.

Along the road repeated attacks of the German armour ended in a
triumph for the defending artillery. As the tanks pressed eastward
across the front of the 25th Battalion they were exposed to heavy
shell-fire which wrought great destruction. Although a few tanks
eventually succeeded in approaching battalion headquarters they
were effectively disposed of by a troop of New Zealand 25-pdrs., and
a six-mile stretch of the road was afterwards described by the New
Zealanders as a ‘graveyard of German tanks’. The credit belongs
equally to the New Zealand and British gunners. At least fifteen
tanks were destroyed during the day and many others damaged.
Finally, Brigadier R. Miles, commanding the New Zealand divi-
sional artillery, ordered a concentration to be put down on the road

114 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

near Thermopylae village by three field regiments, to discourage a
renewal of the German effort. This had the desired effect. On the
right flank a counter-battery shoot at extreme range had silenced
German guns in action beyond the Maliaic Gulf.

After dark, when the withdrawal was about to begin, it was possible
to send vehicles forward past the burnt-out tanks along the road and
collect the forward gun-detachments, some of whom had been
engaged at close quarters with German infantry in the course of the

ht.

On the left flank, however, the Germans had climbed higher into
the hills, aiming, on precisely the same ground, at the identical
flanking manceuvre which had been employed by Mardonius when

he sent the Immortals on their night march to take Leonidas and his
force in the rear.

The historic tactics were being repeated, but the chance which
made accomplishment possible was due to a technical breakdown on
our side for which a parallel cannot readily be found in the days of
Xerxes. The turning movement had of course been observed by our
artillery observers in the hills, but they were unable to inform the
batteries because their field telephone lines had been cut by enemy
fire. The German infantry continued to creep from boulder to boulder
each bound forward making more hazardous the situation of the
25th Battalion and perhaps of the whole brigade. And if the brigade
position were overrun that afternoon, the German tanks might well
be swarming over the plain of Boeotia around Thebes by evening,
perhaps to throw the whole scheme of evacuation due to begin that
night into tragic confusion.

The company holding the left of the line was pulled back, but
suffered severely from enemy fire during the process of getting clear.
And when the withdrawal began it was necessary to send a company
from each of the other battalions and two carrier platoons to enable
the 25th Battalion to break off the action and depart.

Even after dark the enemy infantry continued to probe forward,
and the artillery duel continued until 9.30 p.m. By this time, when
the Germans seemed to call a halt, the New Zealand infantry were
boarding their trucks which had been so late in coming up that
arrangements had been made to take both infantry and gunners
away in the artillery vehicles ; for the medium and field guns were due
for destruction, the last battery remaining in action being one of the
2nd Regiment R.H.A., which did not cease fire till nearly midnight.
By this hour the New Zealand convoys were clear of Molos and
driving, first along the coast road and then southward through
Thebes, to Kriekouki. Further south the troops were to be dispersed

EVACUATION 115

and hidden until, forty-eight hours later, they could expect to be
embarked.

Thus the main effort of the enemy to break through the Thermo-
pylae position ended in failure with considerable loss to his armoured
forces.

In the morning Australian observers on the forward crests near the
Brallos road had seen the Germans cross the Sperkhios in the plain
below and concentrate for their attack eastward against the New
Zealand position. On the Australian left, men of the advanced com-
panies of the 2/lst Battalion watched German mountain troops
scaling the hillsides out of range. At intervals throughout the morn-
ing the battery positions were under attack by dive-bombers, but the
2 2nd Field Regiment, which had moved most of its guns to rear
positions before dawn, suffered little loss. At 11.30 a.m. the machine-
gunners with the 2/llth Battalion in the centre engaged German
infantry advancing along the railway, and the afternoon wore on
without the enemy making much progress. Suddenly a heavy mortar
bombardment opened upon one company of the 2/11th which
suffered considerably, and then, just before 5 p.m. a determined
attack by German infantry caused the two forward companies of the
battalion to fall back slowly through the support companies on the
edge of Brallos village. The fire of the Australian machine-guns
covered this movement, and made possible the rescue of many of the
wounded who were carried back and then sent away in the battalion
transport. Later, orders were given for the 2/11th to hold a line west
of Ano Kalivia until 9 p.m.

The two companies of the 2/Ist Battalion holding the left of the
forward position had been withdrawn from the top of the pass at
noon. At Brallos they were deployed to cover the mountain track
along which they had retreated. Brigadier Vasey sent another com-
pany of this battalion to watch the road from Gravia and at dusk,
near this village, fire was exchanged with German infantry. Enemy
pressure was maintained, the detachment of the 2/8th Battalion east
of Brallos coming under attack, until nearly 8.0 p.m. and then the
fighting died down. Rather unexpectedly the Australians, who had
been watching the southward road leading into Ano Kalivia, were
able to board their trucks and withdraw without interference. The
tail of the column moved off about 10.15 p.m. First ordered to destroy
their guns, the 2/2nd Field Regiment was told, later, to bring them
away and did so, with the scanty supply of ammunition that re-
mained. Driving through the night, mostly with headlights on,
Vasey’s troops passed through Mandhra and at about 8.0 a.m. on
April 25th—Anzac Day—arrived at Megara.

116 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE
m4 ]«
First Embarkations

AFTER the Greek surrender there was no longer a Commander-in-
Chief, but the Greek staff continued to do their best to assist our
embarkation. Thus Greek troops were kept clear of the main roads
so that there should be less chance of congestion as our traffic moved
to and fro between the forward positions and the areas of concentra-
tion near the beaches. The Greek people were now well aware that
we were on the point of departure, but, for the most part, their
friendliness was no less than when they had welcomed us as allies,
and perhaps deliverers, little more than a month before. They called
their thanks, tendered small gifts and cried ‘come back again!’ as
the fighting men in their battered vehicles drove through Athens
towards the sea.

Anzac Corps headquarters had moved from Levadia to Elevsis
during the previous night and closed at 2 p.m. on April 24th. General
Blamey visited General Wilson in Athens during the morning and,
later, was flown to Egypt where his presence was much desired." At
Alexandria he saw Admiral Cunningham and emphasized the need
to speed up the evacuation.

Some revision of the programme was made in order to embark
still more troops from the furthermost beaches of the Peloponnesus,
localities which were deemed less liable to air attack. To protect the
isthmus of Corinth from the assault of airborne forces ‘Isthmus
Force’ was formed under Brigadier Lee. His troops consisted of a
company of the 19th New Zealand Battalion, the 6th New Zealand
Field Company, and a section of the 122nd Light A.A. Battery ; his
orders were to keep the Megara road open, but to make preparations
for the destruction of the road and railway bridge over the Corinth
canal as soon as the last of our troops had passed. Here a conflict of
loyalties arose, for the Greek commander at Corinth insisted that he
was in sole charge of the bridge and responsible for its protection.

With the fall of darkness our trucks began to move back along the
roads converging upon the beaches where the embarkation was to
take place. Elaborate plans had been made to conceal our intentions
from the enemy up to the last possible moment. During the stand at
Thermopylae all day-movement of road convoys towards the rear
had been forbidden, so as to give as little appearance as possible
to the roving aircraft of the Luftwaffe that withdrawal was being
planned. Now, during the period of embarkation, all night-movement

1 He was appointed, forthwith, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Middle East.

EVACUATION 117

of convoys forward was prohibited, in order to allow unim-
peded movement to the columns of vehicles making their way
towards the beaches. Strict road discipline was maintained and
vehicles were forbidden to overtake, but driving with side-lights was
permitted to ensure the maximum practicable speed. The traffic
control of the withdrawal, at any rate at this early stage, compared
favourably with some of the subsequent desert ‘flaps’, when our
increased power to give air protection to retreating troops had led to
the gradual adoption of more free and easy methods on the road.
Now and again a vehicle would break down en route. Unless it was
due to a minor failing that could promptly be remedied, it was
pushed off the road and jettisoned, and its occupants distributed
themselves among the succeeding trucks. For traffic blocks anddelays
of any sort during the hours of darkness had to be avoided at all
costs, and the loss of a few more vehicles was of no importance when
all would have to be sacrificed in the end.

The 16th and 17th Australian Brigades—moving as one group—
drove from the Mandhra region into the Peloponnesus and har-
boured near the small fishing village of Myloi.

And so the troops moved by night and lay hid in the thickly-
planted olive groves or in the mountain ravines by day, enduring that
queer boredom of enforced inactivity while great events are moving—
a type of boredom that bears no relation to any other form of that
misfortune. They kept as still as could be during the daylight hours—
and prayed that the Luftwaffe would fail to observe them.

The Germans attempted no night bombing of the embarkation
beaches; but during April 24th they had attacked Athens and
Piraeus. In the evening they set on fire and sank with great loss of life
the Greek steamer Hellas which carried wounded, R.A. and Pioneer
Corps personnel, and civilians.

Aided by a calm sea, on this the first night of evacuation, the
estimate of troops who could be embarked was exceeded. At Porto
Rafti, much favoured by Athens bathers in times of peace, about
5,200 men, mostly of the Sth New Zealand Brigade Group, were
taken on board H.M.S. Calcutta and s.s. Glengyle by means of
various types of landing-craft, and sailed for Crete. At Navplion
occurred the first of many mishaps that were to befall the force
during the next few days, s.s. Ulster Prince ran aground at the
entrance to the harbour, was refloated, and ran aground again. She
had been allotted a contingent of 2,000 men who would now have to
wait until the following night: nevertheless at least 5,500 troops—
mostly of Corps headquarters, Australian Division headquarters,
the 4th Survey Regiment, 16th Heavy A.A. Battery and ‘base details’,

MAP No.6.

1412@>
Tatois

Mt. Parnis

Kriekouki

THE ROAD TO THE BEACHES

Navpaktos es)
= —

EVACUATION 119

with about 150 Australian and New Zealand nursing sisters, were
taken off in the s.s. Glenearn, the cruiser Phoebe, the destroyers
Voyager and Stuart, and a corvette. This convoy, also, was for Crete.

In addition to recalling General Blamey to Egypt, orders were
issued on this day for the departure of the two divisional com-
manders. Major-General Mackay was flown direct to Crete early on
April 25th. Major-General Freyberg, whose troops were heavily
engaged at Thermopylae and also holding the covering position at
Kriekouki, received from Force Headquarters in Athens an order to
depart which he could not well obey. Actually he continued in com-
mand until the end.

All concerned may take pride in the success with which contact
was broken with the Germans after the fighting at Thermopylae and
Brallos. Almost our entire force was withdrawn to the Athens area
or beyond. By daybreak of April 25th the only troops remaining
north of Athens were the rearguard consisting of the 4th New
Zealand Brigade at Kriekouki, south of Thebes, and the skeleton of
the 1st Armoured Brigade on the southern fringe of Mount Parnis
with a strong detachment forward at Khalkis. Thus the two principal
approaches to Athens from the north were still covered.

There was in fact no close pursuit during the day. The Germans
duly entered the abandoned Thermopylae position, and finding that
they had failed to trap any part of the British force published a some-
what imaginative account of the operation. The German communiqué
proclaimed that Thermopylae was captured ‘by a pincer attack, by
which the entmy were thrown out of a particularly strong and long
fortified defensive position’. In fact, the fighting on the previous day
justifies the belief that Thermopylae could have been held for days
longer if the general plan had demanded it. The perhaps under-
standable pride in the ‘ejection’ of the British force could scarcely be
reconciled with statements already being broadcast by Dr. Goebbels
that the bulk of the British troops had gone and that only a small
covering force still remained in Greece.

Behind Thermopylae on the main road to Athens the sappers had
done one of the best demolition jobs of the campaign. The road was
so thoroughly cratered and wrecked that the German engineers, after
taking a look at it, ruefully reported that they could not guarantee a
speedy repair, and the enemy tanks, which should have been bowling
along towards Levadia and Thebes, had to be diverted on to side
roads and mountain tracks which had never seen a motor vehicle
before; and then to make their slow and difficult way as best they
could in a generally south-easterly direction. At nightfall, they were
still far from Thebes.

120 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

The decision to abandon the main road was perhaps only in part
conditioned by the work of destruction carried out by our sappers.
Though the enemy aircraft failed to locate the New Zealanders at
Kriekouki, it seems that they believed in the likelihood of our making
a further stand where the mountains begin to rise south of Thebes,
dividing the plain of Boeotia from Attica. It was from these moun-
tains that Pausanias had watched the Persian forces in the year after
Thermopylae, until he descended into the plain and destroyed them at
Plataea.

It may be that von List had read his Herodotus and realized the
potential dangers of an incautious advance; but what is more sur-
prising is that the Germans were so far from wanting to engage and
destroy our rearguard that their movements were designed definitely
to avoid action and to approach Athens by a more devious
route. Whatever Dr. Goebbels may have been saying over
the radio, it seems that the German Intelligence, with its habitual
inaccuracy, considerably overestimated the strength of our troops
in the Thebes area.

Apart from the now uninterrupted air activity of the ubiquitous
Luftwaffe, which was systematically combing the whole hinterland in
search of our places of concealment, the day passed quietly over the
area that had ceased to be ‘the front’. Perhaps the most noteworthy
incident was the demise of the last of our cruiser tanks when it fouled
the bridge at Tanagra as our rearguard withdrew from Khalkis.

This same day the Germans, following the occupation of Samoth-
rake, Thasos and Skiros, landed troops on Lemnos. The island had
been regarded as of key importance to the general defensive system
in the eastern Mediterranean should the Germans invade Turkey ;
and, in view of this, a British battalion had been landed there from
Palestine on April 4th, two days before the German attack on Greece.
With Turkey left unmolested and the enemy in possession of the
coast of Greek Thrace, there was no point in our retaining a garrison
on the island. It had been withdrawn on April 12th.

On the mainland it was a comparatively quiet day but anxiety was
felt for the isthmus of Corinth, Brigadier Lee’s troops being neither
equipped nor organized to repel an airborne attack. During the day
reinforcements in the shape of three companies of the 2/6th Austra-
lian Battalion and a squadron of New Zealand cavalry were received.
Then, in the evening, a bombing raid silenced nearly all the anti-
aircraft guns in the canal area. It was an ominous portent for the
morrow.

An order issued by Force Headquarters placed General Freyberg
in command of all troops in the Peloponnesus as soon as he should

EVACUATION 121

arrive there from Attica. At night General Wilson left Athens for the
Peloponnesus, and early next morning his headquarters were estab-
lished in an olive grove near Myloi. Here General Freyberg and his
headquarters arrived, having also moved down during the night. Near
Tripolis, a rather ugly modern town in the heart of ancient Arcadia,
was the 6th New Zealand Brigade which, coming from Attica, had
crossed the Corinth bridge before daylight of the 26th. The brigade
had impressed all beholders by its admirable discipline and the calm
and confident air of all ranks; it was still well equipped and emi-
nently battleworthy.

The 16th/17th Australian Brigade Group moved on this night from
the Myloi area to the vicinity of Kalamata where it was to be
embarked.

The night’s embarkations had comprised the 19th Australian
Brigade Group, a party of nursing sisters, and some wounded and
other troops. These were taken on board from two beaches at Megara
to the number of 4,700. The ships had to put to sea by 3 a.m. in order
to be sufficiently far out by daylight to escape serious danger of dive-
bombing attacks ; as a result 500 men were left behind. Knowing that
the Germans might arrive at almost any time, these troops tried to
get together transport to convey them to the Peloponnesus whither
the remainder of the Australian Division (the 16th/17th Brigade
Group) had proceeded with the beach at Kalamata as its objective.
For reasons soon to be related they were unable to get through the
Isthmus next day. Many made their way north to join the New
Zealanders near Porto Rafti beach, but a party of about two hundred
embarked in a Greek schooner and were picked up on the way to
Crete by one of our destroyers.

With nearly 15,000 troops embarked and at sea, the rate of evacua-
tion was well up to the programme laid down, and, despite the acci-
dents on each night, all appeared to be running as smoothly as could
be expected. The next day was to tell a different and much more
unfortunate tale.

m[ 5 ] +e
Airborne Attack

It was now, when fully a quarter of our forces was already safely at
sea and a good proportion of the remainder was either already
through to the Peloponnesus or in the neighbourhood of their em-
barkation beaches, that von List executed the manceuvre which, had
E

122 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

it been made earlier, might have produced disastrous results. He
attacked the isthmus of Corinth with airborne troops.

Saturday, April 26th, dawned clear, still and bright—perfect
weather for an enterprise of this type. The tactics employed by the
Germans are of particular interest, since the operation was in the
nature of a rehearsal for the full-scale airborne attack made upon
Crete in the following month. The day opened with a high-level
bombing attack upon the canal area at about 6 a.m. aimed at locating
the positions of our anti-aircraft guns. In this the attackers proved
all too successful, and when the next wave arrived—twenty or thirty
dive-bombers, escorted by from eighty to a hundred ME 110’s—the
guns were most effectively silenced. The JU 87’s swooped down and
dropped their bombs on or around our gun positions, and what they
failed to hit was largely accounted for by the machine-gun and
cannon fire of the fighters. For half an hour there was nothing to be
heard but the whine and crash of falling bombs and shells and the
chatter of machine-guns; and then, when every man in the neigh-.
bourhood of the canal had his head well down in a slit-trench or was
under cover of some kind, the troop-carriers began to appear.
Arriving usually in formations of three, practically wing tip to wing
tip, they approached, flying quite slowly (or so it appeared to eye-
witnesses on the ground) at a height of not much more than 200 feet.
It looked like an exercise in field manceuvres, for there was not an
R.A.F. fighter to be seen and there was not an anti-aircraft gun to be
heard.

Then the parachutists began to emerge, dropping through the
clear almost windless air and descending on both sides of the canal.
The outer aircraft of each formation of three dropped men, the inner
ones, by means of different coloured parachutes, dropped supplies.
And while this was happening the German fighters were machine-
gunning the approach roads from north and south in an endeavour
to seal off the canal area which it was the task of the parachutists to
seize, preserving the bridge intact.

Two battalions of the German No. 2 Parachute Rifle Regiment
with supporting arms were used for the action, a force amounting to
not less than 800 men.

Isthmus Force had a wide area to cover, and the troops actually
in position close to the canal were not numerous. They consisted
chiefly of a company of the 19th New Zealand Battalion and a
squadron of New Zealand cavalry, and on them fell the first weight
of the assault. Many Germans were killed in the air, and others fell
into the canal; but as more and still more arrived our men were oOver-
whelmed. The defenders inflicted many casualties but suffered

EVACUATION 123

severely themselves, and after some confused fighting the bridge over
the canal was seized intact. This was a matter of importance to the
enemy if his ground troops were to advance speedily into the Pelo-
ponnesus. Promptly the paratroop-engineers, who had been among
the very first to drop, set about tearing up the fuse wires and re-
moving the charges, congratulating themselves upon another bridge,
the most important of all, taken intact. Suddenly there was a loud
explosion.

Two young officers, Captain J. F. Phillips (Devonshire Regiment)
and Lieutenant J. T. Tyson (Royal Engineers) had both taken cover
at a point about two hundred yards south of the bridge when the
parachutists completed their mopping up task in the immediate
neighbourhood.

As... they saw the possibility of their retreat being cut off, they
decided to divide the German forces by the width of the canal. With
admirable coolness one of them took a rifle and, although already seen
and fired at by the Germans, took steady aim at the charge they had
fixed to the bridge. The first shot missed, but the second detonated the
charge with a violent explosion, just as a dozen parachutists were
crossing to round them up. Down crashed the bridge, the hundred
and fifty feet into the waters of the canal, taking the Germans with it.
py two boys escaped and reached Navplion, where they were taken
off.

The headquarters squadron of the 4th Hussars had been stationed
at the Isthmus, and the three light tanks that they still possessed
might have been of value against the parachutists, who seem to have
been short of anti-tank weapons; for a German account stresses the
fact that they were ordered to salvage all abandoned British anti-
tank guns and rifles to meet an expected counter-attack with tanks.
This they proceeded to do.

The guns and ammunition were piled into a captured car and taken
up ahead to where one Captain S. was waiting. This officer had the
guns set up immediately and it looked for a moment as if immediately
would be none too soon. For about that time one of the light tanks
did appear across a field. The gunners drew a bead and got ready to
fire, but something about the tank looked phoney: it would start and
then stop, and when under way it travelled jerkily. Just in time Captain
S. hit upon the thought that this was a British tank now being operated
by a couple of his parachutists. This turned out to be true.’

In fact, the headquarters squadron of the 4th Hussars had been
overrun almost at the start and we were never able to get any of the
tanks into action against the parachutists.

1 Casson, Greece Against the Axis, p. 196.
3 Major Paul W. Thompson, Modern Battle, p. 129.

124 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

By 8 a.m. the action round the canal was practically over. The
Germans held both banks; the bridge had gone, but it was quickly
replaced by an emergency bridge. Corinth itself was entered a little
later without opposition by a party using a captured British car
driven by a German war correspondent who had been dropped with
the parachutists. Four or five paratroopers hung on to the running-
boards or clung to the car with one hand while holding a grenade or
a machine-pistol in the other. This car was followed by the captured
British tank. Just as they entered the town from one side a German
aircraft touched down in a field a few hundred yards away on the
other.

From it there emerged—an interpreter. He proceeded sedately into
Corinth and in excellent modern Greek relieved the mayor of his
responsibilities.

German thoroughness!

Isthmus Force now disintegrated. Many had been killed or
captured, and the survivors were split into two bodies by the German
paratroopers solidly established between them. Some of our men
went north to find the 4th New Zealand Brigade, but only two
appear to have done so; others, by various means, eventually arrived
in Egypt. Parties on the south side of the canal made for Tripolis to
join the 6th New Zealand Brigade.

Those who made contact with this brigade brought news of the
airborne attack but not of the destruction of the bridge. Accordingly
two companies of the 26th Battalion were sent north to counter-
attack in order to re-open the route for the withdrawal of the rest of
the force from Attica. The operation would have to be carried out
without artillery support of any kind and even without mortars; in
addition, the New Zealanders were subjected to heavy attack from the
air as they approached Corinth. Nevertheless, they had gone into
action against the new firmly established paratroops when news of
the destruction of the bridge was at last received. There being no
object now to be gained by the attack, contact with the enemy was
broken off, and companies fell back upon the remainder of the 26th
Battalion, which was being organized to cover the Navplion em-
barkation points by holding a defensive position at the highest point
on the road between Corinth and Navplion. The ascent is gentle and
easy from the direction of Corinth; on the southern side the ground
drops away more steeply, and the crags to the east, where stand the
massive remains of Agamemnon’s palace of Mycenae, look out over
the open plain of Argos.

It was not a position that could have been held for any length of
time, but fortunately it soon became clear that the German force at

EVACUATION 125

the Isthmus had no further objective for the day than the capture of
the canal area and the town of Corinth. No attempt was made to
advance southward ; it seemed that the enemy’s main object had been
to bottle up our troops to the north.

Fortunately for us most of the troops who had still to be embarked
were now in the Peloponnesus, and the remainder had access to an
adequate number of beaches in eastern Attica.

Therefore, despite its spectacular quality, despite its profound
tactical significance, the airborne landing had accomplished remark-
ably little except to inflict upon us considerable loss. The Germans
claimed 21 officers and 900 other ranks as prisoners from the fighting
around the Isthmus, also 1,450 Greeks including the commander of
the ‘Army of the Peloponnesus’. Their own reported losses in killed,
wounded and missing, were no more than 237. The attack had
practically wiped out our small and ill-equipped force; but although
it had given our Command added anxiety regarding the fate of our
troops further to the north, it had not decided their fate.

There was one other significant German move during the day. The
vanguard of the SS Adolf Hitler Division, which had taken Yanina
six days earlier and had since been moving south by Arta and
Agrinion, crossed the Gulf of Corinth during the afternoon and
landed in the Peloponnesus just south-west of Patras. The three
squadrons of light tanks of the 4th Hussars—nine tanks in all—had
been withdrawn earlier in the day in the direction of Kalamata, and
there was nothing left to oppose the crossing or to prevent the
Germans from making contact with their paratroops at the Isthmus.
They promptly took possession of the brand-new airfield at Araxos
in the immediate neighbourhood. It had been slowly constructed
under British supervision during the long winter months—just in
time to be ready for the Germans when they arrived.

Brigadier Lee had already been dispatched with a small force of
Australians and New Zealanders and a few guns to prepare a last
ditch defence in front of Monemvasia in the extreme south-east of
the Peloponnesus. In view of the presence of German troops at both
Corinth and Patras, more use would now have to be made of this
port and of Kalamata in the final evacuations.

The largest formation still remaining north of the Isthmus was the
4th New Zealand Brigade. Already for two days by the artful use of
camouflage it had succeeded in laying hidden from air observation
and attack in the gullies and olive groves south of Thebes. But the
German ground forces were in Thebes early on this Saturday morn-
ing, and a reconnaissance patrol pushed through between cight and
nine o'clock almost to the New Zealand outposts. The New

126 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

Zealanders—they had the 2/3rd Australian Field Regiment in
support—gave no sign of movement, and the patrol returned evi-
dently quite satisfied that the road through the hills into Attica was
undefended.

Just before noon a column of about 100 trucks filled with infantry,
preceded by motor-cyclists and a solitary tank, drove confidently up
the road. Not until the tail of the column was within range did the
Australian gunners open fire. Hit after hit was scored, and the
German force withdrew in some confusion.

The enemy, it appeared, was anxious to avoid direct contact with
a rearguard which he presumed to be a good deal stronger than it
actually was. There had been none of his customary rapid deployment
to either flank which normally followed the opening of fire by our
defenders. In the afternoon the New Zealanders observed a much
stronger column consisting of about 500 vehicles moving eastward
from Thebes, towards the coast road. This was the main spearhead
of the advance against Athens, moving at right angles to our line of
retreat to the beaches east of Athens. Therein lay a danger for the
following day.

The planned withdrawal of the brigade to the Peloponnesus had
had to be abandoned when news was received of the paratroop
landing at Corinth. General Wilson’s headquarters had no means of
communication with Brigadier Puttick, but General Freyberg’s high-
powered wireless set managed to call up the last remaining set of the
ist Armoured Brigade near the Marathon beaches. A message was
transmitted ‘in clear’, but in sufficiently disguised phraseology,
instructing the 4th New Zealand Brigade to make for the Porto Rafti
area during the night, and to prepare for embarkation on the night of
April 27th/28th. This message was carried from Marathon by two
officers to Brigadier Puttick. It seems that Brigadier R. Miles, com-
manding the New Zealand artillery, picked up the message at Porto
Rafti and also sent it on; so the brigade commander must have
received this important order in duplicate.

The 4th New Zealand Brigade was therefore condemned to another
twenty-four hours on the mainland north of the Isthmus, and the
evacuation, of necessity, was spaced over a fourth night. It was
certainly the best arrangement which could be made, under the
circumstances, and offered good prospects of the rescue of Puttick’s
fine battalions at the eleventh hour. The withdrawal began at dusk,
the 20th Battalion covering the movement. Demolitions were blown
without interference from the enemy and the brigade reached its
bivouac area near Porto Rafti in the early hours of next morning.

EVACUATION 127
[6]

Last Days at the Beaches

Tuts Saturday night was to have seen the major part of the evacua-
tion accomplished, but things went amiss and performance could not
keep pace with programme.

From the Attica beaches the intention was to embark 6,000 men
at Porto Rafti and Rafina. The Porto Rafti lift was safely accom-
plished, the 64th Medium Regiment R.A., the 5th New Zealand
Field Regiment, the 27th New Zealand Machine-Gun Battalion, the
7th New Zealand Field Company, and other troops being taken
aboard the s.s. Salween for Alexandria and H.M. ships Carlisle and
Kandahar for Crete. At Rafina, where the s.s. Glengyle had to lay
a mile and a half out to sea owing to the heavy swell, and each boat
trip from shore to ship and back again took over sixty minutes, the
sailing hour had to be advanced to 2 a.m. In consequence about
2,600 men were taken and 1,000 left, the latter including Ist Armoured
Brigade headquarters and parties of the Rangers, R.H.A., Northum-
berland Hussars, 6th New Zealand Field Regiment, New Zealand
cavalry, and anti-aircraft gunners. The Hussars destroyed their anti-
tank guns on the beach when it became obvious that these weapons
could not be embarked.

The ships from Porto Rafti and Rafina were dive-bombed at sea
and suffered some casualties, but no vessel was sunk or seriously
damaged. :

From Myloi General Wilson departed in a Sunderland flying-boat
for Crete leaving General Freyberg in command of all our troops
remaining in Greece, a command which even so fine a soldier found
difficult if not impossible to exercise; for some of the detachments
waiting to embark were cut off from all communication, and their
numbers, whereabouts, and condition could not now be ascertained.

The Navplion area was likely to become untenable by Sunday
night, so every effort had to be made to evacuate the troops gathered
near. The stranded Ulster Prince, however, was a decided obstruction ;
reduced to a mere hulk by dive-bombing her position made the
approaches to the quayside so difficult to negotiate that the whole
business of evacuation was slowed down.

Here is the account of the embarkation as given to a special cor-
respondent by the captain of H.M.S. Calcutta, who had been present
at the Aandalsnes evacuation and also subsequently at Dunkirk:

The whole thing was different from Dunkirk in this—the task of
transporting the men from shore to ship was slower as they were

128 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

heavily laden with all their equipment. But they were not exhausted.
Most of them had been resting under trees, waiting for us to pick them
up when darkness fell. All these operations were carried out without
a single light, and as far as I know not a life was lost accidentally.

I took three merchantmen with me, and made for Navplion. The
rest of the ships in my convoy, with the escorting destroyers, went to
Porto Rafti and another fishing port, Rafina. At four that afternoon,
after we had separated, we had a sharp attack from eighteen JU 87’s
and 88’s attacking in two waves of nine machines. They hit one of my
transports! in the engine room, disabling her, while a second vessel
was hit by a small bomb but not badly damaged. When it was over I
ordered the destroyer Griffin to stand by the crippled transport, which
was towed into port. With the other two I arrived at Navplion about
ten o’clock. I took 960 men on board while the destroyers Hotspur and
Isis took 500 and 400. So far the weather had been perfect, but that
night the wind got up with a choppy sea, which made boat work most
difficult. The cruisers Orion and Perth, with the destroyer Stuart,
appeared before midnight and embarked men from Tolo. These ships
took on about 2,500 men. .. . I was anxious to be going, as the Germans
had occupied the aerodrome at Argos, a few miles north of Navplion.

From Navplion and Tolo together, therefore, a total of about
4,360—including men of the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment, with some
of Force Headquarters—was taken on board during the night. But
the Germans were now very much on the qui vive and from earliest
dawn their reconnaissance planes were roving the southern Aegean
in search of the convoys, whose route they could, after all, clearly
predict.

The captain continues :

At seven o’clock in the morning of April 27th, bombers came over
and did not leave us until 10 am. We were shooting so accurately
that again and again we put them off. About 7.15 one transport
was hit and began sinking. I ordered the Diamond alongside to
take off the troops, and about 9 a.m. three more destroyers, the
Wryneck, Vampire and Voyager, joined us in the battle with the dive-
bombers, so I detached the Wryneck to help with the rescue work. In
that three hours the Calcutta fired about 1,200 round of four-inch

shells and many thousand rounds of pom-pom and machine-gun
ammunition.

H.M.S. Calcutta eventually got away safely to Port Said. The
s.s. Slamat was the transport sailing in company which was sunk by
bombing on the way, but all the survivors were taken off. The
destroyers Diamond and Wryneck were less fortunate. They were
hunted by dive-bombers throughout the morning, and both were sunk
about midday. A few survivors were picked up by the destroyer
Griffin but in addition to the crews over 500 of the troops on board
were drowned.

1.8, Glenearn,

EVACUATION 129

The choppy waters in the bay had slowed down the turn-around
of the boats to such an extent that, when the hour came for the ships
to depart 2,200 men had to be left behind at Navplion and Tolo. Of
these, some 400 moved off down the coast in a landing craft which
was subsequently bombed and sunk by the enemy.

Kalamata had been designated as the embarkation point for the
16th and 17th Australian Brigades, both very weak in numbers and
therefore organized in one group. This group formed by far the most
coherent part of a miscellaneous force of about 15,000 which had
arrived by evening ; nearly double the number that had been allowed
for when the decision was first taken to use Kalamata as a place of
evacuation. The total had been swollen by stragglers who had made
their way south after the news of the German airborne descent on the
Isthmus. The cruiser Phoebe, with the transports Dilwara, City of
London and Costa Rica, duly arrived to embark the troops, but it was
clear that the few hours of darkness at their disposal would not allow
them to take off all those who were waiting to leave. They managed
to get 8,000 troops on board, mostly from the two Australian
brigades, before it was time to set sail. Although the Costa Rica was
bombed and sunk on the way to Egypt, the troops were taken off
and landed in Crete.

Two caiques left Yithion, the ancient port of Sparta, that night,
bound for Crete, but there were 7,000 men waiting on shore at
Kalamata when dawn broke on Sunday.

This night of Saturday/Sunday should have seen over 26,000 men
embarked. The total of troops who were actually taken off amounted
to approximately 17,300 (Rafina 2,600; Porto Rafti 2,400; Navplion
1,800; Tolo 2,500; Kalamata 8,000).

Apart from the stragglers scattered over Attica and the Pelopon-
nesus there remained four main groups still waiting to be embarked.
Of these, the 4th New Zealand Brigade and the remnants of the Ist
Armoured Brigade were moving towards the neighbourhood of the
beaches of eastern Attica. There was a concentration from many
units at the head of the Navplion gulf. Another group was formed by
the 6th New Zealand Brigade, strung out along the road from the
neighbourhood of Argos back to Tripolis. And finally, there were
the troops at Kalamata. Of these four groups, only the two New
Zealand brigades were still capable of a prolonged resistance. They
were as good as ever.

April 27th, Sunday morning in Athens. It was exactly three weeks
from that Sunday when Germany had launched her attack upon
Greece. Throughout the previous evening British, Australian and New
Zealand troops, cut off from their units or prevented by the enemy
E®

EVACUATION 131

movements from making their way to their assigned embarkation
points, were trickling through the Greek capital. To the last they met
with friendliness and assistance. ‘We know you will return’ was the
prevailing sentiment with which the Greeks bade farewell. To the last
the cry of ‘Nike! Nike!’ (Victory! Victory!) could be heard, while
girls tossed flowers to the weary dusty transients as they made their
way on foot or in the few remaining lorries through the streets of
Athens, and civilians of all ages made the ‘thumbs up’ sign, widely
believed on the Continent of Europe to be the customary British
form of greeting.

Here may be related the story of a small party of New Zealanders
who found themselves stranded at Megara and, early on Sunday
morning, took a bus into Athens whence they travelled by taxi-cab
to Rafina—an unconventional retreat under the circumstances, and
one made possible only by Greek goodwill.

At 9.30 a.m. on this calm and beautiful Sunday morning there was
no sound of approaching battle. No German bombers swept over the
city. But down the road that approaches Athens from the gay, garden
cities of Kephissia and Amaroussi, down the broad Queen Sophia
Avenue passing the large pale pink building which had been the house
of Venizelos and was and is the British Embassy, appeared a reptilian
swarm of motor-cyclists. They moved on towards the heart of
Athens, looking neither to right nor left, like automatons of some
evil Wellsian fantasy. At the great Square of the Constitution they
swung left, past the Royal Palace and the tomb of the Unknown
Warrior, and up the winding road that leads to the Acropolis. And
on the flagstaff at the summit of the rock that has stirred the imagina-
tions of thirty centuries, on the hill of Athene and Poseidon, their
leader hoisted his flag. Then came the armoured cars and the tanks
and the lorried infantry. Athens had fallen.

Now let us look at the 4th New Zealand Brigade, a fighting force

still capable of returning blow for blow. The battalions had driven
back from their well-guarded lair above Thebes during the night,
back through Athens, and on the morning of the 27th they moved
into position just beyond the village of Markopoulon. Here they
deployed for action for the last time in Greece, the 18th and 20th
Battalions forward, the 19th in reserve. Throughout the day they
must hold the final beach-head in front of Porto Rafti. They had still
Australian field artillery in support, and to the north of them around
Rafina lay a remnant of the Ist Armoured Brigade—headquarters
troops, some of the Rangers, and a handful of artillerymen—too
weak to offer effective opposition if the Germans should discover
their hiding place.

132 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

Was there to be a last-ditch fight in front of Porto Rafti? A flight of
twenty or more Messerschmitts came over in the course of the morning,
sweeping down upon the cornfields and vines and olive groves while
some of the New Zealanders were still taking up their battle posi-
tions. Men among the ripening corn saw their cover sprayed with
incendiary bullets and were compelled to display themselves in the
open. Worse still, the German planes were seeking out the guns
which had so often during the past fortnight saved our infantry
against tank assault. Of the small number of pieces still serviceable
they destroyed one 25-pounder and six anti-tank guns. It seemed the
certain prelude to an attack in strength by the German ground
forces.

Yet noon passed by, and the sun began to descend towards the
ridge of hills behind Athens, and still the enemy tarried. Then
armoured vehicles and lorries were seen moving forward along the
road into Markopoulon. Our gunners engaged them and the infantry
opened up with mortars; but the reluctance of German vanguards
during these last days to push home attacks against a resolute resis-
tance again served the defenders well. The Germans, who lacked
artillery support, began to draw back out of range, but not before
they had suffered considerable losses. Bombing and machine-gunning
of the New Zealand positions from the air was then resumed and
continued intermittently until dusk.

After dark the brigade pulled back to the beaches at Porto Rafti,
where H.M. ships Ajax, Kimberley and Kingston had arrived to take
them off. Some losses had been suffered by attack during this final
uncovenanted day ashore, but on the whole things had gone better
than could have been expected. The brigade group, to the strength of
3,400, embarked without incident and sailed for Crete at 3 a.m. on
the morning of the 28th.

At Rafina the destroyer Havoc took off a party of New Zealand
cavalry and what was left of the Ist Armoured Brigade.

But these were the only troops embarked from Greece that night,
for no shipping had been available for a fourth night’s evacuation
from the Peloponnesus. There were still about 1,700 men, mainly
base details, around Navplion, many of them now without rations,
all anxiously aware that Sunday night would probably provide their
last opportunity of escape. For the Germans were said to have
reached Argos and there was nothing now to prevent them advancing
to Navplion and Tolo, gathering in all the men who remained at the
beaches.

The 7,000 left behind at Kalamata after the previous night’s
evacuation were joined in the course of Sunday by 300 men of the

- EVACUATION 133

4th Hussars who had made their way down, by bad mountain roads,
from their last patrolling position on the southern shore of the Gulf
of Corinth. Brigadier Parrington, as the senior officer on the spot,
deployed the Hussars as a covering force for defence of the beach-
head while instructing the remainder to disperse and take cover. He
estimated that he possessed about two days rations for the whole
force, but, as more than half of the 7,000 men under his command
had no arms and the fighting value of many was, in any case, ques-
tionable, the actual capacity for resistance of his force bore little
relation to its size. Nevertheless, the greatest part of the New Zealand
Reinforcement Battalion was present, and a contingent of Australian
reinforcements, while the 4th Hussars was, of course, a good, well-
trained regiment.

Between the small force at Navplion and the much larger one at
Kalamata was the 6th New Zealand Brigade which, at daybreak, was
strung along the road from the Gulf of Navplion back to Tripolis.
The 26th Battalion, breaking the custom which had prevailed
throughout the period of withdrawal, took the risk of moving by day,
despite the omnipresence of the Luftwaffe. This policy proved fully
justified, and though the column was repeatedly attacked by German
aircraft as it made its way back over the bad roads of the Pelopon-
nesus to Monemvasia in the extreme south-east, it actually suffered
only three casualties. The other two battalions followed after dark,
and travelling all night by unfamiliar and ill-mapped roads, reached
Monemvasia just as dawn was breaking on Monday, April 28th.

Here Brigadier Lee had organized a defensive perimeter and
sappers had prepared the approach roads for demolition, using, in
default of other explosives, depth charges taken from Greek destroyers
stranded in the harbour.

As at Kalamata, there had been no opportunity for evacuation
during the night. But Colonel Blunt, British military attaché in
Athens, and Colonel Quilliam, Deputy Director of Military Intel-
ligence, Middle East Command, had been busy gathering caiques in
the neighbourhood with a view to the possibility of ‘island hopping’
during the ensuing night, if no shipping arrived.

On Monday, April 28th, the German vanguard came down upon
Navplion and Tolo in the course of the morning, and by noon the
beaches were under fire. Some sporadic resistance was offered, but by
evening all was quiet. A few of the 1,700 escaped in small boats to one or
other of the neighbouring islands or started to work down the coast
towards Monemvasia. A few more gotaway on foot inland. But the bulk
of the force, short of food and arms and including many non-fighting
personnel, was gathered in by the Germans in the course of the day.

134 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

At Monemvasia the evacuation on the whole went with astonish-
ing smoothness. There were about 4,000 troops assembled, mainly
consisting of the 6th New Zealand Brigade which covered the land
approaches, and then withdrew to the beaches after dark. The ships
were late in arriving and little had been done by midnight. Later, the
destroyers Isis, Hotspur and Griffin were joined by H.M. cruiser Ajax,
and the tempo began to speed up in astonishing fashion. At 3 a.m.,
the normal hour for the ships’ departure, Admiral Baillie-Grohman
decided to risk another hour in order to get the remainder of the men
away. The gamble proved fully justified, and by 4 a.m. the entire force
had been embarked, the last boatload carrying the Admiral himself
and General Freyberg. All the four thousand troops were evacuated
without loss that night from Monemvasia.

General Freyberg had watched with satisfaction the orderly and
business-like departure of his New Zealand battalions who had come
away fully armed and equipped. So far as he knew no more of our
troops, apart from the inevitable stragglers, remained on Greek soil.
He had no knowledge of the fact that thousands of men were waiting
—and waiting in vain—to be taken off the beaches of Kalamata.

At Kalamata occurred the tragedy of the night.

The total of 7,000 left behind after the previous night’s evacuation
had swollen to about 10,000 in the course of Monday. The latest
arrivals included fully 2,000 Yugoslav soldiers and civilians, numbers
of Greek civilians, and Cypriots and Palestinians of the pioneer
companies. The Germans were well aware that a force of some size
was assembled in the neighbourhood of the port, and while their
troops hastened forward along the mountain roads of the Pelopon-
nesus their aircraft bombed and machine-gunned the neighbourhood
during the day. ;

Nevertheless, the embarkation promised to go well. A strong force
of cruisers and destroyers was coming to take the troops off. The
whole assembly, representing so many nations and so many units,
had been organized in four detachments : each would begin to arrive
at its own control post, ready to enter the boats, at 9 p.m.

After dark, when the troops were moving down to the sea, the
German vanguard broke into the town. Their armoured cars accom-
panied by lorried infantry and self-propelled guns had succeeded in
over-running the weak covering screen formed by the 4th Hussars ;
and, shooting their way through, they raced on to the quayside,
where they captured the beachmaster, the only naval officer ashore.

At 9 p.m. the ships were reported to be lying off the harbour: the
cruisers Perth and Phoebe, the destroyers Nubian, Defender, Havoc,
Hero, Hereward, Decoy and Hasty, and three merchant vessels.

EVACUATION 135

Confused fighting was still in progress on shore, and the news was
flashed by hand-torch to the ships: they were informed that attempts
were being made to clear the quay and they were asked to stand by
and to send a boat. A naval officer was promptly landed. He met
Brigadier Parrington and returned to his ship with the brigadier’s
evacuation plans.

Now came another turn of Fortune’s Wheel and, for the moment,
the situation was saved. We still had men apt and ready for the
counter-attack. Sergeant J. D. Hinton, a New Zealander, crying ‘To
hell with this, who’ll come with me?’ ran forward to within a few
yards of the nearest German gun which fired and missed him. He
hurled two grenades at the gun detachment and wiped them out.
Then, with bayonet fixed, he led a rush of New Zealanders which
caused the Germans to abandon their guns and take refuge in two
houses. Smashing in doors and windows, Hinton and his men settled
the issue with the steel.

Elsewhere officers had rallied small parties of men and were attack-
ing the Germans wherever encountered. By 11.30 p.m. Kalamata was
practically clear of the enemy who had lost a dozen lorries, two guns,
two armoured cars, and about 150 prisoners; and the little victory
seemed to promise salvation. An ‘all well’ message was flashed to the
ships.

But the Fates were against our unfortunate and much-tried men.
Only a little later a naval officer came ashore to announce a terrible
disappointment. Orders had just been received from the Commander-
in-Chief for all ships to rejoin the Fleet without delay, as the Italian
fleet was reported to be at sea. There was no alternative. Orders had
to be obeyed, even though they were practically tantamount to a
sentence of captivity for the duration of the war for the 10,000 men
at Kalamata. Only a few boats were available and there was no time
to embark more than a few wounded and 400 troops before the ships
sailed.

It was obvious that Kalamata could not be held for long. Already
the Germans were beginning to work their way back and firing had
again broken out in the northern outskirts of the town. The gallant
Sergeant Hinton was wounded at this time and was subsequently
captured. Months later, in a German prison camp, he learned that he
had been awarded the Victoria Cross.

Brigadier Parrington reviewed the situation. Although one German
attack had been repulsed there was no hope of prolonging the resis-
tance. His men lacked support weapons and there was a shortage
even of rifles and small-arms ammunition. There was no means of
reply if enemy artillery should bombard the town and harbour. The

136 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

wounded were many. Little food was left. After a conference with
some of his senior officers the brigadier determined on surrender and
despatched a representative, together with an English-speaking
German officer prisoner, to inform the enemy that no resistance
would be offered after 5.30 a.m.

And so, on the morning of Tuesday, April 29th, the Germans took
Kalamata and some seven thousand prisoners.! The pity of it was
that the report concerning the Italian fleet proved to be unfounded.

With this surrender the British campaign on the mainland of
Greece came to an end. About 300 of the troops got away to the
south-east and some of them were picked up later. Destroyers which
came in close to the Kalamata beaches on the night of the 29th took
off 16 officers and 18 others. Numbers of stragglers had got away,
during the course of the previous day or two, to Kithira, making the
short voyage in every sort of craft, seaworthy and otherwise, an
Embarquement pour Cythére never dreamed of by Watteau. In the
end Colonel Blunt had as many as 850 under his command on the
island and they were successfully evacuated to Alexandria. About
600 more got away by caique to Milos and thence to Crete and
Egypt. .

For days and weeks after, survivors continued to trickle through to
Crete, to Chios and the islands of the eastern Aegean and to the coast
of Asia Minor ; and the total number evacuated after the actual close
of operations is estimated to have been as high as 1,400.

Because of the variety of methods and times of evacuation, it is
difficult to achieve an exact estimate of the total number of our troops
evacuated from Greece. Figures from official sources vary slightly,
one with another, but the discrepancies are of no great significance.

Revised official figures of the strength of the Army in Greece,
casualties sustained and numbers evacuated are as follow:

British Australian New Total

Zeal.
Strength at ee of campaign 24,206? 17,125 16,720 58,051
Evacuated . ; , . 13,7008 14,157 14,454 42,311
Losses ' : ‘ - 10,506 2,968 2,266 15,740

Our battle casualties may be reckoned at about 3,000, a by no
means heavy figure, and among the ‘missing’ counted in the losses

This is the figure claimed by the Germans themselves. It appears entirely con-
gruous with the number known to be in and around the town under Parrington’s
command at that time. The balance of something over 2,000 (after allowance is
made for the number evacuated and those killed in the night’ 's action) may be
assumed to have dispersed into the hills.

2 Includes 5,000 Palestinians and Cypriots.
5 Includes 1,100 Palestinians and Cypriots.

EVACUATION 137

are a considerable number of men who remained at large in Greece
after our departure. Some of these managed to rejoin Middle East
Command later in the year.

The Germans, by their own computation, lost 5,000 officers and
men.

The much greater proportion of British losses to those of the
Commonwealth troops is accounted for by the fact that the
lines of communication and base troops were supplied entirely
by the British. It should be remembered that the maintenance,
supply and general administrative services had been calculated for
the requirements of a combatant force almost double the strength of
that which actually went through the campaign. As we know, the
crisis in Egypt prevented our sending additional fighting formations
to Greece.

Grievous to relate, there had been yet another mass abandonment
of equipment, not on the Dunkirk scale—for the forces involved
were so much smaller—but on a scale quite sufficient to embarrass
General Wavell, who had so many fronts to provide for. Practically
none of our artillery, heavy equipment or motor transport could be
brought away. At least 8,000 vehicles of all kinds were abandoned or
destroyed. With certain notable exceptions the troops who returned
from Greece were short of machine-guns, mortars, ammunition and
even rifles. Some detachments were without blankets, cooking gear,
or personal possessions of any sort. Such signal equipment and close-
support weapons as the units still retained had been smuggled aboard
the ships, for the Navy, in order to facilitate quick loading, insisted
that nothing of any bulk or weight be brought away. Men were,
indeed, more important than material. So there was great need of re-
equipment, reorganization, and reinforcing drafts before most of the
troops who fought in Greece could do themselves justice in battle
again.

Epilogue

So all was over. Australians, New Zealanders, men from the British
Isles, had fought a good fight. As soldiers they had shown themselves
equal, more than equal, to their well trained, better equipped, and
far more numerous German adversaries. They had endured a haras-
sing, if brief campaign which from the start had offered little hope of
clean-cut victory; and their departure from the scene had been
achieved at considerable price. That the price was not bigger is to the
credit of the Royal Navy who risked ships and men day after day and
night after night to bring the troops to safety.

The resolve to send this expedition to Greece has been the subject
of much argument. Of all the decisions which rested solely with the
British War Cabinet none has given rise to more apreulaton and
debate.

Let us consider the issues.

It has been urged that the original pledge of aid to Greece had been
given at a time when France was our ally and the balance of power
in the Mediterranean was utterly different and immeasurably more
favourable to us. Such a pledge was conditioned by the over-all war
situation; and just as William Pitt had conquered Canada on the
plains of Germany, so Greece might have been aided best by victory
in the desert of Libya.

But our obligation to Greece was a direct and genuine one. We
were in honour bound to do our utmost to assist an ally who, while
engaged in an heroic struggle with one of our common enemies, was
threatened by the other. We could have pleaded, and no doubt
obtained, remission of our guarantee of aid, in view of our manifold
commitments elsewhere ; but to do so would, in the words of the New
Zealand Government, have destroyed the moral basis of our cause.
There are some transactions that must be carried through, even
though the ledgers show a loss.

Again, it has been contended that, although the enlistment of
American sympathy and therefore of American aid was essential for
the cause of liberty in Europe, a further gesture on the lines of the
Norwegian expedition, by displaying our limitations in land-fighting

138

EPILOGUE 139

against Germany, could do nothing but harm: failures, even gallant
failures, are not calculated to bring neutrals to the help of a nation at
war.

Nevertheless, at the beginning of 1941 we could only count upon
victory in so far as we could rely upon aid from the United States ;
our failure to give corresponding help to a small ally would have pro-
duced a most unfavourable effect upon the Americans. It was not
really to be contemplated that, at a time when the Roosevelt adminis-
tration was pushing through ‘Lease-Lend’ to Britain, we should
have taken no steps to pass on what aid we could to Greece. And if
we were to fail, failure was likely to bring home to the American
public the magnitude of our task. Defeat in Greece, after we had
committed all we could spare to the campaign, might well increase
American awareness of the aggressive strength and expansionist
tendencies of Nazi Germany.

When the campaign was over President Roosevelt used these words
in a telegram to our Prime Minister : ‘You have done not only heroic
but very useful work in Greece . . . you have fought a wholly justified
delaying action...”

Then there is the argument—very ably put?—that the forces we
employed in the Greek campaign could have been used to complete
General Wavell’s conquests in North Africa. The Italian forces were,
at the time, quite incapable of effective resistance and the Afrika
Korps was only beginning to arrive: Wavell’s vanguards might have
been on the frontier of French North Africa before the end of March:
the problems of maintenance, admittedly difficult, could have been
solved.

Yet here we should take account of the weakness of Wavell’s
forces: he had so few formations which were battleworthy, and, in
his own judgment, was not ready for an offensive. Having regard, also,
to the difficulties of supply it would seem that only a small force could
have been pushed forward quickly. Such a force might have occupied
the port of Tripoli. To have maintained it there would have been
difficult in the extreme; and it would have been exposed to the
German attack. Truly the prospect of completing our conquest of
North Africa does not appear to have been so bright after all.

Possibly, if the troops we sent to Greece had been available in the
Desert when Rommel advanced, the German success might not have
been so great. One can say no more than that.

We do know, however, that Hitler’s decision to occupy Yugo-
slavia and Greece and to reach the eastern Mediterranean caused

1 Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. III, pp. 207-8.
2 By Major-General Sir F. de Guingand in Operation Victory.

140 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

him to postpone the invasion of Russia for a month. It is true that
we failed in our efforts to create a defensive front by rallying Yugo-
slavia, Turkey and Greece, but our military expedition to Greece
may be regarded as one of the reasons why Germany devoted larger
forces and more time than she had intended to the solution of her
Balkan problem.

The time question is perhaps the more important. Russia was to be
crushed by a quick campaign and Hitler required all preparations to
be completed by May 15th, 1941; it was not, however, until June
22nd that the Germans attacked. So two questions arise, neither of
which is easy to answer. Is the whole delay to be attributed to events
in the Balkans? And did the loss of less than six weeks of good
weather make just the difference between German success and failure
in Russia?

Now to examine the actual military prospects of our Greek venture,
which in General Wavell’s phrase was ‘a gamble with the dice loaded
against us’. It is quite wrong to suppose that the British Cabinet and
those who advised them underrated the difficulties. They were well
aware of the power of the German Army and recognized that a
German penetration of the Balkan States would threaten our posi-
tion in the Middle East and bring us no strategic advantage. They
appreciated that our chief dangers lay in the enemy’s superiority in
the air, the uncertainty of the Yugoslav attitude, and the risks to our
shipping in the narrow waters of the Aegean. These were major
matters—the problem of air defence, the problem of establishing
effective defensive positions in Greek territory, and the problem of
maintenance and supply.

And to the certainties that we were bound to be overmatched in
numbers and equipment, that we could not compete with our
adversary in the air, that the defence of Greek territory was in reality
a Balkan problem hard to solve, and that the Royal Navy had more
than enough to do already, may be added other risks and difficulties.
There was the danger that Germany might strike before our full
strength—such as it was—could be deployed, and the length and
inadequacy of our land communications in Greece was a handicap
hard to overcome.

Unfortunately there was nothing novel in our situation. It was not
the first instalment, nor yet the last, of the penalty we had to pay for
our unpreparedness for war. We should have been no more justified
in declining battle on this occasion than in refusing to enter the War
in September 1939 or in giving up the struggle after Dunkirk. Past
policy condemned us to face the odds, and for many weary months to
come dictated the offensive-defensive policy described in the opening

EPILOGUE 141

pages of this book. It was our inevitable réle to engage in delaying
actions which would win us the precious time we needed to develop
our armed might and, as it happened, to rally the forces of liberty to
our side. Failures and losses there were bound to be, for at this stage
our armed forces were, in a very special sense, the scapegoats of a
policy which had failed.?

In common with most campaigns, the planning of the campaign in
Greece and the way in which it was conducted offer some grounds for
criticism—not all unfavourable. Before discussing our preliminary
dispositions it is as well to consider the circumstances under which
our troops arrived to take their part in the defence of Greece. We
were, of course, at a great disadvantage in having to fit our con-
tingent into the framework of the Greek defensive dispositions. So
long as Greece was fighting we were dependent in more or less degree
upon the policy of her High Command and, indeed, the quality of her
troops. It may be that some of our commanders were inclined to
expect too much of the Greeks. Co-operation did not prove to be
easy—there was always the language difficulty and the military
customs and outlook of our ally were so different from our own—in
spite of the goodwill displayed by both sides. How regrettable was
the misunderstanding which left three good Greek divisions isolated
in the Metaxas forts when we expected them to be available for the
Aliakmon line!

The strength and merits of the Aliakmon line have been the subject
of some discussion. It was obvious that a German drive through
Yugoslavia had to be taken into account; hence it followed that the
position was liable to be turned by an advance through the Monastir
Gap. This contingency could have been met if sufficient forces had
been at our disposal: actually we were not strong enough to do other
than fight a delaying action at the main position. Our men were too
thin on the ground and there was no depth in the defence. The Greek
troops under General Wilson’s command were ill-equipped for
modern warfare and were woefully deficient in artillery. It is true that
the Germans struck before our deployment was much more than half
completed, but in the upshot we were not perhaps much the worse
for that. Our forward troops fought well and were well handled.
What we needed was not only the arrival of the rest of the Anzac
Corps, but at least another corps, and armour as well.

The larger the force in the field the greater demand upon the
services of transport and supply. The weakness of our line of com-
munication so vulnerable to air attack is obvious: it crossed six
hundred miles of sea and then followed a single railway and a single

1 See Eric Linklater’s The Campaign in Italy, p. 1.

142 THE CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

road for three hundred miles. As it happened we were at no time,
during the three weeks’ campaign, faced with a maintenance problem,
and this may fairly be regarded as a considerable achievement. Even
so, if we had been required to maintain very much larger forces for
a longer period the task might well have proved impossible, for the
power of the Luftwaffe grew day by day up to the time of evacuation.

Again, more troops without a corresponding increase in air power
would have paid no dividends. Perhaps, in some respects, we were too
considerate of Greek feelings: we might have been more insistent
upon the preparation of the airfields we so urgently needed. The
prompt provision of the necessary materials and a great effort by
civilian labour were needed to give our air squadrons adequate
ground protection and facilities for dispersion. Not that such
measures would have done more than delay the inevitable, for we
lacked, and were bound to lack, the numbers to challenge the enemy
in the air.

When the Greek resistance weakened and collapsed, withdrawal
and evacuation became our only course. The withdrawal was well
conducted, our infantry fought very stoutly, and time after time we
matched artillery against armour with considerable success. This is
true even to the last rearguard action before our departure; and the
losses we sustained at or near the beaches and on the high seas were
again the result of the German command of the air.

THE BATTLE FOR
CRETE

CHAPTER I

The Island

m[ 1]

Base or Outpost?

THE evacuation of the last of our troops from the mainland of
Greece at the end of April 1941, and the occupation of the Aegean
Islands by German forces, left Crete as our outpost in the eastern
Mediterranean. So also had Rommel’s practically simultaneous
sweep across the Cyrenaican desert to the frontier of Egypt left
Tobruk ‘islanded’. Crete and Tobruk, at the beginning of the month
of May represented two forward positions which, so long as they
continued to be held by us, hampered the completion of the German
victories. The possession of these two outposts would have a defen-
sive value for Germany: at the same time they were of potential
offensive value—each as an advanced base—in the event of any
further development of enemy operations in the Middle East.

In particular the Germans required Crete as a means of barring the
access of British warships to the Aegean Sea.

The strategic importance of Crete to Britain and France had been
realized from the first: in enemy possession the island would con-
stitute a threat to our seaborne communications in the eastern
Mediterranean. It has been explained earlier in this volume that as
far back as May 1940 an agreement had been reached with the Greek
Government by which the two Powers might immediately land troops
at any point in the island in the event of war developing between
Greece and Italy. The tragic developments of the succeeding month,
involving the defeat of France, meant that our role in the Mediter-
ranean must for some time remain essentially defensive, and had Italy
delivered an attack upon Greece and Crete as early as June, the posi-
tion, in view of the extreme paucity of Wavell’s resources, must have
become acutely embarrassing. At that time he did not consider that

145

146 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

he could spare even one brigade to garrison Crete. Yet the impor-
tance of Crete was not forgotten by any of the Services, and the Navy
in particular considered it essential that the admirable harbour of
Suda Bay, on the north coast of the island and near its western end,
should be available as a refuelling base for our ships and thereby
denied to the Italians.

With the intensification of the Italian threat against Greece, mili-
tary conversations had been initiated with the Metaxas Government
in mid-October regarding the defence of Crete in the now probable
event of aggression by the Fascist State in the near future. Following
the outbreak of war with Italy at the end of the month the Greek
Government gave us the most complete freedom of action. They
assured us that they would welcome the presence of our troops, and
that they did not require to be asked for permission to land them but
merely to be informed of our intentions.

We now proceeded to establish a naval refuelling base in Crete
and to send for defensive purposes what troops and armament could
be spared. The naval part was accomplished without incident; and
on October 31st—Greece having rejected the Italian ultimatum on
the 28th—the 2nd York and Lancaster Regiment was sent by Wavell.
to Suda Bay to come, temporarily, under naval command. The
battalion landed safely on November Ist, although Suda and Canea
were bombed twice by enemy aircraft during the day and again on
the morrow. The most pressing question was that of maintenance.
Little food was to be obtained locally, so that a considerable reserve
of supplies required to be built up by shipment from Egypt.

On November 6th another contingent arrived at Suda Bay.
Brigadier O. H. Tidbury, commanding the 14th Brigade, brought
with him his own headquarters, the 151st Heavy Anti-Aircraft
Battery, the 156th Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, and the 42nd Field
Company R.E. His orders were to take command of all British troops
in Crete; to keep close contact with the Greek military commander ;
to defend the naval refuelling base; and, in co-operation with the
Greek forces, to prevent and defeat any attempt at invasion by hostile
forces.

The geographical aspect of Crete could scarcely have been worse
from the point of view of organizing its defence against attack from
the north. The island is 170 miles long (the equivalent of the distance
from Dover to Poole harbour), but practically the only major road
was that which followed the north coast. This road, on which were
situated the two principal towns, Canea and Heraklion, was narrow
at many parts; some of its bridges were too weak to take the strain
of heavy military traffic; and long stretches lay open to attack from

THE ISLAND 147

the sea. Yet it was to constitute both our line of communication and
our ‘front line’.

There were no railways.

To the south of the road, and running almost the whole length of
the island, is a ridge of mountains rising to about 8,000 feet. These
mountains fall very steeply to the southern coast where access to the
few small, shallow, cliff-girt beaches is difficult. Thus the shipping
required to supply our garrison, not to speak of the civil population
which amounted to nearly 400,000, was committed to the use of the
ports on the northern coast facing the direction from which invasion
would come. Our convoys must pass either through the narrow
channel between Kithira—where the Germans after their occupation
of the Peloponnesus were quick to construct a landing-ground—and
the western extremity of Crete, or through the still narrower Caso
channel between the Italian-held Dodecanese and the eastern end of
the island. Crete could not be supplied or reinforced unless our ships
were at all times prepared to run the gauntlet of attack by watchful
enemy aircraft.

Unfortunately the ports on the northern coast, all subject to air
attack, offered very limited facilities for the prompt discharge of
cargoes or disembarkation of troops. Suda Bay is a capacious
harbour, but only two ships at a time could be unloaded at the jetty.
Heraklion could berth four ships, up to 3,000 tons, at the main jetty,
and three or four could tie up inside its long breakwater; but Canea
could only discharge ships by lighter. Retimo affords little shelter in
stormy weather and under favourable conditions it was only possible
to discharge one ship at a time, and that by lighter.

Before the war Crete possessed only one airfield, situated near
Heraklion. The concrete runway measured 1,000 yards by 800: there
were no hangars.

Brigadier Tidbury sent in his first report on November 10th.
Transport and labour were scarce and road conditions difficult, espe-
cially after rain; but anti-aircraft and coastal defences were being
organized in co-operation with the Navy. Some of the anti-aircraft
armament had been allotted to the defence of a new airfield under
construction at Maleme. ‘Creforce’—the code-name for the British
military forces in Crete—could, at most, prepare to resist landings in
the western half of the island and protect outlying defence works for
a time. More artillery was urgently needed.

The Greeks were anxious that we should take over entire responsi-
bility for the defence of Crete, in order to release their own troops for
action in Albania. We were prepared, though reluctantly, in view of
our numerous other commitments, to undertake the defence, in

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THE ISLAND 149

conjunction with such local levies as could be raised. As early as mid-
November 1940, however, the British Chiefs of Staff had come to the
conclusion that, in the event of the mainland of Greece being over-
run our use of the island would be conditioned by the extent of the
enemy’s air power and by the weight of attack that could be brought
to bear from the mainland. Air defence was indeed the vital factor if
we were to retain control of Crete.

General Wavell visited the island on November 13th. He accepted
—indeed he could hardly do otherwise—the withdrawal of the Greek
troops, and he had another battalion of the 14th Brigade, the 2nd
Black Watch, sent from Egypt. No. 50 Middle East Commando
followed. It was considered that in Crete this unit would be well
placed to carry out raids on the North African coast or the Dode-
canese islands. At the moment no more infantry could be found by
the Middle East Command, but an increase in the anti-aircraft
armament was more important, and this was realized in Egypt as
well as at Home. Mr. Churchill expressed the view that, despite the
many claims upon our anti-aircraft batteries, a further definite allot-
ment should be made to Crete. There seemed little possibility of doing
so. General Wavell had urgent commitments in the Western Desert
of Egypt, in the Sudan and East Africa. He had to take measures for
the protection of the Suez Canal and to keep a watchful eye on our
defences in Palestine and on the possibility of a threat to the Persian
Gulf by way of Iraq. And early in 1941 he had to find the troops for
the expedition to Greece. Under these circumstances it was not to be
supposed that Crete could receive a very high priority of material for
defence. Nor would it have been either wise or possible to have locked
up larger forces there so long as the island was not actually in the
‘front line’. Moreover, if more troops were eventually to be allotted
to the defence of Crete measures must be taken to accommodate
them. Middle East Command considered that the pressure of events
—say the over-running by our enemies of the Greek mainland—
might compel us to bring the garrison of the island up to the strength
of at least one division: the immediate need was to plan for the
necessary installations and camps.

Thus, in the period from November 1940 to May 1941, Crete
served its purpose as an advanced naval base, and transit camp for
naval and R.A.F. personnel. Cruisers and destroyers refuelled in
Suda Bay, although it was not wise for ships to anchor for long
periods because of the danger of air attack and the lack of a net
defence against torpedoes. And the Army devoted the labour, trans-
port, material and tools at its disposal primarily to the preparations
for the establishment of a military base: roads, light railways, water

150. THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

supply, petrol pits, huts for storage and workshops. Accommodation
for additional troops—camps, hospitals and the like—was planned.
There was never any prospect of turning Crete into a ‘fortress’.

om» [2 lo
Defence Problems

So far nothing has been said of the part which the R.A.F. was
expected to play in the defence of the island. At the beginning of
January 1941 the Chief of the Air Staff had considered that strong
air forces established in Crete should be able to delay the German
advance southward through Greece, and would also be well placed
to give aid to Turkey at need. Strategically this was sound enough,
but the necessary aircraft to operate from this new and supplemen-
tary base simply did not exist. We sent what air forces we could spare
to Greece, and it was not until the evacuation of the mainland was
imminent that any aircraft, other than those of the Fleet Air Arm,
were available for Crete.

Since the island lies over 400 miles from the coast of Egypt it would
have to be self-supporting so far as the operations of defending air-
craft were concerned, for no fighter cover could be given from North
Africa. The airfields consisted of the original one at Heraklion, the
new one put in hand at Maleme, ten miles west of Canea, and a third
to be constructed at Retimo, some thirty miles to the east of the
capital. A fourth, which was begun at Kastelli, in the extreme west
of the island, was afterwards abandoned and the site ploughed up
as we possessed neither the armament for its defence nor the aircraft
to operate from it. At Suda there was a base for flying-boats and
another in the Gulf of Mirabella but both were dangerous in heavy
weather and unsuitable for use at night.

Local fighter forces were thus confined to three airfields—Herak-
lion, Maleme, Retimo—which were neither well situated nor suffi-
cient in number for our purpose. There would be the constant risk
that our squadrons might be neutralized, or even destroyed, by the
concentrated attacks of superior air forces based on the mainland of
Greece and in the Dodecanese. We knew by bitter experience in
Greece and Norway that in a struggle against a stronger air power
safety must be sought in dispersal : the eggs should be in many baskets.

An attempt was made, during the battle which ensued, to over-
come the problem of air cover by fitting Hurricanes with extra tanks
to enable them to make the distance from Africa and back and to

THE ISLAND 151

permit them up to half-an-hour’s patrolling and fighting over the
island. But the experiment was not successful; the hampering effect
upon the speed and operational efficiency of the machines proved too
reat.

: During these months there is no doubt that Crete suffered from the
frequent changes in command. Brigadier Tidbury, who arrived in
November 1940, had begun to tackle the defence problem. He urged
a policy of night and day digging of infantry positions and the pre-
paration of gun-sites ; but shortage of labour and transport hampered
the initiation of the work. As early as mid-December the Brigadier
had drawn up a remarkably accurate appreciation of the form which
an enemy attack would take. He forecast an airborne assault with
the primary object of taking possession of the naval base of Suda
Bay, the attacking troops being dropped at the three landing-grounds :
Maleme to the west, Retimo to the east and Heraklion (Candia) still
further to the east of the port. He therefore recommended the con-
centration of the main defence position around Suda Bay.

On January 10th, 1941, Tidbury was succeeded by Major-General
M. D. Gambier-Parry, former military head of the British Inter-
Services Mission to Greece. Gambier-Perry’s tenure lasted only three
weeks, for at the beginning of February he was appointed to the
command of the 2nd Armoured Division then arriving in Egypt.
Lieut.-Colonel H. D. Mather, officer commanding the anti-aircraft
artillery, then took over temporarily until Brigadier A. Galloway
was given command on February 19th with the specific tasks of
defending the Suda Bay base in co-operation with the Greeks; pre-
paring for the reception of reinforcements up to the strength of one
division; and controlling such operations as might be initiated
against the Dodecanese islands. The small and remote island of
Castelrosso off the coast of Asia Minor—it is over 200 miles north-
east of the eastern extremity of Crete—was occupied for a few days
at the end of the month by No. 50 Middle East Commando who
destroyed the wireless signal station and then withdrew in the face
of a strong Italian counter-assault. The commando was then re-
called to Egypt, but the Ist Welch Regiment (the third battalion of
the 14th Brigade) arrived to replace it on February 17th.

Brigadier Galloway left in his turn to become Chief of Staff to
General Wilson commanding the expedition to Greece, Colonel
Mather again taking over at the beginning of March. Then it was
the turn of Brigadier B. H. Chappel who arrived on March 19th
‘to assume command of the garrison’ but with no definite directive
as to the extent of his authority and ‘in some doubt as to whether
he should include the defence of Heraklion in his commitments’.

152 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

Within ten days of Brigadier Chappel’s arrival yet another officer
was informed that he would be appointed to command Creforce.
This was Major-General E. C. Weston, Royal Marines, who was
despatched early in April to carry out a thorough reconnaissance of
the island. The advent of General Weston was consequent upon the
decision to develop the refuelling station at Suda into a properly
equipped naval base, and to send to Crete the Mobile Naval Base
Defence Organization (M.N.B.D.O.). This self-contained ‘organiza-
tion’—there seems to be no other word for it—was, or had been,
lavishly equipped for its purpose. It consisted of an underwater
group, a sea patrol, and a land group which contained a searchlight
regiment and two regiments of anti-aircraft artillery. In October and
November 1940 the land group was merged in the anti-aircraft
defences of Britain. It was the only portion of the M.N.B.D.O.
which was eventually sent to Crete and it did not begin to arrive
until May 10th, 1941.

On April 15th General Weston submitted a report which recom-
mended the independent defence of the two vital areas, Suda and
Heraklion each to be allotted a brigade group; the construction of
‘full scale operational aerodromes’ ; and the provision of more anti-
aircraft batteries and defence stores. This report was followed by a
paper prepared by the Middle East Joint Planning Staff which held
much the same views as to what was required and agreed with
General Weston that the 16,000 Italian prisoners then in Crete
should be removed. These men were, of course, the prisoners of
the Greeks. General Wilson, who arrived from Greece on April 27th,
also reported on the defence requirements of the island. He thought
that the Navy would find it difficult to interfere with a seaborne
expedition covered by strong forces of shore-based aircraft, so he
expected that the German invasion would be by air and sea; we
required more troops, more searchlights, more anti-aircraft batteries.

Plans and dispositions for the defence of the island were bound to
be complicated by the decision to use Crete as a transit camp in the
evacuation of our forces from Greece. By landing troops in the island
the necessary quick ‘turn round’ of the ships was ensured; but the
reception, reorganization and maintenance of the different units as
they arrived affected and hindered our preparations to resist a
German assault. It was never intended that the men from Greece
should play a leading part in such resistance—they were to be taken
on to Egypt and Palestine and the garrison reinforced by fresh
troops—but lack of time and lack of shipping facilities ruled otherwise.

On April 30th General Wavell visited Crete. The very last of our
troops were being picked off the southern coast of the Peloponnesus

THE ISLAND 153

that night, and an attack upon Crete was expected after an interval
of about three weeks.

The Commander-in-Chief held a conference of senior officers,
those present including Lieut.-General Wilson, Major-General
Freyberg, Major-General Weston, Wing Commander Beamish who
was senior air officer in Crete, and Air Vice-Marshal D’Albiac, late
commanding the R.A.F. in Greece. Sir Michael Palairet, British
Minister to Greece, was also there. General Wavell pointed out that
a combined airborne and seaborne attack was to be expected, but
in view of our extreme shortage of fighter aircraft he doubted whether
any further air support could be supplied. He appointed General
Freyberg to command Creforce with orders ‘to deny to the enemy
the use of air bases in Crete’.

Freyberg had reached Crete on the previous day when his 6th New
Zealand Brigade, practically intact, had also arrived from Greece.
This brigade, under naval orders, left Suda Bay for Alexandria but
Freyberg had come to see his 4th and Sth Brigades which had already
landed in the island. To the Commander-in-Chief he expressed his
desire to go on to Egypt, there to reorganize the New Zealand forces
who were his peculiar responsibility, but Wavell called him aside and
said, ‘It is your duty to stay’. This was enough. Certainly no better
choice of a commander could have been made.

»([3 ]«
The Men and the Means

THE troops in Crete at this time may be divided into three main
categories. There was the permanent garrison, equipped and armed
for the defence of the island; there were the men who had been
brought away from Greece; and there were the Greek forces.

The permanent British garrison at the beginning of May, when
the evacuation of Greece was completed, consisted, exclusive of
artillery, of the three battalions (2nd York and Lancaster, 2nd Black’
Watch, Ist Welch Regiment) forming the 14th Brigade. These were
reinforced on May 16th by the 2nd Leicestershire ; and on May 19th,
the day before the assault began, the Ist Argyll and Sutherland High-
landers arrived at Timbaki on the south coast.

The troops from Greece were much more numerous. Of these the
organized and disciplined fighting units which had proved their
mettle in the campaign on the mainland were a valuable asset, even
though nearly all their heavier armament and much of their
F

154 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

equipment had been jettisoned by superior order. But the presence on
the island of certain elements, base and line-of-communication troops
of various nationalities, was a distinct liability. General Freyberg
reported that his preparations were hampered by 10,000 ‘other
ranks’ without arms and with little or no employment other than
getting into trouble with the civilian population. There was a danger,
he considered, that our hitherto excellent relations with the Greeks
would be imperilled unless we could get rid of these men.

Subsequently the majority of them were shipped back to Egypt.

The Greek forces in Crete, which at one time during the winter
had been reduced to as low a figure as 750, in order to provide
battalions for service in Albania, now amounted to about 15,000
organized in a number of units, each about 1,000 strong. This total
was made up of 11,000 of the Army, 2,800 gendarmes, 300 cadets
from the Greek Military Academy and 800 from the Greek Air
Force Academy. They were most inadequately armed, even those
who possessed rifles having on an average less than 30 rounds per
man, and in the opinion of General Weston could only be used for
guerrilla fighting, for counter-action against parachutists in the less-
important districts and for providing information.1 However, the
eastern end of the island, where a landing was not anticipated and
did not in fact occur until our troops were actually in the process of
evacuation, was eventually allotted to them for defence. Some of the
better-armed battalions were posted in the neighbourhood of Suda
and at Retimo.

Although the retention of Crete had at an early stage been re-
cognized as depending upon air defence and (in view of the diffi-
culty of operating fighters) especially upon anti-aircraft guns, it had
never been possible to supply these in large quantities. At the time
of the evacuation of Greece there were only 16 heavy and 36 light
anti-aircraft guns on the island, and one-third of the latter could not
be described as mobile. This total was absolutely inadequate to
defend the three airfields and the base area around Suda, and it
was Officially estimated that our minimum additional requirements
were another 40 heavy and another 12 light anti-aircraft guns, as
well as 72 searchlights. It proved impossible to supply them, simply
because we did not possess such a surplus in the Middle East at the
time. When the month of May arrived and attack was known to be
imminent the only anti-aircraft reinforcement in sight was that to
be provided for the defence of the Suda area by the Mobile Naval
Base Defence Organization—one searchlight regiment and sixteen
heavy and twelve light guns.

1 In fact, some fought with extreme courage and tenacity.

THE ISLAND 155

On May 20th the first day of the assault, the garrison in Crete was
made up approximately as follows:

Arrived from Reinforce-

Original Greece and ments Total

‘Creforce’ remained from Egypt
British . . : - 5,200 6,399 3,464 15,063
Australians. : 5 6,451 6,451
New Zealanders . 4 7,100 7,100
TOTAL. - - 5,200 19,950 3,464 28,614

To strengthen the defence and to provide an effective means of
counter-attack, a few tanks had been sent by Middle East Com-
mand. They arrived on May 14th—sixteen light tanks of the 3rd
Hussars and seven ‘infantry’ tanks of the 7th Royal Tank Regiment.
There was a promise of more to come.

After the disastrous German attacks upon our airfields in mid-
April the remnants of our squadrons in Greece were hastily evacuated
to Crete. There was not much left of them. The famous No. 211
Bomber Squadron had been wiped out on April 13th and many of
our fighters, including some newly arrived Hurricanes, had been shot
up and destroyed on the ground. The R.A.F. brought back from
Greece fourteen Blenheims, only half of which were serviceable,
fourteen Gladiators, only six serviceable, and six Hurricanes. These
were all that were left of Nos. 30, 33, 80 and 112 Squadrons. In addi-
tion nine Blenheims of No. 203 Squadron had arrived from Egypt.
Most of these aircraft now began to operate from Heraklion, the
remainder from Maleme. Retimo was, as yet, little more than an
emergency landing-strip.

The total at one time in May reached the not very formidable
figure of 36 aircraft, scarcely any of them in really satisfactory con-
dition. These, it was understood, would have to cope with an attack
from over 300 long-range bombers, between 200 and 300 dive
bombers, and over 300 fighters. No more puny David ever faced
a well-accoutred and confident Goliath.

Allusion has already been made to the presence on the island of
the 16,000 Italian prisoners of war captured during the Italian cam-
paign. We had been anxious to have these removed to the greater
security of Egypt, but the Greek Government had shown itself
reluctant to agree, fearing that such an action would be regarded
as contrary to international law. It was not until just before the
attack opened that we obtained their consent, with the result that
it proved too late by that time to organize the evacuation of the
prisoners—we soon had another and more urgent evacuation to
consider—and though we succeeded in carrying off the officer

156 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

prisoners to Egypt, practically all the remainder were subsequently
freed by their German allies. Although these men can hardly be
considered a significant accession to Axis strength it is regrettable
that arrangements were not made to convey them to Egypt weeks
before, when our transports were returning empty from conveying
troops to Greece.

om [4 le
The Plans

GENERAL Freyberg was under no illusions about the formidable
nature of the task which had been allotted to him. At the beginning
of May he pointed out to the Middle East Command, and also to
the New Zealand Government—as was his right and duty—the
inadequacy of the means at his disposal for meeting an attack. Only
numerically would his men be sufficient to cope with an airborne
assault: in all other respects his resources fell short of the necessary
minimum. Besides our weakness in the air and the difficulty our
naval forces would experience in repelling a seaborne attack, artillery,
entrenching tools, transport, and reserve supplies of every sort were
lacking. Therefore he urged that the decision to hold Crete be re-
considered if it were not possible to send adequate reinforcement.

By way of reply General Wavell could only endorse Freyberg’s
impression of the gravity of the position; but in view of the definite
instructions from the War Cabinet that Crete must be held, he had
no choice in the matter; and even if the question were re-considered
it was doubtful now if the island could be evacuated before the
Germans attacked. Admiral Cunningham would give the fullest
possible support by sea. Air support would be more difficult, for we
were going through a very lean period as regards fighter aircraft in
the Middle East, but every effort would be made to obtain further
’ reinforcements from home.

‘I fully realize’, wrote General Wavell, ‘the difficulties and dangers
of your situation. . . . We have very anxious times ahead in the
Middle East for the next few weeks.’

It was true enough. A victorious Rommel lay on the frontier of
Egypt, with little between him and the supreme prize of the Nile
Delta. Iraq was in revolt and there were ugly mutterings and indica-
tions of German activity in Syria. Only in Abyssinia, where Addis
Ababa had been entered on May Sth and where the enemy resis-
tance was fast folding up, was the military situation in the least

THE ISLAND 157

encouraging. Indeed, the period of six weeks covering the month
of May and the first half of June 1941 was, for Britain, among the
most critical of the whole war. Wavell had scraped the bottom of
the barrel to provide the necessary minimum of manpower and
material for his many fronts.. He had spread his meagre resources-
to plug the most urgent cracks—and there was simply not enough
to go round. Somewhere—Crete, Libya, Iraq, or Syria—a crack
would widen and the German flood pour in.

Faced with a regretful non possumus General Freyberg continued
to organize his defence as best he could with the limited resources
at his disposal. Whatever shortcomings may be found with the
planning or execution of the defence of Crete, Military Intelligence
is not among them. The preliminary forecasts of the time, place and
method of the German attack proved remarkably accurate and were
confirmed by last-minute information from captured enemy airmen.
It was not that we were lacking in information or made any serious
misjudgments regarding the coming attack (the important misjudg-
ments were all on the enemy side), but that we lacked the resources
with which to counter the invasion.

Freyberg and his improvised staff realized that the assault would
be delivered in a series of phases. First, an intensive air attack for
several days in succession upon the landing-grounds and their
vicinity. Then, the dropping of paratroops on or around the air-
fields. Thirdly, the arrival of troop-carrying aircraft, so soon as the
airfields had been cleared by parachutists. Fourthly, the follow-up
with seaborne landings on the beaches in the neighbourhood of the
airfields and a seaborne attack directed against Suda Bay itself.

Since it would have been quite impractical to have attempted a
thin ‘cordon’ defence of the whole coast, and since all the indica-
tions suggested four areas of especial danger, Freyberg organized
his forces in four commands to protect respectively Heraklion town
and airfield; the landing-ground at Retimo; the port of Suda Bay
with the adjacent town of Canea; and, fourthly, the airfield of
Maleme.

At Heraklion, under Brigadier B. H. Chappel, were stationed two
battalions of the 14th Brigade (2nd York and Lancaster and 2nd
Black Watch); the 2/4th Australian Battalion supported by the 7th
Medium Regiment R.A. organized and armed as infantry; the
- 156th Light A.A. Battery; one troop and one section of the 7th

Australian Light A.A. Battery; one section of the 15th Coast Regi-
ment, R.A.; and six light and two infantry (‘I’) tanks. Two Greek
battalions were to be added, also the 2nd Leicestershire Regiment
when it arrived on May 16th.

158 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

At Retimo Brigadier G. A. Vasey was in command with his own
19th Australian Brigade forming the core of the defence. The brigade
had been reformed since Greece and now consisted of the 2/Ist,
2/7th and 2/11th Battalions, with the 2/8th Battalion only two com-
panies strong. An Australian machine-gun company and two Greek
battalions were also in this sector, which contained two localities
particularly favourable for a landing from the sea. One of these was
between Retimo town and the landing-ground, situated close to the
shore and about five miles to the east; the other was the flat, open
beach of Georgeopolis, a dozen miles west of Retimo.

Vasey accordingly divided his force, setting up his headquarters
at Georgeopolis with two of his Australian battalions (2/7th and
2/8th). The remainder, consisting of the 2/1st and 2/11th Australian
Battalions, the two Greek battalions, some supporting artillery and
two Infantry tanks, was detached to form an eastern force under
Colonel I. R. Campbell, Commanding the 2/1st Battalion. It was con-
sidered likely that the eastern and western parts of the Retimo com-
mand would have to act independently of one another once operations
started. This indeed proved to be the case.

No anti-aircraft guns were available for the protection of Retimo
landing-ground; but two ‘I’ tanks were dug in, one at either end
of the ground.

At Suda-Canea Major-General Weston directed the defence. His
ground forces were practically limited to the personnel of the Mobile
Naval Base Defence Organization; the Northumberland Hussars
(102nd Anti-Tank Regiment) who were posted with rifles to defend
the isthmus leading to the Akrotiri peninsula; the 16th and 17th
composite Australian battalions, together totalling little more than
600 men, on the coast east of Suda; and a Greek battalion. But
much of the anti-aircraft armament was concentrated here: the
151st and 234th Heavy A.A. Batteries, the 129th Light A.A. Battery,
the 7th Australian Light A.A. Battery less two troops and one
section, the 304th Searchlight Battery, and the 15th Coast Regiment
less one section.

Ten miles west of Canea along the coast road was the newly con-
structed airfield of Maleme. Here the defence was mainly entrusted
to the New Zealanders lately returned from Greece. General Frey-
berg being in command of the whole garrison of Crete, Brigadier
E. Puttick was acting commander of the division. Covering Maleme
airfield was the 5th New Zealand Brigade (21st, 22nd and 23rd
Battalions and 28th Maori Battalion), under Brigadier J. Hargest,
supported by a composite battalion of New Zealanders, known at
that time as Oakes Force but later to be brigaded with the New

THE ISLAND 159

Zealand divisional cavalry, the 20th New Zealand Battalion and two
Greek battalions to form the 10th New Zealand Brigade under
Colonel H. K. Kippenberger. The particular task of the brigade was
to hold a defensive position covering the village of Galatas from the
west and also a stretch of coast west of Canea.

There were also available three Greek battalions, two troops of
the 156th Light A.A. Battery and a troop of the 7th Australian Light
A.A. Battery.

As at Retimo and Heraklion, two ‘I’ tanks covered the airfield.
Three more ‘I’ tanks were on the way, and the remaining ten light
tanks were also allotted to this sector.

So our forces were disposed in order to defend four—or rather
five—localities stretched along more than 70 miles of coast and con-
nected by one coastal road. Where to place reserves for prompt
counter-attack was not easy to decide. Judging that the crucial
sector was situated between Suda Bay and Maleme, Freyberg con-
centrated both the Ist Welch Regiment and the 4th New Zealand
Brigade (less the 20th Battalion) of Brigadier L. M. Inglis, in this
area. The former was designated to operate towards Suda, the latter
towards Maleme, but both were to remain in touch with Force Head-
quarters and one another, ready to move in any direction that seemed
immediately threatened.

Force Headquarters were in dugouts on the south-eastern side
of Canea.

These dispositions, however, give a decidedly false impression
of the actual strength and power of our forces in each sector. The
units that had returned from Greece were weak in numbers and were
very short of equipment, though Freyberg had done his best to
ensure that every man possessed at least a minimum power of self-
defence, by retaining a proportion of rifles from all units that we had
been able to re-ship to Egypt. But apart from a few light automatics
there was an acute lack of other infantry weapons. The Cypriot and
Palestinian troops who ran into several hundreds were largely
unarmed.

Some units consisted of artillerymen without their guns; and
apart from the anti-aircraft batteries the only guns we possessed at
the beginning of May were a number of captured Italian pieces and
a very few British 3-7-inch howitzers for static defence.

The troops who had been brought from Greece possessed little
more than what they stood up in. By a redistribution of blankets it
was found possible to provide almost every man with one, but the
lack of cooking utensils and mess tins was a matter of practical
inconvenience. Worse still was the shortage of entrenching tools.

160 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

There had never been enough in Crete to undertake the large-scale
defence works necessary for the protection of the island. Now, with
the garrison suddenly swollen to five times its previous size, there
were nothing like enough, and some men were to be reduced to the
primitive expedient of digging trenches by scooping out the earth
with their steel helmets. This lack of entrenching tools led to heavy
casualties in our counter-attacks, since our troops often had not the
means to dig in quickly and consolidate the ground they gained.

In view of the makeshift way in which the force had been built up
it was natural that there should be an acute shortage of transport.
None had been brought out of Greece, and naturally in an island so
poor as Crete there was little that could be commandeered locally.
Even brigadiers found themselves without cars, and a battalion
which possessed as much as one truck and one staff car to serve all
purposes considered itself lucky. Too much importance however,
can be attached to this lack of vehicles, for road convoys could
scarcely have moved by day, owing to the complete domination of
the air by the enemy; also, distances were short, and the troops had
little to carry. Yet an adequate supply of trucks would have been
invaluable when we were faced with the necessity of speedy con-
centration in order to deliver a counter-attack while it was still
dark.

The general policy of the defence was to dispose about one-third
of the total force allotted to each locality on, or in the immediate
neighbourhood of the airfield. These men would bear the brunt of
the first assault. The remaining two-thirds were so located that they
would be outside the probable area of parachute and troop-carrier
landings. Thus our infantry defence would form, in effect, an inner
and an outer ring. The inner ring would get to grips at the start, the
outer would be available for a speedy counter-attack. The necessity
of covering the probable landing-beaches from a seaborne attack
involved a further commitment for many of the troops.

It has been suggested that a risk might have been taken with the
beaches, on the assumption that the Navy could be left to take care
of the sea invasion, and that the maximum strength could have been
concentrated in the neighbourhood of the airfields. This would have
been a totally unjustified gamble. The seas are wide—an elementary
fact not always realized by amateur strategists—and whatever the
vigilance of the Royal Navy there could clearly be no guarantee
against small forces slipping through at night. Freyberg could not
possibly have taken such a risk. Also he was afterwards of opinion
that the Germans made an inexplicable mistake in not attempting
seaborne landings by day. They could have provided ample air cover

THE ISLAND 161

against attacks by the Royal Navy, and there were many suitable
beaches.

Since the airfields were in use by our own aircraft to within twenty-
four hours of the German attack, the policy of defence depended
rather upon shooting down the enemy in the air than on rendering
the landing-strips unusable through extensive demolitions. Conse-
quently the Bofors guns of our light anti-aircraft batteries were sited
well forward towards the edge of the airfields in positions where con-
cealment was extremely difficult and sometimes impossible. It was a
real tactical dilemma. Place your Bofors close enough to deal with
low-flying troop-carriers, and they are liable to be destroyed by the
preliminary bombing from the air; place them further back where
they can be effectively concealed, and their capacity for dealing with |
the enemy aircraft is gravely, perhaps fatally diminished. The only
satisfactory solution lay in adopting concealed and camouflaged
positions as close to the airfield as possible, in shifting the guns
repeatedly and at the same time providing numbers of dummy anti-
aircraft guns to mislead the attacking aircraft. But this could not be
done on an effective scale except by consistent effort over an extended
period: the frequent changes of command and the lack of sufficient
labour, tools and material were fatal to the realization of such a
scheme of defence. y

At each landing-ground the ‘I’ tanks were dug in with a view to
sweeping the field with fire as the German airborne troops arrived.
These tanks could hardly be employed in a more mobile role, for
their engines were mostly worn and unreliable. The light tanks, such as
were available, were to be used as the spearhead for counter-attacks.

Fire from all but the anti-aircraft guns was to be withheld until
the preliminary bombardment was over. Infantry might open fire
when parachutists began to descend, but the field guns and tanks
would, in principle, only open up when troop-carrying aircraft
started to land. Otherwise there was a danger of gun sites and
infantry positions being prematurely revealed to the enemy and
severely dealt with by his air forces. Some Bofors were ordered to
remain silent during the first stage of the attack.

om [5 le
The Enemy

WHILE Freyberg was improvising his makeshift defence, organizing
a staff out of regimental officers gathered in almost literally from the
highways and hedges, forming composite infantry units of ‘gunners
¥F* :

162 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

who had lost their guns, sappers who had lost their tools and R.A.S.C.
drivers who had lost their cars’, arranging for the digging of defen-
sive positions which should have been initiated six months earlier, a few
score miles away across the straits of Kithira the German Command,
in a very different spirit and with the confidence which comes from
a knowledge of greatly superior power, an almost perfected battle
technique and the prestige of continuous victory, was meticulously
preparing for a unique enterprise.

There was every reason to suppose that the attack on Crete repre-
sented the first move in a general all-out offensive against the British
position in the Middle East, that offensive which had been the dream
of Hermann Goering and the nightmare of every responsible British
commander. The invasion of Crete seemed to link up naturally with
the German-incited revolt in Iraq, with the highly equivocal conduct
of General Dentz who held Syria for Vichy France, and with
Rommel’s offensive across Cyrenaica. It appeared to be the logical
preliminary to a further airborne operation against Cyprus which
would help to create a band of Axis-controlled territory—Crete, the
Dodecanese, Cyprus, Syria, Iraq, perhaps Persia—across the Middle
East, shutting off General Wavell’s forces from their vital sources of
oil and completing the operation by means of a gigantic double
envelopment or ‘pincer’ (the hackneyed word is occasionally also
the mot juste) movement against the Nile Delta.

Here it is appropriate to notice a Directive issued by the Fiihrer’s
Headquarters on May 23rd, 1941, three days after the German
attack on Crete had begun and we were already occupied in restoring
the situation in Iraq. This Directive runs:

The Arab Freedom Movement is, in the Middle East, our natural ally
against England. In this connection, the raising of rebellion in Iraq is
of special importance. Such rebellion will extend across the Iraq
frontiers to strengthen the forces which are hostile to England in the
Middle East, intercept the English lines of communication and tie
down both English troops and English shipping space at the expense
of other theatres of war. For these reasons I have decided to push
the development of operations in the Middle East by going to the
support of Iraq. Whether, and in what way it may later be possible
to wreck finally the English position between the Mediterranean and
the Persian Gulf, in conjunction with an offensive against the Suez
Canal, is still in the lap of the Gods... .

The decision to occupy Crete, stated as ‘for the purpose of using
the island as an air base against Britain’, was not actually taken until
April 21st, but preparations for the attack thereafter developed con-
currently with the last stage of the Greek campaign; and while our
forces were embarking from the ports of southern Greece the German

THE ISLAND 163

engineers were already at work upon the landing-grounds to be
employed by the fighters, dive-bombers and transport aircraft. In
some cases, as for example at Araxos, they found airfields just com-
pleted and awaiting their occupation, but elsewhere they got straight
away to work, commandeering local labour and sparing neither
their serfs nor themselves. Making all allowances for the more
satisfactory weather, the sureness with which they selected their
sites and the rapidity with which they constructed or improved
upon existing installations almost takes one’s breath away. Their
ground troops arrived at Myloi, near Navplion in the last days of
April; within a week an airfield had been constructed and was
already in use. On the west flank of Crete a forward landing-ground
was rapidly constructed upon Aphrodite’s island of Kithira; on the
eastern flank the landing-ground at Scarpanto was improved and
enlarged. Milos was not occupied by German troops until May 10th;
but by May 13th a landing-ground was already is use: the survey

arty started work while fighting was still in progress on the island,
and the enemy did not scruple to employ the forced labour of
British prisoners. On the mainland local labour was conscripted
quite ruthlessly. By contrast with British usage which, in considera-
tion for the susceptibilities of our ally, refrained from the conscrip-
tion of available labour either in Greece or Crete, the Germans took
what they wanted—and they certainly showed results. By mid-May
they had a ring of forward landing-grounds on the most advanced
islands, from which single-engine fighters could operate. Dive-
bombers and twin-engine fighters were to use the three aerodromes
round Athens (Menidi, Hassani, Elevsis), and also Corinth and
Argos; the transport places would work from the Athens airfields,
from the Isthmus and from Tanagra, back on the plain of Boeotia ;
while the heavier bombers would be based mainly upon the airfields
of Macedonia, southern Bulgaria and Rhodes.

The troops selected for the first wave of the attack on Crete were
drawn from the IX Air Corps of General Student, who had been in
charge of the parachutist operations in the Low Countries a year
earlier and who was to end the war in command of the Parachute
Army, fighting as infantry in the last retreat from the Rhine to
Hamburg. The full strength of the 7th Air Division was to be em-
ployed, together with the glider-borne Ist Assault Regiment, and
in support the Sth Mountain Division. Of the Air Division about
8,000 men would be used in parachute attacks, the remaining 2,000
going by sea with the heavy equipment; at least two-thirds of the
mountain division would be conveyed directly to battle in troop-
carriers ; the remainder, two battalions strong, would follow by sea.

164 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

The air component was drawn from General von Richtofen’s
VIII Air Corps which could provide about 600 troop-carriers
(JU 52), capable of transporting several thousand fully equipped
men with light support weapons, and also supplies. These would be
supported by 280 bombers (JU 88, ME 111, DO 17), 150 dive-
bombers (JU 87), 90 twin-engine fighters (ME 110) and a further
90 single-engine fighters (ME 109) and about 40 reconnaissance
planes.

The troops allotted to ‘Operation Mercury’, the seizure of Crete,
were therefore made up as follows:

Glider troops . 3 : 750
Paratroops. % j < 10,000
Airlanding troops . . 5,000
Seaborne troops. : P 7,000

TOTAL = 22,750

These forces were to be divided into a Centre Group (Major-
General Siismann) consisting of the bulk of the 7th Air Division (less
one regiment and one battalion), to be reinforced on the following
day by a rifle regiment of the 5th Mountain Division; a Western
Group (Major-General Meindl) composed of the glider-borne Assault
Regiment (a part of which was to be dropped by parachute) and
another rifle regiment of the Sth Mountain Division; and an Eastern
Group (Colonel Brauer), which had one parachutist regiment and
one airborne mountain regiment.

The same astronomical terminology which had given the code
name of Mercury to the whole operation was maintained in the
nomenclature of the groups, which were known as ‘Mars’ (Centre),
‘Komet’ (West) and ‘Orion’ (East). .

The task of Mars was to land a little to the west and south of
Canea; clear the country as far west as Galatas, as far south as
the mountain spine of Crete and as far east as Suda Bay; and take the
town of Canea. A sub-section would be landed at Retimo in the
afternoon and, having captured the town and airstrip, would pro-
ceed west in captured transport to link up with the main body near
Suda. A further sub-section, under Colonel Heidrich (afterwards to
achieve fame as commander of the Ist Parachute Division in de-
fence of Cassino in 1944) would clear the area south-east of Canea
on the Canea-Alikianou road, deepening the ‘bridgehead’ and
getting into position for the attack upon Suda, which was to take
place on the following day.

In the west, Group Komet had the task of capturing Maleme
airfield and the road and sea approaches, after which it was to link
up with Mars on the Canea road.

THE ISLAND 165

Group Orion had the similarly straightforward role of taking the
town and airfield of Heraklion, following a landing at 3.15 p.m.
that same afternoon.

Thus, it was intended that by the end of the first day of the battle
the assault troops should be in possession of all three airfields, the
town of Canea, the town and port of Heraklion, and the town of
Retimo, while they should have neutralized Suda Bay and be in a
position to take control of the harbour early on the morrow. Their
western and centre groups, it was estimated, should already have
made contact with one another, and practically the whole of the
coast from Maleme to Retimo would be in German hands. On the
second day Suda would be attacked and taken and further rein-
forcements, with the heavy weapons, would arrive by sea.

The remaining pockets of resistance would be cleared up on the
third day.

Two concentrations of ships were available, mainly composed of
commandeered Greek vessels. They were primarily to carry the
heavy weapons, motor transport and supplies necessary to ensure
that the positions gained by the assault could be successfully main-
tained. On the second day of the battle one convoy would make for
the open coast west of Maleme while the destination of the other
would be the coast east of Heraklion. Each of these two ‘fleets’
carried a further rifle battalion of the Sth Mountain Division, as an
additional guarantee that the assault would be adequately rein-
forced even if the landing of troop-carriers on the three airfields
were delayed by our destruction of the runways.

It was known that our Mediterranean Fleet was at sea, scouring
the waters to intercept just such a seaborne operation as this; but
the Germans reckoned that the all-powerful Luftwaffe would be
equal to the task of defending the invasion flotillas. They were quite
ready to match their dive-bombers against the anti-aircraft,armament
of our warships.

The whole operation had been prepared with that elaborate care
and method characteristic of the German military mind. The recon-
naissance work was generally admirable, though the value of the ©
German air photography was diminished by the fact that, in some
sectors at any rate, no photographs had been taken during the last
week before the attack, during which time various changes in our
dispositions had been made. It is particularly remarkable that the
field hospital on the little peninsula about two miles west of Canea
was marked on German maps merely as a ‘tented encampment’ and
that the attackers who were launched upon it were clearly unpre-
pared to find no one but doctors, hospital orderlies, nurses and

166 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

wounded there. Moreover, the habitual inaccuracy of their Military
Intelligence, which was one of the major phenomena of the whole
war, led to a dangerous misjudgment of the strength of the defending
forces. The organization of Admiral Canaris had reported that there
were no Greek troops on Crete and that the total of the British
forces amounted to about 5,000 men.! The British, Australian and
New Zealand troops, quite apart from the Greeks, amounted to
more than five times that number.

In consequence, it was reckoned that an assaulting force of approxi-
mately 23,000 men would be more than adequate to obtain posses-
sion of Crete, and it was intended, as we have seen, that the whole
affair should be completed in three days. With astonishing naiveté
the Germans believed that the Cretans, anxious to enjoy (in the
words of the official German appreciation of the situation before
the attack) ‘the favourable terms which had been arranged on the
mainland with the German forces’, would actively assist, or at the
very least would not hinder the invaders. This strange assumption
would appear to be based on the knowledge that the people of Crete,
being Venizelists almost to a man, had been widely out of sympathy
with the internal policy of the Metaxas dictatorship; that a fortiori
they were convinced democrats, and therefore profoundly opposed
to the Totalitarian Monster, and that, above all, they were patriots
does not seem to have penetrated the German mind.

With this degree of misinformation, both numerical and psycholo-
gical, it is not surprising that General Lohr who directed the battle
from his headquarters in Athens, should have considered two highly
trained and well equipped divisions quite sufficient to carry through
Operation Mercury. As a further insurance, however, the 6th Moun-
tain Division was held in reserve in the Athens area in case it should
be required.

It was, indeed, required.

>» [6 ]«
Prelude to Assault

THE May days drifted by over Crete in brilliant sunshine and cloud-
less skies, and the slender sickle of the moon swelled nightly towards
the full circle as the men under General Freyberg’s command prepared

1 Estimates from German XII Army Intelligence sources were more nearly
correct. They placed our strength at two British infantry brigades and one

brigade of artillery. But they too were inclined to ignore the number of troops
brought from Greece.

THE ISLAND 167

their hasty and improvised defences, struggling to achieve, in
a few days and with wholly inadequate means, a degree of strength
and a capacity for resistance for which the six months that the locust
had eaten—those months of untroubled occupation—had been so
unsatisfactory a preparation.

No one could doubt that the attack was coming. British Intelli-
gence forecast it, Lord Haw-Haw on the German radio gloated
almost nightly over the prospect, the Drang nach Osten of German
strategy seemed to demand it. The first reports suggested that it
might be launched even as early as May Ist or May 2nd. Then, when
the days passed and the invasion tarried, there seemed good reason
to believe that the 15th or 16th would be the chosen date. That at
all events gave some respite, and Freyberg took from it what advan-
tage he was able. His sense of realism was undiminished, but it was
matched and exceeded by his greatness of heart and the Homeric
gusto with which he welcomed situations of exceptional hazard.
Driving round the island from one position to another, he managed
to infuse something of his own dynamic spirit into the defenders, to
such an extent that by May 16th he was able to report ‘all ranks are
fit and morale is now high. . . . I feel at least that we will give a good
account of ourselves. With the help of the Royal Navy I trust that
Crete will be held.’

But it was bombers’ weather during these bright, still, cloudless
days. From the beginning of the month the buzz of their engines was
repeatedly audible overhead. At first they concentrated mainly
against the ships approaching or lying off the island bringing the
much-needed supplies and equipment to the garrison. As there were
no ports on the south coast that could be used, and no adequate
means of transferring the supplies across the island even if there had
been ports, the convoys, as we know, had to run the gauntlet of the
channel between Crete and Krithia or between Crete and the
Dodecanese.

The majority of the cargoes were unloaded at Suda Bay, with
repeated interruption from the Luftwaffe. Shipping losses steadily
increased until by May 19th there were no less than 13 damaged,
sunk or partially submerged hulls in Suda harbour, and it was be-
coming clear that, with a continuation of bombing on this scale, the
entrance to the port would be effectively and perhaps permanently
blocked.

Day after day a black pall of smoke from the burning petrol stores
in ships bombed by the Germans hung over Suda Bay. The losses
were growing very serious and supply was dropping further and
further behind our needs in terms of rations, while our build-up of

168 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

arms, ammunition and transport vehicles was developing only very
slowly. Half the guns and more than half the R.E. stores despatched
between May Ist and May 20th were sunk en route or in harbour.

But during this period the garrison did receive certain important
reinforcements: the Royal Marines of the Mobile Naval Base
Defence Organization with their anti-aircraft batteries and search-
lights ; the 2nd Leicestershire ; the tanks of the 3rd Hussars and the
7th R. Tank Regiment; and the Ist Argyll and Sutherland High-
landers. General Freyberg also received forty-six field guns with
three hundred rounds per gun. Ammunition had been brought up
to the total of 1,450 tons, enough for several days’ operations if it
could be effectively distributed ; but.that, in view of the difficulty of
transport and communications, was almost impossible to do.

Daily the Germans came over Suda, bombing almost at leisure
and at will, though not always without loss. Under these conditions
it had been decided to run in supplies only at night in ships fast
enough to unload, turn round and be well away from port before
dawn. This practically limited the number of vessels available to the
faster warships of the Royal Navy. At the same time the constant
air raids notably diminished the quantity and reliability of civilian
labour. Despite the losses en route, the rate of unloading and dis-
posal of the cargoes failed to keep pace with the rate of arrival of
the ships. Ships had to hang about off Suda quay in imminent danger
from enemy bombing, or put to sea again without discharging; at
best, the cargo was liable to be hastily unloaded and then left about
on the quayside.

To meet this emergency volunteers, preferably with previous
experience as dockers, were requested from the Australian and New
Zealand troops stationed around Suda. About 400 offered them-
selves and were organized in shifts. Through the short and perilous
nights these men put in a tremendous job: they worked in constant
and deadly danger, for the German bombers were over night after
night. It made no difference to the effort of these stalwart volunteers
from the Dominions.

“You can dive over the side if the ship you are on is hit by a bomb,’
the officer commanding the Australians told them. ‘Otherwise, you
must keep right on with the job, even if the bombs are falling all
round you.’

So it was usually possible to unload at least 500 or 600 tons nightly.
During the whole period between April 29th and May 20th some
15,000 tons of stores were landed at Suda. It represented some-
thing like 70 per cent of the estimated current total required to feed
and maintain the troops and the civilian population in Crete.

THE ISLAND 169

On May 13th the main bombing effort shifted to the airfields and
to the anti-aircraft positions around them. The purpose was plain
enough. The Germans aimed at destroying the three dozen R.A.F.
aircraft operating in Crete and knocking out the anti-aircraft guns
which might subsequently oppose their own landings. It was what
the Luftwaffe had attempted and so signally failed to do at the begin-
ning of the Battle of Britain. But in Crete our serviceable aircraft
were a mere handful, our airfields were only three in number, and
there was no reserve of machines, of manpower or of space that
could serve the defence.

The few damaged Hurricanes or obsolete Gladiators that remained
fought gamely to the last. They shot down during this period a
number estimated as 23 enemy aircraft with another nine ‘ probables’
and a further eleven damaged. But having to engage repeatedly in
action with quite insufficient periods for re-servicing, they gradually
dropped out of the air if they were not shot up on the ground. By
May 19th only three Hurricanes and three Gladiators were left. This
tiny force had no means of providing its own cover and represented
only a further commitment, since it was necessary ta keep an aero-
drome in readiness and ground staff available.

And so on Monday, May 19th, these six aircraft were flown away
to Egypt and orders were given to render the airfields useless. It was
too late. There was not time now to carry out demolitions, for the
German airborne attack came in on the morning after our remain-
ing aircraft were withdrawn. Earlier in the month, while we were
still conducting air operations from Maleme, Major F. M. Hanson
of the New Zealand Royal Engineers had asked permission to
mine or crater the airfield. Authority was not granted. Our aircraft,
who were to continue their reconnaissance flights for as long as
possible, could not be moved to Retimo or Heraklion because no
transport was available to transfer their ground crews and equipment.

After the loss of the island much stress was laid upon the impor-
tance of the German capture of Maleme, the only airfield the enemy
succeeded in taking by his airborne assaults. One critic has written:

It was indispensable to the Germans to capture an airfield in Crete.
They tried and failed to capture Retimo and Heraklion. The airfield
they did capture was Maleme. And it was the possession of Maleme
that enabled them to reinforce their ground troops and operate their
aircraft from Crete. It is little wonder that Hanson, in a report on
the Crete operations, wrote with some bitterness:

‘I still feel that a major mistake was made in not making the
(Maleme) aerodrome unsuitable for landing planes’.

1 Hetherington, Airborne Invasion, p. 48.

170 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

Yet while one must sympathize with Major Hanson’s views, it can
hardly be contended that the failure adequately to wreck Maleme
was itself of decisive significance. Even before they obtained control
of the airfield itself the Germans were landing their troop-carriers in
the bed of the Tavronitis on its western side; and at Heraklion on a
plateau far from the airfield. There seems little doubt that they would
have continued to come in, accepting the consequent losses, and used
any place where an aircraft could make a landing.

From May 14th onwards the German air attacks were concen-
trated against the anti-aircraft guns and the men in the slit trenches
around them. The bombers pin-pointed their targets at leisure. The
fighters, finding that there was little occasion to concern themselves
with warding off attacks on the bombers they were escorting, were
diverted, day after day, to attack on their own account the defence
positions among the olive groves.

It was a grim experience for the men who crouched in their slit
trenches under orders not to fire at the German aircraft until the
attack by airborne troops actually opened, for fear of giving away
their positions. Supplies reached them fitfully by night, for the roads
were under almost constant air attack during the day.

The astonishing thing is that so little harm was done by these
almost unopposed bombing attacks and these ‘ground-straffings’
carried out by fighters often coming down as low as fifty feet from
the ground. The selection and digging of gun-positions had, it is true,
been one of the few defensive precautions taken in hand at an early
stage of the occupation, some hard work had been put in on camou-
flage, and slit trenches among olive groves are in any case extra-
ordinarily difficult to detect from the air. In some respects high-level
bombing from an unseen enemy is the harder to endure: both the
dive-bombers and the low-flying machine-gunning fighter are always
a good deal more dangerous in appearance than in reality to trained
troops. Even on May 19th, when the airfield raids reached a crescendo
of intensity—sure sign of an impending attack—no direct hit was
scored upon any of the guns around Maleme. Some slight mechanical
damage was done to the predictors and heightfinders by ‘near misses’,
but that was all. Our casualties that day from air attacks on Maleme
amounted to one man killed and three wounded.

For the whole period of a week during which the enemy aircraft
worked to ‘soften up’ our powers of resistance the total losses among
our anti-aircraft troops were only six killed and eleven wounded. And
in two companies of the Black Watch the total casualties during eight
days amounted to three.

But whether by accident or design there is little doubt that the

THE ISLAND 171

German tactics which forced the defenders to keep their heads down
made them slow to observe the approach of the first troop-carriers.
What happens in the first minutes of an airborne assault often decides
the issue between success and failure. It is in those first minutes,
while his enemy is still in the air, or on his way to the ground, or has
but just landed, that the defender enjoys the advantage and has his
best chance of wiping out the attack.

Far away to the north at Hildesheim in the heart of Germany the
crack Assault Regiment that was to make the initial landing by glider
had been assembled, and had been brought down by train to the
Salonika area in the first days of May. Paratroop units were moving
from Bulgaria and converging upon northern Greece at the same time.
Anair of intense mystery distinguished the preparations for the attack,
in remarkable contrast with the gloating forewarnings of Dr. Goebbels
and William Joyce over the radio. No pains were spared to ensure the
utmost secrecy of movement to the concentration areas. The troops
were instructed to remove their parachute badges; their special
equipment was kept under lock and key; their vehicles, when they
moved by road, had the identification marks painted out; paybooks
were exchanged for identity cards which gave no indication of the
bearer’s unit ; the strictest censorship was enforced upon private mail ;
the men entrained under cover of darkness; and even the singing of
parachute songs was strictly forbidden during the journey.

Three years later the most meticulous precautions were taken to
ensure secrecy among the forces preparing for the assault landing in
Normandy, but it is doubtful whether even the detailed and effective
security measures employed by the Anglo-American Command on
that occasion exceeded in thoroughness the restrictions applied among
General Student’s men for an operation of which the probability,
locale and timing had been so accurately forecast by our Intelligence.

That the private soldier was not taken into the confidence of the
command as much as might have been expected, and as would
certainly have been the custom before an operation of a similar type
in our own Army during the later part of the war, seems established
from the fact that the majority were not informed of their destination
until an hour or two before the aircraft took off, and some not until
after they were in the air. Many had little idea of the names of the
positions they were to attack, though it appears to have been im-
pressed upon all of them that the first objectives were to be taken
within forty minutes of landing. As if to balance these deficiencies in
information, special phrase-books were issued, of the type usually
supplied to foreign tourists, containing sentences considered likely to

172 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

be useful to the invaders translated into (phonetic) English, such as
the following : ‘If yu lei yu uill be schott!’

The speed with which this highly complex undertaking had been
laid on necessarily involved certain hitches in the organization. To
mount an operation involving the employment of some twelve
hundred aircraft of various types was a colossal undertaking. To base
it on the barren, poor and ill-provided territory of the Greek
peninsula was bound to multiply the difficulties. The small and sparsely-
equipped airfields of Attica and its neighbourhood were over-
burdened with the number of squadrons that were detailed to operate
from them. The official report of the XI Air Corps, published after
the battle, complains ruefully of the lack of ground organization and
supply services. Owing to the destruction of bridges on the single rail-
way line from the north and the damage done to the roads by our
demolitions, practically all the supplies required had to come by sea
to Corinth and Piraeus. Our minefields and the activities of our
submarines helped to delay the arrival of the ships and throw the
timetable out of gear. And when the ships did reach the ports the
unloading of the cargoes at the blitzed quaysides, with local labour
inadequate and unwilling, proved slow and difficult.

The date for the attack had originally been fixed for May 15th. But
delays in the arrival of the supply ships, combined with the difficulty
of providing adequate quantities of petrol for the many airfields that
were in use, caused a postponement until May 18th and then again
until May 20th.

Our Intelligence had been well informed when it forecast May
15th-16th as the most probable dates. Then, on May 18th two
German airmen, who had baled out after their aircraft had been hit,
were fished out of the sea off the coast of Crete. To their Cretan
captors, whom they oddly supposed would be in sympathy with the
‘liberating’ German forces, they frankly admitted that the invasion
was timed to take place soon after dawn on May 20th. The informa-
tion was duly conveyed to General Freyberg.

Freyberg had done all that he could within the straitened limits of
his resources and in the brief time allowed to him. Neither he nor
Wavell was under any illusion about the dangers that beset Crete,
and the deficiencies of its garrison. He had had a bare three weeks of
desperate improvisation in which to set his defences in order. Now
he faced the very élite of an army which could chose its own time
for such an occasion as this, an occasion for the employment of great
resources, immense technical skill, tactical ingenuity and unquestioned
human courage of a high order.

CHAPTER II

The First Day

om([ 1 lve
Airborne Invasion

TUESDAY, May 20th, dawned in glorious summer weather. Scarcely
a wind disturbed a serenely cloudless sky, and in the clear Mediter-
ranean air the watcher on the island could see a full twenty miles out
to sea.

Over came the German aircraft. To the men who shook themselves
shivering from their single blankets (the nights were still astonish-
ingly cold) it was just the customary early morning ‘hate’, and they
dived for the slit-trenches with what was now becoming the speed
born of habit. The long whine and thud-of the falling bomb, the
increasing buzz and roar of the dive-bomber, the quick rattle of
machine-gun fire from the accompanying fighters—they had heard it
all before, every day for the past week. And despite the information
which had reached the Command no general order had yet informed
the troops that this Tuesday was ‘The Day’.

It was at 6.30 a.m. that the air attack had begun, and when, after .
an hour of bombing and ‘ground-straffing’, the bombardment was
clearly intensifying rather than diminishing in scale the Headquarters
of Suda Area decided that this was indeed the grand attack, and
Operations Room, Canea, issued warnings to all anti-aircraft positions.

While the gunners were being pinned to earth by the bombardment
the first German transport aircraft were approaching across the
southern Aegean, moving over the western extremity of the island
and approaching Maleme and Canea from the south-west, the land-
ward side.

This is how it appeared to an eye-witness :

At about 7.30 a.m. some of the other officers and I were standing

near the mess tent, chatting and waiting for breakfast to be served,
when suddenly without any warning there was a terrific outburst of

173

174 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

ack-ack fire. We all sprang into the slit-trenches, thinking that this
was just another of the ordinary raids we had got so used to lately.
But this time it was something very different. Before we knew what
was happening, the skies were full of Germans planes which had
apparently sprung from nowhere. There seemed to be hundreds of
them, diving, zooming and criss-crossing as they bombed and machine-
gunned all over the place. Then a flight of large silvery machines
passed low down over our heads, coming from the south-west and
making for Canea. They passed as silently as ghosts with just a
swishing sound instead of the usual roar, and their wings were very
long and tapering. It was only then I understood that these were
gliders and that an airborne attack on Crete had begun in grim earnest.
Shells from our ack-ack batteries were bursting all around the
gliders and their accompanying planes, but these were so many and
our guns so pitifully few that little damage seemed to be caused.
I saw one glider twist sideways with a jerk and come down behind
the trees at a very steep slant, and I guessed that it must have crashed,
but most of the others—about thirty, I estimated—slid serenely on and
descended in the direction of Canea. They were going much slower
than an ordinary plane and I reflected what a hash a few of our
‘Hurricanes would have made of them if only they had been there.

From the gliders which made their landing sprang men armed with
mortars, machine-guns, tommy-guns, and hand-grenades. All were
ready for instant action, and could move at once in compact groups
as they had arrived.

To some the first intimation of the invasion came when, relieved
at the temporary cessation of bombing and low level machine-
gun fire, they heard the steady uninterrupted hum of approaching
aircraft and, looking up, perceived the slow-moving JU 52’s overhead.
A British regimental officer who was at Heraklion afterwards wrote:

I must say the Nazis have little to learn about effect! The troop
carriers are huge black beasts with yellow noses. They fly slowly and
almost sluggishly and with a wealth of experience and confidence in
their very appearance. It is, of course, just too easy for them when they
have local (I hope temporary) air superiority. Even one Hurricane
could have done tremendous execution.

From the underside of the German aircraft white puffs appeared,
tiny clouds that settled and then drifted rapidly down towards the
earth. In a moment tiny figures could be seen attached to the para-
chutes, and here and there parachutes appeared of different colours—
red, yellow, green, blue or black. These carried arms and ammuni-
tion, medical supplies and food. Some parachutes seemed to descend
in groups of three ; these carried down light field and anti-tank guns,
most of which were dropped in separate pieces, which could be
rapidly assembled and put together; but there were cases of the
20-mm. anti-tank gun being dropped complete and ready for im-
mediate use.

THE FIRST DAY 175

Nothing seemed to have been forgotten in the equipment of the
men who landed by parachute. Besides their personal arms (auto-
matic pistol and jack-knife) they carried two or three days rations,
including the specially-prepared Wittler bread sliced and wrapped in
cellophane or silver paper (it was supposed to last indefinitely until
unwrapped, but in fact did not); processed chocolate and rusks ; tar-
taric acid, sugar, biscuits and thirst quenchers ; cigarettes and contra-
ceptives. They wore camouflaged overalls and crash-helmets. Their
wrists and ankles were bandaged, as a rule, to lessen the risk of
sprains or breaks. With their packs they carried blankets, stoves and
utensils for boiling water. Doctors arrived by parachute with complete
sets of surgical instruments, bandages, cotton wool, quinine and a
variety of different types of drugs. To quote our regimental officer
again:

Without any exception their [the parachutists’] equipment was
first-class and brand new. Their clothing is most practical and well
designed and very light. For instance they have a big inside turnup
to their trousers and in this they keep a spare pair of socks, vest,
pants, etc. In some sort of sling pockets on the waist they had odd
bits of food—small hard biscuits, sausages, etc., and their dope...
and the prisoners I took complained it made them very thirsty.

It is curious to discover that a German regimental report after-
wards complained that the paratroopers’ uniform had proved ‘quite
unsuitable in this hot climate’. Quick movement was said to be im-
possible and many officers and men suffered from heat-stroke during
the subsequent operations; the British uniform (most of our men
wore battle-dress, though some fought in shirts and shorts) was con-
sidered to be superior.

At all events our antagonists displayed such energy during the
struggle that the question arose as to whether special drugs were
employed to maintain an abnormal degree of alertness and resistance
to fatigue. It seems clear enough now, however, that the parachutists
did not go into action doped in the generally accepted sense of the
term. But they were supplied with tablets such as energen or pervitin,
akin to benzedrine, calculated to produce energy and wakefulness, to
be taken under orders or at discretion. Further than this, some at
least, of the paratroops were issued with hypodermic syringes and a
special preparation with which they were instructed to inject them-
selves or one another if subjected to prolonged fatigue.

Dr. Brett Day of Cairo told John Hetherington, the Australian
war correspondent:

Curiosity led me to investigate this matter, and as I was secing
professionally many officers of the various units serving in the Middle

176 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

East, I was ultimately able to obtain several hypodermic equipments.
I have one compact taken from a German parachutist shot down in
Crete. It is three and a half inches long and one inch wide. The smail
hypodermic syringe is of the all-glass type, fitted with a steel needle
one inch long. A spare needle is in the box. The ampoules, of which
there are two in each box, contain caffein-sodium salicylate. Each
ampoule is of one cubic centimetre in 2 gm. solution.

The therapeutic effect of this combination would be to stimulate the
nervous system, particularly the higher mental.faculties. The special
senses, hearing, vision, smell, etc.. become more perceptive. Reflexes
are heightened. The use of the drug is not followed by depression.
Functional increase of muscles is another consequence of its injection,
and one of its outstanding effects is prevention of fatigue, both mental
ane cae It is most notably a first-class agent for the prevention
of sleep.

I have shown one of these packet equipments to several wounded
German prisoners of Rommel’s Afrika Korps who were under treat-
ment in a Cairo hospital, professing my ignorance of the usage. They
told me that all their shock troops, parachutists, tank and glider, were
injected with one ampoule of the solution before going into action.
Immediately following the injection, they were given a glass of
lemonade to drink. There is an incompatibility between caffein pre-
parations and acid fruit juices which would theoretically increase the
kick of the solution.

Our regimental officer has something to say regarding the men
themselves :

They do not run to form at all. Some were so tough that they just
never gave in, and having assembled in small parties, fought on hope-
lessly until we killed them. Others appeared to be very resentful of the
reception they had had on the way down (they had been told to expect
no opposition) and after wandering helplessly for 48 hours, more or less
gave themselves up with cries of ‘give me water’. I could write a
book about these paratroops! Such odd creatures!

Many of those who saw the descent of the parachutists agree that
there was something hypnotic in the spectacle of the slow-moving
aircraft spewing out their cargo of paratroops like handfuls of con-
fetti in the bright sunlight.

This paralysis was only a matter of seconds. But the first moments
are of the utmost importance in countering an airborne attack. For
the parachutists were being dropped from remarkably low levels,
from 600, 300, even 200 feet, and were only in the air for a matter of
‘seconds. During those seconds they were easy targets for a cool
infantryman on the ground with rifle, Bren-gun or machine-gun.

Men seized their arms and fired as the parachutists descended.
Many were hit and died before they reached the ground.

“Suddenly you’d see one go limp, then give a kick and kind of
straighten up with a jerk, and then go limp again, and you knew he

THE FIRST DAY 177

was done for,’ was one description given of the manner in which
these men died in the air.

Some fired to hit with incendiaries the parachutes themselves.
Bullets were seen to tear the bellying silk, setting it on fire. The men sus-
pended from these parachutes fell heavily, breaking legs or ribs. Else-
where parachutes were becoming entangled in the branches of trees
and the men hung suspended like Absalom, waiting until some Joab
arrived to put paid to their account.

That the Germans lost very heavily during this phase of the opera-
tions is clear, but it is equally clear that their losses varied greatly
between one sector and another. Thus one account states that out of
ten ‘sample’ parachutists, who jumped from a height of about 300
feet, one was killed through the failure of his ‘chute’ to open; one
was picked off by the defending riflemen as he descended; one was
put out of action by breaking a wrist or ankle on alighting; and the
others ‘spouted about helplessly with tommy-guns’ only to be
‘picked off with rifles at 600 or 700 yards distance’. Another account
stated that it was impossible to hit a descending parachutist with a
pistol and almost impossible with a rifle; but that it was ‘easy enough
with a captured German tommy-gun if you can get close enough’. On
the other hand, the present writer was told by troops leaving Crete
that the picking off of paratroops in the air was comparatively simple
for the alert riflemen. It was asserted that the descent took as much
as twenty seconds and that during this time they were extremely
vulnerable.

‘We fire at their feet and we can be almost certain of getting them
in that way’ was the summing up of these men.

A relatively small number of troops had been allocated to the glider
operation, only 750 in all. But the parachutists were descending in far
greater numbers, fifteen from each transport aircraft, and because
the nature of their descent tended to disperse them, they appeared
even more numerous than they were. Though many were killed before
they reached earth and many more were so badly shaken that they
were easily rounded up as prisoners, yet the speed with which those
who arrived uninjured rallied to their formations was most remark-
able. Some of the paratroopers, though not all, carried tommy-guns
and even fired them at random as they descended. The remainder,
being armed only with jack-knives and pistols, collected their
weapons from the containers that fell among them. Troops in the
first wave carried hand-grenades, sometimes as many as four.

The first move of the parachutist after detaching himself from his
cords was to seek cover. His second was to rally towards an N.C.O.
or officer. Cover was abundant. Not only did the dense plantations of

178 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

olive trees and vines provide shelter from view, while the deep gullies
gave temporary protection from fire as well, but there was a good deal
of thick undergrowth. Concealment therefore was not difficult for
those who reached the ground alive and out of close range of the
defenders’ small-arms fire.

Those first ten minutes were the vital period : the few seconds while
the paratrooper was swinging helplessly in the air; the second or two
while he was sorting himself out and releasing himself from his para-
chute; the few minutes while he was still an isolated individual de-
tached from other members of his unit, alone or almost alone in a
jungle where men on all sides would try to kill him and where little
quarter could be expected. Among the prisoners were some who
seemed to be under the impression that the defence would have been
obliterated by the preliminary air attacks and that they would have
little to do except ‘mop up’. There was indeed a great deal of ‘mop-
ping up’ done all through the day ; but the active réle was more often
assumed by the British, Anzac and Greek troops than by the German
invaders. ;

During the first hours the wildest confusion prevailed upon both
sides. Such confusion is inevitable at the beginning of any paratroop
battle much more so in this which remains one of the greatest and
most formidable airborne operations in history. Men stalked one
another among the olive groves and the thickly planted country
around Canea and Maleme. It was kill or be killed. Neither side
could afford to take prisoners, for there was no means of effectively
securing them and few could know for certain whether they were
surrounding the enemy or were themselves surrounded.

Gradually the Germans—those of them who were still alive—
coalesced into groups holding certain areas of ground. The para-
chutes of officers or of those charged with leading a particular forma-
tion were of a distinctive colour, so that they served as provisional
rallying points at the start. As information trickled back to the
various British headquarters and anxious staff officers marked with
blue circles on the talc covers of their maps the enemy positions, it
was seen that the airborne troops were appearing in two main areas,
one around Maleme airfield, the other in what was known as the
Prison Valley, about four miles W.S.W. of Canea. Further landings
were noted to the west and south of Canea and on the Akrotiri
peninsula. The enemy was clearly fulfilling expectations by aiming at
the Maleme airfield, Canea the principal town in western Crete, and
the naval base at Suda.

THE FIRST DAY 179
»([2 ]«

Maleme

JusT to what extent the anti-aircraft defence at Maleme failed to do
itself justice on that grim and fateful Tuesday morning can never now
be accurately determined. Too many of the men who fought are dead.
It is possible that the cry of ‘Wolf! Wolf!’ had been repeated too
often and that in consequence the gunners were reluctant to believe
that the real airborne attack, for which everything else was a pre-
liminary, had actually begun. It appears that some of the gun detach-
ments were driven from their guns during the vital period.

Certainly the Bofors gunners at Maleme had an unenviable task.
They had, of necessity, to be sited well forward on the edge of the
airfield where concealment was practically impossible; and yet their
vision was obliterated by the clouds of dust and smoke arising from
the bursting bombs. In any case, the Bofors had been located, for the
most part, to deal with an attack coming in from the sea; it was diffi-
cult to bring fire to bear when the German aircraft approached from
the south-west. Of the heavier artillery, one section of 3-inch guns,
on a ridge south of Maleme, was about 500 feet above sea-level ;
when the enemy flew in at heights of from 600 to 300 feet our gunners
were at a manifest disadvantage.

The first German gliders drifted down and began to discharge their
cargoes of armed men in the dry river-bed of the Tavronitis to the
west of Maleme airfield. This was an admirable rallying point, con-
cealed from the observation of the defenders and sufficiently close to
the airfield to put that important objective in grave danger. The time
was about eight o’clock. Twenty minutes later the parachutists began
to arrive, some five hundred being dropped in this locality. Those who
fell to the west were the more fortunate, since they were largely out of
range of the defence, and were in any case protected by the covering
fire of the troops who had previously been landed in the river bed by
glider. They constituted what was probably the largest group of the
Assault Regiment allocated to the attack on Maleme, but others were
landing on the higher ground about a thousand yards south of the
airfield ; close to the spur known as Hill 107; and in the neighbour-
hood of a bridge over the Tavronitis bed south-west of the airfield,
near which a group of R.A.F. buildings had been previously noted
from the air by the German observers.

Groups of paratroopers came down in and near Maleme village.
Those who landed in the narrow streets and on the flat roof-tops
were promptly attacked by men of the headquarters company of the

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THE FIRST DAY | 181

22nd New Zealand Battalion—two platoons of drivers and storemen
—armed with rifles and Bren guns. The Germans had the advantage
in automatic weapons and the New Zealand effort to clear Maleme
"and its approaches was not completely successful although most of
the enemy were killed. Here Cretan civilians joined the fray. There
were few able-bodied men who were not already under arms, but old
men, boys, even women, used knives and staves and ancient rifles
which had perhaps seen service against the Turks half a century
before.

Not far away, near the coast, a German company descended upon
a New Zealand engineer unit whose commander, when asked if he
required assistance, replied on the telephone, ‘They’ll all be dead
before you can get a man here.’ These words hardly exceeded the
facts. A captured company roll found in the pocket of a German
officer showed 126 names; within three hours the New Zealander
sappers, who were fighting as infantry, had accounted for 112 of them.

To the east of the airfield the Germans dropped a battalion, nearly
600 strong, of the Assault Regiment. It had originally been intended
that it should land along the beach between Maleme and Platanias.
But in order to avoid the danger of any of the parachutists being
dropped into the sea, and because their information told them that
this stretch of country both along the coast and inland was unde-
fended, the battalion was put down in the foothills south of the
coastal road.

The result was disastrous—for the attackers. They descended slap
into the prepared positions of the 23rd and a part of the 22nd New
Zealand Battalion. Many were killed or wounded in the air or caught
up in the trees, and most of the containers, in which all but the per-
sonal arms were stored, fell into New Zealand hands. Every officer
with the battalion was either killed or wounded. Here and there a
handful of men held out until the following day or even until the day
after that, and a few eventually fought their way through westwards
to the main body in the Tavronitis river-bed. But the battalion was
completely destroyed as a fighting unit.

The enemy’s aim was to capture the anti-aircraft battery at the |
mouth of this broad and sandy river bed ;1 secure the Maleme air-
field; and establish a perimeter defence beyond the airfield. He had
not yet succeeded. Losses had been severe, and included General
Meindl himself who had landed with the first wave of attackers and
received a wound in the chest. Next day he was succeeded by Colonel
Ramcke.

1 Thus German Intelligence. Actually the guns were met up on the western
slopes of Hill 107, about a mile from the coast.

182 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

By 10 a.m., however, several hundred troops had been landed by
glider and parachute and were rallying in small groups for local
defence, at the same time preparing to take the offensive supported
by the mortars and light guns which had been dropped in special
containers. And the parachute landings were being followed up by
the arrival of troop carriers, about twenty of these craft having already
made crash landings on the beaches east and west of Maleme.
Clearly a fresh German effort would not be long delayed; and the
22nd New Zealand Battalion (Lieut.-Colonel L. W. Andrew, V.C.),
which Brigadier Hargest had made responsible for the defence of
the airfield and its approaches from land and sea, was faced with no
easy task.

As our anti-aircraft artillery had inflicted comparatively little
damage upon the airborne Germans the New Zealanders had to deal
with a heavier weight of attack than had been anticipated. Our
signal cables had suffered great damage in the preliminary air
bombardment and the paratroopers had been taught to seek for and
cut field telephone lines as one of their first duties. So the separate
companies of the 22nd New Zealand Battalion soon found them-
selves engaged in isolated action with little means of communicating
with each other or with battalion headquarters save by the very slow
and uncertain method of employing runners.

The broad gulley of the Tavronitis became at an early stage a
rallying point for the Germans. The main body of the Assault Regi-
ment which had descended in this neighbourhood, soon secured
intact the long bridge which spans the gulley. Further south an
attempt was made against Hill 107. A few R.A.F. ground-staff were
captured from the camp near the foot of the hill, but the report,
widely circulated at the time that these men were used as a screen
behind which the Germans advanced to the attack, cannot be sub-
stantiated. Two attacks appear to have been made against the hill,
but neither was pressed home in strength and neither was successful.

Meanwhile a further battalion of the Assault Regiment had been
landed south of Kolimvari (a coastal village more than two miles
west of the Tavronitis) to provide protection against a possible
counter-attack from this side. The drop was made without inter-
ference, for we had no Regular troops available for holding the coast
so far west,’ and the Germans promptly began to push along the
road in a south-westerly direction towards Kastelli. Their progress
was opposed by Cretan guerrillas who had been organized by British

1 The German account published by XI Air Corps attributed much of
the success achieved on the first day to our failure to occupy positions between
the Tavronitis and Kolimvari.

THE FIRST DAY 183

and New Zealand officers, and one platoon of Germans which had
landed still further to the west was completely wiped out. The enemy,
apprehensive of a counter-attack in strength, pushed ahead to secure
a high pass five miles down the road to Kastelli. This was reached by
evening.

By noon the position around Maleme was that the Germans to .
the east of the airfield had largely been ‘mopped up’, while the
attempts to exploit southwards on to the high ground, where a part
of the 22nd New Zealand Battalion was stationed, had hitherto met
with no success. But to the west they were strengthening their posi-
tion in the dry river bed of the Tavronitis, and the hard-pressed
isolated platoon of the 22nd Battalion on the western fringe of the
airfield could not be succoured or reinforced, since the enemy was
bringing powerful crossfire to bear on the airfield itself. And mean-
while troop-carrying aircraft continued to land on the beaches.
Nearly forty had come in by midday. The men they brought, arriving
simultaneously and ready for action, constituted a far more menac-
ing reinforcement than a corresponding number of paratroopers
would have done.

At the start the Germans were concerned chiefly to deny the use
of the airfield to our troops, since they could not be certain that we |
were not in a position to use it to fly in reinforcements on our own
account. During the morning, therefore, this flat coverless field was
a death-trap for the troops on either side. It became clear from an
early stage that it was to some extent the key to the whole situation
in this part of Crete, perhaps the key to the possession of Crete
itself, and it was realized that the Germans would make the most
strenuous efforts to secure it for their own use.

Throughout the afternoon the position grew worse. Had com-
munication between our units been swifter and easier, had we
possessed more transport, had we possessed even vestigial air cover,
it might have been possible to mount a prompt counter-attack
against the enemy concentration near Maleme airfield before it had
been reinforced to any great extent by further airborne troops. But
the German air power proved of decisive importance during this
crucial period. The co-operation between ground troops and air
forces was of a high order. A most effective system of signalling was
used by the parachutists to indicate their own whereabouts, the
location of our troops the development of the action and their own
immediate needs. A few white or yellow strips laid out in any open
space in a series of simple diagrammatic patterns proved easy of
recognition by the low-fiying German aircraft. Did a unit wish to
indicate that it was surrounded, that the enemy was about to attack,

184 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

that it require medical supplies, mortar ammunition, anti-tank
ammunition, smoke bombs, or ground reinforcement, the appro-
priate signal could readily be made. Indeed, the German fighter
aircraft swooping down at will over the field of battle in Crete could
report the progress of the struggle and the requirements of the ground
forces to General Lohr’s Headquarters in Athens in less time than
it took some of our isolated company commanders to communicate
with their battalion headquarters by the tedious and uncertain
method of runners.

The ubiquity of the German air force during this day and the
following days and its unchallenged and unchallengeable supremacy
meant in the first case that, from Force Headquarters downwards,
the passing of information, and of orders consequent upon that
information, was virtually suspended or slowed down to such an
extent as to surrender the initiative wholly to the enemy. It is diffi-
cult to think of any instance in the history of warfare where one
force has been so pinned down and paralysed at every level, from
the rifleman in his slit-trench fifty yards from the enemy to the staff
officer at Force Headquarters waiting for information that does not
arrive or planning movements that will not be carried out because
the orders will never get through or only when the situation has
so changed as to render them completely obsolete and irrelevant.

Even when it proved possible to make some sort of counter-move,
launch some form of counter-attack, the signs of preparation by our
forces were all too patent to the enemy. The inevitable low-flying,
dive-bombing or machine-gunning air attack followed as surely as
the hounds of spring upon winter’s traces. It paralysed movement,
it blinded observation, it shook morale. One may well ask what
chance had the defence under such conditions as these?

Yet it may be that the chief danger had not yet been adequately
realized. The parachute obsession was great, had been so ever since the
days of the Netherlands campaign, and there was a tendency to
regard these troops as constituting the major threat, whereas they
only served as an advanced guard to the main body landed by
troop carrier during succeeding days. The parachutist of today does
not correspond so much to the shock trooper but rather to the light
skirmisher of nineteenth-century warfare. This, perhaps, was not at
first appreciated, partly because it was difficult to realize the extent
to which the enemy was prepared to go on landing troops-on an
airfield still under fire or in crash-landing carriers on the beaches or
elsewhere. That is why it is uncertain whether, even had we succeeded
in keeping our grip on Maleme airfield, we could have prevented the
enemy from landing troops on a large scale and gradually passing to

THE FIRST DAY 185

the offensive with an ever-increasing weight of numbers and fire-
power. We might have made him pay even more dearly for his con-
quest of the island. We could hardly have prevented it.

The situation, as has been observed, grew worse during Tuesday
afternoon. The enemy was clearly getting stronger, and he succeeded
in establishing a grip upon the ridge south of Maleme airfield ; but
the main danger came from the west. It was in this direction that our
first more or less co-ordinated counter-attack was delivered.

It will be remembered that two ‘I’ tanks had been allotted to the
defence of Maleme airfield. These do not seem to have proved effec-
tive during the period of the first air-landings but they were well-
suited to accompany and cover a counter-attack with infantry.
Shortly after 5 p.m. an attempt was made to re-establish the position
west of the airfield. Forty New Zealanders of the 22nd Battalion, as-
sisted by a few Bofors guns and supported by the two tanks, advanced.
The small number of infantry available is an indication of the extent
to which the battalion had been deployed over the wide area, making
it difficult for any but a small force to be concentrated for a counter-
attack. Our men were moving forward against a force that might be
anything up to ten times as numerous as themselves, but they possessed
two potential trumps in the ‘I’ tanks for at no time did the enemy
land any armoured fighting vehicles from the air; those that were
subsequently observed to be operating against us were captured
British tanks.

Supported by the two tanks, the troops made good progress and
reached the further fringe of the airfield without loss. Then the
mechanical inefficiency which seemed inseparable from British tanks
during the Greek and Crete campaigns decided the issue. The 2-
pounder gun, also apparently the machine-gun, of one of the tanks
jammed hopelessly, and the tank, now a useless mobile metal box,
was compelled to turn round and withdraw. Worse still, the engine
of the second tank, which had penetrated as far as the edge of the
Tavronitis gulley, broke down.

The Germans captured both the crew and the tank and very soon
began to use its guns against our troops.

Lacking the covering fire of the tanks, the infantry had no alterna-
tive but to withdraw rapidly, since they were far too weak in numbers
to press on alone. In re-crossing the airfield they suffered so heavily
from enemy fire that only three of those who managed to get back
to their original starting point were unwounded.

Owing to the slowness and difficulty in transmitting messages the
situation at Maleme airfield was only very imperfectly realized at
5th New Zealand Brigade headquarters. In fact, about mid-afternoon,
G

186 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

a message was despatched to the commanders of the 21st and 23rd
Battalions informing them that they would not yet be required to
counter-attack. It was recognized, however, that the 22nd Battalion
had been severely tried, and at dusk the Brigade ordered a company
from the 23rd and a company from the 28th (Maori) Battalion, both
of which were in position further to the east, to counter-attack.

It was at 9 p.m. that Lieut.-Colonel Andrew, commanding the
22nd New Zealand Battalion, came to the conclusion that he must
withdraw from the immediate neighbourhood of the airfield. At this
time he was in touch with only two of his five companies—A and B.
Of the remaining three, C Company, which was directly concerned
with the defence of the airfield, had been heavily engaged and was
known to have suffered great loss ; the headquarters company, which
held the Pirgos and Maleme area to the east, had been out of contact
since noon; D Company in the south at Hill 107 was known to have
been hard pressed and one of its members who joined Colonel
Andrew in the evening reported himself to be the only survivor. So —
far as the battalion commander knew, he had not many more than
200 men available to defend the whole area.

As a matter of fact, of the three outlying companies the head-
quarters company was firmly established around Maleme-Pirgos,
where it had dealt with most of the parachutists who had been
dropped in its midst; D Company was still holding its positions at
Hill 107; and even C Company had one platoon almost intact and
could rally survivors from the others. ;

However, these facts were not known to Colonel Andrew. He
merely knew that the Germans were building up in strength from the
west against what he supposed to be his only two remaining com-
panies and that they were infiltrating, or appeared to be infiltrating,
to the south and east.

Accordingly, after communicating by radio to brigade head-
quarters, he dropped back, first to the south-east, where he concen-
trated A and B Companies, and then into line with the 21st Battalion
holding an inland sector, and the 23rd Battalion whose area stretched
through Pirgos to the coast line.

Of the two companies which had gone forward to counter-attack
during the evening, the company of the 28th (Maori) Battalion got
as far as the fringe of the airfield, which it reached at about midnight.
Finding no New Zealand troops there it withdrew to its original
position, ‘mopping up’ on the way isolated parties of German para-
troopers to the number of about fifty. The company of the 23rd
Battalion made contact with Colonel Andrew and assisted in covering
his withdrawal.

THE FIRST DAY 187

The ‘lost’ companies, finding that their battalion had withdrawn,
succeeded in making their way back, with the exception of one
platoon of D Company, which remained on Hill 107 and was sur-
rounded and captured next morning; and another platoon of the
same company, which moved off into the mountains and eventually
reached the south coast.

The evacuation of the airfield (which had not, in fact, been effec-
tively in our hands since the morning) by the withdrawal of the 22nd
New Zealand Battalion has been authoritatively described as ‘ prob-
ably the most decisive single step in the battle for Crete’. It is impor-
tant, therefore, to give full consideration to the reasons that prompted
this withdrawal. They are many.

Our combined forces in the neighbourhood, even if they had
been fully equipped, were insufficient to hold an area with a peri-
meter some five miles in extent. All units were weak in numbers.

The weapons of our troops were very inferior, both in quality
and in numbers to those of the enemy. Colonel Andrew had less
than 60 per cent of his establishment of machine guns, and less
than 30 per cent of mortars.

His battalion was short of officers. There had only been twenty
on the morning of the German attack, and eight of these had
become casualties in the course of the day.

Communications were poor owing to damaged cables and lack
of signal equipment.

The tanks had failed. The one which broke down on the edge of
the river-bed was already being used by the enemy as a pillbox
from which to fire upon our most forward company.

There was a lack of artillery support due to bad communications,
forward observation officers being almost invariably cut off from
their batteries.

The multiplicity of command within the area hampered defen-
sive action.

No proper counter-attack had been made. Instead, two com-
panies had gone forward separately to deal with an almost unknown
situation.

The anti-aircraft defence of the aerodrome had failed, partly
through the siting of the Bofors guns in obvious and vulnerable
positions, and also through our inability to provide additional
concealed guns and guns which would only open fire when the
German troop-carriers came in.

The policy adopted with regard to the airfield which might have
been mined in advance of the German landing. Only temporary
obstructions had been placed in position. Moreover, a great deal

188 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

of petrol and many bombs and miscellaneous stores had been left
intact in the neighbourhood.

The tremendous value of the close support given by the Luftwaffe
to their ground forces.

Thus it may well be assumed that our positions at the airfield had
become untenable. Lieut.-Colonel Andrew, a resolute commander,
afterwards felt that ‘looking back now and knowing more of the
facts I am convinced that the withdrawal at that time was the only
possible action to take’.

It is less easy to understand why the invaluable hours of darkness
were not utilized to launch a vigorous counter-attack in the greatest
force available. The other battalions of the Sth New Zealand Brigade
had had a hard day, but there was no reason to doubt their energy
and spirit. Probably the explanation is to be found in the inadequate
signal communications which prevented commanders from obtain-
ing promptly the information upon which successful action must be
based. With this handicap in mind it has been suggested that brigade
headquarters, near Platanias some four miles away from the airfield,
were too far distant to control the fight.

»([3 ]«
Canea—Suda

LET us now transfer our attention to the second sector attacked on
the morning of May 20th, the area of Canea and Suda Bay, main
objective of the Centre (Mars) Group of the German assault. No. 3
Parachute Rifle Regiment and half a battalion from the Assault
Regiment were employed in a widely dispersed drop all around
Canea, which was to be taken on the first day, the various British
camps and troop concentrations being destroyed at the same time.

The operation opened badly for the Germans, for the glider
carrying Major-General Siissmann, the commander of the Group,
crashed on the island of Aiyina in full view of Athens, and the general
and all his personal staff were killed.

For the most part the assault fell not upon the Canea-Suda garri-
son, but clashed with the 4th New Zealand Brigade, and attached
troops in the area west and south-west of Canea which was under the
command of the New Zealand Division.

This tract of country had been subjected to an air bombardment of
great intensity between 7 and 8 a.m. and our guns were silenced. Four
gliders are said to have landed in the vicinity of the prison, on the

THE FIRST DAY 189

Canea—Alikianou road, but the main attack was made by paratroops
who did not begin to descend until about 9.20 a.m.—an hour after
the first wave had come down in the Maleme sector. Since Canea
was the main objective and the landings were made roughly in a semi-
circle around the town, it will be simplest to follow the fortunes of
each main group from north-west to south-west around the perimeter.

On a small promontory on the coast two miles west of Canea stood
No. 7 General Hospital, the principal British military hospital in
western Crete. It consisted of a number of large tents with beds for
500, many of which were already filled with men wounded in the air
attacks of the past three weeks. It also contained a few wounded
German airmen.

The morning had witnessed a heavy bombing attack on the neigh-
bourhood, where the ground was reasonably flat and therefore well
suited to the dropping of parachutists. Some hospital tents had been
set ablaze by the bombs while others had been ripped open by
machine-gun fire. Those patients who could walk had made for the
slit-trenches, but many had to remain helplessly in their beds with the
burning camp around them. A number of wounded men were hit
again by machine-gun bullets or bomb splinters.

An hour elapsed. The noise of bombing had long since died away,
but a cloud of smoke still drifted from a blazing marquee. Down
came the parachutists, a full company strong. Possession of the
hospital peninsula besides providing a good dropping area would
enable the attackers to cut the Canea—Maleme road and would give
them a good starting point from which to launch an attack upon
Canea itself.

Few of the patients or hospital staff appear to have seen the para-
chutes open. Almost before they realized what had happened they
found paratroopers all around them. The men in the slit-trenches and
the men in the hospital beds, all who were capable of standing, were
abruptly ejected and rapidly rounded up. Though they were speeded
with shots and hand grenades, it appears that in only one case was
an unarmed man killed at this time. Lieut.-Colonel J. L. R. Plimmer,
who commanded the 6th Field Ambulance, standing up in his slit-
trench and having one arm in a sling, was immediately shot dead.
Help was given to the paratroopers by some of the German wounded
in the hospital who had leapt or crawled from their beds and were
seen signalling with hand-mirrors.

By 11 a.m. the Germans were completely in control of the hospital
and of the New Zealand dressing station, away on the southern
side of the Canea road. They found, as was to be expected,
one of their wounded who was quite ready to take charge of

MAP No.1O.
———— : THE .
_——— _ PRISON VALLEY
——— SCALE

|

a
island

Galatas
, we Karatsos
Pink Hill
ran) F cobtrs ia
BS, £9 Hilt

Alikianou J
Aan

THE FIRST DAY 191

his fellow patients. He greeted the paratroops with the Nazi salute,
demanded a tommy-gun and then took up a position watching those
who were too weak to leave their beds.

The parachutists could now be seen dispersing among the trees,
but about a dozen remained in charge of the walking wounded.
About noon they began to move off to the south with a view to link-
ing up with a battalion which had been observed dropping east of
Galatas, possibly a mile distant. For the neighbourhood of the
hospital looked like becoming decidedly unhealthy. A German air-
craft had swooped down and fired upon the group, whereupon the
guards had made one of the captive officers climb a tree and drape a
white flag on top. And a light tank of the Hussars had come into view,
hesitated and then withdrawn. Intermittent rifle fire, though in no
great volume, was coming from the neighbouring trees.

So the party, about 300 strong with its dozen German guards,
began to move off inland, the wounded men barefoot and in pyjamas,
stumbling along as best they could. The ground was rough and
broken, and every kind of cover was provided by hillocks and ditches,
by trees and bushes, and by an occasional low stone wall. From time
to time a sniper’s rifle barked out and one or two men were hit. It
was difficult for the prisoners and their guards to know whether these
shots came from friend or foe.

The straggling crocodile of prisoners had travelled about a mile,
but there was no sign of the battalion of parachutists whom their
guards hoped to join. In fact these troops had dropped into the
defended area of the 19th New Zealand Battalion and had either been
wiped out or driven off southwards. So the procession continued its
painful progress, snipers being met with fire, while the prisoners them-
selves were from time to time urged on with shots.

In the early afternoon the column came to a halt on the brow of a
hill which commanded fair observation. The guards deployed to left
and right behind a low stone wall while the prisoners sank to the
ground and tried to take cover as best they could.

Presently a New Zealand patrol from the 19th Battalion came into
sight, working through a thick plantation of olive trees not more than
a hundred yards distant. The prisoners were compelled to keep silent
by the guns of their captors and had to watch the New Zealanders
move straight across their front. One of them could be heard saying
*There are no bloody Huns down here’. Slowly the patrol moved out
of sight, and the hopes of the prisoners vanished with them. But the
guards did not dare to move from their position, and presently the
New Zealanders could be heard returning. This time one of them fired
a shot—apparently at random. It passed close to a Luftwaffe pilot

192 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

who had attached himself to the parachutists. He fired back and the
alarm was given.

The fight that followed lasted for perhaps half an hour, perhaps
longer. The New Zealand patrol did not at first realize that there
were some hundreds of our own wounded among the Germans.
When they did, they acted with the utmost circumspection. A British
captain, a Maori major and others afterwards paid tribute to the pre-
cautions which were taken. ‘I cannot praise too highly’, said the
British officer, ‘the way in which the New Zealand troops developed
their attack with the utmost regard for our safety.’

With some help from the prisoners in directing the fire, the New
Zealanders moved round to outflank the wall and one by one they
picked off the paratroopers until only two remained. Greek troops,
working in from the rear, helped to finish off the action.

A few of the wounded prisoners and medical staff had been hit
during this action, but considering the circumstances they had been
almost miraculously lucky. They were brought into the area held by
the 19th Battalion.

At much the same time the hospital itself had been recaptured by a
detachment of New Zealanders, with some assistance from the 3rd
Hussars who had a few light tanks stationed in the Canea area,
though none appear to have been engaged in this particular affair.
German losses in the whole engagement in this neighbourhood were
very heavy. By their own account most of the company were killed
in the course of the day’s fighting. Our estimates put the number at
nearly 200.4

Further south an untidy battle—or rather, a series of isolated
fights—raged all day around Galatas and along the Canea—Alikianou
road to the south-west. South of the road a strong force of parachu-
tists came down all around a troop of 3-7-inch howitzers. The gunners
were overwhelmed, but not before one of their number, on his own
initiative and at grave personal risk, had succeeded in disabling three
of the four guns so as to prevent them falling intact into enemy hands.
There were nine light tanks of the 3rd Hussars in the rather close
country between Canea, Galatas and the road from Canea to the
prison and reservoir. Three of these, with a company from the 18th
New Zealand Battalion, delivered an attack shortly before dusk
against the hamlet of Galaria (a mile east of Karatsos) which for the
time being had become one of the principal enemy strongpoints in

1 Many contradictory accounts have been given of the capture of the hospital
and the subsequent alleged use of the wounded and medical staff as a screen for
the advance of the parachutists. The author has largely followed the report of the
New Zealand War History Branch which is based on a large number of narratives
by eye-witnesses.

THE FIRST DAY 193
the sector. The German parachutists were established in the houses
with mortars and machme-guns and succeeded in driving off the
attack ; nevertheless, during the night, in obedience to orders received
from their regimental headquarters, they quietly evacuated Galaria
and withdrew south-west to help form a defensive bloc in the area of
the prison, where the main body of No. 3 Parachute Rifle Regiment
was concentrating in expectation of a counter-attack on the following
day.

The initial German assault had failed, largely because most of the
3rd Battalion of this regiment had dropped in or near the defence
positions of the 19th New Zealand Battalion and No. 6 Greek Regi-
ment. Attempting to carry out their role of attacking and taking
Galatas, which was held by the Composite New Zealand Battalion,
they were set upon from all sides and were reported to have been
‘unquestionably annihilated in quick order’. Only a few survivors
escaped southwards across the Canea—Alikianou road.

It was on either side of this road, in the area known to our troops
as Prison Valley, that the main body of No. 3 Parachute Rifle Regi-
ment had been dropped. For a good part of the eight-mile stretch to
Alikianou the road traverses open meadow land, eminently suitable
for the landing of paratroops. It had, however, the disadvantage
that it was overlooked from the high ground immediately south-
east of Galatas, and no force dropped in this valley could feel secure
until this height, known to our men as Cemetery Hill, had been
secured.

To meet the threat in this area we had No. 6 Greek Regiment,
flanking the valley from the east from Galatas southward to the
foothills, and No. 8 Greek Regiment covering the western exits and
the approaches to Alikianou. Further north, in the same area but
out of effective range of the landing, was the New Zealand divisional
cavalry,! less than two hundred strong, fighting as infantry since
their Bren carriers had been left in Greece.

The parachutist descent was carried out more or less as planned
but over a more widely dispersed area than had been intended, with
the result that numbers of the enemy were easily picked off by rifle
fire in the open country before they could find cover or give
each other support. It was estimated that of the two battalions which
were dropped here about one hundred were disposed of almost at
once; the number may have been much higher, for a member of the
2nd Battalion afterwards stated that out of the 700 men of that unit
who were dropped only 500 survived the landing and the initial

1 From May 22nd, after the divisional petrol company had been brought under
command, this detachment was renamed Russell Force.

c*

194 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

forming-up period. But nearly three hundred men made successful
landings on the slopes to the south-east of the road; and a more
formidable force, over five hundred strong, came down in the prison
valley astride the road, roughly midway between Canea and Alikianou.
The two Greek battalions had had a fairly easy task in the first ten
minutes or so, since the country afforded little cover for troops
dropping from the sky. But No. 8 Greek Regiment, in the foothills,
found itself cut off from the rest of our forces. From the sound of
heavy rifle and mortar fire it seemed that the Greeks were engaging
the Germans, and, though gradually driven southward they cer-
tainly prevented the enemy from making any important progress.
When he launched an attack upon the village and bridge of Alikianou
from the east it was decisively repulsed, women and even children
turning out against the invader. The stout resistance of the battalion
continued right up to the night of May 25th/26th, and prevented any
wide German flanking movement south of Canea during these days.

No. 6 Greek Regiment was less successful. It had received a con-
signment of small-arms ammunition on the previous evening, but
most unfortunately this had not yet been distributed, with the result
that the men had only a few rounds apiece when the parachutists
descended in the morning. After a brief resistance the Greeks dropped
back north on Galatas and east on Perivolia. The New Zealand
cavalry had been moved towards Galatas where they took up a
position near the southern edge of the town.

The Germans, always quick on this vital opening day of the battle
to exploit an advantage gained, followed up rapidly. Colonel
Heidrich, who commanded No. 3 Parachute Rifle Regiment, and
who was now commanding the 7th Airborne Division until a suc-
cessor to Siissmann could be appointed, had arrived early on the
scene in the neighbourhood of the prison. He promptly realized that
the heights south of Galatas were the key to the whole situation. One
of his three battalions had landed almost intact in the prison area,
and advanced to the attack ‘in classic style’ (to use the words of the
German official report). Despite flanking fire from the direction of
Galatas it rushed Cemetery Hill and pushing east joined up with
another force. The advance continued eastward upon the village of
Mournies, scarcely more than three miles from Suda. Since the
attack was being closely suppported by low-flying aircraft, the situa-
tion began to look critical ; but parties of No. 6 Greek Regiment, led
by Lieutenant Forrester of the Queen’s Regiment and a resolute Greek
subaltern, helped to check the German effort.

But the enemy remained in control of the Prison Valley. Heidrich’s
Ist Battalion had taken Cemetery Hill and during the afternoon his

THE FIRST DAY 195

2nd Battalion, after one repulse, took Pink Hill immediately south-
west of Galatas. Thereupon two companies of the 19th Battalion
(4th New Zealand Brigade), together with a detachment of the 3rd
Hussars which provided two light tanks, were ordered to counter-
attack.

Unfortunately it took over two hours to launch the counter-
attack after the order was given. When our men advanced at 8.30
p.m. the enemy’s defence was fairly solidly established and although
a number of casualties were inflicted the attack came to a halt,
pinned down by fire, 600 yards from the starting line. Brigadier
Puttick commanding the New Zealand Division, considered that
there would be no chance of success when daylight came; so at
dawn our troops were brought back to their original positions.

When darkness fell the Germans were still in possession of both
Cemetery Hill and Pink Hill, but owing to a misunderstanding the
commander of the 2nd Battalion withdrew his troops from Pink
Hill. Cemetery Hill continued to be held by the Germans until the
morning of the 21st.

Following the perimeter of Canea round in an easterly direction
we come to the second area of glider landings, where three indepen-
dent companies of the Assault Regiment were detailed to land, one
under Lieutenant Gentz, immediately south of Canea, where an
anti-aircraft battery and the wireless transmitting station were to be
attacked and captured; the other two companies to the north-east
of the town on the Akrotiri peninsula. Here also an anti-aircraft
battery formed the primary objective

South of Canea Lieutenant Gentz’s company, though losing one
of its fifteen gliders during the approach flight, while three more
landed at Canea itself, had the advantage of following up a highly
successful air bombardment which had neutralized our guns and
had scored a hit on a big ammunition dump just before the landing
took place. Consequently the Germans met with little opposition
except from a scattered splutter of light machine-gun fire. They over-
ran the battery, killing or capturing the gun detachments, and then
proceeded methodically to stalk and destroy the machine-guns with
hand-grenades.

A scratch force of the Canea-Suda garrison, consisting of elements
of the Rangers, the Ist Welch Regiment, Royal Marines, and No. 2
Greek Regiment came into action during the afternoon, moving out
from Canea and the village of Mournies just to the south. They not
only dislodged the Germans from their positions, but succeeded in
recapturing two heavy anti-aircraft guns which, the more surprisingly,
were found to be undamaged. With the guns they rescued 32

THE FIRST DAY 197

survivors of the detachments. By the end of the day Lieutenant Gentz’s
command had been reduced to a few dozen men, isolated and with
little hope of holding out on the morrow. They were, however, in
wireless communication with Colonel Heidrich in the prison area
and received orders to break out to the south-west through the hills
and thence to rejoin the main body. The route which they followed
took them straight through a succession of our positions, but by
dint of bluffing, Gentz, who spoke fluent English, succeeded in
working, and occasionally shooting, his way back to the main body
of the regiment which he rejoined early on the following morning
with three officers and twenty-one men.

Still less fortunate were the two companies under Captain Altmann.
It had been intended that they should land on the Akrotiri peninsula
and immediately put our guns out of action. But the flight came
under both heavy and light anti-aircraft fire and lost cohesion as it
approached land. Out of fifteen gliders taking part in the operation
four fell into the sea. That was the first misfortune that befell the
enemy. The second was that our gun positions had been shifted
since the last German air reconnaissance with the result that the
troops in the gliders, who should have been landed close enough to
overwhelm the guns at the first rush, found themselves put down in
positions which gave them little chance against the defenders. They
were not allowed the opportunity to give one another effective sup-
port; and, to add to their troubles, German aircraft action during
the landing proved less effective here than elsewhere.

The effect of this German miscalculation and our own intelligent
and alert defence soon showed how far even these picked assault troops
were from being the supermen of fevered defeatist imagination. The
Northumberland Hussars, who were stationed here with a view to
dealing with an airborne landing, promptly attacked the glider-borne
troops, many of whom had descended on our positions at the village
of Profitilias. Some of the enemy, it seems, never had an opportunity
of emerging from their aircraft and deploying. A large number,
including Captain Altmann, were killed ; others surrendered. By the
end of the day, though there were still a few remaining to be ‘winkled
out’ from the defensive positions they had taken up in the hills, all
danger from this direction was at an end.

But what happened at Akrotiri provides an excellent example of
the flexibility of German assault tactics. From the quality of the
troops employed and the tactical importance of their objective (the
neck of the peninsula close to Canea) it is reasonable to assume that
this was regarded as one of the most important parts of the opera-
tion. But when it came so completely to grief the Germans made no

198 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

further attempt either to reinforce it, to continue pressure from this
side, or to extricate the men isolated there. General Lohr was intent
upon pursuing the sound policy of reinforcing success. More and
yet more troops would be poured in at Maleme, for at Maleme there
was a possibility of successful exploitation. The operation at Akrotiri
would be jettisoned and the surviving troops abandoned, for it had
failed. ‘To him that hath shall be given’ is a maxim of more than
scriptural application.

Generally speaking, the attack around Canea had misfired badly.
The various groups of parachutists and glider-borne troops should
have linked up ; they should have been in uninterrupted control of the
coast from west of Canea to the approaches to Suda; Canea should
have been taken. Instead, the various detachments had been isolated
and largely rounded up. Only a few snipers—less than a dozen in
all—actually penetrated into the town of Canea, and these had
merely a nuisance value. Of the three battalions that formed Colonel
Heidrich’s Parachute Rifle Regiment, one had been completely dis-
persed and partially destroyed ; the other two, heavily engaged all day,
had accomplished much less than had been expected. In addition, the
pioneer battalion had been engaged all day with the Greek forces
towards Alikianou, had suffered severely and been compelled to
fight its way through to the main body in the Prison Valley during
the night. The assault groups of Altmann and Gentz, amounting to
another half battalion, had been destroyed.

In only one sector, the Prison Valley, between four and five
miles south-west of Canea, was there an enemy concentration that
threatened serious trouble on the morrow. And even these troops
were not in a position to contemplate serious offensive action. The
balance of advantage remained with the defence.

m4 ]«
Retimo

Our forces defending Retimo were, as has been mentioned, divided
into two parts. Two battalions of the 19th Australian Brigade were
stationed, under the direct command of Brigadier G. A. Vasey, to
cover the beach at Georgeopolis, a full dozen miles to the west of
Retimo (a good deal further if the winding of the road is taken into
account). At Georgeopolis a seaborne landing was considered a
serious possibility. The other two battalions and some Greek troops
covered the Retimo landing-strip (airfield by courtesy), which .

' THE FIRST DAY 199

lay flush with the coast, something more than five miles east
of the town.

The Germans had allocated No. 2 Parachute Rifle Regiment
(Colonel Sturm) from the Centre (Mars) Group to carry out the
capture of the town and airfield, after which it was to move west in
such transport as it could lay hands on and join forces with the
main body of Mars in the neighbourhood of Canea. Here, as at
Heraklion, the drop was not to take place until 3.15 p.m. by which
time it was to be assumed that the attention and perhaps most of the
available resources of the defence would be concentrated upon the
operations further west around Canea and Maleme.

The terrain at Retimo was, in its essential aspects, similar to that
at Maleme. A narrow coastal strip, threaded by the main road, was
overlooked by a series of steep-banked terraced ridges, here and there
rising perpendicularly to a height of twenty feet. Visibility was limited
by olive plantations and by vines in the coastal plain and on the seaward
slopes of the ridges. Cover from view was therefore considerable both
for attack and defence, and provided considerable opportunity for
delaying action.

Colonel Campbell, in local command at Retimo, concentrated his
force on two hills, known respectively as Hill A and Hill B, to cover
the landing-ground from the east and south-west respectively. The
2/1st Australian Battalion was posted on and to the west of Hill A,
with two companies on the fringe of the airfield and a third well
forward to support them ; the 2/11th Battalion on and around Hill B.
Detachments were also stationed on an intermediate ridge running
parallel to the sea coast. Most of the field guns (captured Italian
pieces and four American ‘75’s’ all without sights) and most of the
machine-guns were placed on one or other of the hills to ensure a
prompt concentration of fire, if such should be needed, against the
landing-ground.

Two ‘I’ tanks were stationed in a wadi a little south of the landing-
ground. Gun ammunition was scarce, but there was plenty of small-
arms ammunition.

The Greek contingent numbered about 2,300, organized in four
battalions. These, however, had only ten rounds of ammunition per
man, were mostly very young and inexperienced and were described
as ‘having little confidence in themselves’. One battalion was located
in the centre between the two Australian battalions ; the other three
were in reserve south of the village of Piyi.

The timing and execution of the enemy’s preliminary moves were
by no means so successful as those of the morning attacks further
west. The refuelling of the aircraft at the airfields in Greece had taken

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THE FIRST DAY 201

longer than was expected, and a dust haze had made the take-off
difficult. However, the bombers arrived over their targets about
3.45 p.m. and proceeded to deliver a heavy but not very effective
attack upon our supposed defences. The air photographs taken by
the reconnaissance aircraft during the preceding days had been
erroneously interpreted and little damage was done to our gun
positions ; also, the bombers were half an hour in advance of the first
paratroop-bearing aircraft, and the latter, instead of themselves
arriving en masse and being able to put in a concentrated attack, kept
appearing in successive waves. Four flights of about 25 aircraft each
seem to have been used, their descent covering a period of fully half
an hour.

As a result of these mistimings the defence was on the qui vive, and
in better shape to deal with an airborne attack than had been the
troops at Maleme that morning. It has been noted that no anti-
aircraft guns were available for the defence, otherwise the whole
operation might have foundered almost as badly as it did at Akrotiri.
But with admirable coolness the infantry concentrated with small-
arms fire against the troop-carriers. Nine of them were brought
down by these means and a number of parachutists were killed
or wounded in the course of their descent.

It may here be noted that some of the Germans, with that extra-
ordinary mental obtuseness which characterizes them, took strong
exception to our men firing upon ‘helpless’ parachutists in the air,
regarding it as a breach of the often-invoked and highly elastic ‘laws
of war’. In this war it was the normally accepted practice to refrain
from shooting at single airmen baling out by parachute from a
damaged aircraft over enemy territory, the assumption being that
such men were on their way to surrender. But there is of course no
conceivable reason why armed paratroops dropping in their scores
and hundreds, with most decidedly hostile intent, should be allowed
a clear ‘run in’ without interference.

In all, about 1,200 paratroops were landed in the Retimo sector,
to east, west and south of the airfield, during the afternoon of May
20th. They were quick to cut the coastal road and sever communica-
tions with brigade headquarters at Georgeopolis, but their losses were
severe. The Greek battalion in the centre had started to disperse
southward towards the hills when the air attack began, but, rallied
by some Australian non-commissioned officers, these men returned
to their positions and fought bravely. The early fighting was neces-
sarily of the same ‘kill or be killed’ character that we have seen else-
where. Enemy losses were far higher than our own, and the 2/11th
Battalion, which suffered only forty permanent casualties during the

202 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

day’s fighting, reported that next day it buried 400 Germans. The
remainder of the enemy on this western flank, perhaps 400 in number,
withdrew into Perivolia village on the coast a mile and a half east of
Retimo and there fortified themselves and began to infiltrate east-
wards during the night. An attempt to penetrate into Retimo town
was driven back by a force of armed Cretan police who greatly out-
numbered the attackers.

Things had not gone quite so well for us on the eastern flank. Most
of the paratroops who landed opposite the airfield defence companies
of the 2/1st Australian Battalion or opposite No. 4 Greek Regiment
were overwhelmed, but the two ‘I’ tanks on being sent against the
enemy concentrations to the east of the airfield became ditched, and
the Germans began to develop a dangerous attack against Hill A.
Moreover, overcoming their customary reluctance to undertake un-
planned night operations, they worked up to the eastern edge of the
airfield after darkness fell and captured the crews of the two ditched
tanks and drove the machines off before dawn. At Maleme they had
employed a broken-down tank as a pillbox ; here they showed them-
selves more apt at re-starting our own tanks than we were ourselves.

Nevertheless, the balance of the fighting in the Retimo sector was
decidedly in our favour. The enemy had captured neither airfield nor
town and had suffered very heavy losses. His force had been split into
two widely separated parts, and for the following morning Colonel
Campbell planned two dawn attacks to clear his threatened flanks.
The enemy was to be driven from the neighbourhood of Hills A and B
by the 2/Ist and 2/11th Battalions respectively, while the Greek forces
in the centre would attack northwards to the coast to clear the ground
between the two Australian battalions of isolated groups of snipers.

A request despatched to Force Headquarters asking for reinforce-
ments had to be regretfully refused, since other sectors were making
more urgent demands upon our slender reserves. The Retimo detach-
ment would have to hold its own with what it possessed ; and this it
seemed quite capable of doing.

No attack developed at Georgeopolis during the day, and in the
evening the 2/8th Australian Battalion—only two companies—was
despatched to Canea to come under command of the Suda sector.

om [5 lw

Heraklion

HERAKLION, the second town of Crete, is the best known to visitors
from the west, an account of the vicinity of the vast and imposing

THE FIRST DAY 203

ruins of the ancient Minoan palace at Knossos, excavated during the
last half century by Sir Arthur Evans. It was the objective of the
German East (‘Orion’) Group, under Colonel Brauer, which was to
be landed in the afternoon of May 20th with the task of taking the
walled town and the airfield, two and a half miles to the east, and
then preparing a beach-head for the landing of No. 85 Rifle Regiment
from the Sth Mountain Division.

The defence here consisted of the bulk of the original British
garrison troops with an Australian battalion and some Greeks. It
was therefore a relatively well-equipped body, the troops were fresh
and units up to establishment in numbers. It may be that General
Freyberg anticipated that the main attack would be delivered against
this sector ; certainly he realized that the somewhat isolated position
of Heraklion demanded a self-sufficient scheme of defence.

The area to be defended stretched from an open beach a mile or
two beyond the airfield on the east to the town of Heraklion on the
west. Brigadier Chappel had taken great pains to protect the airfield.
Holding a hill overlooking the beach, a ridge south of the landing
ground, and an intermediate gorge between the two positions was
the 2nd Black Watch. Next to the Highlanders but south of the main
road was the 2/4th Australian Battalion occupying a feature includ-
ing two knolls near Aghiai Pandes but known to the Australians
by the more homely name of ‘Charlies’. Men of the 7th Medium
Regiment R.A., now acting as infantry, were stationed near
the sea in Nea Alikarnassos, a newly built village for Asia
Minor refugees on the road between the airfield and Heraklion town.
To the west of the Australians, and in the rear of the artillerymen,
lay the 2nd Leicestershire as mobile reserve, ready to counter-
attack in any direction but especially towards the airfield. The 2nd
York and Lancaster, next to the Leicestershire, was immediately
south-east of Heraklion. The town itself and its approaches from the
south as well as some beaches to the west were held by a Greek
garrison battalion and two Greek recruit battalions. Right outside
the main defences on a ridge overlooking East Beach from the south-
east, were posted a platoon of the Black Watch and two Greek
reservist companies.

Another platoon of the Black Watch held a road-block at Knossos
across the highway that runs inland to the central mountain ridge.

The airfield itself was well covered also by our guns. Two Bofors
were sited on its fringe, and an ‘I’ tank was concealed at each end.
Two troops of captured Italian field-guns were in position on the
high ground to the south-west, and the remainder of the guns with
six light tanks of the 3rd Hussars to the south-east. So was provided

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THE FIRST DAY 205

a more formidable concentration both of troops and guns than had
been possible in the somewhat makeshift arrangements at Maleme.

Here, as at Retimo, the Germans somewhat mistimed their attack.
It had been intended that the descent of the parachutists should
begin at 3.15 in the afternoon, when Colonel Brauer with No. 1
Parachute Regiment would land and seize the town and airfield of
Heraklion, keeping the latter open for subsequent landings. But,
though losses among the troop-carrying Junkers planes had been
surprisingly few—according to the German official account only
seven were lost out of over 500 employed in the morning’s operations
—a number had crashed on returning to their bases on the mainland.
Their removal to clear the airfields took time, and, as already ob-
served, there were delays over refuelling, and complications caused
by the dust storms that swept the mainland airfields. Owing to the
difficulties of telephonic communication between the various units,
scattered all over southern Greece and the islands, no fresh common
starting time could be planned. Accordingly, formations started in
ragged order and ‘incorrect tactical sequence’.

At 4 p.m. the preliminary bombing began. Our ground troops
reported that as many as 750 aircraft took part in this bombardment,
but this seems almost certainly an over-estimate. The attack con-
tinued from four until five o’clock. Then, nearly two hours behind
schedule, the first troop-carriers came into view, and the anti-
aircraft guns which had remained commendably silent during an
hour’s bombing opened up as the parachutists began to descend.

Owing to the delays, the drop, as at Retimo, was not con-
centrated into the shortest possible time. It spread over a period
of about two hours, the troops descending in a series of waves as
the carriers arrived, usually in groups of twelve, from the north-west.

The defence was ready, neither troops nor guns having suffered
seriously from the preliminary air bombardment, and the anti-
aircraft gunners worked with a will. Out of more than one hundred
and fifty—there may have been two hundred—JU 52’s employed in
the operation fifteen were shot down in the air, and apart from the
men in these aircraft a large number of parachutists were killed as
they descended to earth.

One gunner said:

I saw planes burst into flames, then the men inside feverishly
leaping out like plums spilled from a burst bag. Some were burning
as they dropped to earth. I saw one aircraft flying out to sea
with six men trailing from it in the cords of their ‘chutes. The
‘chutes had become entangled with the fuselage. The pilot was
bucketing the plane about in an effort to dislodge them.

206 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

There was no delay in launching the counter-attack. Every unit
had received instructions to go straight in and annihilate the enemy,
taking the fullest advantage of that brief favourable period before
the parachutists had had time to establish themselves and while
the ground situation was too confused to permit the Luftwaffe to
intervene effectively from above.

The parachutists seem to have been quite taken by surprise.
Prisoners stated that they had been assured that the preliminary
‘blitz’ would obliterate the defenders, and they were utterly astonished
to see men rising from the slit-trenches and greeting them with
powerful and accurate fire.

First of all the airfield was cleared. The Germans had dropped an
entire battalion here, one half to the east and one half to the west.
It was practically annihilated before dark. A carrier platoon of the
Leicestershire with a platoon of the York and Lancaster counter-
attacked into ‘Buttercup Field’ on the western side and dealt with
all the invaders within twenty minutes, while the Black Watch cleared
the eastern approaches. Captain Burckardt, the only surviving officer
from the whole battalion, managed to collect about 60 or 70 men in
a gulley to the south-east of the airfield at nightfall, and a few
snipers who had established themselves in the Greek barracks on the
southern edge of the field continued to hold out. But the rest of
the battalion had been destroyed. Five men escaped by showing con-
siderable enterprise and endurance. They managed to reach the shore
and, swimming along the coast, eventually rejoined regimental head-
quarters to whom they brought news of the disaster.

After the clearing up of this area, the Leicestershire were able to
give assistance to the Australians in attending to the hill known as
‘Charlies’ and the country immediately east of Heraklion.

Some Germans took refuge in a field of barley. The barley stood
about three feet high and gave good cover from view. From this
position they sniped our troops who, unable to see them, could only
fire back at random.

‘Let’s set the bloody barley on fire boys,’ a soldier said.

Men crawled out across the intervening ground with bullets flipping
all round them. The barley was fairly dry and flared up as matches
were touched to it. A brisk wind set the flames dancing through it at
high speed, and the hidden Germans jumped up and ran like rabbits
smoked out of their burrows. They were machine-gunned and picked
off with rifles as they ran.}

Not pretty! Just war.
Things were going very badly for the Germans, and at about 7.20p.m.
when it had become clear that the main objectives had not been

1 Hetherington, Airborne Invasion, p. 80.

THE FIRST DAY 207

achieved, the bombers came over again to attack our principal con-
centrations. Further parachutists were subsequently dropped, this
time well to the east of East Beach, beyond even our most advanced
outpost. These late arrivals knew nothing of the situation at the air-
field, which they assumed to have been seized by this time. They
endeavoured to push through and join hands with the battalion
supposed to be in possession there, and were surprised to find them-
selves held up shortly before midnight by strong opposition on the
edge of the airfield plateau.

The rather raw Greek troops in Heraklion, meanwhile, were
undergoing a much greater ordeal at the hands of Germans who had
forced their way in from the south and west. A confused and scram-
bling fight developed from dusk onwards in the steep and narrow
streets running down to the harbour. The Germans, opposed by an
odd medley of Greeks, Australians, York and Lancaster and Black
Watch, gradually worked their way forward and between ten and
eleven o'clock they reached the harbour itself.

A party of some thirty Australians and British, retreating before
them, had been driven on to the long mole that juts out to sea, a
relic of Venetian times. There was a gun at the end of the mole, but
it had run out of ammunition.

With the Germans at the landward end of the mole, sweeping its
extremity in the moonless night with heavy but inaccurate fire, there
was nothing for our troops to do but attempt to escape by boat.
They were fortunate in finding four small rowing boats moored near
the end of the mole, and the whole party managed to embark with-
out loss of a single man. They rowed some little distance out to sea.

Then the dark outline of a ship loomed up close ahead. There was
a hail in English.

“We're British!’ was the reply.

‘All right. Come on board!’

They had encountered .a British destroyer which was searching
the seas round Crete for the enemy invasion fleet.

m6 ]«
The Balance

WHEN, in the light of the information available, the German Com-
mand reviewed the situation at the end of the first day there could
have been little cause for satisfaction. It must have become clear
that a bad miscalculation had been made regarding the strength of
the Anglo-Greek forces in Crete; so far from having to deal with

208 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

some 5,000 British troops there were about five times that number
from Britain and the Dominions, besides the Greeks who amounted
to 11,000. Against these the Germans had landed some 8,000 men.

At Heraklion they had launched 2,000 of whom half were already
lost. Some of the attackers had got into the town; others were very
much on the defensive in buildings to the south of the airfield ;
another detachment was established further to the east. The airfield
itself had not been captured.

At Retimo, 1,200 men had been dropped and about half had
become casualties. The remainder was separated into a eastern and
western detachment, with almost the entire garrison of Australians
and Greeks between them; and although the eastern force was still
in a position to threaten the airfield it could scarcely be claimed that
it held the initiative.

At Canea about 2,000 had been put down, but severe losses had
been suffered and the attack on the town had failed. Only to the
south-west along the Alikianou road (Prison Valley) was there any
considerable force in being.

At Maleme rather more than 2,000 troops had been dropped, and
here again losses were severe. The invaders had forced us off the
airfield and controlled the western fringe themselves while our troops
remained near to the eastern edge. The field itself was therefore a
no-man’s-land effectively held by neither side. It was not yet true to
say that Maleme was ‘taken’.

One may say that the German sacrifices—and in men and aircraft
they were considerable—on the first day had gained certain oppor-
tunities rather than solid advantages.

The scale of losses was of course not yet known to the German
Corps Command back in Athens. The first reports, following the
morning air landings around Maleme and Canea, gave reason to
suppose that all was going well and according to plan. Then, in the
early afternoon, information was received that the attack upon Canea
had been discontinued after heavy losses had been suffered: and
about this time the news of the fatal accident to General Siissmann
was reported.

Later came information from Group West describing heavy fight-
ing and the wounding of General Meindl. Towards evening came a
report, unconfirmed and as it happened inaccurate, that Maleme
airfield had been captured.

No news had been received from Retimo since the attackers had
found it impossible to establish any wireless communication. From
Heraklion came news ofheavy fighting to theeast of the airfield. List and
Student must have realized that days of more heavy fighting lay ahead.

THE FIRST DAY 209

It is unlikely that any serious consideration was given to the
possibility of calling off the whole operation. In practice, there was
no choice. The Germans were deeply committed, and to cut their
losses meant writing off the picked troops who had been landed on
the island that day. Nor was it the German method to throw in a
hand so easily. More troops must be fed into the battle—therefore
the decision was taken to commit the Sth Mountain Division in full.
The seaborne support troops and weapons must be forthcoming on the
following day, although no port had yet been won at which they
could be landed. The ferrying of troops by air must continue—there-
fore every effort must be made to obtain quick possession of at least
one airfield. Only at Maleme was there a possibility of obtaining an
early grip—therefore the success already won there must be rein-
forced to the full. And meanwhile until an airfield could be effec-
tively occupied, transport aircraft must be crash-landed wherever
the nature of the ground allowed, and those troops who were estab-
lished in reasonable strength in open country must set to work to
prepare landing-strips.

Fresh forces had to be found at once to maintain the offensive at
Maleme. Consideration was given to a proposal to evacuate the
troops from Retimo and land them in the neighbourhood of Maleme;
but it was realized that this could not be achieved with any speed,
and the plan was abandoned. But two companies were available
which should have landed on the west side of Heraklion during the
previous afternoon, but had been kept back owing to the lateness of
the hour. These could now be employed at Maleme, and the whole
of the Sth Mountain Division (the ‘follow-up’ division) would now
be landed there as well. That part of it which was to have gone by
sea to Heraklion would now be diverted towards Maleme and
Canea.

If the German Command was considerably dashed by the result
of the first day’s fighting, it cannot be pretended that the picture
from our side was reassuring. The scale of the attack though not
exceeding the expectations of the defenders on the island was greater
than had been anticipated by the Middle East Command as is frankly
admitted in General Wavell’s despatch. Nevertheless, the result of
the day’s fighting was on the whole encouraging, since nowhere save
at Maleme were the enemy achievements such as to cause undue
disquiet. General Freyberg reported to Wavell that night:

The day has been a hard one. We have been hard pressed. So far
I think we hold Maleme, Heraklion and Retimo aerodromes and the
two harbours. The margin by which we hold them is a bare one, and
it would be wrong of me to paint an optimistic picture.

210 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

He added that communications were ‘most difficult’. There was a
shortage of supplies, particularly ammunition, in some sectors, and
these could only be brought up henceforth by night and under an
armed guard in view of the possibility of convoys being attacked by
roaming bands of Germans.

An attempt was made, without delay, to satisfy Freyberg’s request
for more ammunition. This would have to be landed at Suda, and
the only solution was to ask the Royal Navy for a warship which
could make the trip and unload during the hours of darkness. Two
destroyers were promised, to take fifty tons of ammunition between
them on the following night.

The problems of transport and communication could not be solved.
Had they been we might have held Crete longer and parted with it
at a greater price. With inadequate wireless equipment, telephone
lines destroyed by bomb attack or cut by enemy paratroopers, and
no kind of vehicle which could be spared to carry a message, all that
remained was the runner. The ingenuity of modern offensive war had
reduced us to employing the methods of Pheidippides, who ran a
hundred and fifty miles to carry the news of the battle of Marathon
from Athens to Sparta. And so runners, or an occasional motor-
cycle despatch-rider, carried the bulk of the messages between the
four sectors and between units in the same sectors. The impossibility
of maintaining effective and punctual contact under such circum-
stances is apparent from a single example. On one occasion a runner
was sent with a message from Retimo to Suda Bay. The distance was
45 miles. The messenger had to run the gauntlet of spasmodic fight-
ing on the road, had to pass twice through enemy positions, wriggling
through bushes on his stomach and sniped at if he dared to raise his
head. He got through in the end. But it took him—just six days

The communiqué issued on the afternoon of May 20th by G.H.Q.,
Middle East ran as follows:

Early this morning German parachutists and airborne troops made

an attempt to secure a footing on the island of Crete. A number have
already been accounted for.

The communiqué of May 21st dealing with the fighting of the
later part of the previous day, read:

Throughout yesterday Crete was subjected to a series of intensive
air attacks, in the intervals of which fresh waves of German parachute
airborne troops were landed at various points.

Heavy fighting continued throughout the day, in which the enemy
sustained serious losses, while ours were comparatively light. At one
point a German detachment which succeeded in penetrating into the
the outskirts of Canea was quickly surrounded and accounted for.
Operations are continuing.

CHAPTER III

Royal Escape

MEANWHILE, as the battle swayed backwards and forwards around
Maleme and Canea, outside Retimo and Heraklion, the day had
witnessed the beginning of one of the most sensational and dramatic
episodes of the war.

King George II of the Hellenes was regarded by the Germans as
their chief enemy in Greece. They affected the view that his blind
Anglophile prejudice had caused him to urge his country into con-
flict with the Axis (oblivious of the fact that it was Greece which had
been wantonly attacked by Italy and Germany in turn) and that he
was therefore the symbol of an obscurantist refusal to accept the
blessings of the ‘New Order’. He’had been singled out by Hitler for
special denunciation in the latter’s speech on May 4th after the con-
clusion of the campaign in Greece.

On April 22nd King George had withdrawn with his Government
to Crete and had there issued a proclamation announcing his deter-
mination to fight to the finish. It would therefore be not altogether
surprising if an enemy airborne operation should aim at seizing the
person of the King as a valuable hostage and as a sign that the long
arm of Hitler could pluck even monarchs from under the protection
of the British.

This danger had been fully realized, and plans had been made for
an overland evacuation of the King and his entourage, if the situa-
tion seemed to demand it. According to the scheme worked out by
Colonel J. S. Blunt, British military attaché in Greece, with the
approval of Force Headquarters, the Royal party would move from
the house where the King was then living near the village of Perivolia,
a couple of miles from Canea, up across the central mountains and
thence down to the village of Ayla Roumeli on the south coast, where
a destroyer would be in readiness, two days after the start of the
march, to convey the party to Egypt.

1See Map 8.
211

212 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

It was on the morning of May 19th, following the customary
bomber raid, that the King decided that it would be advisable to-
move from his own house, which lay more or less directly under the
route of the dive-bombers, to that of his Prime Minister, M. Tsuderos,
which was a mile or so further south and close to the foothills. Here,
besides being less exposed to attacks, he would be better placed for
assuring the retreat into the mountains, should the necessity arise.
Accordingly, the move was made—very fortunately, as it turned
out—that same afternoon.

Next morning, following the customary air bombardment, the
gliders and troop-carriers could be seen flying serenely overhead.
The imminence of a large-scale airborne attack was obvious, and
even before the parachutists appeared Colonel Blunt had made his pre-
liminary arrangements for the party to move towards the mountains.

Standing in the garden outside the Prime Minister’s house, the
King and his attendants were able to watch the parachutes open and
the little dabs of silk, white, green and red, float down towards the
earth. A landing in strength was being made around Perivolia, and
between 150 and 200 men descended on every side of the villa so
lately occupied by the King of the Hellenes. On the face of it, it
seemed reasonable to assume that the Germans were accurately
informed of the whereabouts of the Sovereign and that this particular
party had received definite instructions to kill or capture him.’ -

Colonel Blunt accordingly ordered that, in view of the scale of the
attack and its propinquity to the King’s person (the nearest para-
chutists were less than half a mile away), the party should make a
prompt withdrawal from the neighbourhood of Perivolia. It was so
important to keep the King out of German hands that in view of
the form which the attack had taken, the only course was to move with-
out delay right out of the battle area up into the central mountains.

For assuring the protection of the King one platoon of New
Zealanders, from the 18th Battalion, under 2nd Lieut. W. H. Ryan
had been provided by Force Headquarters; counting a number of
Greek gendarmes, the whole party totalled less than forty. With the
King was his cousin, Prince Peter, Colonel Levidis (Master of Cere-
monies), M. Tsuderos, M. Varvaressos (Governor of the Bank of
Greece) and one or two servants. By 9.30 a.m. the party had begun

1 This was not the case. The parachutists who landed around Perivolia were a
company of the 3rd Battalion, No. 3 Parachute Rifle Regiment who should have
been dropped in the neighbourhood of Galatas. They had no knowledge of the
whereabouts of the King. Nevertheless, had he remained in his own house on the
night of May 19th/20th he might well have been either killed or captured, next
morning.

ROYAL ESCAPE 213

to move off through the foothills towards the high mountains that
form the backbone of the island.

Almost at the start they ran into danger, for a dozen parachutists
dropped very close to them but were driven off by the fire of Ryan’s
New Zealanders. A little later three groups of parachutists landed
within a few hundred yards of the Royal party, but apparently they _
failed to see it, for they at once moved off from the foothills in the
direction of the plain.

Again and again, however, the King and his escort had to drop
flat on their faces among the rocks as hostile aircraft droned over-
head. At times these came so low that the watchers on the ground
could actually see the faces of the pilots. Since the King was wearing
the uniform of a Greek general, covered with gold braid and medal
ribbons, he was lucky not to have attracted any particular attention,
and at length Ryan was constrained to request him to take his tunic
off, for fear that some more observant German pilot should draw
the correct conclusions regarding the identity of the party.

Actually the danger was greater from Greeks than from Germans.
On that confused and hectic morning they were more than once
fired at by a party of Cretans who had observed their progress up
the mountain slopes.

‘Can’t you see we are Greeks?’ called out Prince Peter.

‘Germans also speak Greek and wear- Greek uniforms’, was the
damnably logical reply ; and the firing continued for some minutes
longer before the men on the ridge above were finally reassured.

After five hours climbing the party reached a cave on the mountain
side where it was possible to rest in safety and eat a meal from the
rations which the troops carried. A number of mules were obtained
here. After arranging for the King and his escort to continue on up
into the hills, Colonel Blunt moved off down into the plain with a
section of Ryan’s New Zealand platoon to make contact with the
nearest Allied formation and find out how the battle was going. At
Mournies he met the New Zealand liaison officer of the Greek
battalion holding the village and heard the story of the first few
hours of fighting in the neighbourhood. He learned that there were
Germans in strength between Mournies and Canea and that there
was no prospect of getting through to Force Headquarters. A patrol
which he had sent back to Perivolia to secure certain papers left
behind by M. Tsuderos and certain valuables belonging to the King
(including the insignia of the Order of the Garter) reported the
Prime Minister’s house occupied by the Germans. Colonel Blunt
accordingly made his way back with his escort and rejoined the Royal
party in the mountains.

214 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

That night, the King and his escort, going on ahead, reached the
village of Therisson at the head of a mountain glen. It was almost
deserted because all the able-bodied inhabitants had already set off
for the valley to fight the invader. Though they had been climbing
all day, so steep had been the mountain and so slow their progress
that they were scarcely more than eight miles, as the crow flies, from
Canea.

The headman of the village, who was far too old to fight, received
the party in his house and provided them with a meal of bread,
cheese and red wine. While they were settling down to sleep on the
stone floor they heard a clamour of voices and then a heavy knock-
ing at the door. Supposing that they had been tracked to this moun-
tain fastness, they sprang up only to find a body of uncouth-looking
Greeks on the threshold. They wore striped prison garb.

They were convicts from the prison on the Alikianou road in the
valley below. The Germans had dropped around the building early
in the day, occupied it, freed the prisoners, and were now setting up
a military hospital in the building.

Gratitude, however, for this unexpected release in no way over-
came patriotism. The freed convicts took the first opportunity to
make off to the hills where they hoped to find arms. And many of
them afterwards fought bravely against their ‘liberators’.

Next morning the Royal party woke to a clear view of the battle-
field below. The red earth of the coastal plain and the fields of ripen-
ing corn were flecked and spattered with innumerable parachutes—
white like patches of snow, sometimes red like patches of blood. Here
and there the carcasses of disabled troop carriers could be seen, but
there were more troop carriers moving in to dump their loads, and
enemy bombers and fighters roamed at will the skies above the battle.

Colonel Blunt in the course of the previous evening had at last
succeeded in getting through from the local telephone exchange to
the senior naval officer at Suda Bay. The latter advised the party to
continue across the island to the southern coast. It was estimated
that the journey would take a further two days to accomplish, and
he undertook to do his best to ensure evacuation on the night of
Thursday, May 22nd.

The party resumed their climb. It proved less eventful than that
of the previous day, but certainly no less tiring. By nightfall they were
over 7,000 feet up and close to the crest of the central mountain ridge
and were compelled to sleep out in the bitter cold. They cleared the .
snow that was still lying on these upper ridges, lit a fire and roasted
a lean mountain sheep over the flames. The only shelter they were
able to obtain during the night was by squeezing down among the

ROYAL ESCAPE 215

rocks in the crevices of a mountain gulley. Some managed to sleep
in this manner; others found it warmer to sit huddled around the
fire all night. The New Zealanders, who had come from the heat of
the coastal plain, had neither greatcoats nor blankets and were clad
in regulation summer kit of thin shirts and shorts.

Next morning, awakened before dawn by the sound of naval gun-
fire from the north where Admiral Cunningham’s Mediterranean
Fleet was dealing faithfully with the enemy attempt at a seaborne
invasion, they continued southwards. They were now beyond the
crest of the mountain ridge and descending towards the sea, but the
going was no easier, for they had to abandon the mules at an early
stage, since even these animals were unable to keep their feet on the
precipitous, rocky slopes. There was much actual climbing to be
done in the course of this day, and the boots of almost everyone in
the party were torn and ripped on the sharp crags. The novelty of
the adventure had certainly worn off by this time, and everyone was
feeling the effects of the past two strenuous days.

Early in the day Colonel Blunt found it advisable to divide the
party into a fast-moving and a slow-moving group. The former con-
sisted of the King, Prince Peter, members of the Royal Household
and the troops, with whom was Colonel Blunt himself. The latter
was composed chiefly of the civilian Ministers and the gendarmes.

M. Tsuderos subsequently said:

During the whole of this fatiguing and heart-breaking march the
King did not for the moment lose his smile. With a majestic simplicity
he shared with us all dangers, all privations, all hardships. He slept
for a few hours on the cold ground, and shared with us the scant food
and snow which the peasants used to bring to sustain us and quench
our thirst in the absence of water.

Colonel Blunt’s tribute was equally emphatic.

The bearing of everybody from His Majesty downwards was all that
one could desire. His Majesty treated it like an outing and seemed
bored at having to take cover from the planes.

With blistered, bleeding feet and tattered buots the party limped
into the village of Samaria in the foothills, about half a dozen miles
from the sea, in the early afternoon. They were regarded at first with
suspicion and hostility by the villagers, who had heard stories of
parachutists and were not at first reassured when the King spoke to
them in Greek. However, the fugitives eventually succeeded in
establishing their identity and were hospitably received. While
they were resting, a Cretan messenger arrived. He carried a note
from Major-General Heywood, who had been chief military repre-
sentative of the British Inter-Service Mission to Greece. It stated

216 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

that the General was at the rendezvous at the coastal village of Ayla
Roumeli a few miles away. The King’s party accordingly resumed
their tramp. They had now to pass down a narrow, boulder-
strewn gorge through which a stream ran to the sea, and for hun-
dreds of yards at a time the way ran through the bed of the stream
itself. A short time before they reached the coast a German air patrol
passed overhead. It was a reminder that they were not yet wholly
out of danger, but the aircraft were flying far too high to notice them.

General Heywood had left Canea the previous day and had done
the last part of the journey by means of a small motor-boat. With
him was Sir Michael Palairet, British Minister of Athens, Lady
Palairet, Admiral Turle, British naval attaché and head of the Inter-
Service Mission, and Mr. Harold Caccia, First Secretary at the
British Legation. They had learned of the general direction taken by
the King’s party and had moved along the coast in the hope of
meeting him.

After a meal cooked by Lady Palairet, one of the party went down
to the seashore and for some hours continued to send S.O.S. signals
on the chance that they might be picked up by a friendly ship. Since
the King’s intention was known at Force Headquarters it was a
reasonable assumption that some vessel of the Royal Navy would
be patrolling the south-west coast of the island on the look-out for
such a signal.

Not until 1 a.m. was there any reply, and then an answering flash
was noted some miles out to sea. But the ship seemed reluctant to
come in closer. During the evacuation from Greece the Germans
had made use of S.O.S. signals to lure our warships into shore and
then opened fire on them.

Eventually Admiral Turle and Mr. Caccia found a way out of the
impasse. They volunteered to go out alone in the fishing boat to
discover if the ship were indeed friendly.

It was a full hour before the watchers on the shore heard the throb
of the engine once more and saw the fishing-boat loom out of the
darkness.

‘Our luck holds,’ called a voice. ‘It is H.M.S. Decoy.’

The party was speedily ferried out to the British warship, which
sailed promptly to Egypt, setting them on shore late that night at
Alexandria.

1 The facts concerning the King’s escape and journey across Crete are compiled
from information supplied to the author by M. Tsuderos and Colonel Blunt at
Alexandria immediately after their arrival.

CHAPTER IV

The Days of Decision

»{[1 ]+«

Focus on Maleme

A REPORT received in the early morning of May 21st that the
Germans had landed from the sea under cover of night near No. 7
General Hospital was soon discovered by New Zealand patrols to
be false.

Dawn had brought the customary, the inevitable German air
attack, searching, though not very successfully, for our gun positions.
Then, a little after 9 a.m., over came the troop carriers. It was a matter
of sombre interest to the defenders to note whether the enemy were
in a position to repeat the parachutist attack on the same scale as on
the previous day. About sixty transport aircraft appeared, and these
dropped something in the neighbourhood of 500 paratroops on to
the positions already held by the enemy west of Maleme airfield.

Already yesterday’s arrivals had renewed their attack against the
airfield and against Hill 107, a mile to the south. Throughout the
morning a ding-dong fire-fight continued across that bare open
square mile; but with the help of their aircraft which, as so often
before, played the part of a mobile artillery, the enemy was able to
edge the defenders back.

The 250 men who were all that remained of the 22nd New Zealand
Battalion were now divided between the 21st and 23rd Battalions,
Colonel Andrew being charged with the task of co-ordinating the
defence of Maleme and preventing the Germans from getting control
of the airfield.

Then the troop carriers began to appear again.

At first they seemed content to effect crash-landings on the beaches
or on the relatively safe bed of the Tavronitis. Then the defenders
1 See Map 9.

H 217

218 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

near the eastern fringe looking skywards saw the heavy and cumber-
some JU 52’s circling slowly over the airfield itself.

The airfield was still directly under fire from every weapon the New
Zealanders could bring to bear—field guns, mortars, machine-guns
and small arms.

It could be nothing but a death-trap for Nazi planes attempting to
land there. Nothing could live in that hell of fire. No man but a mad-
man would send aircraft to destruction there. No man but a madman
would obey an order to pilot an aircraft on to that steel-raked field.

That was the first reaction of the men on the ground. But the
aircraft were circling overhead; and then they swooped down.

It seemed suicidal madness, ‘and for the first men who landed in
this manner it certainly was no less. The New Zealanders—nearly
all the Sth Brigade was engaged by this time—were throwing all the
metal they could at the enemy arriving overhead. It seemed to be
‘money for old rope’ to the men at the guns.

Then the thing that couldn’t occurred. One of the troop carriers
touched down, rolled to a stop, unloaded its men and their equipment,
lifted, and flew off again. It was down and away within seventy
seconds. ... The dark line of aircraft still streamed in from the Aegean.
It seemed endless. And presently a second plane made a landing and got
away, then a third, then a fourth. More and more. Madness that
counted not at all the cost in men’s lives and shattered planes.+

Yet perhaps it was not really such madness. We had only eight
guns available for firing on the airfield, and though contemporary
reports, made in undoubted good faith, spoke of one after another
of the troop carriers bursting into flames in the air or being shot to
pieces by field guns and mortars before they had run to a halt, a
sober examination of the facts does not support these stories. One
reliable observer—the commander of a troop of artillery which was
firing on Maleme—has stated that he did not see a single aircraft
hit on the airfield before it came to a halt, though his troop certainly
set some stationary planes on fire and caused losses to the men dis-
embarking from the machines.

But our guns were firing mostly with makeshift sights (in the case
of one troop these were improvised from slivers of wood stuck on
with chewing gum); not all of them were well emplaced for bringing
direct fire to bear upon the airfield; there was repeated interruption
from enemy fighters overhead; and by this time the spectre of an
ammunition shortage was beginning to haunt the gunners, for a
number of ammunition dumps had been destroyed by the hostile
bombers.

1 This and the above passage are taken from the description given by Hethering-
ton in Airborne Invasion, pp. 104-105.

THE DAYS OF DECISION 219

The German Command, having made its decision to fling in the
Sth Mountain Division at Maleme, was obviously prepared to accept
losses on a formidable scale in order that these fresh troops might
do what the parachutists had manifestly failed to do and secure the
use of an airfield without delay. And that was why our persistent
fire, though it caused the enemy heavy losses, particularly at the
start, could not stop the landing of the troop carriers.

As more and more troops arrived in this manner the balance of
fire-power began to tilt towards the enemy. Each aircraft was
carrying up to forty men; the new-comers arrived fully armed and
ready for instant action. They went quickly to ground, and began to
put up a formidable small-arms fire. And as the afternoon lengthened
the tempo of the arrivals quickened. By the end of the day enough
German aircraft had touched down in the Maleme area (including
the beaches and the Tavronitis bed) to bring in a considerable part
of the Sth Mountain Division. How many of these hardy mountaineers
had survived the experience is another question.

The landing of the troop carriers was accompanied throughout
the day by a very heavy concentration of German fighter aircraft
against our forward and rear positions—though in these conditions
‘rear positions’ is a misnomer when the defence of an area is con-
cerned—and in particular against the routes of approach to the
Sth New Zealand Brigade. It was clearly the German objective to
seal off the battle area and prevent movement of any sort to or from
it. For this reason the ground further east suffered as heavily during
the day from low-flying attacks by Messerschmitts as did the troops
near the airfield; and movement along the roads became a practical
impossibility.

Believing that the bulk of the New Zealand forces had been drawn
into the battle around Maleme, it seems that General Student deter-
mined to employ against the New Zealand communications the two
parachute companies whose flight to Heraklion on the previous day
had been cancelled owing to the lateness of the hour. These com-
panies would be dropped along the supposedly open stretch of coast
from Pirgos to Platanias and attack the Sth New Zealand Brigade
near Maleme from the east, while the Assault Regiment on the airfield
attacked simultaneously from the west. But once again German
information was inaccurate. The two companies, who were dropped
in the course of the afternoon, jumped straight into the positions
held by New Zealand support troops or in full view of them. The
majority had no chance of getting near their weapon containers and
were speedily ‘mopped up’. About eighty survivors fought their way
west towards Pirgos and managed to establish themselves at a farm

220 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

near the beach. Here and there over the area isolated groups collected
fot defence as night fell, but, viewed as an important offensive effort,
the drop had failed completely. ;

Some Germans landed among the ‘inmates’ of the Sth New
Zealand Brigade Punishment Centre, who gave them short shrift.

By this time our troops had captured a number of the coloured
strips employed by the Germans to signal to their aircraft for supplies,
as well as the code which was conveyed by a series of simple dia-
grams. They used these lucky finds to signal for supplies to the hostile
aircraft overhead, and were rewarded by getting exactly what they
asked for. Assuredly, the value of the parachutists was now proving
subject to that ‘law of diminishing returns’ which seems inseparable
from the employment of any novel weapon or novel method of
warfare. On this, the second day of the battle, they were auxiliaries
only and no longer the decisive arm.

The German Command had shown their recognition of the poten-
tially decisive importance of Maleme by the heavy scale of their
reinforcement there during this second day of the battle and by
their comparative neglect of other sectors. Now to Freyberg came
the realization that the clock was about to strike the vital hour; and
the gravity of the situation and the odds arrayed against him called
out the best of a man who had faced so many difficult and hazardous
tasks. He knew that if the Germans were granted another day for
the landing of troop-carrying aircraft on Maleme airfield they would
have built up such strength that successful counter-attack would be
impossible and the defence must progressively collapse. He knew
that with the enemy in total and dominating control of the air above
the battlefield by day the only time for a successful attack by our
troops was the night. And it must be that night.

It must be that night ; and it would demand every man, vehicle and
gun that could be concentrated for the attack. But Freyberg knew
that they might not be enough or that it might not be possible to
concentrate sufficient strength in time.

All this Freyberg knew. He knew, also, that a seaborne landing
was to be made—or at least attempted—that evening, and there
could be no certainty that the Navy would intercept it.

The plan, as determined by General Freyberg after conferring
with Brigadier Puttick, envisaged a counter-attack to retake Maleme
airfield and the higher ground overlooking it, beginning with a night
march to the points of concentration and developing with an assault
launched just before the dawn of Thursday, May 22nd.

The whole of the 5th New Zealand Brigade would ultimately be
committed. The three battalions, 21st, 22nd and 23rd, had been in

THE DAYS OF DECISION 221

action against the paratroops for two days, and the 22nd Battalion,
in particular, which had borne the brunt of the fighting at Maleme
on the first day, was, as we know, very much reduced in numbers
and excessively tired. To lead the assault there would be available
the 28th (Maori) Battalion, which had so far not been very heavily
engaged, and the 20th Battalion, brought under the command of
the 5th Brigade for this operation. Both were at present in technically
rear areas which covered the coast line between Platanias and Canea.
But since to move them up into position would leave an undefended
gap along the coast which might be exploited by paratroops or by
a seaborne landing, it was decided that the 2/7th Australian Battalion,
which formed part of Brigadier Vasey’s force watching the unassailed
Georgeopolis Bay, should be moved across in motor transport to
take over from the 20th New Zealand Battalion; and the latter was
instructed not to begin its move forward until the Australians arrived.
This was planned to occur at about 10 p.m.

There was another and more compelling reason for the delay, in
that it would be necessary for the New Zealand Battalion to take over
the transport vehicles from the Australians, since the first part of
their move forward would be made in lorries along the main coastal
road. They did not possess sufficient transport of their own. Other-
wise Freyberg might have been prepared to risk leaving uncovered
the coastal stretch between Platanias and Canea.

While the 20th New Zealand Battalion would advance along the
coast road, with Pirgos, something over a mile short of the airfield,
as its first objective, the Maoris would advance along a route parallel
and to the south of the 20th to gain the high ground overlooking the
objectives from the south. It was hoped that the two battalions
would be able to take up positions from which the airfield could be
brought under mortar and machine-gun fire. Then the final assault
would go in.

The approach march from the Platanias area was to begin at
1 a.m. and the attack from the forward positions at Pirgos and to
the south would open at 4 a.m. A troop of the 3rd Hussars, with its
light tanks, was to lead the advance along the coast road. No ‘I’
tanks were available, but it appeared that the Germans lacked
adequate anti-tank weapons.

Further support would be forthcoming from the R.A.F. operating
from Egypt. They undertook to bomb the Maleme area from mid-
night onwards.

The supreme importance of the occasion was fully appreciated.
All that planning could do had been done. The rest was in the lap
of the gods.

222 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

Eastward, a few short miles away, the fighting on this second day
of battle brought no great change to our fortunes round Canea and
Suda.

As we have seen, the enemy was strongest in the Prison Valley
south-west of Canea. Although the attack by the 19th New Zealand
Battalion, which had started on the previous evening, had been
called off, later in the morning a single company drove the Germans
from Cemetery Hill, a position from which they could have enfiladed
our troops further north towards Galatas and denied us artillery
observation over their own concentration area.

Heidrich, who had now concentrated something like two battalions
in the meadowland below, was apprehensive of an attack in force
from our side, but Cemetery Hill being bare and exposed proved just
as untenable by us and we were unable to exploit the advantage which
its occupation had given us.

And so the ding-dong fighting went on in the restricted area
between Galatas and the prison. The Germans continued to attack
from the air, and their troops made an unavailing attempt to seize
Cemetery Hill again. They were driven back by fire. During the day
ammunition and supplies in very considerable quantities were dropped
to them by air.

Elsewhere little change took place in the situation. There was,
of course, little respite from the attacks of the German bombers and
fighters. The Northumberland Hussars and a detachment of the
Welch Regiment continued with the ‘mopping up’ of the Germans
who had survived the ill-fated airborne landings on the Akrotiri
peninsula. Canea itself was strengthened during the day by the
arrival of the 2/8th Australian Battalion (400 men) from Georgeopolis
and about 200 Australian gunners (from the 2/2nd Field Regiment)
armed as infantry.

By the end of the day, though the enemy had gained no further
ground, he had consolidated his position and strengthened his fire-
power in the Prison Valley, while his constant air attacks and the
presence of numerous snipers within our lines continued to disrupt
our communications. Moreover, the supply of small arms ammuni-
tion was running short among certain of our units, and the troops
were showing ominous signs of fatigue.

On the evening of May 21st, the Headquarters of the XI Air
Corps, following from Athens the development of the battle, reached
the conclusion that the crisis of the attack upon Crete had been
successfully surmounted. As the result of the day’s fighting at
Maleme, it was felt that the situation at the airfield was reasonably

THE DAYS OF DECISION 223

secure, for the landing of the troop-carriers had been effective,
though entailing serious losses. It seemed to the German Command
that our power to launch a counter-offensive here was exhausted.
The New Zealanders had been repulsed when they attempted local
counter-attacks ; air reconnaissance reports of an advance in strength
from the south, which at first caused some alarm, had proved to be
groundless; and it was now clear that we had no forces in the
Kastelli neighbourhood—that is in the extreme north-west of the
island—which could deliver an attack from the west. Major-General
Ringel, who now took over Group West at Maleme, hoped to be in
a position to advance against Canea on the following day. Gradually
the whole of the 5th Mountain Division would be fed into his sector,
while the invaders at Retimo and Heraklion concentrated upon
keeping the maximum number of our troops engaged and denying
us the use of the airfields at those places.

And that night the invasion fleet, carrying the heavy supporting
arms, motor transport, and two battalions of Ringel’s 5th Mountain
Division would arrive off shore.

om [2 ]+e
Sea Venture

Ir is the measure of the German failure during the first two days
that, with the exception of Maleme, not one of the points that were
to have been in their hands before the arrival of their sea expedition
had yet been taken. They had not secured Canea—much less Suda,
or Retimo and its airfield, or Heraklion and its airfield. The ships
due to sail for Heraklion had been counter-ordered, and those
destined for Maleme had had their departure twice postponed. But
now their purpose was to put ashore the troops and arms as near
Maleme as possible and if necessary to force a landing.

Our Mediterranean Fleet had been ready since May 15th for such
an attempt. On May 20th the ships were widely deployed, screening
the island from invasion by sea. The battleships Warspite and
Valiant accompanied by six destroyers (Rear-Admiral H. B. Rawlings)
were to the west of Crete to guard against the unlikely event of the
reappearance of the Italian fleet.1 The cruisers Dido, Ajax and Orion,
with the destroyers Isis, Kimberley, Imperial and Janus (Rear-
Admiral I. G. S. Glennie wearing his flag in the Dido) were to patrol

1 A renewed attempt had been made by the Germans on May 20th to persuade

the Italian fleet to put to sea in order to draw off the British warships from Crete.
It failed owing to the stubborn, and realistic, refusal of the authorities in Rome.

224 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

the western half of Crete’s north coast by night, with particular
attention to Maleme-Canea-Suda. A third force, consisting of the
cruisers Naiad and Perth, with the destroyers Kandahar, Nubian,
Kingston and Juno (Rear-Admiral E. L. S. King wearing his flag in
the Naiad) would simultaneously sweep the eastern half of the north
coast, with particular attention to Heraklion.

These night sweeps were duly carried out, but apart from a few
Italian motor-boats to the north-east of the island no hostile craft
were observed. Meanwhile the destroyers Jervis, Nizam and Ilex
bombarded the Italian aerodrome on Scarpanto in the Dodecanese
with some success.

So far so good. But the perils to which the fleet would be exposed
became only too apparent on the following day. Our ships were
patrolling close to the enemy forward air bases and possessed no
fighter protection of their own. Throughout May 21st they were
attacked by German bombers, both of the dive-bomber and high
level variety. These had the definite objective of sinking so many ships
that the remainder would be compelled to withdraw in order to
escape destruction, leaving the way clear for the German seaborne
invasion. On May 21st, however, the enemy aircraft failed con-
spicuously in this task.

Over came the bombers again and again, while the ships below them
zigzagged continually to avoid being hit and thundered back at the
aircraft without pause. It was a grim experience, this trailing of the
coat in front of the German Bomber Command, and to the men in
the ships the long hours of daylight seemed interminable. All three
squadrons were spotted by German reconnaissance planes and were
bombed repeatedly, but the losses were far lighter on this day than
might have been expected. Juno was hit soon after noon by a whole
stick of bombs and quickly sank, and Ajax was damaged by near
misses. But the fleet kept the sea unperturbed, and before nightfall
the bombers were compelled to desist. The German invasion ships
would have to take their chance, with the British Mediterranean
Fleet still at sea very much on the alert to intercept them; and with
land patrols covering the beaches round Suda, where searchlights
and coastal guns were waiting in readiness to play their part in
repelling the attack.

It was shortly before midnight that Admiral Glennie’s force!
picked up the first of the invasion convoys, consisting of small
steamers and caiques, escorted by an Italian torpedo-boat, about
eighteen miles north of Canea. Once the searchlights had illuminated
them the rest was almost child’s play. The boot was on the other

1 Destroyers Hasty and Hereward had now relieved Isis and Imperial.

THE DAYS OF DECISION 225

foot now, and our ships were able to do much more than repay all
they had suffered from the bombing during the day. The torpedo
boat was heavily hit but not sunk, and then the British destroyers
thrust grimly in among the light craft and destroyed many of them.
Some were rammed, others sunk by gunfire. In the restrained words
of the Admiral, our ships ‘conducted themselves with energy and zest’.

About 8.30 next morning a further section of the invasion fleet
was encountered by Naiad and Perth with their attendant destroyers,
now joined by the anti-aircraft cruisers Calcutta and Carlisle and
the cruisers Fiji and Gloucester. Admiral King’s powerful squadron
promptly engaged the first ships visible. A caique was sunk, then a
small merchant vessel. An enemy torpedo-boat was sighted and
engaged, hits being scored on her; she then withdrew behind a
smoke-screen which also helped to conceal a large number of
caiques which were under her escort.

The enemy force was withdrawing rapidly northward in the
direction of Milos, and under other circumstances would have been
easy game for our ships. But in view of the fact that his anti-
aircraft ammunition was already beginning to run low, and remem-
bering his experience of the previous day, Admiral King decided
against pursuing the destroyers and light craft of the invasion fleet
any further northward.

Contact was therefore broken off, and the enemy force was enabled
to withdraw in the direction of the ports from which it had emerged
a few hours earlier. Nevertheless, these two actions did in fact prac-
tically mark the end of the danger of attack from the sea. Estimates
of the number of trained mountain troops drowned or killed vary
between two and four thousand. A few survivors, almost demented
by their ordeal, eventually stumbled ashore near Canea. A large
number were washed ashore dead during the next few days.

Yet our fleet had to remain at sea, for more enemy craft were
known to be available for a further attempt. And it was during this
day, May 22nd, that it suffered its most severe losses from bombing
attacks, losses which exercised a great influence upon the course of
the battle for Crete.

Admiral King’s force of cruisers and destroyers, after dispersing
the second portion of the German invasion fleet, was within easy
reach of the German dive-bomber bases. At 10 a.m., on May 22nd,

1 According to a German account only a small portion of the flotilla was caught
and destroyed. This Luftwaffe report adds: ‘To avoid the risk of a similar fate
overtaking the 2nd Motor Sailing Flotilla, then on its way to Crete, the admiral
commanding South-Eastern Area ordered its immediate return to Piraeus, and
the problem of supplying heavy arms and reinforcements by sea therefore
remained unsolved.’

H®

226 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

while, as will presently be seen, the land battle was swinging his way
at Maleme, the enemy’s aircraft resumed their attack upon our ships.
Wednesday had been a supremely hazardous but under the circum-
stances not a costly day for the Mediterranean Fleet. They could
scarcely hope to expect such good fortune a second time. The
destroyer Greyhound was sunk early in the afternoon in the strait
between Crete and Kithira. The cruiser Gloucester was hit and sunk
in the same neighbourhood; and very late in the afternoon the
cruiser Fiji, which had survived some twenty bombing attacks in
the course of four hours, fell a victim to a single aircraft which
swooped suddenly out of the clouds. Luckily, most of the crew were
saved. Warspite, Valiant and Carlisle were also hit during the day,
and Naiad was seriously damaged.

At 10.30 that night Admiral Cunningham received a signal from
the commander of the Seventh Cruiser Squadron, from which it
appeared, owing to a calligraphic error, that the battleships of the
main force at sea had no pom-pom ammunition left. In fact they had
plenty. Acting on this misinformation, however, Cunningham issued
the order at four o’clock next morning, that all naval forces should
withdraw forthwith to Alexandria."

With the daylight the dive-bombers returned, and at about eight
o’clock in the morning (May 23rd) the destroyers Kelly and Kashmir,
which had arrived as part of a destroyer flotilla from Malta to join
in the hunt, were hit and speedily sank. The remainder of the fleet
continued its withdrawal. In the course of three days since the battle
had started two cruisers and four destroyers had been sunk, while
two battleships, two cruisers and four destroyers had been more or
less seriously damaged. These losses clearly showed that it was
impracticable for the fleet to continue to operate by daylight in the
neighbourhood of Crete. They could only continue to navigate in
reasonable safety if given overhead cover from fighter planes; and
that was exactly what they could not be given, for the same reason
that the troops who were being riddled by low-flying aircraft around
Maleme could not be given it—because our bases were too distant.
Crete lay a full two hundred miles too far to the north. Upon that
simple geographical fact hinged the whole issue of the battle.

For if the fleet could not keep the seas around Crete there would
be nothing to prevent seaborne reinforcements ultimately following

1 The withdrawal of the ships on the morning of May 23rd was not caused, as
has been shown, by the losses incurred, but by the misinterpreted signal regarding
the shortage of A.A. ammunition. The fleet did not, in fact, operate by daylight in
the neighbourhood of Crete again. Reviewing the position on May 24th Admiral
Cunningham decided that ‘the scale of air attack now made it no longer possible
for the Navy to operate in the Aegean or vicinity of Crete by day’.

THE DAYS OF DECISION 227

up the airborne troops. The enemy henceforth could put supplies
and reinforcements by air and sea into Crete and could prevent us
doing likewise. On that fateful May 22nd it was so clearly seen that
it is not enough to command the seas unless one can command the
air over the seas as well. Our air battle had been lost from the start.
Now the sea battle was lost, on the very day that the tide began to
turn decisively against us on land. What remained could only be a
delaying battle, a rearguard action, such as we had fought in Greece
a month earlier, an action in which we must aim at inflicting the
maximum losses upon the enemy and at saving what we could of
our own forces from the wreck.

All this could not, of course, be immediately apparent to Freyberg
and his subordinates, piecing together their information as it came
in and improvising from one day to another, often from one hour
to another. With the information now available, in the light of after
events, we can see that from this day onwards the battle must follow
a fixed and determinate course.

» [3 ]«
Maleme—Canea—Suda

THE hardest and most bitterly contested engagement of the battle
for Crete began before the dawn of May 22nd paled the sky.1 It was,
perhaps, the decisive engagement of the whole ten days. It was
decisive in the sense that unless we could drive out the Germans
_ from Maleme airfield and its neighbourhood Crete was lost to us.

On the other hand it is too much to assume that even victory at this
stage could have kept the island for us.

The counter-attack, planned so carefully and delivered with as
much strength as General Freyberg could commit, was, from the
first, subject to the inevitable hazards of war. Its timing depended
upon the punctual arrival of the 2/7th Australian Battalion which
was to relieve the 20th New Zealand Battalion (Major J. T. Burrows)
in the coastal area between Canea and Platanias. But the Australians
were delayed in their move westward by a heavy air attack which
pinned them down for some time, and coming through Suda they lost
their guide. Only two companies had arrived at 1 a.m. when the whole
battalion should have been present and ready to hand over its trans-
port to the New Zealanders for their advance along the coastal road.

It was then decided that the New Zealanders should move off to
the attack comneey by company as the Australians came in. This

1 See Map 9.

228 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

course was far from ideal, but to wait until the whole Australian
battalion had appeared would have resulted in the total loss of the
invaluable hours of darkness.

Not until 3.30 a.m. was the whole of the New Zealand force in
motion and advancing against its first objectives. Two and a half
hours had been lost and dawn was very near, but until dawn the
troops did very well.

Preceded by the three tanks of the 3rd Hussars the New Zealanders
pressed on with the 20th Battalion on the road and the coastal strip,
Lieut.-Colonel G. Dittmer’s Maori battalion along the higher ground
inland. In this area on the previous afternoon an unsuccessful para-
chutist landing had been made, but not all the enemy had been dis-
posed of. So the number of isolated centres of resistance to be
cleared—often by bayonet and grenade—proved greater than had
been expected and consumed precious time. But, in any case, the
advance could not be rapid: the darkness made it difficult for each
platoon to keep touch with its neighbours and to recognize friend
from foe. And as the New Zealanders pushed westward the German
” resistance increased and progress became slower still.

Commanding one of the leading platoons of the 20th was 2nd-Lieut.
C. H. Upham who, with pistol and grenade, subdued, almost single-
handed, two machine-gun posts and, by tossing a grenade through
the window of a house, enabled his men to destroy another. Later
he was to go forward under heavy fire and guide back to the battalion
position a company which had become isolated during the advance.
And all this was accomplished by a man who was weak from dysentery,
in no state, one would have thought, to enter the battle at all. We
shall hear of Charles Upham again.

With dawn at hand the New Zealanders approached their vital
objectives—the airfield itself and the high ground overlooking it
from the south. Maleme village was still in German hands, and here
the fire of anti-tank guns (so much for the theory that the enemy
possessed no such weapons) hit a tank. The guns of the other two
tanks jammed, and all three were then withdrawn, one of them being
lost by air attack in the process.

On the extreme right some of the 20th Battalion had pushed
forward along the beach to the edge of the airfield. Further they
could not go. The left wing of the 20th was engaged in hand to hand
conflict at Maleme. The Maoris had reached the near end of the
ridges south of the airfield.

The New Zealanders had accomplished remarkable things. And
they had found that at close quarters the German infantryman
possessed less actual battlecraft than themselves.

THE DAYS OF DECISION 229

‘They broke before bayonet charges and bunched badly in their
flight’ ran one official report. ‘They also tended to bunch badly in
cover and showed little knowledge of deployment. The impression
was confirmed that the Germans were physically very fit and superbly
armed, but that they showed a meagre knowledge of the finer points
of soldiering.’

But with daylight the German aircraft began to take a hand in
the battle, as had been all too accurately anticipated. With repeated
low-flying attacks being made upon our troops it was clear that we
could not hope to take the airfield. Nor could Maleme village be
cleared without a heavier concentration of artillery fire than we
could bring to bear upon it. Also, the positions that the forward
troops had reached by daybreak were not suitable for defence
against air attack.

Almost the whole of the 5th New Zealand Brigade was now com-
mitted, for the 21st and 23rd Battalions (between whom was divided
the remnant of the 22nd) had joined in as the advance reached them.!
One small detachment (men of the 22nd) actually got as far as the
final objective, the Tavronitis valley. But the forward positions could
not be held, and the decision was taken to withdraw the troops in
the coastal plain southwards to try and consolidate on the higher
ground won by the Maoris.

The counter-attack had indeed failed. It had, in the words of
General Wavell’s subsequent despatch, ‘recaptured almost the whole
of the ground lost’, and in the process it had inflicted heavy casual-
ties on the enemy; but at the decisive point it had failed, because we
had not recovered possession of the airfield. The over-late start, the
length of the opposed approach march, and the exposed nature of
the positions which we had attained when the Luftwaffe intervened
after daybreak were all factors contributing to the failure.

And our casualties, too, had been severe.

Oblivious of the losses they might still suffer, the Germans now
began to employ a regular ‘taxi’ service to and from Maleme. The
big JU 52’s kept arriving, each with its complement of up to forty fully
equipped men. At one time during the afternoon these planes were
actually coming in at the rate of three to every five minutes. Circle
around, spiral down, land, take off, was the regular drill.

To some observers it seemed a shade too speedy, a shade too
regular. Could it be that the enemy, discouraged by his losses, was
actually beginning to withdraw, and that the planes which appeared,
landed and disappeared so rapidly were in reality taking men off the

1The share of the 23rd Battalion was limited to the employment of one
company for ‘mopping up’ purposes after the attack had passed through.

230 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

island and not bringing more to it? It seemed a theory worth testing,
and strong fighting patrols were sent out during the afternoon to do
so. They found the Germans well-armed and posted in strength
across the routes of their reconnaissance and were forced to with-
draw. These encounters scarcely supported the theory of an
evacuation.

Evidence from enemy sources shows that such a possibility was
never seriously considered. It is true that the German Command
was very discouraged by the poor results achieved in the first forty-
eight hours of the battle. The wide inaccuracy of their estimate of our
strength in Crete had thrown the well-laid plans agley. How much
longer they could have continued to reinforce by air, with the atten-
dant losses involved, had they lost control of the airfield is an open
question. But some comments on the British side seem somewhat
to understress the use which the Germans were already making, and
were presumably prepared to go on making, of the beaches and of
the Tavronitis river bed. For that reason it can never be said with
certainty that, even had the counter-attack in the early hours of
May 22nd succeeded to the full, the Germans would have been unable
to retain and subsequently extend their foothold on Crete. All that
can be said with certainty is that we could certainly have rendered it
more costly. There was, of course, a limit to the number of aircraft
which the Germans could crash land, but even if this limit had been
reached the enemy might still have exploited the possibilities of
seaborne landings.

In the course of this critical May 22nd the Germans landed three
mountain battalions, elements of a parachute artillery unit and a
field hospital on the airfield at Maleme. Even allowing for the effec-
tiveness of the enemy’s use of aircraft for bombardment purposes,
this was a remarkable achievement: the landing-ground was still
within range of our field guns and was littered with broken-down
and burning aircraft, but the debris was rapidly removed, with the
help of tanks captured from us; and the strong measures taken by
General Ringel, the new commander of Group West, restored dis-
cipline which was at one time badly shaken.

The number of new troops was quite sufficient to swing the balance
of strength to the side of the enemy, and Ringel could now turn his
attention to developing the offensive, instead of having to concen-
trate solely upon maintaining his foothold at Maleme. Under the
new plan three battle groups were formed.

The first, two battalions strong, under Major Schaette, was
detailed to protect Maleme from any possible counter-thrust from
the south and west to which the Germans throughout these early

THE DAYS OF DECISION 231

days of the battle were peculiarly sensitive. The main body at Maleme
would be placed under Colonel Ramcke, who had commanded the
Group temporarily after the wounding of General Meindl. Re-
organized, it would develop the attack eastwards towards Canea.
A third body, consisting of the Ist Battalion of No. 85 Mountain
Regiment (5th Mountain Division) under Colonel Utz, would begin
an enveloping movement to the south.

The advance eastward upon Canea could not start before the
following day, but Schaette began to move out to the west to clear
the way to Kastelli. No. 1 Greek Regiment, with three New Zealand
officers and ten N.C.O.s, about forty gendarmes and some Cretan
guerrillas, the whole under the command of Major G. Bedding,
offered a tenacious resistance, fighting—in the words of the German
official account—‘ with the utmost cunning’; so that it was not until
the morning of May 26th that Schaette completed his mission by
the capture of Kastelli.

Despite its great exertions the 5th New Zealand Brigade was still
to be reckoned with. Local counter-attacks by the 21st Battalion
and the Maoris against a spur south of Pirgos were still developing
during the afternoon, though the enemy had penetrated once more
into Pirgos village. At five o’clock the indefatigable Freyberg
ordered yet another counter-attack against the airfield, estimating
that if Crete could be saved at Maleme, that evening provided the
last desperate chance of doing so. The morrow would be too late.
Brigadier Puttick, however, who had command of all the forces west
of Canea, felt compelled to point out that enemy concentrations
‘of considerable but undisclosed strength’ were threatening an
attack towards Galatas from the prison area and that these troops,
who constituted a permanent threat to the communications between
the two New Zealand brigades, should first be dealt with. To cap
this, Brigadier Hargest, on behalf of the Sth Brigade, reported that
his men were exhausted by the hard fighting of the day, following
upon a night of intense activity, and were unfit for any immediate
operation.

So it seemed that attack was impossible, and the positions occupied
after the counter-attack were unsuitable for defence. Brigadier
Puttick therefore took the decision, which was reluctantly confirmed
by General Freyberg, to withdraw the Sth New Zealand Brigade to
a new concentration area on the coast to the rear of Platanias. The
effect of this would be to echelon the brigade from Platanias to the
neighbourhood of Canea. The Maori Battalion, which had been
the rearmost of the four (in relation to Maleme) on the morning of the
attack, would now in resuming its old position become the most

232 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

forward battalion, the others taking up positions further to the
east. This move would have the advantage of still preventing a link-
up of the enemy’s Maleme troops with the Prison Valley contingent
and would give the divisional commander the option of employing
his more closely concentrated brigade either for a counter-attack
against the prison region, for consolidating a line from Platanias
south-eastwards or, thirdly, for carrying out a measured withdrawal
upon Canea.

Unfortunately, detailed instructions could not be issued to the
battalions until the small hours of the following morning, and,
although the forward troops began the withdrawal before midnight,
it was clear that the movement would still be in progress at daybreak.

None of the reserve rations could be brought away with the troops,
and all the food which reached the brigade on this evening was in one
half-loaded carrier. The hundreds of corpses which lay in the sun
threatened to breed disease, and there was a probability that the
village wells were becoming polluted. Attending to the wounded and
getting them away was a well nigh impossible task, for every convoy
needed an escort and every vehicle a constant guard.

The threatened attack towards Galatas mentioned by Brigadier
Puttick was delivered about sunset when a force of some four hun-
dred Germans advanced from the south. After gaining 500 yards
the enemy was checked with considerable loss by the New Zealand
divisional petrol company and a Greek detachment. Command in
this area was then unified under Major Russell of the New Zealand
cavalry, his force also containing the petrol company, a platoon of
the 19th New Zealand Battalion, and some gunners.

Apart from the encounter related above, and a certain amount of
patrolling and sniping by both sides during the day, there was little
activity in the prison valley area. German aircraft had dropped
supplies around the prison about 10.0 a.m., but no reinforcements
had arrived. For the moment the position was one of stalemate.

And now, after three days fighting, the scene shifts eastward from
Maleme airfield to where our troops are about to take up fresh dis-
positions in order to defend Canea. A line of sorts covering the
town is taking shape from north-west to south-east, with the much
tried Sth New Zealand Brigade at the western (coastal) end; the
4th New Zealand Brigade a little further east; the improvised 10th
Brigade of Greeks and New Zealanders under Colonel Kippenberger
holding the front as far as the Canea—Alikianou road ; and Brigadier
Vasey’s 19th Australian Brigade (the 2/7th and 2/8th Battalions from
Georgeopolis) south of the road. In the immediate vicinity of Canea
a scratch defence force is being organized; it consists of the

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THE DAYS OF DECISION 233

Australian gunners of the 2/2nd Field Regiment, now fighting as
infantry, a company of the Rangers, and some Royal Marines.

At this juncture the decision was taken to evacuate the civil popu-
lation from Canea, where the essential services had already collapsed,
to the hill villages some miles to the south. The geographical position
of the town, and its narrow winding streets rendered Canea a favourite
target of the German bombers, and it was as well to get the people
away in orderly fashion while there was opportunity to do so. Most
of them left during the night. None was compelled to go.

Friday, Saturday and Sunday, May 23rd, 24th and 25th, represent
the period during which the German forces in Crete progressively
grew stronger and exerted an ever growing pressure, while our own
position correspondingly weakened from day to day—less as the
result of direct enemy attacks than on account of the increasing
difficulties of supply, administration and command arising out of
the lonely battle in which our ground forces were now engaged.

These were the days when the enemy was building up.towards his
major effort—days which saw the balance tilt ever further against us.
In addition to all the other handicaps under which our men were
fighting, it must be remembered that they were practically without
reinforcement or relief, so that dwindling units and troops. growing
ever more weary fought day after day against opponents who were
fresh and newly arrived in battle.

During the night of May 22nd/23rd the withdrawal of the Sth New
Zealand Brigade from the Maleme region had begun, but, as we
have seen, the movement could not be completed under cover of
darkness. In the last stages of the retreat, when it was light, German
aircraft and German forward troops harassed our men considerably.

The enemy combined frontal pressure at Platanias with attempts
to infiltrate through to the coast between the Sth and 4th Brigades.
The latter movements were more easily held than the direct attack
which came down the road and along the beach at Platanias. The
German vanguard, driving captured R.A.F. lorries, seized a bridge
across a river-bed which was to have been held by the New Zea-
landers as part of their forward position, and then planted a cap-
tured Bofors gun to defend it. This attack developed in strength
during the afternoon of the 23rd and threatened a direct break-
through. Here were engaged some tanks of the 3rd Hussars, two
companies of the 20th New Zealand Battalion, and a company of
the Maoris which fought on the beach. The Bofors gun was recovered
and at length the German effort died away.

234 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

It was clear that the 5th New Zealand Brigade, now enduring its
fourth day of continuous battle, was no longer equal to maintaining
the struggle without a temporary relief. The strain of fighting under
such uniquely unfavourable conditions, the constant pounding from
the air, the supreme trial of the previous night’s attack, all these had
contributed to produce a dangerous state of exhaustion. No troops in
the world could have endured longer than these New Zealanders did. It
seemed, both to Freyberg and Puttick that the limit had been reached.
The brigade must be relieved and withdrawn into divisional reserve.

In that case the 4th New Zealand Brigade and the polyglot 10th
Brigade would be obliged to take over the line—if line it can be
called—and since they could not move forward without leaving a
dangerous gap liable to attack or infiltration from the south, the
new front must crystallize on their present positions north and
south through Galatas.

Fortunately the troops under Sth Brigade command were able to
hold until nightfall, and the withdrawal was carried out under cover
of darkness, beginning even before sunset. Our men disengaged with-
out difficulty, but owing to the lack of towing vehicles they had a
good deal of trouble in getting their guns (mostly the Italian or
French models, the latter taken over by the Italians and subsequently
captured from them in the Western Desert) away to the rear.

Round Galatas little happened during the day. Small parties of
Germans made a series of attacks towards the village from the
prison area, but these were checked without much trouble. The guns
and mortars we still had in action fired on any target that offered.
About noon the headquarters of the 4th New Zealand Brigade was
heavily bombed fromr the air.

Canea old town was set on fire by German bombers and shipping
was attacked in Suda Bay where an oil-tanker was hit.

The new front at least permitted the integration of the various
New Zealand and Australian units fighting west of Canea. The 4th
New Zealand Brigade, with Colonel Kippenberger’s composite
force, would hold in the north; the 19th Australian Brigade, which
consisted of the 2/7th Battalion and half the 2/8th, in the south. It
was a position imposed upon our Command by the exhaustion of
the forward troops rather than one of its own choosing; the with-
drawal signified the final abandonment of any attempt to dominate
or overlook the Maleme airfield; and, if it led to the very needful
reorganization of our position, it equally permitted the linking-up
of Ringel’s Group from the Maleme sector with Heidrich’s forces
who had been holding on in the prison area. The German menace
to Canea was beginning to take shape.

THE DAYS OF DECISION 235

Yet, despite this considerable withdrawal, the general feeling
among the troops around Canea and Suda on that Friday was one
of tempered optimism. It was believed (and in view of the tone of the
official communiqués, this is scarcely surprising) that the German
airborne landings at Retimo and Heraklion had been completely
defeated and the enemy forces at those places annihilated. While it
was known even among those who had not been themselves involved
in the battle that we had withdrawn from Maleme under extremely
heavy enemy pressure, it was supposed that the enemy’s losses,
inevitably exaggerated by popular report, had been on such a scale
that they might well prove fatal to his enterprise if only the R.A.F.—
in whose ability to encompass the impracticable the ground troops
maintained a flatteringly naive faith—could succeed in neutralizing
his flow of reinforcements and supplies by a large scale bombing
and interception programme.

It was, perhaps, fortunate for the peace of mind of these men, so
sorely tried, that they were blissfully unaware of the handicaps and
the responsibilities of our air forces in the Middle East.

For nothing now was interfering with the punctual arrival,
departure and re-arrival of enemy aircraft at Maleme. A full seven
miles separated our most advanced positions from that bitterly
contested quadrilateral. All day the German aircraft landed unin-
terruptedly just as they chose. The early arrivals had paid the price
on the two previous days. It had been high, but it had been sufficient.
Maleme offered a safe landing now. It may well be that nearly two
hundred troop-carriers alighted there in the course of the day.

It is true that the R.A.F., who were still doing what was possible
to help in the defence of the island, managed to send Blenheims and
Marylands to bomb the airfield in the evening. These aircraft were
a heartening sight to those of our men who saw them come over, but
the strike did little to impede the German operations. It was neither
heavy enough nor sustained enough to do that.

General Freyberg, whose sense of realism was scarcely surpassed
even by his outstanding courage, was the first to appreciate the
significance of the loss of the airfield. In a signal to Middle East he
stressed the fact that the enemy now possessed an operational aero-
drome scarcely more than a dozen miles from Suda Bay, the only
port which it was practicable for us to use for the maintenance of
our principal force in Crete. Nor were landings being confined to the
aerodrome, as we have seen, Nevertheless, Maleme was the supremely
important point and Freyberg had intended yet another attack
against it that night, even after the withdrawal to Platanias; but the
threat to his flank from the Prison Valley area and the exhaustion of

236 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

the troops under his command had rendered this impracticable. He
therefore intended to consolidate his new position for defence. Two
facts were inescapable; he could no longer take chances on the
safety of his southern flank from attack and infiltration ; and a large
proportion of his men required a rest before they could engage in
battle again.

But even to continue on the defensive was becoming a hazardous
procedure. The enemy was now approaching equality of numbers,
and in addition to the airborne landings Freyberg had received
information that some small ships had landed German troops on
the Akrotiri peninsula behind Canea that day. Suda was now in-
creasingly threatened, and Suda, let it be repeated, was the only
port of supply available to his western force. The defensive fight
could only be kept up so long as the maintenance of his troops in
ammunition and supplies could be assured.

It was possible, he said in his report that help from the R.A.F.,
especially in fighters, might alter the outlook, but ‘the next few
days ... are critical’.

It was certainly not an alarmist or defeatist statement; it merely
drew attention to unpalatable facts.

On Saturday, May 24th, the German offensive from the air was
intensified; and throughout the day supplies and reinforcements
were poured into Maleme, troop-carriers arriving on the airfield at
the rate of twelve in an hour.

Supported by bombing attacks upon our positions west of Canea
the enemy’s ground forces strove to press eastward and northward.
During the morning the Germans reached the Aiya Marina ridge,
and were engaged on the coastal road by our artillery. In the after-
noon tanks and infantry assembled south of Theodhoroi Island and
clashed with the 19th New Zealand Battalion which resisted stoutly.
Fighting continued in the vicinity of the road till darkness fell, the
little ground which was lost being recovered by counter-attack.

Near Galatas German attacks had been repulsed and we also held
our own in the Prison Valley, but the fighting was not so severe.
Further south beyond the road the 19th Australian Brigade was not
attacked at all, being able to spend the day improving its defences.

So far so good. But it was perfectly clear that the German effort
would be renewed on a larger scale next day, fresh and well-equipped
troops being put in against the weary and depleted ranks of the defence.

Canea, which was still burning, suffered very heavily from the
German bombers in the afternoon. It was much the heaviest attack
that the Cretan capital had experienced. The enemy aircraft flew

THE DAYS OF DECISION 237

backwards and forwards over the town in perfect formation. Some-
times there were as many as sixty of them overhead at the same time;
on no occasion while a raid was in progress were there less than a
dozen. It was a perfect demonstration of pattern bombing. The
Germans could afford it, for there was no fighter opposition against
them. Lines of bombs were sown accurately across the town, for it
was the German purpose to block its streets with rubble and cause
the maximum difficulty to the troops and vehicles that had to be
moved through it. Little was left of Canea except the water-front area.

On Sunday, May 25th, the Germans attacked in strength.

To appreciate the conditions under which our troops entered upon
the last struggle for the defence of Canea and Suda, the extent to
which they had been weakened and units had been broken up and
‘cannibalized’ must be taken into consideration.

The New Zealand Division which had done nearly all the fighting
in this sector since the opening day was reduced to a total strength,
including headquarters troops, of approximately 4,400. Of these,
the Sth Brigade which had borne the brunt showed returns of about
1,380, the 4th Brigade of about 1,440, and the composite 10th Brigade
about 800. In simple terms, the New Zealand Division was reduced to
brigade strength, and each brigade was barely more numerous than a
battalion should be.

Vasey’s 19th Australian Brigade had as yet seen practically no
fighting, since it had had to cover the unattacked Georgeopolis beach
during the first day or two and had not been at all seriously involved
since its shift to the Canea sector. But the original strength had only
been that of a battalion and a half, and when Sunday’s battle opened
it could muster no more than 1,170.

Of the Greeks fighting in regular formations in the western sector
of Crete there now remained about a thousand of No. 2 Greek
Regiment in the neighbourhood of Mournies and Perivolia (S.S.W.
of Canea); an unascertainable number still resisting around Ali-
kianou on the further side of the Prison Valley; and about 700 men
of No. 1 Greek Regiment near Kastelli in the far west.

For the previous two days the Germans had been landing troops
quite unimpeded at Maleme. Even allowing for their losses they can
scarcely have had less than 15,000 troops in the sector by the
morning of May 25th. And they could now be reinforced contin-
uously up to almost any extent.

Against them we could put into the line a total of something under
6,000 with another thousand or two who might be committed as a
final reserve. Say 9,000 in all. Nine thousand men, all of them tired

238 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

through the incessant strain and hazard of air attack, even when they
had not been involved in the ground fighting; nine thousand men
who had no reasonable hope of reinforcement or relief.

While the New Zealanders and the 19th Australian Brigade con-
fronted the German advance fom the west and south-west the troops
in rear were being reorganized in four commands.

Lieut.-Colonel Healy, a gunner, was given command of the so-
called ‘Suda Brigade’, a hybrid organization of about 2,000 rifles. It
included a battalion of Royal Marines—previously manning search-
lights—gunners of the R.H.A. and 2/2nd Australian Field Regi-
ments, the ‘Royal Perivolians’ who had representatives of many
units in the ranks, and elements of two Greek battalions. This force
was to take up a north-south support position along the line of a
stream at Mournies two miles south of Canea. It was a position that
might with luck hold for a very few hours, not longer.

Next, there was the Akrotiri Force under the command of Major
Boileau, composed of the Northumberland Hussars, and the Rangers.
These troops: were to enjoy the inconvenient réle of Mr. Facing-
Both-Ways. They would have to be prepared to hold a potential
‘stop line’ across the Akrotiri isthmus against attacks from the
south while at the same time dealing with any sea or airborne troops
who might be landed on the peninsula to the north.

Then there was the ‘area reserve’ which had not yet been committed
to action except for a platoon or two which had rounded up some
paratroopers—the Ist Welch Regiment (Lieut.-Colonel Duncan).

Finally, the defence of Suda itself was entrusted to the scratchiest
of scratch forces under Major Farrier, composed largely of Greek
gendarmerie, civilian volunteers and a few solitary details separated
from their units by the eddies of battle—a Home Guard of the most
rudimentary nature.

During the night of May 23rd/24th there had arrived for us at
Suda a slight reinforcement of 200 which gave promise of better
things to come. This was the vanguard of ‘Layforce’, commanded
by Colonel R. E. Laycock and composed of parts of No. 7 Com-
mando and Nos. 50 and 52 Middle East Commandos, numbering
800 officers and men and organized in two battalions.’

1 It had been intended that these commandos should be employed in offensive
and harassing operations, for which their training and equipment pre-eminently
suited them. In the early part of the year plans were well advanced for an attack
upon the Dodecanese to eliminate the danger of air and submarine attacks upon
our communications from Africa to Greece. In this projected operation the
commandos were to have played a prominent part. But the Dodecanese under-
taking was abandoned, and presently, in view of the acute shortage of our man-

power, it was found necessary to use these skilled assault troops as reinloncements
for the defensive battle of Crete.

THE DAYS OF DECISION 239

The spirit of the troops, everywhere, was still high, despite their
grievous condition. Small arms ammunition was running so short
that it had to be doled out a few boxes at a time as the limited
quantity of transport vehicles permitted—and not by day when
German aircraft were sure to be overhead. Also, the distribution
of drinking water, in many instances strictly conserved, and of the
dwindling supplies of food could only be undertaken at night.
Medical stores were failing. Dressing stations and field ambulances
were overcrowded with wounded men.

The enemy’s assault on this fateful Sunday followed the pattern
now becoming all too familiar through repetition. The morning was
devoted to the preliminary ‘softening up’ from the air, during which
time our forward and rear areas were very thoroughly ‘combed’. The
R.A.F. from their bases in Africa, came again. Both in the morning
and afternoon Marylands, Blenheims and Hurricanes attacked
Maleme airfield, and at night four Wellington bombers did likewise.
So far as could be ascertained these efforts had only a nuisance value.

In the early afternoon, after ample time had been allowed for the
battering and riddling of their objectives, the German ground forces,
nearly two brigades strong, went in to the attack.?

The first thrust was held, but following intensely concentrated
mortar fire, the enemy at about 3 p.m. broke through along the
coast on the extreme right of the 18th New Zealand Battalion and
gained nearly half a mile. For some two hours the Germans per-
sisted in their efforts to develop this success but the advance of the
20th Battalion—one hundred and forty strong—helped to keep
them in check. Then the inevitable happened. Overborne by the
heavy volume of mortar fire the defenders were pressed back to
positions east of Galatas. The 18th New Zealand Battalion,
which lost 99 killed and 150 wounded out of 450 of all ranks, was
engaged by all three battalions of No. 100 Mountain Regiment on
this day.

At Galatas the composite body known as Russell’s Force which
consisted chiefly of the divisional cavalry and petrol company with
a party of the 19th New Zealand Battalion and some gunners—in
all about 150 strong—continued to hold the village. Russell’s men
were machine-gunned from the air at tree-top level and, from now
onward, were attacked repeatedly from the west and from the direc-
tion of the prison. Then, about 8.30 p.m., after the 18th Battalion
had been forced back as related above, Colonel Kippenberger
ordered Major Russell to withdraw his force behind the village to
the east. This he succeeded in doing, the troops extricating themselves

1 See Map 10.

240 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

from a most difficult position, though not without considerable
loss. The exultant Germans streamed into Galatas.

The trickle of stragglers moving back now thickened to a flood.
A breach had been opened in our front, and the Germans in the
village might be counted upon to assail our exposed flanks. The
situation was critical. The safety of the whole line was in peril. Should it
crumble the enemy might well be in Canea, even Suda, that night.

The day was saved by one of those spasmodic, improvised counter-
attacks which before now have stopped an army in full flood tide of
success. First of all two of the light tanks of the Hussars clanked up
the road into Galatas and out again shooting up the Germans in the
streets. That gave a breathing-space, just time enough to compel the
enemy to consider the desirability of adopting defensive precautions
rather than of pushing on. But the tank crews had lost two men
wounded in the course of the sally, a machine-gunner and a gunner-
observer. They appealed for replacements. A machine-gunner and
a truck driver from brigade headquarters volunteered, the latter
being put through his paces in ten minutes.

A succession of reinforcements—small, well organized, well
armed parties—were sent forward by Brigadier Inglis commanding the
4th New Zealand Brigade. These men were drawn from a dozen units
and included even the members of the ‘Kiwis’, the New Zealand
concert party which had been sent to Crete to enliven the pre-
sumed Jongueurs of the defenders. They were posted on ridges over-
looking Galatas, and under cover of this makeshift line elements of
the Sth New Zealand Brigade—two companies of the 23rd Battalion
_ each eighty strong, a party from the 18th and two platoons of the
20th—were assembled for the counter-attack against the village.
Four light tanks were now available; two of these were held back to
cover the approaches to the next village, Karatsos, the other two were
detailed to support the counter-attack against Galatas.

Then, as darkness thickened on that warm May night the motley
force organized and led by Kippenberger in person’ went forward
to death and glory. It was Ethandune; it was the charge of Pappen-
heim at Liitzen, of Desaix at Marengo; it was the charge of the
Worcestershire Regiment at Gheluvelt, the attack which saved the
line at Ypres on that last day of October 1914.

The most English of our poets of this century writing of a battle
that welded England a thousand years earlier has interpreted the
essential spirit of that last broken charge:

1Colonel Kippenberger who started off leading the counter-attack was
unfortunate enough to sprain his ankle. He was passed by his men as they broke
into a run, but followed them up to the village.

THE DAYS OF DECISION 241

When Alfred’s word was ended
Stood firm that feeble line

Each in his place with club or spear
And fury deeper than deep fear
And smiles as sour as brine.

Wild stared the Danes at the double ways
Where they loitered all at large

As that dark line for the last time
Doubled the knee to charge—

And caught their weapons clumsily,
And marvelled how and why—
In such degree by rule and rod,
The people of the peace of God
Went roaring down to die.

It was with that spirit that they charged through the darkness on
that Sunday in May, men of English blood from the land of the
Southern Cross, casting their all into the battle of all mankind.

Back into Galatas they stormed, climbing over the low stone walls,
swarming into the houses, firing when they could, clearing buildings
with hand grenades when they possessed any, and then going in
with the bayonet.

It lasted for twenty minutes, the quick flash of rifle fire, the rattle
of automatics, the glowing red of the tracers... .

Then the Germans broke. Those who were not killed in the streets
and the houses, and most were killed, were swept away on the
impetus of the attack. They vanished westward into the darkness,
and the village was clear.

Again distinguished for his gallant and resourceful leadership was
2nd-Lieut. Upham of the 20th Battalion; although he had been
wounded two days before, he had insisted on remaining with his men.

The action at Galatas was made memorable by that lost despairing
heroism that has so often snatched victory from defeat : at Ethandune
no less than at Ypres and over the skies of Britain as among those
desert wastes where the bleak uninhabited ridges of Ruweisat and
Alam Halfa look down upon the curve of coast that bears the name
of Alamein.

General Freyberg has described this action as ‘one of the greatest
efforts in the defence of Crete’.

After the conquest of the island, the Germans erected a memorial
in the village to both Germans and New Zealanders who fell in the
fighting at Galatas.1

. iaae memorial, erected in 1941, was removed by a later German commander

242 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

And the supreme tragedy lies in the fact that the heroism was in
vain. The counter-attack, in its reckless courage, deserved to have
turned the fortunes of the whole battle. How fit and appropriate if
it had indeed done so; if in the obscure village of Galatas had been
erected a single stone, like that which the visitor may see where the
road from Ypres climbs the first shallow ridge near St. Julien, the
stone which bears the sole inscription: ‘Ici fut arreté l’envahisseur’.

But it was not to be. The New Zealanders were weakened by the
losses they had suffered; they no longer had enough men to hold
the line. And troops of all units were now hopelessly mixed in the
forward areas, complicating the task of reforming and regrouping
them. The men were dog tired, wearied out by the strain of being
under incessant air attack. But the Germans had broken into our
forward positions in at least two places, and unless they could be
driven out before dawn were likely to exploit their gains next day.
So, even at this late hour—about midnight—consideration was given
to the possibility of yet another counter-attack with a view to dis-
lodging the enemy. But only the 28th (Maori) Battalion was suff-
ciently rested and organized to be committed, and its 400 men might
have to face any number of Germans up to five battalions. There was
no chance of success though Colonel Dittmer would have taken his
men forward without demur.

There was thus nothing for it but a further disengagement and
withdrawal to a new and shorter line which would be only about
two miles in front of Canea ; and this movement had to be carried out
at once in order to take advantage of the hours of darkness. No
avoidable delay could be risked in the issue of orders, for all tele-
phone communications forward of divisional headquarters had been
destroyed by bombing, and messages must be conveyed to brigades
and battalions by runner.

Late that night Brigadier Puttick signalled General Freyberg that
he hoped to establish the new line but that his men were badly
shaken by the severity of the air attacks and he feared that it might
be impossible to get his guns away.

‘I am exceedingly doubtful’, he concluded, ‘on present reports,
whether I can hold the enemy tomorrow.’

An effort to reinforce Crete with the main body and headquarters
of Layforce had failed by reason of the very rough weather. The
troops left Alexandria in four destroyers on the 25th with the inten-
tion of coming ashore during the night; but the boats on which a
quick landing depended, were washed away by heavy seas, and the
flotilla, with fuel supplies running low, was obliged to return to

Egypt.

THE DAYS OF DECISION 243

Monday, May 26th, the seventh day of the battle, was described
by General Wavell in his subsequent despatch as the critical day.
In one sense, perhaps, the crisis had been determined—in favour of
the Germans—on May 22nd when the counter-attack failed against
Maleme airfield. In another sense, given the conditions which the
defence had to face, the critical date was that when the German
Comunand fixed the scale of attack. But May 26th was the day on
which the break came, the day when evacuation was admitted to be
a necessity.

The initiative now lay firmly in German hands, for the invaders
numbered over 20,000, most of them concentrated between Maleme
and Canea for the main threat against Suda.

General Ringel, commander of the Sth Mountain Division, who
was in charge of the operation, had determined that on this day
should be delivered the coup de grdce. The greater part of our forces
had been drawn into the Canea sector, where intense German air
attacks upon the rear areas were already producing a state of ad-
ministrative confusion. For the frontal attack Ramcke’s Group
would move east along the coastal road against Canea; No. 100
Mountain Regiment would push through Karatsos; and Colonel
Heidrich’s No. 3 Paratroop Rifle Regiment, which had been fighting
in the prison area since the opening day, would continue its pressure
towards Canea from the south-west.

These converging columns, whose nominal strength amounted to
at least seven battalions and whose actual numbers represented more
than four, were preparing a knock-out blow for a force of three very
weak battalions all of them wearied by the strain of constant vigi-
lance, arduous battle and continual air attack. These defenders who
occupied the angle formed by the coastal and the prison roads were
to be pinned down and then shattered in front of Canea. Meanwhile
their line of retreat was to be cut by a flank march through the hills
to the south.

The roads from Canea to Alikianou (south-west) and from Canea
to Stilos (south-east)! form, roughly, the sides of an isosceles triangle.
If the Germans could move along the base line through the foothills
from Alikianou to Stilos and thence on to the road to the south they .
stood a good chance of cutting off and capturing the whole of our
troops based on Canea and Suda.

It was not at all a simple task which General Ringel set No. 85
Mountain Regiment. From its assembly point at Modhion (a little
south of the coast road and about midway between Maleme and
Platanias) it was faced with a march of nearly twenty miles as

1See Map 14.

244 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

the arrow flies, much the greater part of it across trackless hills
‘against the grain of the country’—up one ridge, down into the
valley beyond, up the next ridge, and so on. But if the Germans
could reach Stilos and the through road at Neon Khorion that night
their object could be achieved ; if they could reach these villages by
the following night they might still cut off the greater part of our
forces, and the remainder could be pressed hard in pursuit. What
von Stumme had conspicuously failed to do in Greece by his move-
ment from the eastern coast into the Larissa plain or by his flank
march from Yanina southward to the Gulf of Corinth, would be
achieved in Crete by the fit young men of No. 85 Mountain Regi-
ment. Or so it was hoped.

Over on our side of the line the disengagement of the forward
troops had been going on during the night, following the glorious
but vain counter-attack at Galatas. In effect, the 4th New Zealand
Brigade, which had held the line during May 25th, now withdrew
through the Sth Brigade, and the latter, so severely hammered in
the first days of battle, found itself once more constrained to play
the ungratifying part of Uriah the Hittite. The withdrawal was com-
pleted by 5.30 a.m. on Monday morning, and the line was now held,
theoretically, by the 21st Battalion on the coast, the 19th in the
centre, and the 28th (Maori) Battalion on the left with its flank on
the Alikianou road. Beyond the road, southward, lay the 19th
Australian Brigade. Behind the Australians was the Suda Brigade
deployed along the line of the Mournies stream.

The New Zealanders, who had the remnants of their own 4th
Brigade in support, were of course, battalions only in name. They
had lost heavily in the fighting and had been reinforced by a number
of small groups which had become separated from their own units.

The 3rd Hussars, now with five tanks of which only four were
runners, lay in support south-west of Canea.

General Freyberg, from his new headquarters in a quarry not far
from Suda docks sent an encouraging message to Brigadier Puttick
but emphasized that the new line must be held at all costs. Yet
Freyberg himself doubted if this could be done for long by the sorely
tried New Zealanders. After signalling his apprehensions to Middle
East Command he placed Brigadier Inglis, from the 4th New Zealand
Brigade in command of a force which was to take over the line after
dark. This new formation comprised the 1st Welch Regiment, the
Ist Rangers, and the Northumberland Hussars.

Rumours were rife, and some men in the back areas believed that
evacuation of the island had already begun. Actually, in anticipa-
tion of a general evacuation, base personnel who could be spared

THE DAYS OF DECISION 245

and dock workers from Suda had already been instructed to make
their way as best as they could to the fishing village of Sphakia on
the south coast of Crete. Unfortunately this instruction soon be-
came generally known, and some stragglers from the combatant
units made no further effort to rejoin but streamed off southward.
In this fashion the Composite Battalion which had fought so finely
around Galatas began to melt away.

As usual the Germans were content to allow the clear and cloud-
less morning to pass without initiating anything beyond extensive
air attacks against our forward and rear positions. It is probable
that they wished to hold us in front of Canea while the flank move-
ment of No. 85 Mountain Regiment made headway. By one o’clock
in the afternoon, however, the Germans were attacking vigorously
along the Alikianou-Canea road at the junction of the New Zea-
landers and Australians, and were working round the southern flank
of the Australians.

Brigadier Puttick, commanding the New Zealand Division, took
so serious a view of the situation that he doubted if the front could
hold beyond nightfall. In the mid-afternoon he started back to
report in this sense to Freyberg at Force Headquarters and to
recommend an earlier withdrawal. Since all telephone lines were
down it was necessary for him to go in person; and since every
vehicle moving by daylight was a certain target for the roaming
Messerschmitts he set out to make the four-mile journey to Suda
on foot. It was a measure of the extent to which essential communica-
tions had broken down that a divisional commander felt compelled
to be his own messenger without the benefit of so much as a bicycle
to carry him.

Puttick reached Headquarters only to be informed that there was
no option and that his troops must continue to hold until the night
relief could be carried out. He returned to divisional headquarters
to find that the situation had changed for the worse; although a
break-through along the coast road had been averted by a counter-
attack supported by the remaining tanks, both Hargest who com-
manded the New Zealanders in the line and Vasey who commanded
the Australians were agreed that the position could not be held.
Intelligence had arrived of German movement round the left flank,
and pressure everywhere along the front was increasing.

At about twenty minutes to six, while Puttick was writing a report
to Major-General Weston, the latter arrived at New Zealand Divi-
sion headquarters. The local commanders—Brigadiers Puttick,
Hargest and Inglis were present and Brigadier Vasey was available
on the telephone—assured Weston that withdrawal should begin

246 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

without delay if disaster were to be avoided, and suggested a shorter
defensive line extending southward from the head of Suda Bay.

The brigadiers knew what their troops had endured and believed
them to be almost at the end of their tether; but there is evidence to
show that the units in the line felt themselves in no particular diffi-
culties during this day. Certainly it seems that the enemy delivered
no ‘all out’ assault. German accounts describe the capture of
Galatas—abandoned by us at 2 a.m. that morning—and other
attacks which were unnoticed by our men. But the threat to the
left (southern) flank was very real.

Being unable to order withdrawal on his own authority, Weston
set out for Force Headquarters. Since it took him an hour and
twenty minutes to cover the distance it is to be presumed that he,
too, travelled on foot.

Freyberg, however, remained adamant. The most he could
promise was that Force Reserve should be moved up to take over
from the New Zealand Division starting off within the hour, i.e.
by 8.30 p.m.’ At the southern end of the line the Australians would
continue to hold, with the Suda Brigade.

Meanwhile Brigadier Puttick was anxiously awaiting the orders
to withdraw that were expected to be the outcome of Weston’s visit
to Force Headquarters. The delays imposed by the breakdown of
communications increased the tension of that day of maddening
suspense and over-strained nerves. The Australians eventually
received a personal authorization from Freyberg to fall back on the
Suda Brigade’s position along the Mournies stream, but when no
communication had arrived for the New Zealanders at 10.30 p.m.
Puttick took the responsibility of ordering the withdrawal of both
Australians and New Zealanders to the line recommended by General
Weston—southwards from the west tip of Suda Bay.

It was not until an hour and a quarter later that Freyberg’s in-
struction came through. It ordered the troops to stand fast until
Force Reserve arrived to take over.

By this time the retreat was already in progress and could not have
been checked. The delays in the transmission of orders meant that
when they arrived they were already inapplicable. Vasey’s 19th
Australian Brigade, for instance, had received specific instructions
to hold along the line of the Mournies stream. By the time this message
was received the Germans were known to be working past it without
opposition on the south.

Each one of the three forward formations—New Zealand Division,

1 Owing to delay in communicating the message and subsequent road blockages,
Force Reserve did not, in fact, start moving until midnight.

THE DAYS OF DECISION 247

19th Australian Brigade and the Suda Brigade—received its
order to stand firm until relieved after it had already begun its own
withdrawal or after withdrawal on its flank had already com-
promised its own position.

Force Reserve, the final desperate hope, had started to move
forward at midnight in ignorance of the fact that the troops whom
it was to relieve had already begun to withdraw from their positions.
An hour and a half later two despatch riders were sent off by Frey-
berg to countermand the advance, since everyone else was now
moving backward. But by the time that the message was received
it was too late to check Force Reserve. The Ist Welch Regiment, the
Northumberland Hussars, and the Rangers went on to offer the last
resistance to the Germans west of Canea.

The remainder of our forces continued their retreat, the 19th
Australian Brigade and Sth New Zealand Brigade dropping back to
take up the position covering Suda, while the 4th New Zealand
Brigade went on to Stilos, near the road to the.south coast whither
stragglers and base personnel in increasing numbers were now
making their way.

While the forward units maintained military formation and
marched in some kind of order, the rear echelons pressed on as best
they could in the direction of Sphakia, moving sometimes without
orders and usually without organization. For the first time there were
some indications of a weakening in morale—but not among the
fighting troops who had lately been in close contact with the enemy.
These remained grimly determined to give blow for blow.

Freyberg knew that the end had come. In a despatch to Middle
East Command drafted at 9.30 p.m. on May 26th (though probably
held for some hours) he signalled the Commander-in-Chief in terms
which left no room for ambiguity.

He reported with regret that in his opinion the troops in the Suda
area had reached the limit of their endurance: no matter what
decision might be taken by Middle East Command, the position at
Suda from a military point of view was hopeless: his smail, ill-
equipped, immobile force could not stand up against the concen-
trated bombing which it had faced during the last seven days: it
must be recognized that the difficulties of extricating the complete
force in the Suda area were now insuperable, but provided that a
quick decision was reached a certain proportion of the troops might
be embarked: once the Suda sector was reduced the reduction of
Retimo and Heraklion would only be a matter of time: the troops
at Suda, with the exception of the Welch Regiment and the com-
mandos were unfit for any offensive action. Freyberg concluded by

248 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

saying that if a gain of time would help the general situation in the
Middle East he would carry on, but would have to consider how this
could be done: Suda Bay might be under fire within twenty-four
hours: casualties continued to be heavy and most of the immobile
guns had been lost.

It seems that even before this message reached Cairo Wavell had
conferred with Admiral Cunningham, Air Chief-Marshal Tedder,
General Sir Thomas Blamey, and the Hon. Peter Fraser (Prime
Minister of New Zealand). The Australian General and the New
Zealand Minister naturally expressed their anxiety as to the fate of
their troops and the Admiral promised to prepare for the evacua-
tion of Crete, a precaution that could hardly be delayed. Early on
May 27th Wavell cabled home a description of the plight of Frey-
berg’s forces ; and, later in the day he received from London approval
for the step which had now become inevitable if all who remained on
the island were not to be sacrificed.

Surprising as it may seem reinforcements arrived in Crete during
the night of May 26th. D Battalion and the headquarters of Layforce
had left Egypt again at 5.30 a.m., conveyed in H.M.S. Abdiel and the
destroyers Hero and Nizam. After an uneventful passage they
landed at Suda just before midnight. A little later they were informed
that our troops were in retreat and that they—the new arrivals—
would form the rearguard.

ol 4 ]«
Retimo

ON May 21st there was again no attack either by air or sea upon
Georgeopolis. The 2/8th Battalion had already been moved west-
wards into the Canea sector and the 2/7th Battalion was to start that
night in the same direction, leaving Brigadier Vasey with a staff but
no fighting force. As we know, on the following day he was to be
found commanding his own troops in a position south-west of Canea.

At Retimo,! the operations planned by Colonel Campbell the pre-
vious evening to clear his flanks were duly delivered at dawn, the
2/1st Battalion going for Hill A on the east, and the 2/11th Battalion
attacking Hill B on the west.

At Hill A the Germans had been building up their strength during
the night, and our attack was answered by a German counter-assault
delivered with most effective support by the enemy’s mortars. The

1 See Map 12.

THE DAYS OF DECISION 249

Australians were checked and had to withdraw. Although the hill
remained under fire from our guns, Australian battalion head-
quarters was equally at the mercy of the German mortar fire. Soon
the Australians tried again and this time with success: by 10 a.m.
the hill was in our hands, together with some guns which we had lost,
and the Germans were retreating eastward towards the olive-oil
factory at Stavromenos, pressed by the Greek battalion which was
in support of the 2/Ist.

Hill B was captured without much difficulty, but the 2/11th
Battalion could make little further progress. The Germans were very
strongly established in the coastal village of Platanes, and their
machine-gun fire was more than our guns—lItalian trophies with
defective ammunition—could subdue. Then came a gratifying inter-
lude when a flight of Dorniers swept over and bombed the enemy,
and other German aircraft dropped supplies amongst the Austra-
lians. A Greek battalion which should have given support was
stopped by fire at a ravine south-east of Perivolia ; but by evening, after
making a wide detour, our allies reached a position overlooking
Perivolia from the south.

In the afternoon the Australians cleared the beaches between the
two hills and among their prisoners was Colonel Stumm, command-
ing the regiment which had launched the assault at Retimo. Further
inland, parties of the enemy had been at large, working through the
hill villages of Maroulas and Adhele, where they captured an
Australian advanced dressing station before being ambushed on
the northern side of Piyi.

The situation at Retimo at the end of the day might be called
satisfactory, in as much as the main enemy forces had been driven
in divergent directions, east and west; but our troops were running
short of ammunition and other supplies, and in view of the isolated
nature of their battle it was not easy to see how help could be sent.
The Germans in Perivolia cut off communication with Suda and the
west.

On May 22nd attacks were delivered against the enemy at Stav-
romenos, to the east,‘and at Perivolia ori the western side of the
airfield. The olive-oil factory at Stavromenos was treated to an
artillery and mortar bombardment which would have been heavier
had we possessed more ammunition. The attack, consisting of forty
Australians and 200 Greeks, went in at about 6 p.m. but could not
be pressed home against the stone walls of the factory. Eventually
the Greeks were left in observation while the Australians, who had
reached a position only forty yards from their objective, were with-
drawn to defences near the airfield.

I

250 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

At Perivolia the Australians fared badly. They were checked by
machine-gun fire east of the village and German fighter aircraft
then attacked them, one company losing fifty men out of 120. Mean-
while the Greeks had lost heavily in an attack upon a church, south
of the main road, which was occupied by a number of Germans.
The only luck that came our way in this locality during the day was
the surprising recovery of both ‘I’ tanks which had been lost on the
opening day of battle. Fresh crews were selected to drive and fight them.

On the morning of May 23rd Colonel Campbell agreed to a three
hours truce to enable both sides to bury their dead and collect their
wounded. There was good reason for this arrangement for here, as
elsewhere, the effect of hundreds of corpses exposed to the hot sun
was well nigh insupportable. When the truce expired, however,
Campbell was astonished to receive a demand from the commander
of the German troops at Stavromenos that he should surrender with
his entire force, on the grounds that the German attacks in other
sectors had met with complete success and that no purpose could
be served by prolonging the struggle here.

Campbell, being in complete control of his own sector, naturally
received the demand with contempt and, as soon as the envoy had
returned to the German lines, opened a fresh bombardment. He was
the more encouraged in his defiance by the fact that at the close
of the period of truce about seventy German walking wounded had
taken the opportunity to pass over into his lines. Their arrival seemed
to be an indication of declining morale and lack of adequate supplies
among the dwindling German force.

It clearly needed only a little more pressure to destroy the German
force around Stavromenos. But Campbell lacked the means to exert
just that additional pressure. He had been short of ammunition
almost from the first day, and he was fighting a lone isolated battle
in what had to be recognized as the least important of the three!
sectors. Even if he had enjoyed direct communication with either
Suda or Heraklion, which he did not, it was doubtful whether any
considerable reserves of guns or ammunition would have been avail-
able for him. For that reason he had to keep his force firmly in hand
and only take such action as was necessary to ensure the defence of
the airfield. He had now completely cleared up Hill A, where the
enemy had given so much trouble at the start of the battle. His
troops had buried 300 German corpses found on and around the
hill; another 200 had been buried at Hill B, further to the west.

If, however, the air strip was securely protected and the enemy

1 Three, bane the Maleme sector had been eliminated by the withdrawal
towards Canea.

THE DAYS OF DECISION 251

concentration at Stavromenos was being worn down, the powerful
centre of resistance at Perivolia showed no sign of weakening. The
Germans, variously estimated at 150 and 300, who had established
themselves in the church a little to the south of the village presented
an ideal targer for a bomber. But we had no bombers. Instead, Force
Headquarters, on the report of a liaison officer who had got through
to Suda, detached a company of the Rangers and a 2-pdr. gun from
the Canea-Suda area to dislodge the enemy. At 3 p.m. a message
was sent to Retimo to inform Campbell that this detachment was
on its way.

Towards evening enemy aircraft made a heavy attack upon
Campbell’s positions. No German reinforcements were flown in,
but supplies were dropped in considerable profusion, some of them
in the sea.

So in the Retimo area the enemy had made no headway, but he
could afford to wait. Our men were feeling the strain and food
supplies were becoming a real anxiety now that the rations that were
left had to be shared with so many German wounded and other
prisoners. ‘The situation remained that of a beleaguered garrison
whose fate depended mostly on events outside its own control.’

At dawn on May 24th the Rangers from Suda attacked the Ger-
‘mans in the church south of Perivolia. Seventy strong, the Londoners
were outnumbered probably by three to one, and such were the
difficulties of communication that neither the 2/11th Australian
Battalion nor the Greek troops knew that the attempt was to be
made. It failed—as it was bound to do—and the Rangers withdrew
by the way they had come, having established no contact with
Campbell’s forces, who were not seriously engaged during the day.

The Australians obtained some German supplies, here as .else-
where, by the pleasant expedient of signalling to enemy aircraft with
their own devices. But, since the positions of the enemy pockets of
resistance were now pretty well known to their higher Command,
the opportunities for profiting by this unintentional bounty were
diminishing. A small quantity of medical supplies was dropped by
our own aircraft on Saturday night, but the ration situation was by this
time getting acute. An attempt to supply the garrison by sea by means
of light coastal craft had to be abandoned owing to choppy weather.

Much bravery of an individual and unorthodox nature was shown
in this almost forgotten fighting around Retimo. The following
story of one old priest of the neighbourhood, who bore his part in
resisting the invader, is believed to be authentic.

A party of paratroops had seized a stone house in one of the
villages and converted it into a strong-post. From their refuge they

252 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

were machine-gunning anybody who appeared. Every attempt to
shift them had failed, but some method of forcing them into the
open had to be found. The priest ensconced himself in a house
opposite, armed with a rifle. Then he sent a small boy with a hive
of bees to creep up on the Germans’ retreat from behind. The boy
arrived at the house unobserved, climbed on to the roof and dropped
the hive down the chimney. Very soon, pursued by the enraged bees,
the Germans came racing into the street, and as they appeared the
priest picked several of them off.

Force Headquarters found that increasing pressure in the Canea-
Suda region prevented the despatch of a larger detachment to do
what the Rangers had failed to do, but Campbell was certainly
making the most of the resources at his command. At 4.30 a.m. on
May 25th the 2/11th Australian Battalion, with one tank, was to
have attacked the enemy south of Perivolia, but an accident to the
vehicle caused the operation to be postponed for twenty-four hours.
Later in the morning a captured German mortar was used to rout
out and drive towards the coast a party of forty Germans from a
spot south-east of Stavromenos.

Next day Colonel Campbell continued his operations in which
the two ‘I’ tanks were to play a part. These vehicles had gone through
a number of vicissitudes since the opening of the battle. Captured by
the Germans on the first evening they had been retaken two days
later ; both had since become ditched and the new driver of one of
them wounded.

At dawn on the 26th one tank went into action to help the 2/11th
Australian Battalion in its attack upon the Germans at Perivolia,
but the tank gun jammed and the effort failed. Shortly before noon,
however, the same tank with its gun in order again, took part in a
reconnaissance of the Stavromenos oil factory carried out by a com-
pany of the 2/1st Battalion. The small number of Germans defending
the building made a poor show of resistance and the Australians
seized it, taking forty wounded and forty unwounded prisoners.

The last remnant of Germans in this quarter, eighty strong, had
withdrawn to a headland a mile or so further east, where they were
kept under observation by a detachment of Cretan gendarmerie.
Colonel Campbell was not concerned to lose lives in eliminating a
force that constituted no further danger to him ; nor did he desire the
responsibility of supporting any larger number of prisoners. He already
held 500, and, as already noticed, the feeding of them was causing
him considerable embarrassment. He was worried by the shortage
of rations and by the persistence of rumours that the evacuation of
Crete by our forces was imminent. Since May 24th he had been out

THE DAYS OF DECISION 253

of touch with Force Headquarters, and with a view to obtaining
information (and also supplies) he had sent the quartermaster of
the 2/11th Australian Battalion to get what he could of both.

The quartermaster returned on the afternoon of May 26th with
more sustenance for the spirit than for the flesh. He reported that
at Headquarters there was no thought of evacuation and that rein-
forcements were to be expected; and he brought the first news of
the Rangers’ attack carried out on the 24th. The news of reinforce-
ments was encouraging, and when the second tank was hauled out
of its ditch and cajoled once more into running order Colonel
Campbell decided to deal with the outstanding German stronghold
at Perivolia on the following day.

Had the quartermaster left Suda even a few hours later, it is
inconceivable that he could have failed to bring back a very different
report of the shape of things to come.

[5 ]«
Heraklion

THE first day’s fighting at Heraklion’ had left the Germans with a
considerable footing over two miles east of the airfield, at a point
on the coast where they were out of range. They were in possession,
also, of the Greek barrack buildings south of the airfield, and they
controlled parts of Heraklion itself, as well as the beaches and
approaches to the town on the western side.

German air attacks began before 5 a.m. on May 21st and were
heavy and persistent enough to hamper our movements throughout
the day. Supplies were dropped from the air for the Germans, and
here, as in other places, our troops were able to secure a share by
making use of captured ground-to-air signals. Reports said that the
enemy had received supplies from small boats which had come into
the beaches west of Heraklion but this may not have been so. The
appearance of British warships off the coast at 7.30 a.m. was a
heartening sight.

Colonel Brauer who commanded the Parachute Regiment had
ordered a general attack upon the airfield just before midnight on
Tuesday. Orders to his scattered forces appear to have been slow
in getting through, for no attack developed until the morning of the
21st, and the whole operation consisted of independent efforts by
separate detachments sometimes of only platoon, strength.

1See Map 13. ;

254 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

Parties advanced from the east, making for East Ridge and the edge
of the airfield. A group at ‘Rattling Bridge’ was dispersed by our
artillery. Our ‘I’ tanks engaged with success light field guns along
the coastal road and brought effective fire to bear upon Germans
in East Wadi. In the afternoon Germans were rounded up at the
village of Prassas, and as the Australians had surrounded the Greek
barracks and cleared the ‘Charlies’ area, the airfield might be
accounted fairly secure. At about 5 p.m., however, a number of
German aircraft landed parachutists beyond East Beach where they
were reported to be laying out a landing strip.

An attack upon our road block at Knossos had been repulsed
with a loss to the Germans of thirty-five men.

Only in Heraklion town did the situation at any time look at all
dangerous. The Germans had one battalion on the outskirts of the
town and another some way away to the west covering the approaches
from that side. Both were out of touch with their regimental com-
mander, Colonel Brauer; but having intercepted during the morning
a wireless message ordering a general attack on the airfield with all
available forces on the eastern side, Major Schulz, who commanded
the battalion in the outskirts of the town, determined to deliver a
simultaneous attack.

Pressing in from the west and south, the Germans again reached
the harbour and captured most of the town. The Greek troops,
fighting from street to street, were running short of ammunition
and on the point of surrender; but they were encouraged to rearm
themselves with captured German weapons. Joined in the evening
by a platoon of the Leicestershire and a platoon of the York and
Lancaster they then succeeded in clearing the Germans from a great
part of the town.

Here as at Retimo the enemy was still very far from securing his
objective, and appeared to have little prospect of doing so without
substantial reinforcements. These could, of course, arrive by air. On
our side we had the advantage that Heraklion was not completely
isolated and even now reinforcement was at hand.

It was true that no British transport could venture within fifty miles
of Crete in daylight without risking attack from the air; but on the
southern side of the island the Ist Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders
had now arrived at Timbaki,! one of the few possible landing places
along that bareand inhospitablecoast. The battalion had been intended
to protect the plain of the Messara, over which brood the considerable
remains of the ancient Minoan hill fortress of Phaistos, and possibly
establish a landing ground for our aircraft there. But since the arrival

1 See Map 8.

THE DAYS OF DECISION 255

of another battalion—the 2nd Queen’s—of the 16th Brigade was
expected, it was decided that the Highlanders should move on across
the island to join Brigadier Chappel at Heraklion.

On the morning of May 22nd the town of Heraklion seemed free
from Germans, thanks to the efforts of York and Lancaster patrols
and parties of Greek soldiery. Those of the enemy who remained in
the barracks south of the airfield were eliminated. With the town
fairly secure and direct threat to the airfield removed, the prospect
seemed encouraging; but hostile snipers were active within our
perimeter and the Germans were still in considerable strength to
the eastward.

In this locality an attack, with tank support, was to have been .
delivered against the enemy’s machine-gun posts. Unfortunately the
traversing gear of one of the tanks was out of order and the engine
of the other seized when its radiator was pierced. Black Watch patrols
were busy near the airfield, but the Germans were too firmly en-
sconced at Rattling Bridge, East Wadi, and the ridge beyond the
wadi to be shifted by any means at our command. As the enemy had
penetrated into the hills south of our perimeter, a company of the
Leicestershire was moved eastward to reinforce the Black Watch.
Apex Hill was then cleared, and the remaining Germans in this area
surrendered when artillery fire was opened on them.

All our movements were harassed by air attack, and in the morn-
ing a troop-carrier had actually attempted to land on the airfield
under cover of a spray of machine-gun bullets from a fighter air-
craft. Both carrier and fighter were driven off by the fire of our
Bofors guns. The Germans dropped supplies to the east, south and
west outside our perimeter and also within it. Perhaps on this day
the Luftwaffe served us better than it did our opponents.

On at least one occasion Germans in the neighbourhood of
Heraklion were seen to be driving Cretan women and children in
front of them to shield their advance. The Greek commander there-
upon sent the enemy a message that if this practice did not cease,
all German prisoners in his hands would be executed. The message
had the desired effect.

The systematic burial of the dead, an important task, could no
longer be delayed. More than 950 Germans were thus disposed of
by us, and another 300 bodies were accounted for by the Greeks.

Thus passed another day on which we seem to have held our own.
Yet, in the evening, two further bodies of parachutists were dropped,
both coming down outside our perimeter. To the west of Heraklion
about 300 men descended, while another 500 came down somewhere
to the south-west of the airfield. This was sufficient indication that

256 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

the enemy by no means intended to abandon offensive action at
Heraklion.

And late that night German forces were reported to have estab-
lished themselves astride the road that runs from Heraklion to the
south coast where the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were
located and preparing to move northwards.

Our efforts to reinforce and sustain Crete continued, but with
little success. At 9.30 p.m. the 2nd Queen’s, with 16th Brigade head-
quarters, left Alexandria for Timbaki. On this night, too, No. 24
Squadron South African Air Force was to have flown to Crete on
a bombing mission, but bad weather kept the aircraft grounded at
their desert aerodrome.

Friday, May 23rd, proved to be an eventful day at Heraklion.
Aircraft dropped supplies to the Germans, and those in position east
of the airfield received further reinforcements by air. Our impression
that the enemy would hold fast on the west and south and make
his chief effort from the east was confirmed during the day by the
interrogation of prisoners as well as by observation. Two companies
of the Leicestershire made a reconnaissance of these eastern posi-
tions where many machine-guns but few Germans were discovered.

Some anxiety arose as to the state of affairs on the Timbaki road.
A ration truck sent to the road-block at Knossos had failed to get
through, and two trucks sent down to make contact with the Argyll
and Sutherland Highlanders were captured by the Germans. Then,
about noon, two ‘I’ tanks arrived unexpectedly from Timbaki with
the news that the Highlanders were on their way. These tanks being
under orders for Suda, were sent on by sea together with the one
tank still operating at Heraklion, and two field guns.

Earlier in the afternoon a single Hurricane from Egypt landed on
the airfield. The return of Noah’s dove can scarcely have brought
more hope to the inmates of the Ark than did this first token of the
return of R.A.F. fighter aircraft to active participation in the battle.
Even the fact that it was speedily destroyed on the ground by half a
dozen Messerschmitts could not dispel a wave of optimism among
the defenders. To them it seemed an indication that the tide of vic-
tory was now definitely flowing in their direction, although it was
actually ebbing, here as elsewhere.

About three hours later six more Hurricanes, following a dog-
fight over the town, came down to sanctuary upon the airfield. Four
of them had received minor damage, and it was not widely realized
at the time that they were all that remained of two squadrons which
had been ordered to Crete. It had been intended that they should
fly directly to Maleme to attack the German transport planes which

THE DAYS OF DECISION 257

were by that time arriving in untroubled succession on the airfield.
They had been diverted to Heraklion—probably a mistake although
they were too few in number to have affected the issue at Maleme.

The reappearance of the Hurricanes, which for the moment
raised unrealized hopes among the defenders of Crete, had been
made possible by the fitting of extra fuel tanks to enable them to
cover the 350 miles each way from their bases in the Western Desert
with a brief period of combat between arrival and departure.

It did not prove a success, and the following reasons, given by one
of the pilots to the writer of one account of the Battle for Crete,
explain why this was so:

The additional tanks gave the Hurricane a range of 900 miles com-
pared with the normal range of 600 miles. There were two additional
tanks—one port, one starboard. The port tank emptied first, then the
starboard tank. Air locks were liable to develop owing to bad refuel-
ling or severe bumps in the air and throw the system out of commis-
sion. You never knew when the port tank emptied if the starboard
tank was going to feed through. If your starboard tank refused to
work over the sea, that was the end.*

The Hurricanes had to shed their armour and reduce their ammu-
nition load to carry the special tanks. The extra fuel load also meant
a certain loss of power, and when they reached Crete they always
ran into formations of Messerschmitts which outnumbered and
could outpace, outclimb and outmanoeuvre them. In any case, the
British fighters were so few that they could do little to blunt the edge
of the Luftwaffe’s vicious attacks.

Following a heavy raid upon the town, the German commander
at 7 p.m. issued an ultimatum that Heraklion would be destroyed
unless the Greeks ceased resistance. The ultimatum was rejected,
but it was judged advisable to get the civilians away and this was
done, except for the inmates of the hospital which contained many
patients who could not be moved. The defence of Heraklion was
now taken over by two companies of the 2nd York and Lancaster,
a road-block being established west of the town.

It may here be recorded that next day German aircraft dropped
leaflets which threatened death to all Greeks who continued to resist.

Heraklion appeared to be of increasing importance now that the
Luftwaffe had demonstrated so unmistakably its command of the
air. Whether our troops were to be sustained and reinforced in their
defence of the island, or were to be brought away, the harbour at Suda,
which no ship could even approach by day without running a frightful
risk, could not be counted on. To use the tiny ports on the south

1 Hetherington, Airborne Invasion, p. 116.
1*

(258 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

coast also involved considerable hazard, but Timbaki was the only
one of these places which was connected to the north coast by a road
fit for motor transport. And this road led only to Heraklion.

At sea, on their way to Timbaki, the 2nd Queen’s and the head-
quarters of the 16th Brigade were ordered back to Alexandria early
in the afternoon of this day, the danger of attack from the air being
considered too great. This order was countermanded in the evening,
and the ships steered north again, but at midnight they received
fresh orders to return to Alexandria.

The Germans proceeded with an intermittent bombing of the
town all day on May 24th, and continued to drop supplies to their
troops both east and west of Heraklion. A considerable number—
perhaps a battalion—of paratroops came down on the west; but
patrols of the 2nd York and Lancaster discovered a hostile move-
ment from west to east on the landward side of our perimeter. There
seemed no doubt that the real build-up was to the east where the
enemy on the ridges beyond East Beach was considered to be too
powerfully established for our available troops to attack with any
prospect of success. Five of our Hurricanes, however, made a
number of sorties against these positions. German aircraft were now
making unopposed landings on the relatively smooth surface of
Mallia beach fifteen miles along the coast to the east—yet another
instance of the extent to which the enemy was dispensing with the
airfields which at one time had appeared to be essential to his success
in Crete. It was becoming clear that while Brigadier Chappel was
master in his own house, his writ did not extend any great distance
beyond it and that the new build-up by theenemy faraway to theeast was
probably in preparation for an Italian landing from the Dodecanese.

The extent to which our force at Heraklion, though successful in
the defence of the airfield and town, was gradually passing from the
role of besieger to that of besieged is shown by the difficulty which
the Argyll and Sutherland experienced in fighting their way through
to the perimeter.

Leaving one company to cover Timbaki and the potential landing-
ground at Ay Dheka near the south coast, the battalion by a forced
march north during Friday night had reached the approaches to the
perimeter west of Heraklion, only to find that, as had happened to
the Athenians of Nikias at Syracuse or the Gauls of Vercingetorix at
Alesia, an outer perimeter was growing up and that this must first be
forced. The new German arrivals by parachute dropped slap into
the battle that was in progress on this side, and their intervention
contributed to the repulse of the first attempt of the Highlanders to
break through.

THE DAYS OF DECISION 259

On May 25th the enemy made an assault upon Heraklion from the
west. He encountered two companies of the York and Lancaster and
one of the Leicestershire who counter-attacked with the support of
artillery and two light tanks. The Germans were driven from the
outskirts of the town, but fell back upon a strongly organized,
machine-gun defence which effectually checked the progress of our
men.

The Greeks who had been relieved of the responsibility for Herak-
lion were now reorganized as two battalions and located at Arkhaia
Knossos: they guarded the hospital and were charged with prevent-
ing the enemy from blocking the Knossos road.

The first party of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had
begun to enter the perimeter on this Sunday morning. The main
body of the battalion—really half the battalion—did not succeed in
getting through until a little before midnight. Only the carriers and
a few trucks came in by road, the others making their way across
the hills. The Highlanders were certainly a welcome reinforcement
and their arrival established the fact that the Heraklion garrison was
still in touch with the outside world.

During the night of May 25th/26th bodies of German troops,
using local mules for pack transport were moving in a wide arc from
the west to the east side of our perimeter. Perhaps the seaborne
Italian expedition from the Dodecanese was even now at hand.
Meanwhile, the Australians who were holding Apex Hill, two and
a half miles south of the airfield, found themselves cut off, and were
obliged to fight their way back to the Black Watch lines. They
arrived about 8.30 a.m. on the 26th having killed many Germans.

At 6.30 a.m. part of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had
been caught by the Germans on an open hillside east of Heraklion,
and suffered considerably from ground and air attacks. A counter-
attack by two companies of the Leicestershire miscarried, partly
owing to the activity of the German aircraft, so this quarter con-
tinued to give cause for anxiety all day.

The enemy certainly showed an increasing tendency to assume the
initiative, though he was still content to avoid a general engagement
and to strengthen his concentration about four miles to the south-
east of the airfield. He was by this time estimated to have not more
than 250 men still in position to the west of Heraklion (left there,
presumably, to mask the departure of the remainder and to prevent
us denuding the garrison of the town for operations elsewhere) ;
about 700 established across the road to the south near Knossos,
where the Greeks were engaged in desultory encounters ; and a force
of unknown size, but certainly considerably larger than either of

260 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

these two, away to the east. Here, where the Germans had been
daily reinforced by airborne troops since the original assault,
seemed to be the chief menace. An attack might be launched in
considerable force even before any Italians appeared.

And what of our reinforcements? At 7.30 p.m. on the previous
evening the 2nd Queen’s and 16th Brigade headquarters had again
embarked for Timbaki; but this, their last attempt to reach Crete,
ended in another failure. From 10.45 a.m. on the 26th the ships were
attacked again and again by dive bombers; frequent changes of
course brought no relief, and, after considerable damage had been
done to the landing craft, the order was given to return to Alexandria.

CHAPTER V

Evacuation

m»([1]«
The Road to Sphakia

AS already related, it was on May 27th that the authorities at Home
sent their approval for the evacuation of Crete. A provisional plan
had already been worked out for the withdrawal of the troops
engaged in the Maleme-Canea-Suda area: they were all to make for
Sphakia, the fishing village on the southern coast, by the rough
mountain road which provided their only line of retreat. It was
just a week since the first glider had drifted down towards the
Tavronitis river bed and the first paratroops had dropped from the
skies above Maleme and Canea.

General Weston, who commanded the rearguard, planned a
series of delaying actions while the main body made its way, largely
on foot, across the island to Sphakia. At least one advantage helped
to compensate for the many trials and tribulations of the retreat:
there was only a single road to follow through the mountains, so,
unless the enemy employed more parachutists, it would be difficult
for him to cut off the main body. It would be necessary for him to
deploy in order to force each rearguard position, for the nature of
the country rendered flank movements scarcely practicable.

A detachment of Layforce 200 strong took up a position during
the night of May 26th/27th in the town and docks of Suda, with
orders to fight a delaying action. The main body of Layforce, which
had just landed, was marched immediately to the Stilos area where,
with two ‘I’ tanks and three carriers it occupied the next rearguard
position. These commando troops, who had been trained for a very

1 The Germans, it appears from their official accounts, expected our force to

iu bee eastward from Suda and link up with Colonel Campbell’s force at
etimo.

261

262 ' THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

different purpose, were at some disadvantage, for they possessed no
artillery or mortars and only sixteen Bren guns. But they were coming
fresh into action.

Except for the gallant 200, and for various stragglers, Canea and
Suda were vacated by our forces during the night, but not without
some confusion, as more and more men took the route which led to
the south. Transport moved in haphazard fashion, and many of the
vehicles broke down upon the mountain road leaving stranded staff
Officers who sought to control and organize the column. The road
was so packed with refugees and stragglers that despatch riders found.
it difficult, if not impossible, to force a passage: hence it was that
General Weston was unable to exercise command over the whole
rearguard operations which were efficiently conducted, nevertheless
by the New Zealand and Australian commanders and Colonel
Laycock who worked well together.

The coastal defence and anti-aircraft guns had been destroyed and
the detachments ordered to Sphakia, their presence naturally in-
creasing the congestion on the road. From the Akrotiri peninsula
the men of the 151st Heavy A.A. Battery crossed Suda Bay in small
boats, since Suda was already in enemy occupation by the time they
had destroyed their guns. Gunners of the 20th Heavy A.A. Battery,
who had been given defence duties in Suda docks, found it hard to
believe that evacuation had been ordered and remained at the docks
with Laycock’s men.

Now our thoughts must turn to Force Reserve, made up, as will
be remembered, of the ist Welch Regiment, The Rangers, and the
Northumberland Hussars. This improvised ‘ brigade’ was commanded
by Lieut.-Colonel Duncan of the Welch, for Brigadier Inglis had
never been able to join it.

The advance continued through the night with the expectation of
coming upon and relieving the New Zealanders and Australians who
had already been withdrawn. Had the newcomers but known it,
there were no troops between them and the Germans who were about
to advance in vastly superior force.

About dawn of the 27th the Welch halted and took up a position
about a mile west of the outskirts of Canea, with the right of the
battalion resting on the coast. The Rangers were kept in close support
and the Northumberland Hussars, on the left, held the line of the
Mournies stream. The pressing need was to obtain contact with our

Own troops, but none of the patrols sent out for this purpose were
seen again. Already the Germans of No. 141 Mountain Regiment were
moving round the southern flank of Force Reserve.

EVACUATION 263

About 8 a.m. the enemy developed his frontal attack, putting in
Group Ramcke, No. 100 Mountain Regiment and No. 3 Parachute
Regiment—the greater part of a division of good German troops,
rested, well equipped and eager for action. Our men offered a stout

_Tesistance. All through the morning the struggle continued, but at
two o’clock in the afternoon the Germans broke through the sorely
harassed line of posts at three points and enteted Canea. At 6 p.m.
the mayor made a formal surrender of the town.

Even now an effort was made to withdraw our troops and reform
in front of Suda, but we had suffered too heavily and only a few
groups were able to break away. A party of the Welch, near the coast,
is known to have maintained the fight as late as the morning
of May 28th; but only about 150 men out of the 1,200 of Force
Reserve who had been engaged made their escape. The German
advance had been slowed and valuable time gained thereby, but the
price we paid was a grievous one.

Meanwhile No. 141 Mountain Regiment was pushing on south
of Canea in the direction of Suda. Here the Sth New Zealand
and 19th Australian Brigades had taken up a defensive position
along a slightly sunken road known as 42nd Street! which ran
between olive groves about a mile west of Suda. On came the
German vanguard, a battalion strong, hastening forward some-
what incautiously in its desire to maintain close contact with
its retreating enemy and perhaps paying insufficient attention
to the possibility of an ambush or counter-attack. It may well be
that the Germans did not expect to encounter any serious resistance
at this stage. Between ten and eleven o’clock that morning they came
up against the positions held by the New Zealanders and Australians.

Without waiting for the attack to develop in force the Maori
battalion and 2/7th Australian Battalion went in to counter-attack
with the bayonet.

No one quite knew how it started. Some thought the New Zea-
land battalion was the first to go forward, some thought the Austra-
lian. In any case it seems that there was a degree of spontaneity about
it. Captain Rangi Royal of the Maori battalion was seen to leap up
on the side of the sunken road, brandishing his revolver and waving
his men on. In a few minutes the whole line was scrambling
forward.

It was one of those surprises which are liable to upset the balance
of any advancing force. Without help from the air, without any pre-
liminary bombardment, without much supporting fire, the Austra-
lians and New Zealanders flung back the German vanguard for as

1See Map 11.

264 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

much as a mile and a half, inflicted upwards of 150 casualties
and captured a quantity of material.

The official German account of this action is somewhat sketchy,
but admits that the fighting was fierce and costly—‘every tree had
to be fought for’—and that heavy casualties were suffered by the
battalion. By the afternoon the enemy was established on the high
ground south-east of Canea, but all thought of rushing Suda that
day was abandoned by him. He contented himself with keeping our
positions under heavy fire from machine-guns and mortars.

But the frontal attack from the direction of Canea was not the
only threat which the New Zealand and Australian rearguard had
to face that day, for the turning movement by No. 85 Mountain
Regiment (Colonel Krakau), now constituted a grave menace to the
southern flank and rear of the two brigades.

It will be remembered that this force had been despatched by General
Ringel with the object of getting to Stilos as speedily as possible and
from that point establishing a position astride the line of our retreat
a mile or two to the east in the direction of Neon Khorion. As in the
case of the German airborne landing at Corinth, which strove to cut
off the retreat of our forces from Greece, this attempt came just about
twenty-four hours too late to achieve any important success. For
this the chief credit must go to the magnificent defence put up by
No. 8 Greek Regiment at Alikianou. For three days (May 23rd-
25th) they had stubbornly resisted first the paratroops, then No. 100
Mountain Regiment and finally No. 85 Mountain Regiment.

Since no progress could be made until Alikianou had been taken
the German command laid on a set-piece attack for the morning of
May 26th. For half an hour the village was heavily dive-bombed ; then
the German mountain infantry moved forward: They found Alikianou
deserted. The Greeks had quietly slipped away into the hills during
the night. It had been a model resistance, holding up strong German
forces for several valuable days and eventually leaving them to spend
their full-scale attack upon a deserted position.

It is a flattering reflection that contemporary German accounts
assumed that Alikianou had been held by a British detachment
throughout these days.

After occupying the abandoned village, Colonel Krakau’s force,
accompanied by a mule train, began to push eastwards across the
foothills. The resistance at Alikianou had suitably impressed the
enemy, and the commander of the leading battalion was surprised
not to encounter any British troops on the heights above the village.
The Germans pushed on, but moving, as has been indicated, against
the grain of the mountain ridges, and constantly harassed by guerrillas,

EVACUATION 265

they only succeeded in covering five miles of up-and-down going in
the course of the day. At nightfall they were not yet round the
southern flank of our position.

Even so, the Germans had made enough progress to compel the
withdrawal of the Australian and New Zealand brigades. General
Weston brought them back during the night to the neighbourhood
of Stilos.

In the Suda docks area Laycock’s detachment had been engaged
with parties of Germans, but managed to break contact at nightfall
and then to retire upon the defile at Beritiana where it joined another
detachment of Layforce, something over a company strong, and also
two companies of the 28th (Maori) Battalion under Captain Rangi
Royal, one of the heroes of the 42nd Street action. The Maoris had
been retained to strengthen this position when their own Sth New
Zealand Brigade was withdrawn to Stilos.

The main body of Layforce was now located at the village of
Babali Khani, three miles further back on the road to Sphakia. The
4th New Zealand Brigade was making for Askifou where a high
valley, called ‘the Saucer’ because of its shape, lay deep among the
mountains—a tempting landing-ground for German parachutists
intent upon the interception of our retreat. North of the Saucer
General Weston had his headquarters for a time. Force Headquarters
was making for Sphakia so that General Freyberg could control the
arrival and disposal of his troops and their embarkation.

Wireless contact with Middle East Command had broken down in
the course of the day, though not before a signal had been received
from Wavell confirming approval of the evacuation and Freyberg
had given an outline of his plans. He reckoned to have ready to
embark on the night of May 28th/29th about 1,000 men, and on the
three succeeding nights, 6,000, 5,000, and 3,000. At this time it was
hoped that a large contingent of the force at Retimo might reach
Sphakia. Freyberg was giving priority to the wounded, then to the
fighting troops, those units which had been longest in action re-
ceiving special consideration.

Since Sphakia was to be the final location of Force Headquarters
the Naval Officer in Charge at Suda had sent a wireless set by motor
launch to ensure communication. The launch never reached Sphakia.
It was seen by the Germans and sunk by air attack.

On the morning of Wednesday, May 28th Freyberg reported to
Middle East Command from his rudimentary Headquarters at
Sphakia,! using an R.A.F. wireless set, the only one available.

1 Some of his staff officers and part of his headquarters personnel were still on
their way across the mountains.

Caney; MAP No. 14.
Sweckuda sp, THE ROAD TO SPHAKIA
y
AY

. SCALE MILES

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EVACUATION 267

He asked if embarkation could be expedited: it had proved im-
possible to break contact with the enemy, and it was most unlikely
that resistance could be prolonged until the night of May 31st/June
Ist: only the New Zealanders and Australians were able to find
detachments fit to fight: at a generous estimate the combatant
troops now numbered less than 2,000 with three guns, a total of
140 rounds of gun ammunition, and three light tanks': tomorrow
night (29th/30th) would be the last chance to get the troops away:
there were many unarmed stragglers: every effort would be made
to embark the fighting troops tomorrow, and any left over would
be directed to Port Loutro for evacuation on the following night.

But the main effort of the Mediterranean Fleet was directed that
night to Heraklion, where were concentrated five battalions whom
it might prove impossible to rescue if their evacuation were to be
postponed for even another twenty-four hours. Somehow General
Weston would have to hold off the enemy pursuit to Sphakia
throughout the whole of Wednesday and Thursday.

The most immediate threat that morning came from the German
mountain troops who for the past two days had been moving across
our southern flank in the direction of our line of retreat to Sphakia.
They had just failed to reach Stilos on the previous evening, but at
about 5.30 on Wednesday morning they moved forward against the
remnants of Hargest’s Sth New Zealand Brigade and the 2/7th
Australian Battalion which had reached the village during the night.

The Anzacs were ready to receive the complete mountain battalion
which seems to have been committed to the attack, and repulsed it
without much trouble. The Germans remained in contact and it was
clear that the position could not be held for long without supporting
artillery. A message was sent back to the 4th New Zealand Brigade,
now at Askifou over sixteen miles south along the road, asking that
three of the four guns there should be sent forward. When this proved
impossible, Hargest and Vasey, using the discretion which was
allowed them in view of the conditions of the retreat, decided to
break off the action and continue the retirement by day. This in-
volved considerable risk, but the troops were considered to be in no
condition to fight all day and march by night. And for once we were
lucky. The Luftwaffe failed to put in appearance in strength,
although the weather was clear and bright. German air activity was
on a notably diminished scale throughout the day in this area, being
primarily concentrated against the defenders of Retimo and Heraklion.

The withdrawal of the Anzacs, which began at about 10 a.m. left
the detachment at Beritiana, two or three miles further north, in a

' This proved something of an underestimate.

268 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

precarious position. No message seems to have been despatched, or
at any rate received, at Beritiana, informing the troops there of the
enemy concentration against Stilos and our imminent withdrawal
from the village.

The force at Beritiana had troubles of its own to face, quite apart
from the uncovering of its rear at Stilos. As early as 6 a.m. a specially
formed pursuit detachment had begun to advance from the north.
This detachment had been given the task of following up the retreat
by the coast road and clearing a way through to Retimo and Herak-
lion. It was composed of fresh troops who had not yet been in action
—one motor-cycle battalion, one mountain battalion, some moun-
tain batteries and a section of engineers for dealing with demolitions.
On any ground where it could find room to deploy it would obviously
be able to overwhelm the weak rearguard detachments opposed to it.

A powerful attack was delivered with mortar and artillery support.
All through the morning the defenders held their own, but by noon
the enemy succeeded in dislodging them. The two Maori companies
fought their way back, covering a distance of twenty-four miles
before they rejoined the main body. In the process they only lost two
men killed and they managed to bring back their eight wounded.
The Layforce detachment was much less fortunate. It was completely
cut off by the German mountain troops, who had now established
themselves in a dominating position at Stilos. Laycock himself and
his brigade-major managed to get away by driving slap through and
over the Germans in one of the two tanks that had remained with
the rearguard. Later they rejoined the main body further back,
driving in with their tank still swathed in its camouflage netting.
For the fate of the remainder who survived we have only the German
Official account, but it appears that they were all rounded up and
captured.

The enemy advancing by the road, now made contact with No. 85
Mountain Regiment, which had made the long cross-march over the
ridges. An advanced party was pushed on ahead to clear the next
rearguard position. Now that the Beritiana detachment had been
annihilated or dispersed and the two nominal brigades which had
been in position at Stilos were withdrawing southward towards the
Askifou valley, the main body of Layforce just north of Babali Khani
formed the rearguard. It had the 2/8th Australian Battalion in sup-
port, and also enjoyed the assistance of one of the very few remaining
‘T’ tanks. So long as this force remained in position it blocked the
main routes to both Retimo and Sphakia, for the road fork was four
miles further on.

The Germans delivered their assault early in the afternoon. A

EVACUATION — 269

motor-cycle company led the way, followed by engineers, artillery,
anti-tank guns and infantry. Attempts to rush the position failed in
the face of steady rifle fire, and the motor-cyclists, who, as was not
unusual, took the first knock, seem to have suffered heavily. The
solitary tank did good service in holding off the German infantry ;
then German reinforcements arrived in the shape of a battalion of
No. 85 Mountain Regiment. This battalion endeavoured to work
round the western flank of the defence, while our men were pinned
down by mortar fire from in front, but the Australian battalion,
which was fed into the line company by company, countered this
threat. So, although very hard pressed at times, Colonel Laycock’s
force was able to hold on until nightfall. As on previous occasions,
our troops endeavoured to make up for their lack of fire power by
local counter-attacks, usually in platoon strength but sometimes with
parties of seven or eight men, wherever the enemy had worked in to
close quarters. Our position had been well chosen, and the German
commander, in his report of the battle, complained that his artillery
support was ineffective owing to the difficulty of obtaining observation.
And again it may be noted that the German infantry showed to no
particular advantage in battle when lacking the close support of the
Luftwaffe; and the small-scale counter-attacks undertaken by Lay-
force at dusk effectively discouraged the enemy from engaging in
night operations.

Layforce had held the position for as long as had been planned.
Shortly after 9 p.m. the troops began to pull back, and, leaving road-
blocks to delay the enemy pursuit, moved off towards the concentra-
tion point at the Askifou ‘Saucer’. The Germans made no attempt
to follow up.

While Layforce was engaged in this successful rearguard action on
Wednesday afternoon the bulk of our forces continued the retreat
along the via dolorosa that led southwards to Sphakia and—perhaps
—to safety. For most of the men taking part it was now a test of sheer
endurance. For only a small proportion was there any longer a ques-
tion of fighting. The remainder had just to keep footslogging along
the stony mountain road, with stiff and aching limbs, with broken
boots and with a torturing over-powering thirst; for there were no
streams and only occasional wells along this mountain route. Often
when a body of men reached one of these wells and clustered round
to fill their water-bottles if they had them—empty bully-beef tins if
they had not—the cry would go up ‘Jerries overhead!’ and all would
fall flat on their faces, hoping the enemy pilots had seen nothing. To
run for cover was the greatest mistake; it merely drew the attention
of the hostile aircraft.

270 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

This is how it appeared on that Wednesday, May 28th, to Dr.
Theodore Stephanides who took part in the withdrawal to Sphakia:

_ On our way I noticed that though the men around us were strag-
gling along anyhow, they did not seem too depressed on the whole;
many of them would crack an occasional joke or sit down at the side
of the road for a quiet cigarette. As a matter of fact, it had not occurred
to me that this was the first lap of a wholesale evacuation. I thought
that we were ‘only retiring to another defensive position prepared in
advance’ owing to a temporary reverse, and that long-range fighters
would reach us somehow to enable us to clear the Germans out of
the island. It certainly never entered my head that it was we who were
being turned out....

. we Saw units withdrawing in perfect order with their Tifles and all
their equipment. They were marching in sections, generally in single
file owing to the terrain, under their officers and N.C.O.s, who ordered
them when to scatter and take cover and when to reform. It was very
heartening to watch the calm and competent way they went aboutit....

Enemy air activity became more marked about this time, and
suddenly we heard a loud droning from over the hills to the north-
east. Then thirty or forty planes swept unexpectedly out of the skies,
and after bombing the village we had just left, swooped roaring in our
direction . . . fortunately we saw an old disused limekiln a few yards
away and tumbled into it just in the nick of time. The upper part of this
kiln had collapsed, but the bottom was some four feet below the
surface of the ground and filled with a dense tangle of weeds and
brambles, into which we burrowed and lay hidden. We were a hundred
yards or so from the main road, and a small group of houses which
the Germans, for some reason or other, began bombing and machine-
gunning with great persistence although, as far as I could see, there
was nothing to warrant such an expenditure of munitions.

For minute after minute, each one of which seemed an hour, that
heart-stopping racket went on. Our refuge heaved and rocked and I
was afraid that it would cave in on us; every now and then chunks
of earth and stones spouting up from the explosions rattled on our
steel helmets, and although we were below ground level the blast was
so strong that it felt like a thump in the solar plexus. .

Time seemed to have been petrified . . . but at last, after what seemed
an age, the planes departed and we crept dazedly into the open and
resumed our march. Two or three houses which had just been strafed
were on fire and sending up thick columns of smoke, there was a
number of huge craters on and around the road and one smashed
truck with its driver lying dead beneath it. That, as far as I could see,
was the total result of all that late sound and fury.

Soon heads began to appear from all sorts of unexpected hiding-
places, followed cautiously by their owners, and the southward retreat
continued as before.'

And here is the impression of Captain Peter McIntyre, New
Zealand Official War Artist, of the same agonizing period:

1 Stephanides, Climax in Crete, pp. 113-120.

EVACUATION 271

As far as one could see, a long straggly line of men trudged up the
mountain, and all along the roadside men lay exhausted. The planes
were circling now, so we left the road and clambered up from the
floor of the ravine below, where the rocks and trees gave some sort
of cover. Single file, the endless line climbed up and up. Men lay
asleep or done up across the track, but the others just stepped over
them and on. The track was strewn with gear—empty water-bottles,
pieces of webbing, greatcoats.

‘Sometimes down the face from the rock the wreckage of army
trucks would be strewn where they had plunged headlong off the road
when attacked by bombers. You would notice dimly the personal
gear strewn around these trucks—a mess tin, a pocket book, a
photograph, or an Australian hat.

A song kept humming through my head. Gradually I became more
conscious of it. I could swear I had heard snatches of it whistled from
the columns in the valley. The song of the retreat, ‘Waltzing Matilda’
—tridiculous in a way and quite inappropriate but somehow expres-
sive of the hopes of these men, hopes of seeing Australian homes or
New Zealand homes again. The broad Aussie hat lying by the broken
truck sent it through my mind again. ‘ You’ll come a waltzing Matilda,
with me?’ Still, the ravine wound up and up. Legs were like lead now,
and you trudged in a foggy coma, conscious only of aching feet and
the raw patch on your hip where the rifle chafed. The sweat ran down
your face and stung your cracked lips. Sometimes a creaking wise-
crack would come from somewhere down the column.

Once, out of a fog of tiredness I became conscious of a bewildering
sight. There in the midst of a retreating army was a young girl, a
pretty blonde, no more than seventeen, with her hair down and
carrying a rifle. The men stared in curiosity as they passed, but in
their weariness they made scarcely a comment. Only one, a New
Zealander with an inch of stubble on his grimy face, raised his hand
in salutation. Who she was, or whether she ever got through to the
coast, we never knew.

At last, at weary last, there was the top of the pass. Below us and
ahead lay a beautiful plain like a cup in the mountains. There were
green fields in a vari-coloured pattern and little white villages clustered
under the edge of the hills. Across the plain, the khaki columns crept
like ants making thin wavering lines into the distance. We came on
a line of huge forests. Other armies must have passed through here
in some forgotten age. In the intervening years this ‘happy valley’
could have seen but little of passing life, lying as it did high and remote
in the mountains. Now it was witness of the British Empire fighting
its rearguard action for life. It saw dive-bombers and the hurtling trucks
and heard the rattle of machine-guns. Civilization had caught up withit.

There were wells here and cold water, giving wonderful relief to
taging thirsts. You gurgled it down, letting it spill over and run down
your chest. Then . . . sling your rifle again and march, march. The
plain narrowed at the far end into another pass, and the bombers were
pasting it. The line of men would move on and up, and then the planes
would come and the line of khaki would melt into the rocks. The
crash of bombs echoed through the mountains. Huge clouds of smoke
and dust belched upwards from the passes.

272

THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

Somewhere here, two of us, a red-headed Irishman called Barry
Michael and myself became separated from the rest of our squad. Too
tired to care we went on. All through the hot afternoon we dragged.
Once we had to crouch under some boulders while the planes bombed
all around us. I remember looking up once to see three great bombers
sweeping over the hilltop straight for us. We saw the bomb leave its
rack. ‘Jesus!’ said Mick, and we tried to melt under the stones.

The crash came almost as a relief, for it was yards away on the
hillside.

‘ And to think right now I might be sitting in a Dannevirke pub, ’ says
the Irishman.

By dark we were marching down through a great chasm in the
mountains. Below the road, the cliff fell away sheer to the depths of
the ravine. Down there we could see another line of men straggling

‘down to the sea. With the darkness came the longing for sleep. Your

feet seemed to move mechanically. Your whole body ached. The rifle
had become an impossible leaden weight and the webbing chafed
until on your hips and shoulders there were raw patches. We had’
had little sleep in over a week. Nerves were ragged, and we had seen
little enough food even in the first days and scarcely any at all in the
last three days. We had marched at a hard pace all through the night,
through the next day, and into the night without more than a few
ten-minute rests.

Thoughts were muddled and senseless now, drifting in irrelevant
fashion to things years back. Tempers flared up out of tiredness. I
remember threatening to swipe Mick when he brushed against me.
The things around me, the dark pine trees against the sky, began to
fade. I remember crashing in the ditch beside the road. I could hear
the feet tramping just beside my head, but could feel nothing. I felt
myself sinking into deep luxury.

The will to live, the instinct for survival, seems to rise in aid of a
man when most needed and becomes the dominating thought and
driving force. I could not have slept more than an hour until I was
awake again to find the faithful Mick in the ditch beside me. The
heavy tramp of feet and the silent mass of men that streamed past
brought back that clear thought, ‘Get to the coast!’, and we dragged
ourselves, numb and heavy, into the column.

Of the next hours I have no recollection whatever, except of an
all-enveloping thirst, until next morning when we climbed into a hole
in the cliff-face.

om [2 ]«

Passage from Heraklion

BRIGADIER Chappel’s position was by no means an easy one.
During the night of May 26th/27th he explained his problem in a
message to Middle East Command whence it could be transmitted
to Creforce, for Chappel had no direct communication with
Freyberg.

EVACUATION 273

Briefly we could defend the existing perimeter, which was exposed
to the enemy’s fire, but were powerless to prevent his reinforcement
by air so that our position might eventually become untenable; we
could attempt to clear the roads to the west and the south-east but
there was little object in trying to do so unless reinforcements or
supply columns could be sent in by these routes ; or we could launch
an attack upon the principal German concentration, to the south-
east near the village of Elia, which would be a hazardous operation
with the forces available.*

During May 27th, Middle East Command provided the answer to
the problem, and the answer was contained in one word—evacuation.
This news was not at once made known to the troops who were
ordered to act aggressively as opportunity offered.

German air attacks occurred at intervals during the day, and a
convoy of trucks which it was hoped could be rushed through to the
south was held up by the enemy at Knossos. From 8.30 a.m. onwards
German supplies and reinforcements were dropped to the west and
the east—but mostly to the east—of our positions, and East Hill and
‘Charlies’ were shelled. The 2/4th Australian Battalion and the
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders sent out fighting patrols to
investigate German activity at Apex Hill which was shelled by our
artillery.

During the afternoon two Hurricanes landed on the airfield, but
one sustained damage when it attempted to take off again.

On May 28th, Admiral Cunningham decided that the Heraklion
garrison—five battalions and twenty-four guns—must be evacuated
that night and Brigadier Chappel was so informed by Middle East
Command. Orders were then issued and preparations began.

An exceptionally heavy air attack was delivered during the after-
noon, and evidence seemed to be accumulating that the very next day
might see a ground offensive launched in force from the east. On the
morrow, indeed, the first Italian troops were to land in the eastern
part of Crete. The Italian commander in the Dodecanese had offered
to participate with his forces as early as May 22nd; this offer, which
was referred upward until it reached Field-Marshal Goering, was
accepted, and the Italians had been asked to undertake the occupa-
tion of the eastern part of the island. Meanwhile Colonel Brauer was
hastening his preparations for the assault upon the Heraklion air-
field, but was compelled to report that he would not be ready before
the afternoon of the 29th.

The Gernians flew in substantial reinforcements during May 28th.
Our estimate was that two battalions were dropped to the east of the

1 See Map 13.

274 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

perimeter, about seventy troop-carriers being employed. One carrier
came down near Apex Hill. The hospital at Knossos, hitherto res-
pected by the enemy, was heavily mortared and machine-gunned ;
and when a protest was made the excuse was given that the place was
being used as an artillery observation post. This, of course, was not
the case ; it seems that the Germans were stung to this act of savagery
by the good shooting of our gunners.

The hospital at Knossos was isolated and practically surrounded
so there could be no thought of bringing the wounded away when the
garrison embarked. Likewise, a platoon of the Black Watch, holding
a road-block in the vicinity, had to be left to shift for themselves ;
and the Greek troops had taken to the hills and were out of touch
with our command. With these exceptions, the garrison was con-
’ centrated in an inner perimeter which the York and Lancaster would
hold as a covering position, being the last troops to leave. By employ-
ing delayed-action fuses, it was arranged to explode an ordnance
dump and a petrol dump—not before 6 a.m. on May 29th.

The cruisers Orion, Ajax and Dido, and the destroyers Hotspur,
Decoy, Kimberley, Hereward, Jackal and Imperial had sailed from
Alexandria at 6 a.m. on the 28th. In negotiating the 25-mile wide
Caso Strait the ships had to run the gauntlet of air attacks as was
expected; and about 9 a.m. Ajax was so narrowly missed by a bomb
that a fire was started and she was ordered back to Alexandria with-
out completing the passage to Heraklion. It was not until 11.30 p.m.
that the remainder of the fleet arrived off the port. Only three and a
half hours remained to carry out the embarkation before the ap-
proach of daylight would compel the ships to leave. The Navy lost
no time. While the cruisers lay outside the harbour the destroyers
went in to the main jetty and acted as lighters, ferrying the troops to
the cruisers before taking in their own complements. In this fashion
Brigadier Chappel’s entire force, over 4,000 strong, was embarked,
and the ships sailed at 3 a.m. on the morning of May 29th.

So far all had gone well. The enemy had made no sign. The first
mishap was that to the destroyer Imperial, whose steering gear broke
down as the result of the bombing attacks during the outward
passage. She was abandoned and sunk, the ship’s company and the
troops being transferred to the destroyer Hotspur. Then, soon after
sunrise, when the ships had entered Caso Strait, the Luftwaffe struck
and struck again. Hereward was hit and forced to steer for the Cretan
coast where she ran aground, most of those on board eventually
becoming prisoners of war. Damage to the Decoy caused speed to be
reduced to 25 knots, and the cruiser Dido was also hit. During re-
peated attacks the Orion, which carried 1,100 troops, was hit three

EVACUATION ' 275

times, losing her captain and 90 others killed and 275 wounded: one
bomb passed through the bridge of this cruiser and exploded in the
stokers’ mess deck. Yet, so damaged as to be almost out of control,
she staggered on towards Alexandria.

The ships were picked up by Fulmars of the Fleet Air Arm shortly
before noon, and the German attacks, in which it was reckoned that
over 100 aircraft were employed, gradually died away. We had
suffered a grievous loss in troops and seamen—over one hundred
killed and more than three hundred wounded—while the damage
done to the ships caused difficulties in completing the evacuation
which, with the departure from Heraklion, had only begun.

It was particularly galling to have to pay such a heavy price for
the extrication of our troops from Heraklion, after the smoothness
with which the assembly at the harbour and the actual embarkation
had taken place. However, taken as a whole, Heraklion may be
regarded as the most satisfactory of the three engagements which
make up the Battle for Crete. The garrison had most effectively de-
feated the German airborne attack on the opening day and then, for
the remaining eight days, had maintained itself and defended the air-
field by vigorous action against ever increasing numbers of the
enemy.

[3 ]«
The End at Retimo

As we know, at Retimo,! Colonel Campbell’s main preoccupation
was to re-establish contact with the outside world. Attempts to drop
him supplies from the air during the night of the 26th/27th failed
because there were no ground flares, and without these to guide them
the pilots could not locate our positions.

The fresh attack upon the German stronghold at Perivolia, which
cut our communications to the west, was duly delivered at dawn of
the 27th, but met with no success. One of our tanks had its track
smashed by a mortar bomb, and the other was penetrated by an
armour-piercing shell and set on fire; even so, two companies of the
2/11th Australian Battalion almost got to grips with the Germans
before they were pinned down by such a volume of machine-gun fire
that they could not stir before dark. Also, they were attacked from
the air.

At 3 a.m. on May 28th, however, two companies of Australians
forced their way into Perivolia and killed about eighty Germans

before they withdrew.
1 See Map 12.

276 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

During the night a landing craft had arrived from Suda with a
cargo of two days’ urgently required rations. But it brought no
message regarding evacuation, although orders to that effect had
been issued by Force Headquarters on the morning of the 27th, and
a column of men was already streaming southward. Actually the
landing craft had made too hurried a departure from Suda on the
previous evening. General Freyberg did send an officer down to
the harbour after the decision to evacuate was made known; but
the vessel had already departed for Retimo. It seems that Colonel
Campbell’s detachment was dogged by sheer bad luck. Force Head-
quarters, arriving at Sphakia on May 28th, learned with concern
that no instructions regarding evacuation had been sent to Retimo;
and from Sphakia to Retimo there was no means of communication.
All that could be done to remedy this disastrous omission was to
signal Middle East Command a request that an aircraft be sent to
fly over Retimo and drop a message instructing Campbell to prepare
for evacuation as soon as possible: to begin a withdrawal that night
on Plaka,’ fifteen to twenty miles to the south across the mountains,
where his troops would be embarked ; to occupy concealed positions
at Plaka by first light on May 31st; and to hand over all German
prisoners to the Greeks.

It was also suggested that a sum of £1,000 in drachmas should be
dropped as a practical means of assisting stragglers, who might be
unable to rejoin the main body, to escape subsequently by caique.
This constitutes probably the first instalment of the many sub-
sidies that were introduced into Greece by ‘irregular’ means in the
course of the next few years. Not all of them served so useful a

ose.

On this day Colonel Campbell was interested to learn from a
B.B.C. broadcast that ‘the situation in Crete is extremely precarious’.

Next day, Thursday, May 29th, an aircraft from Egypt flew over
the Retimo position and dropped a message bidding the garrison
evacuate, couched in slang phraseology that would not be com-
prehensible to the Germans if they should pick it up. There is no
evidence that this message was ever found. In the evening a Hurricane
was sent with a further message. But with so many Messerschmitts
roaming the air above Crete it is not surprising that the solitary
Hurricane did not return.

That day the Germans began to close in from the west. A body of
their motor-cyclists entered Retimo during the afternoon, and made
contact with the Germans at Perivolia. Even the little force on the
headland far away to the east moved forward to take up fresh positions

1 See Map 8.

EVACUATION 277

before dark. During the night the four Greek battalions which had
been stationed in the centre between the two Australian battalions
slipped away into the hills. The end was at hand.

Colonel Campbell’s force was indeed in an impossible position. Of
his original numbers, about 1,000, with which he had started to give
battle he had lost a comparatively small proportion, but he had
rations for only one more day and he had no clue at all to the situa-
tion in other parts of the island, and did not know whether his force
would be able to march or fight its way to the south coast. And so
signals were sent out to sea during the night in the hope that they
might attract the attention of some stray British craft.

But by this time there were no British ships anywhere in the waters
to the north of Crete.

The end came on the morning of Friday, May 30th. After dawn
German army trucks could be seen pouring out along the road from
Retimo to Perivolia. They could only have come from the Canea
sector, and this was the first definite indication to Colonel Campbell
that our resistance in that quarter had entirely ceased.

Lacking any orders, Campbell still maintained his purpose to
continue the defence of the airfield. With the exception of one
Company of the 2/11th Battalion, which was left to fight a holding
action at Perivolia and was overrun by sheer weight of numbers and
metal, he withdrew all his remaining force to a smaller perimeter in
the immediate vicinity of the landing-ground. But the Germans came
on. There were two tanks and several field guns with the advanced
force; and as Campbell grimly noted that they were moving to the
south, taking up the positions formerly held by the Greeks, he knew
that his situation was hopeless.

Resistance could not, in the opinion of the garrison commander,
have been prolonged for more than another hour, in view of the
commanding position which the German tanks and guns would be
able to take up and his own shortage of ammunition. The chances of
getting through to Sphakia (for Campbell had heard nothing of the
plan to evacuate his force from Plaka Bay), were extremely slight. It
was a three-day march, even if the way were clear, and his men had
no rations beyond that day. Nor was it possible, owing to the lack of
communications, to pass any quick messages through to the forward
companies telling them to attempt to fight their way through.

Campbell had no alternative.

He was himself in personal command of the 2/1st Battalion and he
sent a message through to the commander of the 2/11th. °

‘I am going to capitulate’ it read. ‘I advise you to do the same.
Destroy all weapons you possibly can.’

278 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

Then he drank the bitterest cup of war. Accompanied by two of his
officers, he walked forward under a white flag and gave in his
surrender.

The commander of the 2/11th Battalion, called a conference of his
senior officers. They discussed the alternatives of fighting it out,
surrendering or taking to the hills. The first was ruled out as useless,
considering the positions which the Germans had already estab-
lished. Even while the officers conferred, mortar shells were bursting
all round battalion headquarters. The troops were recommended to
surrender or to attempt to make their escape in small parties.

A fair proportion chose the latter and, helped and fed by the
Cretans, managed to get through eventually to the south coast.

Of the 1,000 who formed the Retimo garrison on May 20th about
160 had been killed in action; 140 made good their escape, the
remaining 700 were taken prisoner.

One can feel only deep sympathy for Colonel Campbell and his
gallant troops. The Retimo garrison had done all, and in fact more
than could be expected of it. Though lacking anti-aircraft guns it had
successfully frustrated the airborne assault upon the landing-ground
and, though seriously short of ammunition and supplies of every
kind, it had driven the invaders beyond mortar-range of the ground
and had contained them there. It had killed about 700 Germans, a
high proportion of the total of enemy dead in the whole of Crete.
The ten days fighting at Retimo ended in surrender only because the
battle had been lost elsewhere.

Part of the German column from Suda continued eastward from
Retimo and reached Heraklion on the afternoon of May 30th, 36
hours after our garrison had left. A motor-cycle detachment pushed
on eastward again, and on the same night met Italian troops on the
Gulf of Mirabella. The whole of the north coast of Crete was in
enemy hands.

om L4]«
Last Scenes at Sphakia

The road to Sphakia stopped two miles short of the coast. Beyond
that the last stage of the journey involved a climb down a 500-foot
cliff by a precipitous goat-track to the water side, where a shallow
beach of shingle, less than 20 yards wide and 150 yards long, pro-
vided the only assembly point for the men about to embark. In the
course of Wednesday, May 28th, the headquarters troops of Force

EVACUATION 279 ©

and of the R.A.F. had gradually arrived, and the latter operated
their wireless transmission set in a cave a mile along the coast to the
east.

After dark the destroyers Napier, Nizam, Kelvin and Kandahar
arrived off the coast. They had brought rations, which were under-
stood to be in urgent need, and they had come to take off the first
instalment of troops from the beaches.

Unfortunately the rations consisted chiefly of flour and matches—
flour and matches when bully beef and biscuit were in urgent
demand.

The destroyers lay off shore for about five hours that night, and
during this time they were able to take on board 200 walking wounded
and 800 unwounded troops, the latter figure including almost all the
remaining R.A.F. personnel on the island. It was not an excessively
large number, having regard to the time and the ships available.
That it was no greater was due to the difficulty found in dispersing
and concealing troops before darkness and yet having them in readi-
ness upon the beach so as to save time when the ships’ boats touched
down. Time was lost, also, through ‘gate-crashers’ having to be
turned back. It was clear that more carefully organized methods and
a general speeding up would be necessary if the whole force were to
be got away.

The original schedule had laid down a period of four nights for
the evacuation of Sphakia, of which this was the first night. But the
likelihood that it would be possible to spread either the resistance or
the embarkation over so long a period had now greatly diminished.
On the one hand, the Germans were advancing along the road
from the north. They might at any time over-run the numerically
weak, ill-equipped and physically exhausted improvised units that
were successively doing duty as rearguard. They might drop a for-
midable force of parachutists either in the Askifou plain or at
Sphakia itself to render the embarkation still more hazardous and
perhaps impracticable.

Nor could the Royal Navy guarantee shipping for the evacuation
for a further three nights. The losses taken had been severe, and
Admiral Cunningham had to consider his other commitments in the
Mediterranean. The Army and Air chiefs in the Middle East, Wavell,
Blamey and Tedder, were equally reluctant to request him to hazard
valuable ships and lives night after night. It became a matter of grim
accountancy. What losses in ships and crews would Cunningham be
justified in risking in order to bring off the thousands that still re-
mained in Crete? The decision was rendered the more difficult be-
cause no certain figure could be given for the troops on the island.

280 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

Not enough was known about the losses we had suffered in battle or
about the location of the various bodies of men in western Crete:
another of the consequences of the breakdown of communications
due to the enemy’s air domination.

Wavell felt that he could not ask that anything larger than des-
troyers should be risked in further evacuations, and the Admiral
came to the conclusion that the last attempt at evacuation would have
to be made on May 30th/31st, one night earlier than had been planned.

In the event, it was a little better than that. The Navy did send
cruisers to take part in the evacuation on the night of May 29th/30th,
and the evacuation was subsequently extended up to the scheduled
date of May 31st/June Ist.

The Anzacs of the Sth New Zealand and 19th Australian brigades
had been plodding south throughout most of the previous day and
far into the night. Not until about 3 a.m. on the morning of May 29th
did they reach the green valley of Askifou where a large part of the
remainder of the force was now concentrated, in preparation for
covering the final ten-mile stretch to the sea. The resistance put up
by Layforce at Babali Khani on the previous day had proved effec-
tive in staving off close pursuit. And when the enemy started moving
forward at dawn on the 29th the leading column took the road to
Retimo to complete the reduction of Colonel Campbell’s force. It
was some time before No. 85 Mountain Regiment, who were charged
with the pursuit to Sphakia, began to approach the Saucer in sufficient
strength to deliver an attack. The 23rd New Zealand Battalion,
now only 160 strong, was posted with a detachment of the 2/8th
Australian Battalion at a pass about three miles north of the
northern rim of the Saucer, but no attack developed during the
morning.

General Weston, in conference with his three brigadiers, Hargest,
Inglis and Vasey, at one o’clock that afternoon, decided that the Saucer
could be held until nightfall by the 4th New Zealand Brigade which
would then retire to the coast. The Australians with the Royal Marine
Battalion would take up a final defensive position at Vitsilokoumos,
a particularly strong point where the road winds and narrows rather
more than two miles north-east of Sphakia: they would have the
three remaining tanks and three Bren carriers under command.
Layforce and the Sth New Zealand Brigade would move south to
the dispersal area and the beach.

Still the Germans refrained from pressing the pursuit. The for-
ward New Zealand company covering the northern approach to
Askifou was engaged by the enemy advanced guard in the afternoon
but managed to hold the attack without difficulty. For the second

EVACUATION 281

day in succession there was comparatively little air activity except
when sixty German aircraft delivered a heavy attack upon Sphakia and
the adjacent beaches between 6 and 7 p.m.

After resting for a good portion of the day the troops, other than
the 4th New Zealand Brigade, began to move south again along the
road during the afternoon. The withdrawal of the 5th New Zealand
Brigade was carried out in particularly good order, the troops moving
in single file and at well-spaced intervals. After dark the 4th New
Zealand Brigade in their turn began to withdraw towards the dis-
persal area near the coast.

As the evening haze began to gather, a powerful convoy of ships
approached the coast of Crete. It arrived off Sphakia about 10 p.m.
Here was the troopship Glengyle, the cruisers Phoebe and Perth, the
A.A. cruisers Calcutta and Coventry, and the destroyers Jarvis, Janus
and Hasty. Pickets had been posted at the various approaches to the
beaches to prevent a repetition of the gate-crashing incidents of the
previous night, and if the system of embarkation proved somewhat
inelastic and produced occasional vexatious delays before the units
due to be taken off could be assembled, it at least avoided the dangers
of uncontrolled embarkation. Naval officers were sent on shore to
explain the procedure, and the vital necessity for absolute stillness
in the event of enemy planes coming over to drop flares. The quiet
and business-like way in which the naval men spoke seemed to brace
everybody’s nerves and to give them renewed confidence.

For more than three hours on that still night the large, flat-
bottomed, shallow-draught boats plied backwards and forwards
across the glass-smooth waters under the tranquil summer sky. In
almost total silence the weary, stumbling, khaki-clad figures limped
aboard the ships, some still carrying their rifles, some without them.
The walking wounded needed a little extra care and time to get them
safely from shore to ship. When the time for putting to sea arrived
shortly after 3 a.m. 6,500 of the men who fought at Maleme and
Canea had been taken on board. Whatever might happen subse-
quently it had already been possible for the Royal Navy to lift a
larger number of men from the island than had been contemplated
by Freyberg three days earlier.

German aircraft were soon overhead next morning and hunted
the convoy for several hours, but except that H.M.A.S. Perth re-
ceived a hit in a boiler room and suffered some casualties the attackers
met with no success. In the later stages of the passage a few long-
range R.A.F. fighters flew to see the convoy home.

On the morning of May 30th over 10,000 men still remained con-
centrated around Sphakia and on the ten-mile stretch of road to the

K

282 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

north." It had been planned that four destroyers should be despatched
that night to complete the evacuation but as these could only convey
2,000 men between them Admiral Cunningham now agreed to extend
the evacuation by another night, seeing that some R.A.F. fighter
cover was available for part of the return passage.

Vasey who was in command of the rearguard on the road to
Sphakia determined to hold the attackers off his main position at
Vitsilokoumos by making full use of his tanks and carriers in a
delaying action. It would be their task to cover the successive demoli-
tions in turn, deal with the motor-cyclists who normally formed the
reconnaissance element of the German advance, and subsequently
to fall back when the enemy pushed forward in some strength. There
did indced appear to be a good opportunity for the armoured fight-
ing vehicles to engage an enemy vanguard that was unlikely at first
to enjoy much assistance from support weapons; and in its way the
day’s fighting proved to be a rather neat and satisfactory business.

Before 7 a.m. the two leading companies of No. 100 Mountain
Regiment, having pushed on past the Askifou plain, began their
attack. Contrary to expectations they were supported by three light
tanks, and one of the British tanks was speedily knocked out. The
other two then withdrew behind the first of the demolitions which
had been prepared by the 42nd Field Company R.E.

The new position which they took up after the demolition had been
blown was about a mile south of Imvros at a point where a bend in
the road concealed our tanks from view while providing them with
good observation of the southern exit from the village. About 11
a.m. the Germans succeeded in dislodging our troops from this
position, too. The road here runs along a ridge, with the ground drop-
ping away sharply on either hand; so when the Germans found
their frontal assault held up their infantry advanced over the ground
immediately below the road where they were unopposed, since it
proved impossible for our tanks to depress their guns sufficiently
to bring fire to bear.

And so it went on all through the morning and afternoon, the two
tanks and the three carriers making a fighting retreat from one road
bend to another and pulling back only when the hostile infantry
threatened to gain the road in their rear, or when anti-tank weapons
began to come into action against them. Once the Germans were
caught napping when, their infantry having just taken up a new
forward position, one of our two tanks and two Bren gun carriers

1 The official estimate of ‘Creforce’ that morning was 7,000, but this figure
underestimated the number of stragglers who were making their way back to the
coast independently.

EVACUATION 283

slipped back up the road to surprise with a burst of fire a party of
about forty Germans. Few of these survived.

By 5 p.m. the two tanks were back on the main Australian posi-
tion. But both were finished. They had steering, brake, engine and
clutch troubles, and so they were wrecked in positions where their
ruined hulls would help to strengthen the existing road-blocks. The
Germans made contact before dark, but the commander of No. 100
Mountain Regiment was sufficiently impressed with the natural
strength of the position to refrain from attacking it. He gave orders
for a company to move out on either flank during the night so as to
effect an envelopment at dawn next morning.

During the day two Sunderland fiying-boats had arrived at
Sphakia and, in accordance with orders from Middle East Command,
General Freyberg and his staff were taken off, General Weston being
left in charge of the final stage of the evacuation.

It was perhaps the moment of deepest tragedy in Freyberg’s life.
Through no fault of his own the battle had been lost which above all
others he would have wished to have won. He had been in supreme
command and his New Zealanders had endured the longest and
severest part of the fighting; but without any means of countering
the deadly and persistent air assaults of the enemy they had been
powerless to turn the fortunes of the day.

The problem of rations and water had become acute. The Austra-
lians posted on the crest of the ridge, a good two-hour climb from
Sphakia, were already suffering acutely from the shortage, and the
supply of rations on the beach at Sphakia was not large. No trucks
could have been got down the hill path to fetch supplies (in any case,
there were now very few trucks left) and the force possessed no
mules. So volunteers were called for to climb the cliff and bring food
up to the Australians. In order to have their hands free these men,
many of them Australians too, took off their shirts and turned them
into improvised haversacks. Thus they climbed the cliff and fed their
fellows of the rearguard which was enabled to hold on throughout
the ensuing day.

The night’s evacuation brought a sharp disappointment. Four
destroyers had started from Alexandria; only two arrived off
Sphakia. One of the four had been stopped and then turned back by
enemy attack, the other, suffering engine trouble, had been compelled
to return to port. The two which did arrive, Napier and Nizam,
undertook to carry double their quota of 500 each, but the revision
of the embarkation plans could not be effected with sufficient speed.
To avoid over-crowding, with its concomitant danger of enemy air
observation and bombing, only those who were actually to be

284 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

embarked had been allowed to move from their dispersal areas on to the
beach. The discipline of the evacuation, perhaps open to criticism at
first, was now perhaps too rigid and the beach-masters were con-
strained to ‘go out into the highways and byways and compel them
to come in’. And this took time, with the result that when the hour
of 3 a.m. arrived only an additional 400 men had been embarked
over and above the first thousand. The ships were dive-bombed
during the return passage, but both arrived at Alexandria unscathed.

When Saturday, May 31st, dawned there were still something like
9,000 troops left on the island, concentrated now in a very small area
covering Sphakia. Of this number, less than half were fighting troops.
This category comprised approximately 1,100 New Zealanders (about
950 of these belonged to the battle-worn 5th Brigade, for most of the
4th Brigade had been taken off on the previous night), 1,250 Austra-
lians, 550 Royal Marines, 500 of Layforce. The remainder was com-
posed of varied base personnel and whatever was left of the static
defence troops from Suda.

The Australian rearguard at Vitsilokoumos held positions on either
side of the road in considerable strength. On their right Layforce
(until relieved by the Royal Marines and the Maori battalion) formed
a defensive flank ; on their left, elements of the New Zealand brigades
were in position. The commander of No. 100 Mountain Regiment,
according to his own account, finding that our front was more ex-
tended than he had supposed and that neither of his two flanking
companies actually overlapped the defence, decided upon a wider
enveloping movement. Two more companies were therefore detailed
to move off into the mountains, one upon either flank, with a view to
descending upon Sphakia from the east and from the north-west
respectively. He hoped that it would be possible to effect this final
envelopment at dawn on June Ist, but having regard to the natural
strength of the position (and with a curious absence of any sense of
urgency), though he now had good observation of our position from
a hill on the eastern flank, he decided to postpone his attack until he
could obtain air support.

Up on the steep escarpment with his back to the southern sea, Vasey
surveyed his position and felt confident that his men could hold at
any rate throughout the day—provided that there were no infiltra-
tions through to the beach. On the previous day two German patrols
had worked their way down close to the cave where Creforce Head-
quarters was now established. These patrols had been destroyed, one
by the platoon which 2nd-Lieut. Upham led with his usual skill and
daring. To this gallant officer who, despite wounds and sickness, had
achieved so much was to come the fitting award of the Victoria Cross.

EVACUATION 285,

Nothing seemed more surprising at the time than the failure of the
enemy to take advantage of the situation by dropping parachutists at
Sphakia and thereby deranging and perhaps preventing our evacua-
tion. The Germans knew perfectly well, from the evidence of their
aircraft, that the whole of our force from Maleme-Canea-Suda was
making for that tiny fishing village. A comparatively small number of
airborne troops could have seized and held the place and stood a
good chance of destroying our troops piecemeal as they came from
struggling across the Cretan mountains. Yet this was not done.
Perhaps the explanation lay in the fact that they had no more para-
chutists immediately available for such an operation. If so, this was
the result of the heavy losses we had inflicted on them during the
struggle.

That, as it happened, was not the worst of Weston’s anxieties dur-
ing the day. Wireless communication with Middle East Command
was now only intermittent, and Creforce was under the impression
that evacuation was not to be extended to cover the night of June
Ist/2nd. But during the afternoon a signal came through to say that
the last evacuation would take place on the coming night. It was
hoped to send enough shipping to embark 3,600, and a couple of
Sunderlands would also be sent, in one of which Weston himself was
instructed to leave.

It needed no very elaborate calculations to discern that something
like 5,500 men would still be left behind when the ships drew away
from Sphakia for the last time. The problem of feeding those troops
who still remained was already causing the utmost anxiety, for the
remaining rations were not sufficient to provide for the force beyond
that day. Already the men were on short commons and many were
desperately hungry. Continued resistance at this stage depended even
more upon more food than upon more ammunition. Weston sig-
nalled Middle East Command to this effect in the early evening and
asked for a directive. But the batteries of the remaining wireless set in
the cave at Sphakia were now failing and no reply was ever received.

The decision to abandon some 20 per cent of the defenders of Crete
had not been lightly taken. While humanity prompted that every
possible effort should be made to rescue these long-suffering troops,
the dangers of sending shipping yet again into these waters had to be
taken into account. It would be no act of humanity and a poor
economy of force if more men were to be lost in attempting the
rescue than could be saved by extending the evacuation over a further
night. But transcending this was the wider consideration of Mediter-
ranean strategy. It was not only the lives of the men in Crete that
were at stake. It was the lives of the men in Malta, the men in Tobruk,

286 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

conceivably also the men in Cyprus. Let the Royal Navy once be
weakened beyond a certain point and the consequences were beyond
all computation. It was said of Jellicoe in the previous world war that
he was the only man who could have lost the war in a single after-
noon. Admiral Cunningham in the present conflict shouldered a
responsibility scarcely less awful.

The decision had to be taken. Everything available was to be
scraped together for that night’s evacuation. After that the ships
would not return.

At eleven o’clock that night they arrived—the cruiser Phoebe, the
minelayer Abdiel, the destroyers Jackal, Kimberley and Hotspur.
Three landing-craft had been left behind after the previous night’s
evacuation : dragged ashore they remained concealed in caves all day.
Now they were loaded up with the first wave of troops to leave.

The order of embarkation allowed for the passage of the remainder of
the 4th New Zealand Brigade (about 200), the 5th New Zealand Brigade
(950), the 19th Australian Brigade (1,000-1,250), Layforce (500) and
the Royal Marine Battalion (550) in that priority. Strong guards had
been posted at the beach approaches in order to ensure this priority
for the organized formations and to prevent the boats being swamped
by any undisciplined rush of stragglers and others. It had to be done.

At first all went smoothly, the New Zealanders were embarked in
an orderly manner, and the time-table seemed to be well ahead of
schedule. But the news had got round that this was the last night of
evacuation, and more and more men, seeing the certainty.of capture
if they were left behind, surged towards the beaches. The guards at
the approaches were either withdrawn too early or were over-
whelmed by the human tide—it is not quite clear which—and con-
fusion reigned. It was rendered the worse by the fact that the Navy
on each of the previous nights had been able to lift numbers in excess
of its estimate. This led to extra troops being allowed to station them-
selves at the approach to the beach so as to be within summons. Asa
result the men of Layforce found themselves unable to break their
way through the rabble of refugees and very few actually reached the
boats. The Australians who had held the final position on the escarp-
ment found themselves impeded in the same way; and, owing to a
faulty transmission of orders, the 2/7th Australian Battalion was not
included in the lists supplied to the officers controlling the movement
to the beaches. Of nearly 500 officers and men still left in the battalion
only 16 succeeded in getting through to the boats. When the ships
sailed at 3 a.m. they carried 4,050 men, a figure that exceeded the
estimate by over 400. But it might have been larger still.

Before leaving by air, in accordance with his instructions from

EVACUATION 287

Middle East Command, General Weston had issued the following
instructions to Lieut.-Colonel Colvin of Layforce, the senior officer
remaining on the island:

“In view of the following facts:

(a) My orders direct me to give preference to fighting troops. This
has reduced the active garrison below what is required for
resistance.

(b) No rations are left this Saturday night. Most of the troops are
too weak owing to shortage of food and heavy strain to
organize further resistance.

(c) The wireless will give out in a few hours and the risk of waiting
for instructions from Middle East cannot be accepted, as this
will leave the officer in charge without any guidance as to his
course of action.

(d) There is no possibility of further evacuation.

‘I, therefore, direct you to collect such senior officers as are avail-
able in the early hours of tomorrow morning and transmit these
orders to the senior of them.

‘These orders direct this officer to contact with the enemy and-to
capitulate.’

The sum of £1,000 was handed over to Colvin so that individual
groups of men might be able to purchase means of escape.

The decision to surrender came as a thunderclap to the majority
of the troops when Colonel Colvin and his officers informed them
that no alternative remained. Attempts were made to tear down the
white flag that was hoisted above Sphakia as an indication to
German troops and aircraft that the end had come. The hope that
springs eternal, and never more certainly than among men in
extremest danger, had led some to believe that there would yet be one
further night of evacuation—nor was it an altogether unreasonable
hope, in view of the repeated changes which the time-table had under-
gone. But when it was realized that the rations were exhausted, and
that small-arms ammunition also was running out, the situation had
to be accepted. No serious defence would have been possible against
the assault which a conscientious but unimaginative German com-
mander, fighting, like Tybalt, ‘by the book of arithmetic’, was plan-
ning against men too weary and weak with hunger even to crawl
forward and surrender. Foreseeing this, and foreseeing also that the
German advanced forces would have carried no superfluous stocks of
food with them, Weston immediately upon his arrival at Alexandria
had signalled Middle East Command requesting that sufficient food
be dropped by air at least to enable the men to march as far as some

288 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

locality where the Germans might be expected to feed them. This was
done without delay.

Before the final evacuation General Wavell had sent the following
signal to Major-General Weston, R.M., the commander of the
rearguard.

You know the heroic effort the Navy has made to rescue you. I hope
you will be able to get away most of those who remain, but this is the
last night the Navy can come. Please tell those that have to be left that
the fight put up against such odds has won the admiration of us all
and every effort to bring them back is being made. General Freyberg
has told me how magnificently your Marines have fought and of your
own grand work. I have heard also of the heroic fighting of young
Greek soldiers. I send you my grateful thanks.

Though there was now no alternative to surrender, it seems that
groups here and there ignored the recommendations or orders from
above and continued to resist with such ammunition as they still
possessed. At any rate the German accounts gravely record a dive-
bombing attack upon our positions which began at 8.30 a.m. and
was followed by an artillery bombardment which ‘forced the enemy
to leave his positions and seek safety by dispersion in the fields’.
Thereupon the elaborate enveloping movement by the two flanking
companies was set in action, but it was four or five hours before the
Germans reached Sphakia, and not until eight o’clock on the evening
of June Ist were they able to report the coast for a distance of three
or four miles on either side of the village firmly in their hands.

Not all of the 5,000 men still left in the southern part of Crete
became prisoners of war. Major Garrett of the Royal Marines find-
ing a landing craft which had been beached after the night’s evacua-
tion (and which contained some much needed rations) soon got it
afloat and, accompanied by four officers and 134 other ranks, de-
parted in the direction of the tiny uninhabited island of Gaudhopoula
a dozen miles to the south, just as German aircraft came over to dive-
bomb Sphakia and the Australian position on the escarpment.

The party reached the island and lay up during the day. At night-
fall they made a fresh start and, with the assistance of a small-scale
map of North Africa and the eastern Mediterranean, set a course for
Tobruk, the nearest point in British hands on the African coast. And
that was a mere trifle of 200 miles away. There was no chance of the
available petrol carrying the craft anything like the required distance;
in fact, it gave out on the following evening. After that they drifted at
sea for a week. Finally, on June 9th, when the party was enduring the
last extremities of hunger and thirst, land was sighted and the boat
ran aground some miles east of Sidi Barrani and comfortably behind

EVACUATION 289

our forward positions in the Western Desert. There had been two
deaths from thirst and exposure; the remainder of the castaways
were in fairly good shape.

Three other landing-craft, each as an independent venture, made
the passage from Crete to Africa, their occupants totalling 136 of all
ranks. Over 400 others, mostly in small parties, arrived, some making
the African coast as late as September. Two groups, in all 13 officers
and 68 other ranks mostly of the 2/11th Australian Battalion, were
rescued by submarine.

Others of our men, as well as those from Sphakia, succeeded in
escaping from the south coast of Crete. It will be recalled that when
our troops left Heraklion an outlying platoon of the Black Watch in
the neighbourhood of Knossos could not be informed of the evacua-
tion and so were left behind. This party successfully extricated itself
and, moving south across the island, joined forces with the head-
quarters company of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, which
had been left at Ay Dheka, a few miles from the south coast, to pro-
tect prospective landings in that area and the landing-strip which it
had been intended to construct in the broad Messara plain. The
united forces moved back to the shore in the neighbourhood of
Timbaki on May 30th. The following day they were joined by about
one hundred Australians from the 2/11th Battalion who had made
their way across the mountains from Retimo after the surrender. No
Germans were anywhere in the neighbourhood, and on June Ist a
Blenheim dropped rations to the party. But the coast was almost
uninhabited and no boats could be found, apart from three damaged
vessels which had been abandoned after the troops had been put
ashore during the preceding week. One of these, a landing-craft, was
got afloat with great difficulty on the evening of June 2nd, packed
with 11 officers and 66 other ranks, and sailed for the Egyptian coast.
Early on the following morning the craft was sighted and stopped by
an Italian submarine which took off all the officers except two and
then allowed it to proceed on its course. No further misfortune befell
this bold enterprise, and the troops reached Mersa Matruh on
June 5th.

As soon as the Germans obtained control of the southern beaches
they removed boats of any size and aircraft were detailed to patrol
close in shore, rendering escape doubly difficult. Many of our men
took to the mountains and were sheltered by Cretans. The Germans
who, on the whole, had treated the captives taken at Sphakia with
reasonable humanity as men who had suffered honourable defeat,
presently grew impatient in the knowledge that armed British troops
were still at large in the mountains assisting the Cretan guerrillas. The
K*

290 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

following appeal is a mark of the irritation which their presence
caused to the enemy command:

SOLDIERS
of the
ROYAL BRITISH ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE!

There are MANY OF YOU STILL HIDING in the mountains, valleys and
villages.

You have to PRESENT yourself AT ONCE TO THE GERMAN TROOPS.

Every OPPOSITION will be completely USELESS.

Every ATTEMPT TO FLEE will be in VAIN.

The COMING WINTER will force you to leave the mountains.

Only soldiers who PRESENT themselves AT ONCE will be
sure of a HONOURABLE AND SOLDIERLIKE
CAPTIVITY OF WAR. On the contrary who
is met in civ clothes will be treated as a spy.

THE COMMANDER OF KRETA

Notwithstanding this threat, there were still about 500 British
soldiers at large in the island as late as the close of 1941.

\

CHAPTER VI

Conclusions

m1]
The Loss

THE strength of the British garrison in Crete on May 20th, when the
attack started, amounted to 28,614. Of these 14,967, or rather more
than 52 per cent of the total, were eventually evacuated to Egypt.
This compares unfavourably with the evacuation from Greece, when
approximately 75 per cent of the expeditionary force was successfully
withdrawn. Moreover the proportion is really lower still, as over
3,000 more troops, consisting of the Ist Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders, two Middle East commandos and a battalion of Royal
Marines, were landed after the battle had begun.

The final figures issued by Middle East Command in November
1941 are as follow:

Arrived

Original from Greece Reinforcements In Crete
Creforce _andremained fromEgypt May 20th

British . : - 5,200 6,399 3,464 15,063
Australians . ‘ 6,451 6,451
New Zealanders . ; 7,100 7,100
Total s F 5,200 19,950 . 3,464 28,614
Evacuated dose
to Percentage of
Egypt Total Grand Total
British F y 7 7,289 7,774 57
_ Australians E . 3,119 3,332 24.4
New Zealanders . ; 4,559 2,541 18.6

As we know, the New Zealanders bore the brunt of the fighting at
Maleme, and about 800 of those who took part in the retreat to
Sphakia had to be left behind. The Australian losses are largely

291

292 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

accounted for by the fact that the Retimo Force which could not be
brought away was, apart from Greek troops, exclusively Australian ;
also, the 2/7th Battalion of the 19th Australian Brigade, which
fought the final rearguard action on the plateau above Sphakia, was
left behind owing to the breakdown of the evacuation arrangements
at the beach on the final night.

Of the British losses, about one thousand were suffered on May
27th when Force Reserve—the Ist Welch Regiment and the remnants
of the Rangers and Northumberland Hussars—went forward, after
the general withdrawal had begun, to stand the shock, unsupported
and vastly outnumbered, of the German advance on Canea and Suda.
The commando troops who composed Layforce also lost heavily, and
few succeeded in getting away.

As ever, the Army in its need had been able to count upon the
utmost devotion and self-sacrifice of the Royal Navy. On June 2nd,
Admiral Cunningham, commanding the Eastern Mediterranean
Fleet received from General Wavell the following message:

‘I send to you and to all under your command the deepest admira-
tion and gratitude of the Army of the Middle East for the magnificent
work of the Royal Navy in bringing back the troops from Crete. The
skill and self-sacrifice with which the difficult and dangerous opera-
tion was carried out will form another strong link between our two
services. Our thanks to you all and our sympathy for your losses.’

The losses of the Fleet were grave indeed. Over 2,000 officers and
seamen were dead. Three cruisers and six destroyers had been sunk.
Two battleships, one aircraft-carrier, two cruisers and a destroyer
had suffered such damage as would take some months to repair.
Cruisers and destroyers to the number of nine were less badly hit.

The official German figures show the combined losses of the Army

and Luftwaffe as:
Killed Wounded Missing Totals
Officers . F : 169 143 56 368
Other Ranks. . 1,802 2,451 1,832 6,085

Totals . - . 1,971 2,594 1,888 6,453

This figure was confirmed by General Student, commander of the
XI Air Corps, in his subsequent interrogation after the war. Though
it falls far below our own contemporary estimates,’ it is higher than
the losses to which the Germans admitted for the whole of the
fighting in Yugoslavia and Greece during the previous month. Never-
theless the totals cannot be accepted as accurate.

1 General Freyberg placed the enemy losses at 17,000 (including 6,000 drowned).

General Wavell’s figure was 12,000 to 15,000 and Mr. Churchill’s estimate in the
House of Commons was much the same.

CONCLUSIONS 293

The Australian War Graves Commission which visited Crete in
June 1945 counted 4,000 German graves in the Maleme-Canea-Suda
area alone. About 1,700 of these were around Galatas. For Retimo
and Heraklion the estimates vary. The lowest figure for German dead
at Retimo is 300, and it is more likely to have been in the neighbour-
hood of 700. For Heraklion the lowest estimate is 600 and it may well
have been over twice that number.

This would give a minimum of 4,900 killed (which may include
many of those drowned in the seaborne expedition). A New Zealand
estimate adds 200 for those drowned when aircraft crashed into the
sea, and 500 more who are likely to have died of wounds in hospitals
in Greece. Its calculation of two wounded for every one killed, would
add a further 11,200, bringing the total up to the very high figure of
16,800. There is no means, however, of confirming these estimates.

Assuming (which is very likely) that the Germans officially listed
as missing were in fact killed, there is no excessive discrepancy be-
tween the German figure, which would amount to 3,859, and our
minimum figure of 4,900. It would seem, therefore, that the German
losses can scarcely have been less than 8,000 and may have been
considerably higher.

But though these are small numbers compared to the gigantic
losses which Hitler was very shortly to incur on the Russian front,
they do represent a high loss in proportion to the total of troops
engaged. And these losses were suffered by specialist troops.

Our own contemporary estimates of enemy aircraft destroyed were
likewise greatly in excess of the actual losses. Unofficial estimates
verged on the astronomical, and the calculated figures issued by
authoritative sources placed the German losses in aircraft at about
180 bombers and fighters and 250 transport planes destroyed. The
actual losses from May 13th, when the air attack upon Crete began,
until the end of the battle amounted to 4 long-range reconnaissance
aircraft, 19 bombers, 9 dive-bombers, 35 fighters, and 80 transport
aircraft, a total of 147. In addition, 4 bombers, 2 dive-bombers,
13 fighters and 45 transport planes were more or less seriously
damaged. To these may be added a further 73 (7 bombers, 9 dive-
bombers, 17 fighters, 39 transport planes and one coastal patrol
machine) destroyed on operations in this theatre of war (chiefly as
the result of crash landings) not directly due to British or Greek
action. Eighty-four more machines were damaged in this manner.

Directly and indirectly, the battle for Crete therefore compelled
the Germans to write off nearly 370 first-line aircraft for the time
being, of which 220 were a dead loss.

294 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE
or [2 ] +
Policy and Performance

THE loss of the battle for Crete proved a bitter disappointment to the
public at home. To many it seemed the crowning disaster in the long
series of humiliations and defeats that seemed inseparable from
British diplomacy and British arms. To understand the particular
quality of disappointment it must be remembered that the tale of
misfortune and mismanagement that starts far back in the period of
the Manchurian incident nearly ten years earlier had seemed to reach
a climax in the tragic events of May and June 1940, when the German
armies swept irresistibly across the Low Countries and France, and
Britain was left alone to face the tempest.

Then the cloud had lifted. To the miracle of Dunirk had succeeded
the miracle of the victory of the Royal Air Force over the skies of
Britain, a battle rightly recognized at the time as decisive in the war,
perhaps decisive in the history of the world. The winter had seen the
no less astonishing victories of the Greeks in the Pindus and Albania
and Wavell’s sweep across Cyrenaica, gathering in prisoners by the
twenty thousand at every stride. Ignoring the fact that the German
ground forces had not been confronted since they swept our troops
from the Continent of Europe, there was a tendency to believe that
the tide was indeed on the turn and that our armies were adequate
in equipment and battle practice to engage the Germans with reason-
able hope of success in. country where the enemy superiority of
numbers could not be effectively employed.

The rapidity with which the Germans blasted their way through to
victory in the three weeks’ campaign in Greece administered a sharp
rebuff to these hopes. But excuse could be found. The collapse of
Yugoslavia, with the consequent uncovering of the flank of our pre-
pared position; the inability of the Greeks to co-operate in our
subsequent retreat to new positions; the heavy losses of our air
forces at a comparatively early stage; the paralysing influence of
defeatism in certain Government quarters in Athens—all these could
be urged in partial explanation of our rapid expulsion from the
mainland.

But Crete seemed to provide a real prospect of breaking the Nazi
wave. British forces had been established in the island for six months
—and therefore it might be assumed that all was in readiness to meet
an assault. The enemy had no considerable volume of shipping easily
available for a seaborne invasion, and in the improbable event of the
Italian fleet putting to sea in strength—well, our Mediterranean Fleet

CONCLUSIONS 295

with memories of Cape Matapan was waiting in anticipation. If he
sought, as seemed most probable, to storm the island mainly or
wholly by airborne assault, he was attempting a task never yet
achieved in war and one upon which he had been unable to embark
in the previous summer and autumn despite the fact that Britain had
lost the entire armament of its Expeditionary Force in her Conti-
nental campaign.

So ran the line of argument, sound enough so far as it went. It
seemed reinforced when early in May, Mr. Churchill, in his most
defiant mood, announced roundly that ‘we intend to defend to the
death, without thought of retirement, both Crete and Tobruk...
Let there be no thought of cutting our losses.’ Tobruk had already
successfully withstood one head-on assault and its defenders showed
no signs of flagging ; it seemed reasonable to hope that the defence of
Crete would prove no less successful.

Yet Crete was attacked and taken by the Germans after twelve
days’ fighting and almost half the force of British, Australian and
New Zealand troops was left behind, either killed or captured on the
island. It was taken solely by airborne assault, for no troops were
landed from the sea until the decision to evacuate had already been
made and the first embarkation of our troops was on the point of
proceeding. It was taken, despite the fact that the attack conformed
closely to the pattern that had been anticipated, and that as regards
both time and place, as well as method, our information andestimates
had been shown to be remarkably accurate.

Crete was attacked and taken; yet it had been defended more on
military, than on political grounds, and because the War Cabinet,
with the concurrence of their military advisers, had decided that it
could be defended with a reasonable hope of success.

The battle for Crete will, perhaps, be matter for discussion as long
as the ways and means of making war exercise their strange and
terrible fascination upon mankind. Regarding the broad, major
reason for our defeat there need be no doubt or dispute at all. The
explanation for the German conquest of Crete may be found in two
words—Air Power.

We lost Crete because we were unable to provide air fighter cover
for our troops and only negligible bomber support. The Germans,
on the other hand, committed their available air forces, consisting of
over 1,200 planes of various types up to the hilt at every stage of the
battle. In the preliminary bombing and machine-gunning of our
defence positions, in the transport of troops to the landing-places and
finally in the close support given by low-flying fighter aircraft to their
ground forces both in attack and defence, the Luftwaffe played a

296 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

decisive rdle. It was omnipresent; our own air support, for reasons
that we have seen, was practically non-existent.

Such a disparity in a vital arm of warfare was almost bound to be
decisive. One must repeatedly emphasize how much an air attack
against which there is no fighter defence tends to immobilize the
‘functioning of the defence from the chief command downwards.
Under such circumstances, direction and execution are so hampered
and restricted that the initiative must be surrendered to the enemy.
Plans, communications, maintenance, attack and counter-attack—all
the normal operations of an army in action become difficult almost
to the point of impossibility. They are, indeed, subject to a form of
effective strangulation.

We may now consider whether it was necessary that the battle
should have been fought at all.

The Royal Navy had been insistent from the first upon the impor-
tance of securing Crete in the event of Axis aggression spreading to
the eastern Mediterranean. Crete was a valuable cover for our naval
base at Alexandria. The threat of air attack to our forces in the
eastern Mediterranean came principally from the Italian bases in the
Dodecanese and these could themselves be largely neutralized and
always threatened so long as we were in actual control of Crete. So
Crete was an outlying defensive post of our Middle East position.
Once let it fall, and enemy aircraft would be established dangerously
nearer to Alexandria and our Middle East bases ; and the prospect of
eliminating the Axis hold on the Dodecanese disappeared. Moreover,
the German conquest of Crete would bring into being a new ‘nar-
rows’ in the Mediterranean. Convoys to Malta from the west already
had to run the gauntlet of the eighty-mile wide channel between
Sicily and Cape Bon in Tunisia ; convoys from the east would be faced
with a second ‘narrows’, the two hundred-mile wide channel be-
tween Crete and the hump of Cyrenaica. The ebb and flow of battle
carried our armies backwards and forwards over the Libyan desert,
but during the greater part of the eighteen months between the loss
of Crete and the Allied landings in French North Africa the Cyrenai-
can bastion was in enemy hands, and German aircraft, operating from
Africa or from Crete, consequently took grievous toll of our shipping.

Yet the case for holding on to Crete is by no means so solidly
established as might appear. While it was desirable to retain any and
every position which might widen and strengthen the glacis of our
main keep in the Middle East or which might provide us with a foot-
hold for a subsequent jump back into Europe, the maintenance of
our forces in any such outlying positions needed to be justified both
On strategic and on administrative grounds.

CONCLUSIONS 297

Any scheme for the defence of Crete had to take into account the
weakness of our air power in the Middle East and our inability to
provide adequate fighter cover for our troops. We refrained from
extending the number of airfields beyond Heraklion, Maleme and
Retimo for the sufficient reason that we possessed neither the aircraft
to station there nor—and this is of cardinal importance—the anti-
aircraft guns to defend them. The example of Norway and the much
more recent example of Greece were sufficient to show that a few air-
craft operating from a few air bases are almost helpless and must
speedily be annihilated by a force working from numerous bomber
and fighter bases near at hand. Therefore, any defence of Crete must
be a defence by the army and the fleet with only such assistance as
could be given by night attacks upon the enemy’s bases by our
bombers from Egypt. From the first, then, we were certain to be
fighting under one of the gravest handicaps possible in modern war.

Yet even supposing that we had never been attacked in Crete, or
that, having been attacked, we had successfully repelled the invasion,
the continued presence of a British garrison on the island would have
constituted a most serious drain upon our man-power, never exces-
sive, in the Middle East. It would have represented a dispersal of force
quite contrary to all the principles of war. It is true that we left one
force detached in Tobruk throughout almost the whole of this year;
and we maintained another garrison in Malta for a full two years
under the perpetual shadow of hostile attack. But we needed Tobruk
as a means of hampering the enemy and rendering difficult the supply
of his forward troops in the desert, and Malta, a valuable link in our
Mediterranean communications, was subsequently to cover the
invasion of Europe by way of Sicily. We did not need Crete for an
offensive purpose, because the best way of return into Europe could
never be through Greece ; and when it was eventually possible to go
back into Greece in the autumn of 1944, we were able from our
advanced bases in southern Italy to bypass Crete with the greatest of
ease. Crete was not necessary to us, therefore, as an offensive position.

Moreover, the problem of its maintenance would have been
extremely formidable. The feeding and supply of the garrison, to say
nothing of the 400,000 inhabitants cut off from all traffic with the
mainland of Europe, would have been a constant drain upon our
resources and our shipping. The absence of any ports on the south
coast and any adequate means of transport to the main towns on the
north must have meant that our convoys would have to continue to
run the gauntlet of the narrow strait of Kithira or the still narrower
strait of Caso under the eyes of the Luftwaffe and the Regia Aero-
nautica, Again and again our shipping was strained to the utmost;

298 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

might not the necessity of keeping Crete supplied have produced
disaster at some more vital point?

Therefore it is clear that the continued maintenance of British or
allied forces in Crete must have involved an extremely serious drain
upon our shipping and a dangerous dispersal both of troops and
aircraft, while the compensating advantages are less easy to see. Of
these advantages not the least important—taking a very long view—
would have been the preservation of a part of the kingdom of Greece
from Axis domination. Had it been possible for a Greek Govern-
ment to continue to function on Greek soil it is arguable that the
tragic developments which later troubled the internal life of that
heroic but ill-starred nation might never have occurred. The rift
which widened between the Government in exile and what came to
be a de facto Government in the mountains, one of the causes of the
tragedy of December 1944, would at least have been diminished.

It may well be that, having beaten off an assault, we might sub-
sequently and in our own time have found it necessary to evacuate
Crete, just as we had found it necessary to evacuate the scarcely less
defensible Channel Islands a year earlier. That is by no means im-
probable, in view of the facts stated above. But it scarcely establishes
a case for giving up the island without a fight. Let the enemy first
attack, let him be allowed to break his teeth upon the island ; then, in
our own good time, if circumstances should so demand, let us with-
draw at leisure and without loss.

The case for contesting an invasion of Crete was most eloquently
and cogently stated by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons
in the debate on June 10th, 1941. The fighting defence of Crete formed
part of the strategy of rearguard actions, the only reasonable alter-
native to capitulation which we could adopt after the disaster in
France and the simultaneous extension of the war to the Mediter-
ranean. It was necessary that, despite our inadequate resources, our
strategy should reverse the disastrous methods of our diplomacy
during the previous decade, that it should avoid above all a policy of
military appeasement which would surrender position after position
to the enemy on the grounds that we were not yet strong enough to
defend them with the certainty of success.

The word on this subject is with Mr. Churchill.

The choice was whether Crete should be defended without effective
air support or should the Germans be permitted to occupy it without
opposition. There are some, I see, who say we should never fight with-
out superior or at least ample air support, and ask when this lesson
will be learned. But suppose you cannot have it. The questions which

have to be settled are not always questions between what is good and
bad; very often it is a choice between two very terrible alternatives.

CONCLUSIONS 299

Must you, if you cannot have this essential and desirable air support,
yield important key points one after another?

The further question arises as to what would happen if you allowed
the enemy to advance or overrun without cost to himself the most
precious and valuable strategic points? Suppose we had never gone
to Greece and never attempted to defend Crete! Where would the
Germans be now? Suppose we had simply resigned territory and
strategic islands to them without a fight! Might they not at this early
stage of the campaign in 1941 already be masters of Syria and Iraq
and preparing themselves for an advance into Persia? ~

The Germans in this war have gained many victories. They have
easily overrun great countries and beaten down strong powers with
little resistance offered to them. It is not only a question of the time
that is gained by fighting strongly even at a disadvantage for impor-
tant points, but also there is this vitally important point of stubborn
resistance to the will of the enemy. I merely throw out these considera-
tions to the House in order that they may see that there are some
arguments which deserve to be considered before you can adopt the
rule that you have to have a certainty of winning at any point, and
if you have not got it beforehand clear out.

The whole history of war shows the fatal absurdity of such a
doctrine. Again and again it has been proved that fierce and stubborn
resistance even against heavy odds and under exceptional conditions
of local disadvantage is an essential element of victory. At any rate
the decision to fight for Crete was taken with the full knowledge that
air support would be at a minimum, as anyone can see, apart from
the question of whether you have adequate supplies or not.

Our defence plan, therefore, had to aim at inflicting a sufficiently
sharp rebuff upon the enemy to compel him to withdraw, at any rate
temporarily, from the assault ; after which we should be in a position
to maintain ourselves in Crete or to withdraw quietly from it if the
maintenance problem proved beyond our capacity. Our ground
troops and our fleet would have to meet the onslaught of a powerful
airborne force, followed up in all probability by a seaborne assault,
and covered at all times by fighter and bomber aircraft to which we
could provide no adequate reply in kind. What strategy could we
adopt which could offer any prospect of success?

Again let us quote Mr. Churchill, in his speech to the House of
Commons, since none can summarize a plan more succinctly than he.

Our Army was to destroy the airborne attacks, while the Navy held
off or destroyed the seaborne attacks. But there was a time limit. The
action of the Navy in mounting the northern seaguard without ade-
quate air defence was bound to be very costly. We could only stand

a certain proportion of naval losses before the northern seaguard of —

the fleet would have to be withdrawn. If meanwhile the Army could
succeed in biting off the head of the whole terrific apparatus of the
airborne invasion before the naval time limit, or loss limit, was
reached, then the enemy would have to begin all over again, and

300 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

having regard to the enormous unprecedented scale of the operation
and the losses he would have to incur, he might well for the time being
at least have broken it off. At any rate there would have been a long
delay before it could be mounted again. That was the basis on which
the decision was come to.

And now one may consider to what extent we might have made
better preparation for the defence of the island against the time of
trial; and if, during the twelve days battle, the Germans might have
been forced to pay a heavier price for their success.

It is true that we had been in almost undisturbed occupation of
Crete for six months, and at first sight one might conclude that there
was ample time and opportunity to take whatever defensive measures
were necessary. But Crete must be viewed against the background of
the whole Middle East Command, laden with tasks and responsi-
bilities which its resources were inadequate to discharge with success.
General Wavell’s straitened means of making war compelled him to
adopt a series of shifts and expedients, and minor changes of policy,
to meet contingencies as they arose. Risks had to be run. Changes in
the dispositions of our forces and the allocation and re-allocation of
munitions, supplies, material and shipping had to be made as the
march of events appeared to dictate. And officers had often to be
found suddenly for new commands which might diminish or grow in
importance, varying with the fluctuations of the Mediterranean
struggle. Under such circumstances some mistakes and miscalcula-
tions were sure to arise. And Fortune was not always on our side.

When a refuelling base for the Royal Navy was established at Suda
Bay some protective armament—primarily a Fleet responsibility—
was required and provided at Suda. But the defence of the whole of
Crete against any form of attack was a much bigger proposition and
one which we had not the resources to undertake except by slow
degrees. As already related, Middle East Command planned to
provide a garrison of one division, and preparations to house supplies,
equipment and munitions for such a formation were taken in hand.
The work, perforce, proceeded slowly. And when we decided to
intervene in Greece troops and stores and shipping, as many and as
much as could be spared, were required for the venture on the main-
land. We were always short of the transport, material, tools and
labour needed for even the preliminary work in Crete where the con-
struction of dumps and installations went on concurrently with the
digging and camouflaging of gun-positions, posts and entrenchments
in the Suda area and around the airfields.

Then Crete was called upon to fulfil an additional purpose which
influenced to a very great extent the conditions under which,

CONCLUSIONS 301

ultimately, it was to resist the German attack. When the evacuation of
our forces from Greece began the island was used as a transit camp
to permit of rapid shipment from the mainland by ensuring a quick
turn-round for vessels which would otherwise have had to make the
much longer passage to Egypt. This is not to say that the troops who
had fought in Greece were expected to defend Crete. They were not.
Only lack of time, and shipping difficulties, prevented the relief of the
men from Greece by the fresh formations to be provided by Middle
East Command. It was the fortune of war, and very much to be
regretted, that two brigades of the New Zealand Division, a goodly
proportion of the Australians, and such British units as the Rangers
and the Northumberland Hussars should have been obliged to
undergo so soon this second ordeal.

The ground defence of the airfields, in the absence of support from
the air, called for special measures : special equipment and armament
and special training of the troops. We had had no experience of the
form of attack which was expected—sustained air bombardment
followed by airborne assault of infantry. None of the three airfields—
Maleme, Retimo and Heraklion—had been laid out with any regard
to facilities for ground defence, and the siting of anti-aircraft batteries
presented some problems difficult to solve. Guns might be called
upon to engage at different times, and at different ranges and heights,
bombers and fighters, gliders and troop-carriers. Without becoming
too technical it may be observed that a wide arc of fire entailed diffi-
culty in providing protection and camouflage for the gun. We had
not the means to construct the alternative positions and the dummy
positions which were needed to complete a sound scheme of
defence.

Infantry dispositions to meet an assault from the skies had, of
course, to cover the vicinity of each airfield; but there was no telling
where parachutists might drop or troop-carriers land, so that most
units were committed to the defence of a wide area. Those located on
the coast had also to keep in mind the possibility of a landing from
the sea. Few of the troops had much opportunity for training or to
practice themselves in their appointed réles, and those who had
fought in Greece needed a period for rest and recuperation before
being committed to battle again.

Aerial reconnaissance, as carried out by the few aircraft we main-
tained upon the island up till May 19th, was doubtless of value, but
it might have been wiser to have withdrawn them from Maleme
much earlier and to have destroyed the airfield. As it happened, our
aircraft departed on one day and the German assault was delivered
on the next.

302 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

Yet it is wrong to attach an over-riding importance to the airfields
as though the invasion could have been defeated simply by our
retaining possession of all three of them. Their value to the Germans
was undeniable, but the loss of Maleme airfield must be regarded as
a serious set-back rather than a decisive blow. If it had been re-
captured the enemy might have experienced great difficulty in using
the bed of the Tavronitis as a landing ground. Even so, there were
other places where the troop-carrying aircraft might have been
crash landed, and in such numbers as to decide the issue in favour of
the invaders. The whole conception of Maleme as the single point
where the enemy could reinforce by troop-carrier implies too rigid a
conception of his potentialities, and makes no allowance for the
flexibility of his methods and his undoubted gift for improvisation
in the field. German parachutists were already at work by the end of
the first day preparing alternative landing grounds, notably one in
the prison area where there is a considerable expanse of open
meadowland.

At Heraklion, where we retained firm control of the airfield
throughout the operations, the enemy managed to land a stream of
troop-carriers several miles to the east in a locality out of range of
our field-guns. When we evacuated Heraklion this concentration was
being built up into a force which, in a day or two, would probably
have been strong enough to take the initiative and attack with every
prospect of success.

To our commanders and troops at Maleme the comparative im-
portance of the airfield as such, mattered little: it was their business
to defend it, and to destroy the invader wherever encountered. And
because the airfield was lost, the reasons for our failure to retain it
have been the subject of some discussion.

In the first place, the timing of the enemy’s operations at Maleme
was excellent. The troop-carriers arrived swiftly on the heels of the
bombers and the machine-gunning fighters : as they were intended to
arrive, but did not, at Retimo and Heraklion. Under the weight of
the air bombardment it is easy to understand that the anti-aircraft
defence was not so effective as it might have been. Our batteries
lacked the training to counter with success the systematic attack by
the low-flying aircraft which supported the airborne assault.

It was the opinion of the Inter-Services Committee who reported
on the action of the Battle of Crete that ‘The main feature of air
operations in Crete was the employment of low-flying aircraft to
support the airborne and parachute troops’. The entire conduct of
the operations was dependent upon this support, and it was the
view of the Committee that once the troops had landed the

CONCLUSIONS 303

destruction of these supporting aircraft was of equal if not of greater
importance than the destruction of the reinforcing airborne troops.

And it was the heavy, systematic and persistent attacks by the
enemy aircraft, bombers and fighters alike, which took heavy toll of
movement by daylight and almost destroyed our means of com-
munication, grievously hindering, if not altogether preventing, the
transmission of orders and information. So counter-attacks were
delayed and, when delivered, were often made in insufficient force
because the novel methods and widespread nature of the German
assault made the focal point of the battle difficult to determine.
Commanders were conducting an all-round defence and rightly hesi-
tated to leave any localities empty of troops; they had been warned,
also, against attempted landings from the sea. Add the difficulties
already mentioned, also the lack of tools, transport and support
weapons, and the failure at Maleme becomes easy to understand.

Certain it is that here and elsewhere the odds against us were very
great. We did what we could; and the last word on the matter may
well be provided by the Inter-Services Committee:

The major lesson of the campaign was that to defend with a rela-
tively small force an island as large as Crete, lying under the permanent
domination of enemy aircraft and out of range of our own, was
impossible.

Whatever criticism is made of our preparations for defence and of
our conduct of the battle, it remains true that we inflicted a decided
repulse on the enemy during the initial days of the battle and that we
threw his general plan of campaign badly out of gear. It is one of the
strange ironies of the war that the Battle for Crete which caused such
grave searchings of heart at home and which was so intensely studied
by Allied staffs as a model of airborne tactics was considered by the
Germans themselves to be their first serious setback.

Of the grave miscalculations of their Military Intelligence we have
already spoken. For the first time in the war the German losses in
picked troops proved to have been far higher than had been estimated.
This had important consequences for the future.

The Fuhrer was most displeased with the whole affair, admitted
Student. Our losses in Crete were very high for that time. We had been
lucky so far, as the whole French campaign had not cost us as many
lives as a single battle in 1870. It was the same with the Balkan cam-
paign, excluding Crete. Crete alone cost us 4,000 killed and missing

‘ out of 20,000 men thrown in.! |

1Interrogation of Colonel-General Student, War Office Intelligence Review,
November 1945. Quoted by Milton Shulman, Defeat in the West, p. 59.

304 THE BATTLE FOR CRETE

There was one direct consequence of the German heavy losses and
delayed victory in Crete. Hitler became affected with a distrust of air-
borne operations in general and in particular of the development of
the German offensive in the Mediterranean by these means. To
British observers it seemed logical that the Germans should exploit
their victory by a further operation in the direction of Cyprus and
thereafter into Syria and Iraq. The conquest of Cyprus would have
presented greater problems in view of the fact that, unlike Crete, it
lay outside the range of effective German fighter support. But who
shall say that, if Crete had been abandoned or but lightly held, such
an operation might not have been most strongly urged by a Com-
mand flushed with easy success and, under such circumstances, sanc-
tioned by the Fiihrer. And beyond Cyprus lay Syria and Iraq, both
ripe for German penetration in that critical month of May, 1941.

Student was perfectly prepared to continue what he had begun.

After Crete I proposed that we should make an attack upon Cyprus
in order to make a jumping-off ground for an air attack and para-
troop attack on the Suez Canal. But Hitler rejected it because of the
losses we had received in Crete.

None can deny that the tide was flowing strongly in favour of a
powerful exploitation of the German position in the eastern Mediter-
ranean during the early summer of 1941. In the space of two months
Yugoslavia had been conquered, Greece had been conquered, Crete
had been conquered ; Wavell’s weakened forces had been swept out
of Libya; Iraq had succumbed to the influence of the Axis powers
and was looking westward for German assistance during the crucial
weeks of May; in Syria Marshal Pétain’s subordinates were proving
a great deal more than complacent to the German requirements in
the way of airfields. Granted that Hitler’s eyes were now set upon
Russia, yet with the immense and practically unimpaired resources
in man-power which he commanded, with his vast stocks of war
equipment available, it might have proved possible to detach suffi-
cient force to secure the immense strategic and economic prizes which
the Middle East had to offer. Crete was a poor reward for so much
planning, such loss of skilled fighting men and such expenditure of
aircraft unless it were a stepping-stone to greater things. The revolt
in Iraq and the sinister developments in Syria during that very month
pointed the way. But Hitler, never sufficiently alive to the impor-
tance of the Mediterranean to the grand strategy of the war, was
blind to the omens. And in part at least this obliquity of vision was
the outcome of the losses suffered by his picked troops in Crete
during ten days fighting in May.

GENERAL INDEX

Air attacks, German, in Greece, 59, 65,
71, 75, 80, 81, 83, 87, 93, 97, 98, 105,
112, 113, 115, 117, 120, 132, 133

. on airfields in
Greece, 70, 97, 107
,on Crete begin, 167

— forces (R.A.F.) in Crete, 155

—_—_———— in Greece, 35, 36

—, German command of, 142, 295, 297,
302, 303

— strategy (R.A.F.) in Greece, 13

Airborne assault on pee begins, 173

———————_ in Greece, 121

Airfield defence in Crete, 160, 301

Airfields in Greece, 13, 15, 17

Africa, German intervention in, 19

Akrotiri peninsula, fighting on, 197, 222

Albania, Greek advance into, 9; R.A.F.
attacks on ports begin, 14, 16; Greek
retreat from begins, 62

Aliakmon Line, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 141;
occupied, 29; 30-1, 32-4; withdrawal
from, 44, 46, 51

Alikianou, defence of, 264

Allen, Brigadier, 82

Allen Force, 84, 87, 89, 93

Altmann, Captain, 197

Andrew, Lieut.-Colonel L. W., v.c., 182,
186, 187, 188, 217

Athens, situation in, 85; entered by
Germans, 131

Babali Khani, action of, 268

Baillie-Grohman, Rear-Admiral H. T.,
94, 96, 134

Bakopoulos, General, 51, 86

Balkans, German penetration of, 3, 4,
5; German policy in, 17, 140

Barraclough, Brigadier H. E., 90, 91, 111

Beamish, Wing-Cdr., 153

Beritiana, action of, 268

Blamey, Lieut.-General Sir T., com-
mands I Australian Corps in Greece,
30; favours Olympus position, 33, 43;
44, 46, 52, 61, 63; conducts retreat to
Thermopylae, 72, 74, 76, 93, 96; leaves
Greece, 116; 248, 279

Blunt, Colonel J. S., in Greece, 133, 136;
in Crete, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215

Boehme, General von, 102

Boileau, Major, 238

eH oes Position at, 99, 111; action
of, 11

Brauer, Colonel, 164, 203, 205, 253, 273

Burckardt, Captain, 206
Burrows, Major J. T., 227

Caccia, Mr. H., 216
Campbell, Lieut. -Colonel I. R., 158, 199,
ae 248, 250, 252, 253, 274, 276, 277.
Canea. See Suda-Canea
Castelrosso operation, 151
Casualties at Corinth, 125
—_—_—_—_—__—_—_,, German, 125
ahah ga! 292, 293
rman, 292, 293,
303, 304

293
Greece, 136
——_—_——————_——_,, German, 137
Chappel, Brigadier B. 'H., 151, 157, 203,
255, 258, 272, 273
Charrington, Brigadier H. V. S., 29, 57,
60, 66, 71, 84
Churchill, Rt. Hon. W. S., 12, 13, 17, 96,
149, 298, 299
Clowes, Brigadier C. A., 76
Colvin, Lieut.-Colonel, 287
SOMA OS, German, ground-air,
Communications, British, failure of, in
Crete, 184, 210, 303
—___——__———, in Greece, 30,
140, 141

Corinth Isthmus, action of, 122

Creforce, 147

Cretan guerrillas, 182, 231, 264, 289

Crete, value of, 145; situation and des-
cription, 146; maintenance problem,
146, 297; sea approaches to, 147, 297;
ports and airfields, 147; defence’ diffi-
culties, 146, 150, 300; air defence of,
149; British policy regarding, 149,
298, 299; military works undertaken,
149, 300; garrison, 153; anti-aircraft
defence, 154; defence plans, 156; Ger-
man preparations for attack, 163; plan
for same, 164; airborne assault begins,
173; seaborne expedition defeated,
221; evacuation inevitable, 243; evacu-
ation approved, 248; failure of rein-
forcements to arrive, 258, 260; evacua-
tion begins, 274; evacuation com-
pleted, 286; subsequent escapes, 288;
reasons for defending, 296, 298;
reasons against defending, 297. See
also Heraklion, Maleme, Retimo, etc.

305

306
Cunningham, Admiral Sir A., 94, 116,
Aas 226, 248, 273, 279, 280, 282, 286,

D’Albiac, Air-Commodore J. H., 13, 14,
15, 16, 35, 36, 70, 106, 153

de Guingand, Major (Major-General Sir)
F., 24, 139

Demolitions in Greece, 43, 49, 56, 65, 67,
75, 80, 84, 91, 108, 109, 119, 123, 126

Dill, General Sir J., 23, 24, 25, 31, 32

Dittmer, Lieut.-Colonel G., 228, 242

Duff, Force, 84

Duff, Lieut.-Colonel C. S. J., 79

Duncan, Lieut.-Colonel, 238, 262

Eden, Rt. Hon. A., 23, 24, 25, 31, 32

Elasson, action of, 90

Escapes from Crete, 288, 289

from Greece, 136

Evacuation of Crete becomes necessary,
243; anticipated, 244; mentioned by
Freyberg, 247; approved, 248

————_———__ Greece, 69; suggested by
Papagos, 81; reasons for, 95; approved
by King and Greek Government, 96;
plans for, 104; orders issued for, 105

Farrier, Major, 238

Ferraro, General, 103

Fleming, Major P., 57, 109

Force Reserve (Crete), 244, 246, 247,
262, 292

Forrester, Lieut., 194

Forty-Second Street, action, 263

Fraser, Hon. Peter, 248

Freyberg, Major-General B. C., v.c., 29,
33, 79; delays departure from Greece,
119; commands in Peloponnesus, 120,
121; 126; is left to command in Greece,
127; leaves Greece, 134; is given com-
mand in Crete, 153; reports on situa-
tion, 156, 209, 235, 247, 265; organizes
defences, 157, 159, 167; 172, 203, 220,

- 221, 227, 231, 234, 236, 241, 242, 244,

246, 276; leaves Crete, 283

Galatas, counter-attack at, 240
Galloway, Brigadier A., 151

. baa airs naa Major-General M. D.,
Garrett, Major, 288

Gentz, Lieut., 195

German plans for attack on Crete, 163-4
policy towards Greece, 14, 15,
17; order for Greek invasion, 18
strategy, 3, 4, 162, 304

INDEX

German Twelfth Army, 27, 43

Glennie, Rear-Admiral I. G. S., 223

Gliders, German, 174 .

Greece, provoked by Italy, 7, 8; invaded
by Italy, 9; asks British aid, 12, 20;
German policy towards, 14, 15, 17;
British forces arrive in, 16, 20, 31;
defence problems, 21; invaded by
Germany, 39; withdraws from Al-
bania, 62; political crisis, 94; approves
British evacuation, 96; surrenders to
Axis Powers, 101

Greek Army of Central Macedonia, 34,

62, 71, 81, 101
Epirus, 52, 81, 101, 102
Thrace (Metaxas Line),

Western Macedonia, 52
forces in Crete, 154
Guarantee, British, to Greece, 11, 138

81

Hanson, Major F. M., 169

Hargest, Brigadier J., in Greece, 92; in
Crete, 158, 182, 231, 245, 267, 280

Healy, Lieut.-Colonel, 238

Heidrich, Colonel, 164, 194, 222

Heraklion, garrison of, 157; first attack
at, 203; attacks on airfield, 254; fight-
ing in town, 254; counter-attacks, 254,
255; arrival of Hurricanes, 255, 273;
eodu investment, 258; embarkation
at, 27.

_ Heywood, Major-General T. G. G., 16,

215, 216
Hinton, Sergt. J. D., v.c., 135
Hospital, No. 7 General, 189

Inglis, Brigadier L. M., 159, 240, 244,
245, 262, 280

Isthmus Force, 111, 116, 122, 124

Italy invades Greece, 9

—— lands troops in Crete, 278

Jodl, General, 103

Kalamata, embarkation at, 129, 135;
fight at, 134-5; surrender at, 136
Ket German progress towards, 182,

King Geroge II of the Hellenes, 94, 95;
his broadcast message, 103; leaves for
Crete, 106; escapes to Egypt, 211-16

King, Rear-Admiral E. L. S., 224, 225

Kippenberger, Lieut.-Colonel H. K., in
snes 90; in Crete, 159, 232, 239,

Kithira embarkation, 136

INDEX

‘Kiwis’ concert party, 240
Korassos, General, 46, 52
Koryzis, M., 21; suicide of, 94
Kotulas, General, 35, 46
Krakau, Colonel, 264

Larissa entered by Germans, 93

Payee Colonel R. E., 238, 262, 268,

Layforce, 238, ore 248, 261, 265, 268,
269, 280, 284, 286

Lee, Brigadier J. E., 34, 45, 72, 97, 98,
116, 120, 125, 133

List, General von, 37, 63, 80, 94, 101,
108, 120, 121

Lohr, "General, 166, 184, 198

Longmore, Air Chief Marshal Sir A.,

Mackay Force, 45, 52, 53, 57

Mackay, Major-General Sir I, 29, 44,
45, 55, 99; leaves a 119

Macky, Lieut. -Colonel N. L., 75

Maleme, garrison of, 158; first attack at,
179; counter-attacks at, 185, 227, 231;
first withdrawal at, 186; the second
day, 217; withdrawal from, 233

Maleme village, fighting at, 181, 228, 229

Matapan, Battle of, 31

Mather, Lieut. -Colonel H. D., 151

Megara, embarkation at, 121

Meindl, General, 164, 181, 208

Metaxas, General, 7, 8, 9; asks British
aid, 12; 14, 19, 20; dies, 21

Metaxas Line, 22, 24, 25, 31, 141; attack
on, 39-40, 41, 43; surrender, 51

Middle East, British strategy in, 5, 300

Miles, Brigadier R., 113, 126

Monastir, British patrol in, 44

Monastir gap, 23, 33, 34, 35, 44, 45, 141

Monemvasia, embarkation at, 134

Naval action, at Taranto, 16; off Cape
Matapan ,31; off Crete, 223
losses off Crete, 224, 226, 274, 275,
281, 292 piece
reece.

—_—_- 128
Navplion, embarkation at, 117, 127, 129

Oakes Force, 158

Oceconomou, M., 86

Olympus Pass, fighting at, 73, 76, 83
——— position, 44, 61, 63, 65, 66;
withdrawal from, 72

307

Palairet, Sir Michael, 96, 106, 153, 216

Palairet, Lady, 216

Papademas, M., 86, 102

Papagos, General, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26,
31, 44, 45, 47, 51, 53, oi suggests
evacuation, 81; 85, '94, 96, , 102

Papen, von, 23

Parachutists, German, equipment of,
175; drugs carried by, 175; differing
types of, 176; defence against, 177;
tactics of, 177°

Parrington, Brigadier, 133, 135

Perescitch, Lieut.-Colonel, 27

Phillips, Captain J. F., 123

Piraeus, embarkation at, 105, 117

———— explosion, 40

Platamon, action of, 74, 75

tunnel demolition, 67,

Plimmer, Lieut.-Colonel J. L. R., 189

Porto Rafti, embarkation at, 117, 127
129, 132

Prison Valley area, operations in, 192,
193, 198, 222, 232, 236

Proastion, action of, 58

Puttick, Brigadier E., in Greece, 92, 126;
in Crete, 158, 195,220, 231,234, 242, 245

Quilliam, Colonel 133

Rafina, embarkation at, 127, 129, 132

Ramcke, Colonel, 181, 231

Rangi Royal, Captain, 263, 265

Rawlings, Rear-Admiral H. B., 223

Retimo, garrison of, 158; first attack at,
198; counter-attacks at, 248, 249, 250,
251, 252, 275; isolation of, 249; Ger-
man prisoners at, 250, 252; truce
arranged, 250; Germans enter town,
276; surrender, 278

Richtofen, General von, 164

Ringel, Major-General, 223, 230, 243, 264

R.A.F in Crete, problems, 150; strength,
155; withdrawal of, 169; attack
Maleme, 235, 239; reach Heraklion,
255, 273

in Greece, strength, 35, 36; losses,
70, 97, 107; self-sacritice of, 106

Royal Navy, Wavell'’s message to, 292

Russell Force, 193, 232, 239

Russell, Major, 193, 232, 239

Russia, German invasion of, 4, 5, 18,
140, 304

Ryan, 2nd-Licut. W. H., 212

Salonika entered by Germans, 43
Savige, Brigadier S. G., 66, 79, 84, 91

308

Savige Force, 66, 72, 84, 91
Schaette, Major, 230, 231
Schulz, Major, et i

Servia Pass, fighting at, 73, 79, 83

Sotir, action of, 57

Sphakia, retreat to, begins, 261; embarka-
tion plans at, 265, 279, 280, 282, 285;
embarkation at, 279, 281, 283, 286;
last rearguard actions near, 282, 284;
surrender at, 287, 288

Stilos, action of, 267

. Student, General, 163, 208, 219, 292,
303, 304

Stumme, General von, 102, 244

Sturm, Colonel, 199, 249

Suda Bay as naval base, 12, 146; bomb-
ing a 146, 167, 168, 234; dock labour

at, 16

Suda Brigade, 238, 244, 246, 247

Suda-Canea, garrison of, 158; first

attacks at, 188, 195, 197, 198; defence
reorganized, 232, 238, 244; reinforce-
ments, 238, 248; withdrawal begins,
2A6; last action at Canea, 262; last
action at Suda, 263; Suda docks
abandoned, 265

Siissmann, General, 164, 188, 208

Syer, Lieut.-Colonel R. L., 91

Tank action in Crete, 185, 192, 202, 250,
252, 254, 255, 256, 268, 275, 282, 283

Tank troubles, in Greece, 34, 50, 56, 61,
72, 84, 99, 120

Taranto attack, 16

Tedder, Air Chief Marshal, 248, 279

Tempe, action of, 82, 87

Tempe, Vale of, 82

Theodhoroi, embarkation at, 107

Thermopylae, action of, 113

————— position, 63, 72, 97, 98,
100, 111, 112

Tidbury, Brigadier O. H., 146, 147

Tolo, evacuation from, 128, 129

Trippier, Lieut. A. W., 59, 61

Tsolakogiou, General, 81, 102

Tsuderos, M., 94, 212, 213, 214

Turle, Admiral, 216

INDEX

Upham, 2nd-Lieut. C. H., 228, 241;
awarded v.c., 284
Utz, Colonel, 231

Vasey, Brigadier G. A., in Greece, 45,
111,-115; in Crete, 158, 198, 245, 248,
267, 280, 282, 284

Vevi, action of, 54

Victoria Cross, awards of, 135, 284

Crete, 12; 15; visits Greece, 19, 24, 52,
95; ordered to assist Greece, 21; 23,
30, 94, 105; visits Crete, 149, 152; his
message to Freyberg, 156; 157; his
despatch on Crete, 209, 229, 243; 248;
approves evacuation, 265; 279, 280;
his message to Weston, 288; his mess-
age to Royal Navy, 292 aa

Weston, Major-General E. C., arrives in
Crete, 152; 153, 154; commands at
Suda-Canea, 158, 245; commands
rearguard, 261, 262, 265, 267, 280; in
charge of evacuation, 283; leaves Crete,
285, 287; 288

Wilson, Lieut.-General Sir H. M., com-
mands W. Force in Greece, 26; 27, 30,
31, 33, 35, 43; decides to withdraw to
Olympus, 44, 51; nature of his com-
mand, 46, 84; 52, 63; orders with-
drawal to Thermopylae, 66, 69, 72; 81,
95, 116, 121; leaves Greece, 127; in
Crete, 152, 153 -

Yanina, Bishop of, 53, 81

Yanina entered by Germans, 102

Yankovitch, General, 31

Yugoslavia, problem of, 22, 24, 25, 26, 31;
pact with Germany, 27; coup d’état,
28; invaded by Germany, 37; surren-
der, 85

Ythion, embarkation at, 129

INDEX TO FORMATIONS
AND UNITS

a Australian (Anzac), in Greece,

Divisions:
6th Australian, in Greece, 29, 32, 34,

99
New Zealand, in Greece, 29, 31, 32,
ay os 75, 99; in Crete, 158, 188,

1,

Brigades:

1st Armoured, in Greece, 29, 31, 33,
34, 43, 45, 51, 52, 55, 57, 58, 60, 63,
65, 66, 71, 79, 80, 84, $1, 99, 119;
126, 127, 129, 131, 132

16th Australian, in Greece, 34, 43, 46,
61, 66, 73, 75, 82, 99, 117, 121

a ‘Australian , in Greece, 34, 66, 99,

19th Australian, in Greece, 34, 45, 57,
61, 66, 72, 99, 111, 121; in Crete,
158, 232, 234, 236, 237, 238, 244,
246, 247, 263, "280, 286

4th New Zealand, in Greece, 34,
61, 66, 79, 83, 92, 99, 113, 119, OS
126, 129, 131; in Crete, 153, 159,
188, 232, 233, 234, 237, 244, 247,
265, 280, 281, 284, 286

5th New Zealand, in Greece, 34, 51, 67,
74, 78, 83, 92, 99, 111, 117; in Crete,
153, 158, 218, 219, 320, 229, 231,
232, 233, 234, 237, 247, 263, 267,
280, 281, 284, 286

6th New Zealand, i in Greece, 34, 5
84, ay 91, 97, 99, 111, 113, 121, ae
129, 1 134

New Zealand, i in Crete, 159, 232,

234, 237

14th Brigade, in Crete, 153

Battalions:

Ist Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders,
in Crete, 153, 168, 254, 256, 258,
259, 273, 289, "291

2nd Black Watch, in Crete, 149, 153,
157, 203, 206, 207, 255, 274, 289

2nd Leicestershire R Regt., in Crete, 153,
Bie 168, 203, 206, 254, 255, 256,

1st Welch Regt., in Crete, 151, 153, 159,
195, 222, 238, "244.1247, 262, 263, 292

309

2nd York & Lancaster Regt., in Crete,
146, 153, 157, 203, 206, 207, 254,
255, 257, 258, 274

1st Rangers (9th K.R.R.C.), in Greece,
33, 34, 45, 46, 49, 50, 51, 55, 57, 58,
59, 60, 61, 71, 84, 100, 113, 127, 131;
in Crete, 195, 233, 238, 244, 247, 251,
253, 262, 292

2/1st Australian, in Greece, 82, 99,
111, 115; in Crete, 158, 199, 202,

248°
2ind oe in Greece, 76, 82, 83,

aed Australian, in Greece, 82, 83, 89

2/4th Australian, i in Greece, 45, 50, "56,
57, 58, 66, 72, 111; in Crete, 157,
203, 206, 207, 273

2/Sth Australian, in Greece, 66, 109

aoe Australian, in Greece, 66, 72,

2/7th Australian, in Greece, 66, 7
te: 158, 221, 227, 232, 234, hs

2/8th * Australian, in Greece, 45, 46,
49, 50, 53, 54, 55, eS 72, ill, "115:
in. * Crete, 158, 262, 222, 232, 234,

, 45, 66,

te, 158, 199, 201;
202, 248, 249, 251, 252, 215, 277, 289
Bir (Composite) Australian, i in Crete,

17 (Composit Australian, in Crete,

18th New Zealand, in Greece, 131; in
Crete, 192, 239, 240

19th New Zealand, in Greece, 73, 109,
116, 122, 131; in Crete, 191, 192;
193, 195, 232, 236, 239, 344

20th New Zealand, in Greece, 83, 90,
126, 131; in Crete, 159, 121, 227,
228, 233, 239, 240

21st New Zealand, in Greece, 67, 74
75, 76, 87; in Crete, 158, 186, 217,
220, 229, 231, 244

22nd New Zealand, in Greece, 67, 73,
74, 76, 77; in Crete, 158, 181, 182,
183, 185, 186, 217, 220, 221, 229

23rd New Zealand, in Greece, 77, 83;
in Crete, 158, 181, 186, 217, 220,
229, 240, 280

zh New, Zealand, in Greece, 90, 91,

310

Battalions—contd.

an ec in Greece, 90, 111,

26th New Zealand, in Greece, 61, 66,
72, 84, 90, 91, 111, 124, 133

28th New Zealand (Maori), in Greece,
73, 77; in Crete, 158, 186, 221, 228,
229, 231, 233, 242, 244, 263, 265,
268, 284

New Zealand Reinforcement, in
Greece, 133

Battalion, Machine-Gun:
27th New Zealand, in Greece, 34, 46,
57, 59, 60, 71, 127

2nd Regt. R.H.A., in Greece, 33, 34,
46, 50, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 71, 72, 111,
114, 127

7th Medium Regt. R.A., in Greece, 61,
84; in Crete, 157, 203

64th Medium Regt. R.A., in Greece, 34,
45, 46, 49, 50, 56, 57, 61, 66, 79, 90,
111, 127

102nd Anti-Tank Regt. (Northumber-
land Hussars), R.A., in Greece, 33,
34, 46, 50, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 65, 71,
72, 111, 127, in Crete, 158, 197, 222,
238, 244, 247, 262, 292

15th Coast Regt. R.A., in Crete, 157, 158

4th Survey Regt. R.A., in Greece, 117

ae Hewy A.A. Bty. R.A., in Greece,

20th Heavy A.A. Bty. R.A., in Crete 262

151st Heavy A.A. Bty. R.A., in Crete,
146, 158, 262

234th Heavy A.A. Bty.R.A., in Crete, 158

106th Light A.A. Bty. R. A., in Greece,

113
ty Light A.A. Bty. R.A., in Greece,
Bete Light A.A. Bty. R.A., in Crete,

155th Light A.A. Bty. R.A., in Greece,
34, 45, 65, 71, 111
eer Light A.A. Bty. in Crete, 146 157,

304th Searchlight Bty. R.A., in Crete, 158

2/1st Australian Field Regt.,in Greece, 72

2/2nd Australian Field Regt., in Greece,
111, 115; in Crete, 222, 223, 238

2/3rd Australian Field Regt., in Greece
46, 56, 90, 113, 126, 131

1st Australian Anti-Tank Regt., in
Greece, 46, 56, 72

7th Australian Light A.A. Bty., in Crete,
157, 158, 159

INDEX

5th New Zealand Field Regt., in Greece,
62, 76, 84, 111, 127
a New Zealand Field Regt., in Greece,

26 Ne New Zealand Field Bty,. in Greece,
ee New Zealand Field Bty., in Greece,

7th New Zealand Anti-Tank Regt., in
Greece, 111

3rd R. Tank Regt., in Greece, 34, 46, 50,
a 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 66, 84, 99, 111,

7th R. Tank Regt., in Crete, 155, 168.
See also Tank action in Crete

3rd Hussars, in Crete, 155, 168, 192,
195, 203, 221, 228, 233, 240, 244

4th Hussars, in Greece, 33, 34, 43, 46,
49, a 61, 71, 84, 100, 109, 123,

>

New Zealand Divisional Cavalry Regt.,
in Greece, 34, 49, 62, 67, 72, 83, 89,
90, 120, 122, 127; 132; in Crete, 159,
193, 194

an (Cheshire) Field Sqdn. R.E., in

Greece, 57, 65

42nd Field Coy. R.E., in Crete, 146, 282

2/1st Australian Field Coy., in Greece, 46

6th i Zealand Field Coy., in Greece,
rh Hew Zealand Field Coy., in Greece,

R. Canadian Engineers (Kent Corps
Troops), in Greece, 43

Commandos:
No. 7, in Crete, 238
No. 50 Middle East, in Crete, 149, 151,

238
No. 52 Middle East, in Crete, 238
6th Field Ambulance, in Crete, 189

Royal Navy:
Mobile Naval Base Defence Organiza-
tion, in Crete, 152, 158, 168
Royal Marines, in ‘Crete, 195, 233,
238, 280, 284, 286, 291

INDEX 311

Greek Forces: Dodecanese Regt., 46, 52, 53, 55
12th Division, 32, 33, 35, 43, 45, 46,
51, 52, 58, 60, 62 No. 1 Regt., 231, 237
19th (Motorized) Division, 32, 33, 35, No. 2 Regt., 195, 237
41 No. 4 Regt., 202

20th Division, 32, 33, 34, 35, 45, 46, No. 6 Regt., 193, 194
51, 52, 58, 60, 62 No. 8 Regt., 193, 194, 264

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

NORWAY
THE COMMANDOS
DIEPPE

The first of the popular military histories of the Second
World War to deal with the smaller campaigns and
actions. The campaign in Norway is shown to have been
virtually foredoomed to failure because the preparation
and the equipment were hardly adequate. The section
dealing with the Commandos tells how that force
developed from small beginnings and is illustrated by
accounts of specific actions related by men who took part.
The action at Dieppe is revealed as a kind of experiment
which cost the Allies dear at the time, but which brought
a measure of profit in the long run.

‘This is a proud ot for the heritage of Britain, and it has found a
most worthy narrat
Sunday Times

a clear general picture lit up by vivid detail . . ., the text . .. Clearly
ab ‘at moments excitingly deploys the facts.’
New Statesman and Nation

- no better author could have been found than Buckley... . He
treats these three episodes, which have an obvious connecting link,

with vigour and clarity.’
Daily Graphic

Demy 8vo., 302 pp. Cloth boards, indexed; illustrated with 16
pages of photographs and 16 maps in the text.

Price 10s. 6d. (By post 10s. 11d.)

Obtainable from

HER MAJESTY’S STATIONERY OFFICE
or through any bookseller

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